From July 20 to July 30, 1874, an estimated 12.5 trillion insects flew over an area encompassing 198,000 square miles between Minnesota and the Rio Grande [...]. [T]he red-legged creatures [the now-extinct Rocky Mountain locust] devoured entire fields [...]. The hoppers also gnawed curtains and clothing hung up to dry [...]. There were reports of hordes of grasshoppers so thick they halted a Union Pacific train at Stevenson station, near Kearney, Nebraska. [...] [C]hickens and turkeys feasted on grasshoppers. The digested insects tainted the meat and eggs with a reddish-brown oil. [...] Conservative estimates put the grasshopper damage to agriculture in 1874 at [...] 74 percent of the total value of U.S. farm products. [...]
In addition to the unprecedented size, scope, and duration of the 1874 grasshopper plague, [...] the nation suffered from financial panic caused by the September 1873 collapse of the banking house of Jay Cooke and Company ["the Panic of 1873"]. [...] Initially, governors and local officials also hesitated to admit the extent of the grasshopper damage for fear that negative publicity about the region would impede development and investment. [...] Newspapers [...] resisted reporting negative details [...] as a result of their dual role as both local media and unofficial immigration agents promoting western settlement. [...]
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The history of the grasshopper relief effort illustrates the particular attitudes of local and federal officials, western promoters, and easterners toward charity during the nineteenth century. [...]
Inherent skepticism of unrestricted charity and the belief that, with the exception of natural disaster victims, the poor were mainly to blame for their own situation influenced the grasshopper relief effort in 1874-75. Victims received public and private support because the nation viewed them as deserving poor, meaning that their condition had not resulted from their immorality, idleness, or individual failure. [...]
The response to the grasshopper plague of 1874-75 was similar to that following the 1871 Chicago Fire, which caused nearly $200 million in damage. Both disasters, although local or regional in nature, drew national interest and the sympathy of residents living in the East [...]. Similar to western boosters who argued that too much aid might render farmers "soft," many prosperous Chicagoans had feared unfettered charity and the "potential dark side" of fire relief in 1871. [...]
According to historian Karen Sawislak, the Chicago Relief and Aid Society, an organization established by the mayor and composed primarily of wealthy citizens, was "internally at war between a form of humanitarianism and conservative impulses, between a commitment to aid the poor and a desire to preserve what they viewed as the proper social order of their city." [...]
As a result [...], the Chicago relief society required a thorough investigation of every person seeking assistance.
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The Nebraska Relief and Aid Association employed similar "tests" for grasshopper victims to ensure that only "worthy" residents received temporary aid. To receive assistance, Nebraska farmers pledged an oath that they possessed nothing of value that could be sold for food or clothing. In a letter published in the Worcester Daily Spy, a Nebraska man described this process: If a man wants help he must go to one of the officers of the relief society and make a sworn statement that he has got nothing that he can sell to get anything with [...].
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As winter edged closer, many western newspapers that had downplayed the extent of the suffering now urged officials to appeal for outside assistance [...]: Thrift, enterprise, industry, and economy was exhibited in and around nearly every poor cabin I visited [...].
In 1876 Governor John S. Pillsbury of Minnesota organized and chaired a conference in Omaha on October 25-26 for governors and scientists from grasshopper states. [...] In concluding that the Rocky Mountain locust presented a problem too great for anyone state to handle, the governors recognized and justified federal assistance to farmers [...].
In 1877, for example, the Nebraska Legislature passed the "Grasshopper Act," which labeled the insect a "public enemy" and required all able-bodied citizens to assemble and fight the pest.
Calling for a sort of "grasshopper army," the law mandated that all male residents between the ages of sixteen and sixty perform two days' labor eradicating grasshoppers after they hatched. Non-compliance brought a $10 fine."
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Similarly, when a warm spring in 1877 caused thousands of grasshopper eggs to hatch prematurely in Dakota Territory, Governor John L. Pennington proclaimed May 4 a day of "humiliation, fasting and prayer" and ordered fields with eggs to be burned immediately. Banks, businesses, and schools closed to allow Dakota citizens to observe the proclamation and help ward off a possible invasion.
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The initial reactions by western newspaper editors and officials to deny the need for outside assistance reflected the widespread belief that welfare should be local and limited. Later, when soliciting donations from other states, western delegates tried to maintain the public perception of western farmers as brave, patriotic, and resilient. [...] Skepticism of unfettered charity [...] and the need to exhaust local resources before appealing for outside assistance guided the response [...].
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All text above by: Alexandra M. Wagner. "Grasshoppered: America's Response to the 1874 Rocky Mountain Locust Invasion." Nebraska History 89 (2008): 154-167. URL: http :// www. nebraskahistory . org /publish/publicat/history /full-text/ NH2008Grasshoppered.pdf [Bold emphasis and some paragraph breaks added by me for clarity. Presented here for commentary, teaching, criticism.]
[means-testing the poor. framing settler agriculture as "patriotic". Chicago institutions acting like Chicago institutions. bugs fucking up railroad companies. btw: despite the swarms of billions, Rocky Mountain locusts were extinct less than thirty years later.]











