Jedidiah T. Sioco

[jedidiahsioco]

In Re: Petition for Change of Name of Julian Lim Carulasan Wang vs. Cebu City Civil Registrar

G.R. No 159966 30 March 2005

Case Digest

Facts:

Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.

The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time because they will let him study there together with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore. Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a person’s name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his current registered name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether they are brother and sister since they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapore’s Mandarin language since they do not have the letter “R” but if there is, they pronounce it as “L.” It is for these reasons that the name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang.

Issue: 

Whether or not dropping of middle name of a minor child is allowed under Philippine laws.

Held:

No. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper and reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.

[jedidiahsioco]

Republic of the Philippines, vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

G.R. No. 103695 March 15, 1996

Case Digest

Facts:

On 1988, private respondent spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto filed for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then fifteen years old, who had been living with private respondent Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven years old. When private respondents were married on January 19, 1986, the minor Midael C. Mazon stayed with them under their care and custody. The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction of the name of the child from "Midael" to "Michael." He argued that although the correction sought concerned only a clerical and innocuous error, it could not be granted because the petition was basically for adoption, not the correction of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The RTC dismissed the opposition of the Solicitor General. According to the trial court, the error could be corrected in the same proceeding for adoption to prevent multiplicity of actions and inconvenience to the petitioners.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the private respondents' petition for adoption.

Held:

Yes. The instant case involves an obvious clerical error in the name of the child sought to be adopted. In this case the correction involves merely the substitution of the letters “CH” for the letter “D”, so that what appears as “Midael” as given name would read as “Michael”. Even the Solicitor General admits that the error is a plainly clerical one.

Changing the name of the child from Midael C. Mazon to Michael C. Mazon cannot possibly cause any confusion, because both names can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme and tone. The purpose of the publication requirement is to give notice so that those who have any objection to the adoption can make their objection known.

[jedidiahsioco]

Tolentino, vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-41427 June 10, 1988

Case Digest

Facts:

A complaint was filed by petitioner with the CFI of Quezon City against Consuelo David for the purpose of stopping and enjoining her by injunction from using the surname Tolentino. Respondent filed her answer admitting she has been using and continues to use the surname Tolentino. Trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this appeal

Issue:

Whether or not there is usurpation when a divorced woman continues to use the surname of her former husband.

Held:

No. Philippine law is silent whether or not a divorced woman may continue to use the surname of her husband because there are no provisions for divorce under Philippine law.

Art 371 is not applicable because it contemplates annulment while the present case refers to absolute divorce where there is severance of valid marriage ties. Effect of divorce was more akin to death of the spouse where the deceased woman is continued to be referred to as “Mrs. of the husband” even if he has remarried.

There was no usurpation of the petitioner’s name and surname. Usurpation implies injury to the interests of the owner of the name. It consists with the possibility of confusion of identity.

The elements of usurpation were 1. Actual use of another’s name, 2. Use is unauthorized, 3. Use of another’s name is to designate personality or identity of a person.

None of these elements were present in the case because public knowledge referred to Constancia as the legal wife of Arturo, and Consuelo did represent herself after the divorce as Mrs. Arturo Tolentino.

[jedidiahsioco]

Philippine School of Business Administration, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992

Case Digest

Facts:

A stabbing incident caused the death of Carlitos Bautista, an enrolled 3rdyear commerce student, while on the second-floor premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA). The parents filed suit in the RTC against PSBA for their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim. It was established that his assailants were not members of the school's academic community but were elements from outside the school. Defendants sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated article. The trial court overruled petitioners' contention and denied their motion to dismiss. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not PSBA may be held liable.

Held:

NO. Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied.

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school’s academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.

In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former’s negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only.

[jedidiahsioco]

Horacio Luna and Liberty Hizon-Luna v. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. L-68374 June 18, 1985

Case Digest

Facts:

Private respondent Maria Lourdes Santos was an illegitimate child of the petitioner Horacio Luna who was married to his co-petitioner Liberty Hizon-Luna. She is married to her co-respondent Sixto Salumbides, and are the parents of Shirley Santos Salumbides, also known as Shirley Luna Salumbides, who is the subject of this child custody case. Private respondents gave their daughter to petitioners two or four months after birth. The couple doted upon Shirley who called them “Mama” and “Papa”. She calls her natural parents mommy and daddy. The petitioners decided to take the child to the US. When the petitioners asked for the respondents’ written consent to the child’s application for a U.S. visa, the respondents refused to give it, to the petitioners’ surprise and chagrin. The petitioners had to leave without Shirley whom they left with the private respondents. The petitioners, however, left instructions with their chauffeur to take and fetch Shirley from school every day. When the petitioners returned, they learned that the respondents had transferred Shirley to another school. The private respondents refused to return Shirley to the petitioners. Neither did the respondents allow Shirley to visit the petitioners. The petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the CFI of Rizal, against the private respondents to produce the person of Shirley and deliver her to their care and custody The CFI granted the petition. The CA reversed.

Issue:

Whether or not the duty of lower courts to enforce a final decision of appellate courts in child custody case should prevail over the preference of the child.

Held:

No. Article 363 of the Civil Code provides that in all questions relating to the care, custody, education and property of the children, the latter’s welfare is paramount. This means that the best interest of the minor can override procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the custody of their children. Moreover, the child is in an age when she can exercise an intelligent choice, the courts can do no less than respect, enforce and give meaning and substance to that choice and uphold her right to live in an atmosphere conducive to her physical, moral and intellectual development. Shirley depicted her biological parents as selfish and cruel and who beat her often; and that they do not love her. And, as pointed out by the child psychologist, Shirley has grown more embittered, cautious and distrusting of her biological parents. To return her to the custody of the private respondents to face the same emotional environment which she is now complaining of would be indeed traumatic and cause irreparable damage to the child. As requested by her, let us not destroy her future.

[jedidiahsioco]

Rosario Mata Castro and Joanne Benedicta Charissima M. Castro, vs. Jose Maria Jed Lemuel Gregorio and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio

G.R. No 188801 15 October 2014

Case Digest

Facts: 

Atty. Castro was allegedly married to Rosario Castro (Petitioner). Unfortunately, they separated later on due to their incompatibilities and Jose’s alleged homosexual tendencies. Their marriage bore two daughters: Rose Marie, who succumbed to death after nine days from birth due to congenital heart disease, and Joanne Castro (Petitioner).

On 2000, a petition for adoption of Jose Maria Jed Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) was instituted by Atty. Jose Castro. Atty. Castro alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth Gregorio (Rosario’s housekeeper). After a Home Study Report conducted by the Social Welfare Officer of the TC, the petition was granted.

Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment seeking to annul the decision of the TC approving Jed and Regina’s adoption. Petitioner allege that Rosario’s consent was not obtained and the document purporting as Rosario’s affidavit of consent was fraudulent.

Issue:

Whether consent of the spouse and legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter is required?

Held:

As a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The law, however, provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. But the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.

In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the adoption. Since her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.

The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they are 10 years old or older (ART. III, Sec. 9, RA 8552).

Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.

[jedidiahsioco]

Rebusquillo and Orosco, vs. Sps. Domingo

G.R. No. 204029, June 4, 2014

Case Digest

Facts: Petitioner was one of the seven children of deceased, Eulalio Abarientos and Victoria Villareal. Both of them died intestate. The deceased left a parcel of land in Legazpi City. In 2001, respondent Emelinda (daughter of petitioner), made petitioner sign two documents. In 2003, the petitioner discovered that the two documents were an affidavit of self-adjudication, and a deed of absolute sale in favor of the respondent spouses. Petitioner then filed an action to annul the two documents before the RTC. In the respondents’ answer, they admitted the execution of the affidavit and deed, but they argued that it was with the consent of all the heirs of Eulalio and Victoria, and that such was agreed to be done to facilitate the titling of the property. Respondents further argued that the petitioner received the amount of Php 50,000 for the sale.

Issue:  Whether or not the issue on heirship in this case must be raised in a separate administration or intestate proceedings. Held: No. The general rule is that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, not in an independent civil action. However, the Court also ruled that recourse to administration proceedings to determine who heirs are is sanctioned only if there is a good and compelling reason for such recourse.

The Court had allowed exceptions to the rule requiring administration proceedings as when the parties in the civil case already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment upon the issues it defined during the pre-trial.

It would be more practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of petitioner Avelina as sole heir of Eulalio, especially in light of the fact that respondents’ spouses Gualvez admitted in court that they knew for a fact that petitioner Avelina was not the sole heir of Eulalio and that petitioner Salvador was one of the other living heirs with rights over the subject land.

Accordingly, the court a quo had properly rendered judgment on the validity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Avelina. As pointed out by the trial court, an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is only proper when the affiant is the sole heir of the decedent.

[jedidiahsioco]

Manacop, vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 104875, November 13, 1992

Case Digest

Facts:

Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a residential lot with a bungalow located in Quezon City. The petitioner failed to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment signed between petitioner’s corporation and private respondent herein (FF Cruz & Co). The latter filed a complaint for the recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against the former. Consequently, the corresponding writ for the provisional remedy was issued which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by the Manacop Construction President, the petitioner. The latter insists that the attached property is a family home having been occupied by him and his family since 1972 and is therefore exempt from attachment.

Issue:

Whether or not the final and executory decision promulgated and a writ of execution issued before the effectivity of the Family Code can be executed on a family home constituted under the provisions of the said Code.

Held:

Yes. SC held that under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home. Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows: “The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: x x x (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home; x x x”. The exemption provided, as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.

[jedidiahsioco]

Salas, Jr., vs. Aguila

G.R. No. 202370, September 23, 2013

Case Digest

Facts:

On 1985, Juan Salas Jr. and Eden Villena Aguila were married. Aguila gave birth to their daughter a year later. Five months later, Salas left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, he no longer communicated with Aguila or their child. On 2003, Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The petition states that they “have no conjugal properties whatsoever”. On May 7, 2007, RTC nullify their marriage and further provides the dissolution of their conjugal property.

On September 10, 2007, Aguila filed a manifestation and motion stating that she discovered 3 properties registered to Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas. However, Salas alleged that Aguila waived her rights to the Discovered Properties in consideration of other properties waived by Salas in favor of Aguila. Thus, he contends that conjugal properties were deemed partitioned.

Issue: 

Whether or not the discovered properties are acquired during the marriage of Salas and Aguila, thus a conjugal property and subject for partition between them.

Held: 

Yes. Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties were acquired by Salas during the validity of their marriage.

The phrase “married to” in the title is merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner, Salas.

Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code. Under this property regime, property acquired during marriage is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through the couple’s joint efforts and governed by the rules of co-ownership.

Thus, the Discovered Properties should be partitioned on the basis of co-ownership.

[jedidiahsioco]

Spouses Julian Sy and Rosa Q. Tan, vs. Hon. Discaya, et al.

G.R. No. 86301 January 23, 1990

Case Digest

Facts:

Branch XIII of the RTC Pasig promulgated a decision against petitioner Julian Sy Bang and his co-defendants, ordering them to pay the amount of P360,877.18, with interest, plus attorney's fees and costs of suit. Consequently, respondent sheriff, levied upon a parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-28294 of the Registry of Deeds for the City of Lucena.

Thereafter, petitioners filed a complaint in the RTC of Lucena, against respondents for the cancellation of the said notice of levy and to enjoin them from causing the auction sale of said property. They alleged that the land involved is the paraphernal property of petitioner Rosa Q. Tan and may not be attached or levied upon for the obligation of her husband. Furthermore, even assuming that the property is conjugal, it cannot also be attached or levied upon because the obligation sought to be enforced did not benefit the conjugal partnership. Both respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, which motion was granted by respondent judge.

Issues:

Whether or not respondent judge erred in dismissing petitioner's complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Held:

Yes. In the case at bar, the filing by petitioners of an independent action with the court other than the one which issued the writ of execution is proper.

A third person whose property was seized by a sheriff to answer for the obligation of the judgment debtor may invoke the supervisory power of the court which authorized such execution. Upon due application by the third person and after summary hearing, the court may command that the property be released from the mistaken levy and restored to the rightful owner or possessor. What said court can do in these instances, however, is limited to a determination of whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance of his duties in the execution of judgment, more specifically, if he has indeed taken hold of property not belonging to the judgment debtor.

[jedidiahsioco]

Rodriguez vs. De La Cruz, et al.

G.R. No. L-3629 September 28, 1907

Case Digest

Facts:

On August 21, 1905, the plaintiff, through her attorneys, filed an amended complaint in Albay for the purpose of recovering from the defendant certain pieces or parcels of land described in the complaint, alleging: That she was the owner of the said lands; that she had acquired said lands during her first marriage from her deceased father, Alejo Rodriguez; that Hilarion de la Cruz was her second husband and that she had permission from him to commence this action in her own name against the said defendant; that she had been in possession of said lands and enjoyed the fruits of the same, from the month of May, 1882, until the month of February, 1905; that the said Hilarion de la Cruz had no interest or right in said property; that on or about the of February 20, 1905, the defendants in the cause commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay against the said Hilarion de la Cruz for the partition of the lands; that on March 29, 1905, the judge adjudged in favor of the respondents in this case.

Issue:

Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring that the said Hilarion de la Cruz was the owner of the lands in question, for simple fact that he had been administering said lands during the entire period of his marriage with the present plaintiff.

Held:

It is admitted that soon after the marriage of the said Hilarion de la Cruz with the present plaintiff he commenced to administer the property in question. There is no provision in the Civil Code which prohibits a husband from administering the property of his wife, as her representative, and certainly it cannot be concluded that the property which he administers for his wife is his for the mere reason that he has administered the same for a long time.

Article 1382 of the Civil Code provides that the wife shall retain the ownership of her property which she brings to the marriage relation. It is true that article 1384 prescribes that she shall have the management of the property, unless she was delivered the same to her husband by means of a public document, providing that he may administer said property; but it cannot be claimed; from the mere fact that she has permitted her husband to administer her property without having his authority to do so evidenced by a public document, that she has thereby lost her property and that the same has become the property of her husband. No such claim was made in the court below on behalf of the defendants.

[jedidiahsioco]

Lacson, et al., vs. Diaz

G.R. No. L-19346 May 31, 1965

Case Digest

Facts:

Abelardo G. Diaz was sentenced to pay the Soledad Lacson the sum P132,718.30. of from July 1, 1960 until fully paid. The Sheriff sent a notice to his employer to garnish one-third of his monthly salary and of any other personal properties belonging to said defendant, to cover the total amount.

Diaz filed with the court a motion to quash the writ of execution and to lift the notice of garnishment on the ground that the same are not enforceable against his present family. The money-judgment arose out of a contract entered into by him during his first marriage said judgment cannot be enforced against his salaries which form part of the conjugal properties of the second marriage. Plaintiffs opposed this motion, for the reason that re-marriage is not a cause for extinction of obligations.

Issue:

Whether or not the conjugal properties of the second marriage may be used to satisfy obligations of either spouse contracted prior to the marriage.

Held:

As a general rule, debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the marriage,as well as fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed thereon, are not chargeable to the conjugal partnership. However, such obligations may be enforced against the conjugal assets if the responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 of the new Civil Code have already been covered, and that the obligor has no exclusive property or the same is insufficient. Considering that the enforceability of the personal obligations of the husband or wife, against the conjugal assets, forms the exception to the general rule, it is incumbent upon the one who invokes this provision or the creditor to show that the requisites for its applicability are obtaining.

In the instant case, although it is not controverted that there is due and owing the plaintiffs-appellees a certain sum of money from the appellant-debtor — a personal obligation yet, it has not been established that the latter does not have properties of his own or that the same are not adequate to satisfy appellees' claim. Furthermore, there is no showing that the responsibilities named in Article 161 of the new Civil Code have already been covered in order that the personal obligation of the husband may be made chargeable against the properties of the second marriage.

[jedidiahsioco]

Cosio, et al., vs. Antonino and Jesus Pili

G.R. No. L-3720 February 3, 1908

Case Digest

Facts:

On August 9, 1905, the attorney for Maria Cosio filed a petition requesting that letters of administration for the property of the late Tomas Cosio, a resident of the capital of Laguna who died on the October 1, 1900, in view of the fact that deceased had no ascendants or descendants, but only collateral heirs. The deceased owned real property which consisted of three parcels of land, situated within the territory of Santa Cruz, and two carabaos. By a writing, Elena Cosio, sister to the deceased, stated that she neither could nor did she claim to be heir to her late brother, because the latter left children with his wife, Leocadia Pili, also deceased, said children being named Antonino and Jesus Cosio.

Antonino and Jesus Cosio filed a petition stating that they were the natural sons duly acknowledged and legitimized by subsequent marriage, of Tomas Cosio and Leocadia Pili, and that for said reason the statement of Maria was false, because the petitioners were the only ones entitled to the intestate inheritance of their father. The court rendered a decision on the October 18, 1906, declaring the brothers Antonino and Jesus Cosio to be the sons legitimized by the subsequent marriage of Tomas Cosio with their mother, Leocadia Pili, holding them to be the sole heirs of the said Tomas Cosio, and, as such, entitled to the possession of the property of said deceased.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondents were really natural children of the deceased and would be entitled to inherit his estate.

Held:

Yes. The record shows that Tomas Cosio, complied with the duties of a father in respect to the children had with the latter from the time of their respective and successive births to that of his death; he kept them with the mother in his own house, fed, cared for, and treated them as such children; he introduced them everywhere and to his relatives especially, telling them that he wished them to treat the aforesaid Antonino and Jesus as their relatives, because they were his children. Such conduct on the part of the father unquestionably argues the tacit or implicit recognition demanded by the Law of Toro and the jurisprudence of the courts; the express recognition contained in an official document is then obtained, thus complying with the provisions of Article 131 of the Civil Code; therefore, there can be no question as to the right of the above named brothers, as natural children recognized by their father and later on legitimized by the subsequent marriage of the latter to their mother, to inherit their father's estate.

[jedidiahsioco]

Pilapil vs. Hon. Ibay-Somera, et al.

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

Case Digest

Facts: On 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino, was married to Erich Geiling, a German national, in the Federal Republic of Germany. However, there was marital discord between them, and they separated de facto. After more than three years into the marriage, Geiling filed for divorce in Germany, which was granted on 1986. On June 27, 1986, Geiling filed two cases of adultery against Imelda.

The Revised Penal Code states that in cases of adultery, the complaint should be raised by the offended spouse. However, by the time of filing the case, Geiling had already been divorced from the petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not an alien spouse has legal standing to file a complaint for adultery after obtaining a divorce decree

Held:

No. The law provides that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. In this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

[jedidiahsioco]

Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis

G.R. No. 138509 July 31, 2000

Case Digest

Facts:

On 1985 the Respondent and Maria Dulce Javier got married. This was the first marriage of the respondent which was not judicially declared as nullified before the second marriage was contracted by the respondent with the petitioner which was celebrated on 1996. It was also alleged that there is a third marriage contracted by the respondent with some Julia Hernandez.

On 1998, the petitioner filed a bigamy case against his husband. Thereafter, the respondent initiated a civil action for the Judicial Declaration of Absolute Nullity of his first marriage on the grounds that this was celebrated without a marriage license which is a formal requisite for a valid marriage. RTC suspended the proceedings of the criminal case pending the decision of the civil case.

Issue:

Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy

Held:

NO. In Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. In the current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner.

Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.

[jedidiahsioco]

Republic v. Quintero-Hamano

G.R. No. 149498  May 24, 2004

Case Digest

Facts: 

Lolita and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan in October 1986. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. 

On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child. They were married with MTC of Bacoor, Cavite. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child. 

Hence, she filed for a declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. RTC declared their marriage null and void because he failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of the petitioner and father to his daughter. CA affirmed RTC’s ruling.

Issue: 

Whether or not abandonment by one spouse is tantamount to psychological incapacity Held: 

Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness.  Although as rule, actual medical examinations are not needed, it would have greatly helped Lolita had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified Toshio’s illness.  This could have been done through an expert witness.  It is essential that a person show incapability of doing marital obligation due to some psychological, not physical illness.  Hence, Toshio was not considered as psychologically incapacitated.

[jedidiahsioco]

Racho vs. Tanaka

G.R. No. 199515 June 25, 2018

Case Digest

Facts:

Racho and Seiichi Tanaka were married on 2001 in Las Piñas City. Racho alleged that on 2009, Tanaka filed for divorce and it was granted. She secured a Divorce Certificate issued by Consul Takayama of the Japanese Consulate in the Philippines and had it authenticated by the DFA. 

She tried to have the Divorce Certificate registered with the Civil Registry of Manila but was refused since there was no court order recognizing it. When she went to DFA to renew her passport, she was likewise told that she needed the proper court order. She was also informed by the NSO that her divorce could only be annotated in the Certificate of Marriage if there was a court order capacitating her to remarry.

She filed a Petition for Judicial Determination and Declaration of Capacity to Marry before the RTC but the latter held that failed to prove that Tanaka legally obtained a divorce. Racho filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC but the latter deferred action on her Petition pending her submission of a duly authenticated acceptance certificate of the notification of divorce. On March 16, 2012, petitioner submitted her Compliance, attaching a duly authenticated Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce that she obtained in Japan.

Petitioner argues that under the Civil Code of Japan, a divorce by agreement becomes effective upon notification, whether oral or written, by both parties and by two or more witnesses. She contends that the Divorce Certificate stating “Acceptance Certification of Notification of Divorce issued by the Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama Pref., Japan” is sufficient to prove that she and her husband have divorced by agreement and have already effected notification of the divorce. She insists that she is now legally capacitated to marry since Article 728 of the Civil Code of Japan states that a matrimonial relationship is terminated by divorce.

Issue:

Whether or not the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is sufficient to prove the fact that a divorce was validly obtained by Tanaka according to his national law.

Held:

YES. Under Article 26 of the Family Code, a divorce between a foreigner and a Filipino may be recognized in the Philippines as long as it was validly obtained according to the foreign spouse’s national law. The second paragraph provides that where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and foreign judgments; thus, our laws require that the divorce decree and the national law of the foreign spouse must be pleaded and proved like any other fact before trial courts.

To prove the fact of divorce, petitioner presented the Divorce Certificate issued by Consul Takayama. This Certificate only certified that the divorce decree, or the Acceptance Certification of Notification of Divorce, exists. It is not the divorce decree itself. Upon appeal to this Court, however, petitioner submitted a Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce, certifying that the divorce has been accepted.

The Office of the Solicitor General, however, posits that divorce by agreement is not the divorce contemplated in Article 26 of the Family Code. In this particular instance, it is the Filipina spouse who bears the burden of this narrow interpretation, which may be unconstitutional. Article II, Section 14 of our Constitution provides that State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Thus, Article 26 should be interpreted to mean that it is irrelevant for courts to determine if it is the foreign spouse that procures the divorce abroad. Once a divorce decree is issued, the divorce becomes “validly obtained” and capacitates the foreign spouse to marry. The same status should be given to the Filipino spouse.