Flux is the flow of a physical property in space, frequently also with time variation. For this purpose, I shall use Flipism as an exemplar. Flipism can be seen as a normative decision theory, although it does not fulfill the criteria of rationality. This can be seen as a rejection of the idea that rationality has some special claim to superiority as a basis for making decisions, what we may really have discovered are the potential benefits of strategic commitment to randomization. It can be beneficial for the informed party in a potential conflict under asymmetric information, as it allows the player to manipulate his opponent’s beliefs in an optimal fashion. However, the decision-maker should not decide based on the coin but instead observe his or her own feelings about the outcome; whether it was relieving or agonizing. In this way, flipism removes the mental block related to the act of decision-making, and the post-decision preferences can be revealed before the decision is actually made. It requires the minimum possible cognitive overhead to make decisions, at the price of making sub-optimized choices. However, the expected marginal value of information gathered (discounted for risk and uncertainty) is often lower than the marginal cost of the information or processing itself. The concept of bounded rationality posits that people employ cognitive parsimony, gathering only what they expect to be sufficient information to arrive at a satisficing solution. Flipism is, therefore, a perfectly rational strategy to employ when the cost of information is very high relative to its expected value. This is a commonly recognized decision making technique used in everyday life, along with other similar methods. In game theory, negotiations, nuclear deterrence, diplomacy and other Conflict theory – rationality, realpolitik or realism can themselves limit strategies and results. They can limit the ability of a player to make demands or get its own way through bluff, bully, instill fear, cause apprehension, or psychologically manipulate or send a heeded warning—and therefore can increase the likelihood that an opposing party may engage in objectionable or unwelcome behavior. If one knows the lines and can predict the response, then predictability and proportionality become a restraint, not a virtue. Thus irrationality (real or perceived) can be an important countervailing tool or strategy, particularly as a deterrent and if it engenders hesitation, fear, negotiation and resolution, or change of course. On the other hand, alternate strategies such as honesty, building a climate of trust, respect, using intermediaries, mediation or other forms of conflict resolution, sanctions, patience, process and reasoning might still be available, as might strategies like so-called Win/win bargaining (also called "interest-based" bargaining) – which tries to reach an accord based on interests, not necessarily on positions, power, rights or distribution.