Feb 18
After kicking in a door, a U.S. Marine checks for any NVA hiding inside during the house-to-house fighting within old imperial capital of Hue, February 1968.
(Photo by Catherine Leroy)
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After kicking in a door, a U.S. Marine checks for any NVA hiding inside during the house-to-house fighting within old imperial capital of Hue, February 1968.
(Photo by Catherine Leroy)
People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) soldiers charge U.S. positions near Khe Sanh, Tet Offensive, 1968.
USMC CH-53A Sea Stallion heavy lift helicopter taking out the trash during the Siege of Khe Sanh in February 1968
(it sold i fkn missed the sale)
Why would a battle fought 54 years ago provide key insight on what Hamas' strategy is today?
Asymmetric Warfare. It's a term that most people don't really understand. Before I did this, I was a United States Army Green Beret and I did a couple of combat tours in Iraq. And needless to say, asymmetric warfare was kind of our thing.
So, in practical terms, it is a type of war between belligerents whose relative military power, strategy or tactics differ significantly. And as a result of this, the weaker opponent will use unconventional tactics in order to maximize one's strengths against a stronger opponent's weaknesses or vulnerabilities.
For instance, an Insurgent force does not have the freedom of movement or firepower necessary to attack a forward operating base or a heavily armed column. So instead, they focus on softer logistical targets. They may choose to use a remotely activated roadside bomb instead of engaging in direct fire.
In many situations, the weaker adversary has fewer personnel and resources. And so, a significant part of their strategy is to preserve those limited resources and use the munitions that they have to the greatest possible advantage.
But here's the thing. To pull this off long term, you generally need a consistent means of supply combined with enough territory to hit, run and then hide. And Hamas doesn't have these things, at least not in sufficient supply to win against the IDF.
So, what's their strategy? What can Hamas leverage that will allow them to conduct offensive operations against a much stronger opponent and then avoid getting destroyed by the IDF's vastly superior military capability?
And the answer to that question as horrific, as it is, is civilian casualties, but probably not the ones you're thinking.
To understand this, let's discuss that example 54 years ago. The Tet Offensive in the Vietnam War virtually wiped out the Viet Kong. It was by every objective measure, a complete tactical failure. But strategically, it was invaluable. Because while achieving none of its military objectives, the Tet Offensive shattered Americans' perspective on the situation on the ground.
Opponents of the war were able to effectively use the offensive as a demonstration of the futility of American involvement. Hollywood, Academia and many in the mainstream media went to work convincing the American people that the war couldn't be won. Or perhaps just shouldn't even be fought. And in a representative government, when the electorate decides that a war is lost, it is, regardless of the situation on the ground.
Now, understand something. I'm not making an argument for the pros or cons of fighting the Vietnam War. I'm merely illustrating a point about modern Asymmetric Warfare. The lesson of the Tet Offensive is when fighting the West, you don't defeat their military. You win their electorate. And the way to do that is through the institutions which shape culture in the West, namely Hollywood, the Media and Academia.
If Hamas had decided to engage in a conventional military attack directed at only legitimate military targets, the IDF would have effectively destroyed their war fighting capability within days, and Hamas knows it. So, they engaged in asymmetric strategy.
Once we understand this, their actions on October 7th, as horrific as they are, begin to make more sense. Hamas didn't just target civilians because they were easy targets or because they despise Jews, although both of those things are true. The attack and the subsequent taking of hostages was actually designed to elicit a major response from the IDF.
But why? Well, maybe it's because to achieve their strategic objectives, Hamas needs civilian casualties. And more specifically they need Palestinian civilian casualties. And this is why.
The two entities in this conflict that lose the most from a greater peace agreement in the Middle East are Iran and the terrorist organizations they support. Upsetting this process requires much more than the random launching of rockets into Israel or strikes against legitimate military targets. The IDF is more than capable of handling such incursions, and the Israeli people have become all too accustomed to weathering such attacks without demanding an overwhelming military response. something more significant was required.
And October 7th created the kind of conditions that demanded a significant and sustained response. They needed something so obscene that Israel would have no choice but to hit back hard.
And this is where the second component of Hamas' strategy plays out. How to get Palestinian casualties. Any government actually worried about civilian casualties dedicates resources to evacuating their own civilians from hostile areas and attempts to separate the civilian population from legitimate military targets. So what conclusion should we come to when a governing body decides to do the exact opposite?
In this asymmetric environment, Hamas is not only incentivized to kill Israeli civilians, they're incentivized to maximize their own civilian casualties in the short run in order to elicit Western intervention on their behalf. As easy as it might be to explain Hamas's strategy away as nothing but mindless bloodlust, it is actually more sinister than that.
Hamas is responding to the incentive structures certain elements within the West have created. Hamas understand that the real Battlefield is not in Gaza but in the streets, University halls and newsrooms of the West. And so that is their target. And while a ceasefire seems like a humanitarian response to the tragic death of civilians, leaving Hamas intact as an operational and governing body will ultimately just reinforce that the perverse incentive structure remains the same.
And that while the West may claim to "not negotiate with terrorists," they always seem to force Israel to as soon as it becomes politically inconvenient for them.
So here's the hard reality. If you actually want to achieve anything resembling a lasting peace in this part of the world, you're never going to achieve it by creating conditions where terrorists are incentivized to hurt both the civilians of their enemies, and their own in order to achieve their political objectives.
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This, of course, was completely obvious from the moment of the al-Ahli Hospital hoax, where Western outlets worked overtime to spread Hamas propaganda without regard for truth, all the way through to the present-day "protests" which are anything but organic or grass-roots.
Lukas Moodysson - Together (2000)
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