#operation downfall

[nelc]

Operation Downfall, the invasion of Japan

[lonestarbattleship]

Cancelled ships of WWII

Shortly before and during WWII, the U.S. Navy set about building a Fleet to meet the Axis head on and win. To due this, the Navy needed build a large number of ships, so it could effectively operate in both in the Atlantic and Pacific theaters.

By 1945, the war in the Atlantic and Pacific could be won with the ships already completed. So, starting in March, a number of ships were cancelled. The largest number were cancelled in August and shortly after the surrender of Japan. Final cancellations happened in 1946, as the military budget was being cutback.

Note: This list contains ships ordered or were intended to be completed during WWII but never completed/commissioned. It doesn't contain ships whose construction was suspended and completed at a later time.

Note: I have updated the list with some of the expected commission date.

Aircraft Carrier

REPRISAL (CV-35), Essex Class, expected commission July 1946

Unnamed (CVB-44), Midway Class

IWO JIMA (CV-46), Essex Class, expected commission, expected commission November 1946

Unnamed (CV-50), Essex Class, expected commission December 1946

Unnamed (CV-51), Essex Class, expected commission July 1947

Unnamed (CV-52), Essex Class, expected commission October 1947

Unnamed (CV-53), Essex Class, expected commission September 1947

Unnamed (CV-54), Essex Class, expected commission July 1947

Unnamed (CV-55), Essex Class, expected commission November 1947

Unnamed (CVB-56), Midway Class, expected commission June 1947

Unnamed (CVB-57), Midway Class, expected commission November 1947

Battleship

ILLINOIS (BB-65), Iowa Class, expected commission June 1947

KENTUCKY (BB-66), Iowa Class, expected commission September 1946

Note: see my other posts on their cancellation, link and link.

MONTANA (BB-67), Montana Class

OHIO (BB-68), Montana Class

MAINE (BB-69), Montana Class

NEW HAMPSHIRE (BB-70), Montana Class

LOUISIANA (BB-71), Montana Class

Note: the Montana Class was ordered in 1940, but were delayed due to the need for more carriers and later cancelled when it became apparent carriers were the new capital ship. There are other reasons but it's better to do a separate post on them. They were originally expected to be commissioned between July and November 1945.

Cruiser

BUFFALO (CL-84), Cleveland Class

NEWARK (CL-88), Cleveland Class

Note: these two were cancelled due to issues with the Federal Shipbuilding and Drydock Company.

YOUNGSTOWN (CL-94), Cleveland Class, expected commission August 1946

NEWARK (CL-108), Fargo Class, expected commission April 1946.

NEW HAVEN (CL-109), Fargo Class, expected commission July 1946

BUFFALO (CL-110), Fargo Class, expected commission August 1946

WILMINGTON (CL-111), Fargo Class, expected commission December 1946

VALLEJO (CL-112), Fargo Class

HELENA (CL-113), Fargo Class

ROANOKE (CL-114), Fargo Class

Unnamed (CL-115), Fargo Class

TALLAHASSEE (CL-116), Fargo Class, expected commission August 1946

CHEYENNE (CL-117), Fargo Class, expected commission December 1946

CHATTANOOGA (CL-118), Fargo Class, expected commission February 1947

CAMBRIDGE (CA-126), Oregon City Class, expected commission August 1946

BRIDGEPORT (CA-127), Oregon City Class, expected commission September 1946

KANSAS CITY (CA-128), Oregon City Class, expected commission December 1946

TULSA (CA-129), Oregon City Class, expected commission April 1947

NORFOLK (CA-137), Oregon City Class, expected commission June 1946

SCRANTON (CA-138), Oregon City Class, expected commission July 1946

DALLAS (CA-140), Des Moines Class, expected commission March 1947

Unnamed (CA-141), Des Moines Class, expected commission April 1947.

Unnamed (CA-142), Des Moines Class, expected commission July 1947.

Unnamed (CA-143), Des Moines Class, expected commission November 1947.

VALLEJO (CL-146), Worcester Class, expected commission February 1947

GARY (CL-147), Worcester Class, expected commission May 1947

Unnamed (CA-149), Des Moines Class, expected commission November 1947

DALLAS (CA-150), Des Moines Class, expected commission July 1947

Note: it is doubtful this cruiser would be named DALLAS since CA-140 was also named DALLAS.

Unnamed (CA-151), Des Moines Class, expected commission September 1947

Unnamed (CA-152), Des Moines Class, expected commission November 1947

Unnamed (CA-153), Des Moines Class, expected commission December 1947

CL-154 class

Unnamed (CL-154), CL-154 class, expected commission October 1947

Unnamed (CL-155), CL-154 class, expected commission December 1947

Unnamed (CL-156), CL-154 class, expected commission October 1947

Unnamed (CL-157), CL-154 class, expected commission November 1947

Unnamed (CL-158), CL-154 class, expected commission December 1947

Unnamed (CL-159), CL-154 class, expected commission October 1947

Note: this class of unnamed cruisers were to be anti-aircraft cruisers and the natural evolution of the Atlanta, Juneau and Worcester Classes. They were ordered in 1945 but never assigned names or laid down before being cancelled

Note: there were a further 8 Worcester Class cruisers planned but never ordered and don't have hull numbers assigned to them.

Large Cruiser

HAWAII (CB-3), Alaska Class, expected commission May 1946.

Note: she was nearly finished after the war but like Alaska and Guam, she didn't have purpose anymore. Several conversion proposal were drawn to use her but none were chosen.

PHILIPPINES (CB-4), Alaska Class

PUERTO RICO (CB-5), Alaska Class

SAMOA (CB-6), Alaska Class

Destroyer

WATSON (DD-482), Fletcher Class

12 Allen M. Sumner Class destroyers

54 Gearing Class Destroyers

Escort Carrier

16 Commencement Bay Class Carriers

Submarine

62 Balao Class Submarines

51 Trench Class Submarines

It should be noted, a lot of the ships ordered in 1944 and 1945 were for Operation Downfall, the planned invasion of mainland Japan if they had not surrendered. But also, the massive building program was institute to overwhelmed the Axis with superior numbers, just like the Air Corps and Army did with aircraft and tanks.

source, source, source, source, source, source, source, source

U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command: NH 89293

[militaryhistoryvisualized]

around 11:00 there is an error, Formosa is Taiwan NOT Korea.

[militaryhistoryvisualized]

Note that this video was permanently demonetized by YouTube - that means after even after a manual review. To a certain degree this is understandable, yet, I don't know how I could have covered this topic with more "care". Anyway, please consider supporting me on Patreon: patreon.com/mhv , because that will allow me to be more independent from YouTube Ads and worry less about "sensitive topics".

[ecthelion83]

The ability to think/see things broadly is sorely lacking today. Part 3.

I made the following response to a HFY (Humanity, Fuck Yeah) story ~4 years ago that implied that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of WWII were "ruthless." As I point out, not only were those bombings not ruthless, they may have been the most considerate course of action given the other alternatives being considered/available at the time. I even included references at the end.

A major concern: "ruthless" would not be the word historians, scholars, and most reasonable people would use to describe the detonation of atomic weaponry over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Tactical and strategic, yes. Pragmatic, certainly (those sites, in the south of the Japanese Archipelago, were selected intentionally for several reasons, including the fear of causing permanent geological damage to the Japanese home islands as well as avoiding further antagonism that would result from nuking Tokyo and the Japanese emperor). Calculated, even. But ruthless? Completely lacking in pity or compassion? What about the Allied obligation not to sacrifice its own troops in a Japanese final-stand meatgrinder? What about the need to end the war and liberate Japanese-occupied and abused territories, which the Japanese refused to do prior to the use of atomic bombs, and even after Hiroshima?

The detonation of Fat Man and Little Boy over two Japanese cities was a strategic decision balanced against the strong likelihood that Japanese military intransigence would otherwise persist, potentially dragging WWII out for at least an additional year despite Soviet entry into the Pacific Theater and costing at least an order of magnitude more lives than those lost in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Casualty estimates for Operation Downfall (the planned ground invasion of the Japanese home islands) were between 1.7 million and 4 million Allied (mostly American) casualties, with ~25% of these being fatalities, and 5-10 million Japanese fatalities (with Japanese total casualty predictions being much higher than fatalities). A proposed naval blockade of Japan had the potential to end the war as well, but was estimated to result in far more Japanese casualties by starvation than even Operation Downfall. By contrast, the number of people killed directly or indirectly (burns and radiation) by atomic bombing was 130-230 thousand people, counted up to 4 months after the bombings. Indeed, after Hiroshima, the US specifically warned Japan that if it did not stop fighting, more atomic bombings would be forthcoming, and the initial Japanese decision was to endure/withstand whatever else the Allies had planned (these discussions were intercepted by Allied codebreakers). If anything, all things considered (including non-Japanese populations under the yoke of Japanese imperial control), the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (both of which were major military sites) could be argued as the most considerate of the options available to the Allies.

Any suggestion that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were compassionless/ruthless or somehow unjustified comes from ignorance of history or an ideology that favors state totalitarianism over liberty, plain and simple; both of these risk repeating some of the very issues that underpinned WWII in the first place. The prevailing opinion in Japan (which may have some merit, though there is no objective evidence supporting it) is that the use of atomic weapons against the Japanese Empire was a form of American atomic diplomacy (directed at the Soviet Union), implying that even the Japanese view Hiroshima and Nagasaki to be, from the American perspective, a strategic and perhaps even necessary decision, and not one driven by a lack of compassion or pity.

Sources:

Frank, Richard B. Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire. 1999, Random House.

Giangreco, DM. Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan, 1945-1947. 2009, Naval Institute Press.

Hoyt, Edwin P. Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict. 2001, McGraw-Hill.

[historyhalls]

Explore WWII's Operation Downfall, the planned US invasion of Japan that never happened, and the horrific expected casualties if it had taken place

Operation Downfall: The Planned Allied Invasion of Japan

[historyhalls]

Explore WWII's Operation Downfall, the planned US invasion of Japan that never happened, and the horrific expected casualties if it had taken place

Operation Downfall: The Planned Allied Invasion of Japan

[nelc]

The Allies' plan to partition Japan after WWII