#basmachi

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Al General

Al means Scarlet in Tatar language. I saw this fellow in my dream where he would only appear in mirrors and in the periphery of the eye, mocking me with his smile, he was blackmailing young witch, so that she would create army of my clones that would grow out of the ground like potatoes and when ready go on to commit crimes around the town, they only looked wrong to me, but to everyone else they were exact copies of myself

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Episode 39 The Basmachi Organize in the Ferghana 1918-1920

The Basmachi, who are often thought of as the great bogeyman of Turkestan, spent most of 1918 and 1919 organizing themselves, mostly in the Ferghana, but there were a few units in the Khiva and Bukhara Emirates as well. The Basmachi originated in the aftermath of the 1916 Central Asian Revolt, but don’t really form the concept of the Basmachi until the fall of Kokand in 1918. By the end of 1918, there were 40 plus self-organized Basmachi units with three men emerging as effective enough leaders to unite the different groups: Irgush of Kokand, Madamin Bey whose family originated from Kokand royalty, and Ibrahim Bek who was organizing in Bukhara and was loyal to the Bukharan Emir. For this episode, we’ll focus on Irgush and Madamin in the Ferghana and save Ibrahim’s story for the greater story of the Bukharan Emirate

Irgush, who was the chief of Kokand’s militia, and Madamin both fled to Ferghana after the fall of the Kokand Autonomy and organized different branches of Basmachi. Irgush led the first attack against the Russians and by the end of 1918, he had raised an estimated 4,000 fighters (Olcott’s article). Madamin Bey enjoyed the support of the ulama, merchants, and moderate members of the Basmachi and the Ferghana Valley. By the end of 1918, both men had built minor fiefdoms for themselves, and it was clear that either they learned how to work together or risked destroying their own movement by fighting with each.

The Situation in Turkestan in 1919

In 1919, the Basmachi were facing three main problems: famine, the Bolshevik forces and the Jadids, and competition amongst each other.

As we’ve talked in our previous episodes, the Russian Civil War disrupted Turkestan’s food supplies, plunging the region into mass starvation while the Russians used armed groups to forcibly requisition food from the poor indigenous and Russian farmers. According to Jeff Sahadeo, an estimate 30% of the Ferghana population died in the famine, which is one of the reasons why it became a Basmachi stronghold. The more the Russians stole from the people, the more they fled into the Basmachi’s ranks. Some of these new recruits included Bashkir, Tatar, and Jadid reformers as well as ulama and conservative merchants. To try and counter this, the Russians switched the focus of their requisition efforts from the indigenous peasants to the Russian peasants while waiting for Red Army reinforcements.

For their part, the Basmachi focused on raiding military supply depots, burning warehouses and ginning factories, as well as attacking mines and oil wells. While the Russians tried to enforce mass arrests, they could never penetrate the Basmachi’s territory in the Ferghana. Instead, their efforts seemed to only help the Basmachi recruitment efforts. Yet, while the Basmachi and Russians were enemies, which didn’t prevent local units from making agreements with each other and it seems like deals were frequently made and broken. During the winter, when food was scarcer than it was already, the Basmachi would reach out to local Russian garrisons to share food and supplies. Once winter was over, the Basmachi would resume attacking Russian units and supplies.

While the Basmachi raided and fought with the Russians, their true enemy were the Jadids and other Muslim reformers. Given the Basmachi’s conservatism and belief in traditional Islam, they thought the Jadids were the greatest enemies of Turkestan. Ibrahim Bek, the leader of the Bukharan Basmachi, once wrote to a Red Army commander:

“Comrades, we thank you for fighting with the Jadids. I, Ibrohim-bek, praise you for this and shake your hand, as friend and comrade, and open to you the path to all four sides. I am also able to give you forage. We have nothing against you, we will beat the Jadids, who overthrew our power.” - Adeeb Khalid, Making Uzbekistan pg. 88

Ibrahim’s hatred of the Jadids seems to have matched the Emir’s own views. One of his officials once wrote,

“Irgush-Bek of Kokand and Muhammad Amin of Margealn with their courage and fortitude have for some time been…exposing and killing Jadids and Bolsheviks” - Adeeb Khalid, Making Uzbekistan, pg. 88

It seems he was still sore the Bukharan Jadids used Kerensky’s Provisional Government to curb his power.

Despite the Basmachi’s antagonism to all indigenous people who threatened traditionalism and conservatism, Turar Risqulov, the leader of the Musburo, actually reached out to Madamin Bey to negotiate an uneasy peace so they could address the raging famine. Madamin was open to negotiations and in the end, they agreed that Madamin’s forces would keep their arms and organization but would become local units of the Red Army. The local Russians allowed this until Frunze arrived and broke the agreement, killed Madamin, and focused on breaking the Basmachi as an alternative form of government in the Ferghana.

Finally, the Basmachi, who were really modern-day warlords, realized they needed to organize their forces and split up their territories before they ended up fighting with each other.

How Does One Organize a Guerilla Force?

The Basmachi were neither coordinated nor centralized and as more and more groups popped up and more and more people joined their ranks, Irgush and Madamin realized they needed to get properly organized. So, in March 1919, Irgush called a meeting of 40 Basmachi leaders to talk about a unified command. By the end of the meeting, Irgush was nominated as the Supreme Commander with two deputies: Kurshirmat, a well-known ally of Irgush, and Madamin. Each of the 40 leaders present received control over a separate territory to protect and administer with support from the ulama as their religious-political advisors.

This structure lasted until the summer of 1919 when Madamin went his own way. At some point in 1919, Madamin met the Russian commander, Konstantin Monstrov, commander of the (Russian) People’s Army in Turkestan. He was just one of the many armed organizations in the region at the time. They united their forces, Madamin’s guerilla unit transformed into the Muslim People’s Army, and together they created the Ferghana Provisional Government which would outlive both of its founders by a few months.

Madamin and Monstrov created a constituent assembly and drew up an eight-point platform to ensure freedom of speech, press, and education for the people. They called for an elected assembly and a five-member cabinet, although it’s doubtful if they ever held elections. Like the Kokand government, it failed to execute any meaningful policy, but gained political recognition and aid from abroad. This would lead to claims that this government was an evil British plot to take Turkestan away from the Russians, nullifying any independent action on the basis of Madamin and Monstrov. While it seems that the British were aware of Madamin and his work, sent him financial support, and even sent agents to negotiate with him, it’s doubtful they masterminded the creation of the Ferghana Provisional Government. The Soviets would make similar claims about the Turkestan Military Organization, a unit consisting of former Tsarist officials and generals. You can learn more about them and the Soviet’s claim by joining our Patreon and gaining access to our exclusive episode on Osipov’s Uprising.

Monstrov and Madamin knew they would not survive long if they did not defeat the Bolshevik forces in the region. Together, they took the city of Osh in September 1919 and were involved in the siege of Andijan where they encountered Frunze’s Red forces. He pushed them to the modern-day Kyrgyzstan-Xinjiang border. Frunze captured and executed Monstrov in January 1920 and Madamin surrendered his forces and formally joined the Bolsheviks in March 1920. He would die later that summer.

By the end of 1919, the Basmachi of the Ferghana attempted to organize their forces to improve their effectiveness. They recruited 20,000 fighters, organized a Provisional Government with a Russian army also aligned against the Bolsheviks, and were impeding the Bolshevik’s efforts to gather supplies and establish their hold on the Ferghana. Even though Madamin would die in 1920, he left behind an organized guerilla force under the command of men like Irgush, Ibrahim Bek, and others who would prove, not only to be a thorn in the side of Frunze and the Red Army, but also entice a certain former Ottoman general to join their cause and attempt to regain lost glory.

References

“The Basmachi or Freemen’s Revolt in Turkestan 1918-1924 by Martha B. Olcott

“Revolution in the Borderlands: The Case of Central Asia in a Comparative Perspective” by Marco Buttino

“Some Aspects of the Basmachi Movement and the Role of Enver Pasha in Turkestan” by Mehmet Shahingoz and Amina Akhantaeva

Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent 1865-1923 by Jeff Sahadeo

The “Russian Civil Wars 1916-1926 by Jonathan D. Smele

Making Uzbekistan: Nation, Empire, and Revolution in the Early USSR by Adeeb Khalid

Central Asia: Aspects of Transition by Tom Everett-Heath

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Soviets Take Bukhara

(top) A true color photo of the Emir of Bukhara, taken in 1911.  (bottom) An aerial photograph taken of Bukhara on September 1.

September 2 1920, Bukhara--After the fall of Krasnovodsk in February, the last major center of resistance to Soviet rule in Central Asia was the Emirate of Bukhara. An attempt to take the city in March failed, but in late August Soviet forces under Mikhail Frunze, in coordination with reformist elements in Bukhara, launched another assault with substantial artillery and air support.  The Ark of Bukhara, the ancient fortress in the city dating back to at least the 5th century, was heavily damaged in the assault.

The Soviets entered the city on September 2; the Emir fled to Dushanbe and eventually went into exile in Afghanistan.  Local Muslim resistance to Soviet rule in the form of the Basmachi movement would continue for several years, however.

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5 Tactics Frunze Used Against the Basmachi

When Red Army General, Mikhail Frunze, arrived in Turkestan, one of the biggest challenges facing him was the guerilla movement known as the Basmachi. He introduced these five tactics that would eventually defeat the Basmachi in 1923. Ensure your forces are flexible and fast: when fighting a mountainous guerilla movement, you need to have freedom of rapid and concentrated movement that can cut…

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Frunze vs the Basmachi 1920-1921

It’s February 1920 in Turkestan. Russian General Mikhail Frunze and the Red Army have arrived and are asserting Communist control and restoring order to the region. Last episode, we discussed how Frunze neutralized the Musburo, the Muslim led organization that barely held the region together before the Red Army’s arrival, and overthrew both the Khivan and Bukharan emirs. While Frunze was doing…

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The Basmachi

The last couple of episodes, we’ve been exploring how the Russian Revolution affected Central Asia from several different perspectives. So far, we’ve talked about the Russian Settlers, the Alash Orda, the Jadids, and the Bukharan and Khivan Emirs. You may be thinking, that’s plenty of peoples and we’re ready to move onto 1918, but we have one more perspective to add and that’s the Basmachi, a guerrilla movement that reinvented itself numerous times during the 1920s and clashed with the Soviets from 1918 to the 1930s.

Who the Basmachi Were and Were Not

Who were the Basmachi? To answer that question, we must first clarify who the Basmachi were not. Interest in the Basmachi seemed to have picked up, in the US at least, in the 80s because of the Soviet-Afghan War. A lot of analysts positioned the Basmachi as a precursor to the Taliban and wanted to use the Basmachi as an example of Islam’s inherent danger to Soviet Communism. This has stuck and when talking about the Basmachi, the instinct is to think of them as this organized nationalistic-Islamic insurgency that was anti-Soviet and was one of the first examples of Soviet fundamentalism vs a Western ideology. And there seems to be this thinking that if you understand the Basmachi, you’ll understand the current iteration of the Taliban and how to fight in Central Asia.

Of course, the biggest issue with that interpretation is that it rewrites history to explain a modern phenomenon and also conflating a conflict that took place primarily in modern day Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and parts of Turkmenistan with a conflict that took place primarily in Afghanistan. So, you know, all kinds of wrong.

The Basmachi were not precursors to the Taliban. The Basmachi came out of a number of conditions and factors unique to Central Asia following WWI and the Russian Revolution.

The Basmachi had periods of extreme organization and efficiency, but more times than their scope of operations was village focused or focused on a collection of roads. The level of organization depended on the local commanders. There was an effort to create a region wide movement, but we’ll get into that and why it failed later in the series.

Ibrahim Bek

[Image Description: A black and white photo of a man with dark skin and a scruffy beard. he is wearing a grey turban, a grey and white long dress shirt, and an embroidered blanket over his shoulders.]

The Basmachi relied on the population for supplies, and they could be as much of a pestilence as the Soviets for the population, despite the Basmachi’s claims they protected the people from Soviet “cruelty.”

They were Muslims and they had a specific vision for the future of Central Asia that was heavily Islamic, but within that vision was a gradient of views and beliefs. While they wanted a recognizably Islamic government, not all could be considered Islamic fundamentalists. They were not nationalistic. Their concept of Central Asia didn’t take into account nationalism or even state building. Their goal was to protect the customary practices of the past, preserve a form of government that was not only recognizable to them, but was also obviously Islamic, and to protect land and food from Soviet requisitions. The Basmachi were not even a pure anti-Soviet movement. They considered the Jadids and other urban modernizers to be as dangerous, if not more so, than the Soviets. Ibrohim-bek, a Basmachi leader, once said:

“I have to make war not just on the Russians, but really against the Jadids.” - Adeeb Khalid, Making Uzbekistan, pg. 88

And Ibrohim even thanked a Red Army commander, who defeated a Jadid led unit at Dushanbe, saying:

“Comrades, we thank you for fighting with the Jadids. I, Ibrohim-bek, praise you for this and shake your hand, as friend and comrade, and open to you the path to all four sides. I am also able to give you forage. We have nothing against you, we will beat the Jadids, who overthrew our power.” - Adeeb Khalid, Making Uzbekistan, pg. 88

            For the Basmachi, they were fighting a defensive war against the Soviets, a turf war with the Russian Settlers, and a civil war against the Jadids and other Muslim modernizers.

Basmachi in 1917

The Basmachi were created out of the combined horrors of 1916 and the famine that followed.

While the most famous Central Asia famine of the 20th century may be the Kazakh Famine of the 30s, Central Asia experienced an equally devastating famine from 1915 to 1920. In 1915, Turkestan’s ability to internally produce needed grains was at 90%. By 1917 it dropped down to 48%. This was made worse by the Tsarist’s efforts to recruit Russian Settlers (who planted most of the grain in the Steppe) and Russia’s decision to stop sending grain to Turkestan (who was dependent on Russia for food because of colonial policies and decisions). Then shipments stopped completely when the Whites took Orenburg, cutting Turkestan off from the rest of Russia.

According to scholar, Marco Buttino, between 1917 and 1920, the Russian settlers reduced the acreage of cultivated land by 28% and its livestock by 7%, the sedentary indigenous population cut their acreage of cultivated land by 39% and their livestock by 48%, and the semi-nomadic population by 46% and 63% respectively. According to an estimate conducted by the Turkestan government (which we’ll get into later in the season) by 1919, 970,000 people were suffering from hunger, about 30% of those people were in the Ferghana valley. Between 1917 and 1920, it is estimated that the settler population dropped from 797,000 to 610,000 and the indigenous population dropped from 6,362,000 to 4,727,000, a majority of whom were semi-nomadic. All estimates are from Marco Buttino’s article.

Given those sober statistics, it’s probably not surprising that the Basmachi emerged first from the Ferghana Valley and that the Ferghana would be one of their most stable areas of operations.

The first bands were led by a kurbashi (leader) from the local police force, the old governments of Khiva and Bukhara as they fell into Russian hands, disgruntled Jadids, and former criminals. They were originally based in Ferghana, but versions of the Basmachi would appear in the rural areas of Khiva and Bukhara after the Soviets defeated the emirs in 1920. The Basmachi would also attract former leaders of other states such as Zeki Velidi Togan of the short-lived Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and Enver Pasha of Ottoman fame.

Enver Pasha

[Image Description: A black and white picture of a man with a thick mustache with the tips twisted upwards. He is wearing a dark fez and a dark uniform with golden epaulettes and many medals. His arms are crossed and facing directly into the camera]

The Basmachi would spend most of 1917 forming their core group of fighters and establishing territorial ownership while fighting both Russian Settlers, Jadids, and anyone else they deemed a threat. The Basmachi may have remained little more than armed thugs if not for the fall of Kokand in 1918 and the pressures of the Russian Civil War who drove a wild collection of skilled men into the ranks of the Basmachi. These men would quickly rise through the ranks and lead the Basmachi, turning them into a persistence and violent headache for the Soviet Union.

Leaders of the Basmachi

Some of the most famous leaders of the Basmachi are Irgush Bey, Madamin Bey, Ibrahim Bek, and Junaid Khan (who we already met. He was the one who organized a coup against the Khivan Emir following the Russian Revolution). To learn more about him, listen to our episode about the Khiva Khanate during the Russian Revolution.

Irgush Bey

Irgush organized and led the first Basmachi attack of 1918. Irgush had originally been a former police officer who was asked by the Kokand Autonomy to be the chief of its militia. When the Kokand Autonomy fell (which we’ll talk about in our next episode), Irgush fled to the Ferghana and organized a band of Basmachi. By the end of 1918, he had over 4,000 fighters under his command. That would blossom to an estimated 20,000 by the end of 1919. Irgush had the support of Ulama of the Ferghana and represented the more extreme version of the Basmachi. Being in Ferghana, Irgush often had to contend with Madamin-Bey, one of the most famous and effective Basmachi leaders for ultimate control of the region.

Madamin Bey

Madamin Bey family came from the hereditary military elite of the Kokand Khanate before the Russians dismantled it. He was supported by the more moderate members of the Basmachi and the Ferghana area, making it hard, but not impossible to work with Irgush. Madamin Bey and Irgush would unite the Basmachi of the Ferghana in 1919 and Madamin would even ally with a White Russian General against the Bolsheviks, before switching sides. We’ll get into all of that in a different episode, but Madamin Bey was able to provide much needed organization and vision to the Basmachi movement.

Ibrahim Bek

Besides Madamin, Ibrahim may have been the most effective commander the Basmachi ever had. He was born to the Lokai tribe, from which he recruited many of his fighters. He was based in the Bukharan area and fought for the return of the Bukharan Emir after the Red Army deposed him. He was vehemently anti-Jadid and one of the longest lasting Basmachi leaders

Tactics

Like the IRA during the Irish War of Independence, the Basmachi were reliant on the population for men, supplies, and safety. Unlike the IRA, there wasn’t a universal, region wide plan, goal, or form of leadership or government. At first, the leaders were focused on protecting territory and food supplies from everyone and anyone-including other Basmachi leaders. It is best to think of them as gang bosses or warlords at this point. Groups of armed and dangerous fighters who were very protective of their own territory and food supply, while espousing rhetoric of protecting Islamic and communal values.

The Basmachi recruited new fighters from the unemployed rural population of Central Asia. The potential recruits were often approached by the kurbashi themselves and were promised food, arms, and horses. While many recruits brought their own weapons, each Kurbashi was personally responsible for recruiting and caring for his troops. They often requisitioned provisions and extracted taxes from the population of their territory. They were better at it than the Soviets. Like in Ireland, it seems that most of the Central Asian population was “willing” to support the Basmachi, although we can also assume that those who resisted did not resist for long.

When the Basmachi could not requisition food from the population, they looked to the Soviets for supplies. Some Basmachi reached agreements with the Soviet forces during winter and when things were tough in order to receive food and supplies before breaking their agreements and returning to the war.

Others were able to receive provisions from the Soviet government itself, since the Soviets were reliant on existing authority figures, many who know the people who made up the Basmachi ranks and so they were willing to help using Soviet supplies.

The Basmachi preferred hit and run tactics, harassing isolated Russian units, and avoiding pitched battles. They fought on horseback, with whatever was at hand, usually swords, grenades, and Berdan rifles of the Russo-Turkish War. Like most guerilla movements they relied on an intimate knowledge of the terrain, mobility, and passive or active support of the populace. As one Russian military observer wrote:

“Without anything distinguishing them [the Basmachi] on the outside, clothed in the same way as the peasant population, they were all around our units, not hesitating to infiltrate, and unrecognizable and elusive, they devoted themselves to espionage that has no equal, whose network extends from the Afghan frontier to Tashkent” Robert F. Baumann, Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan, pg 96

The Basmachi were able to fill in a power vacuum within the Ferghana and other rural parts of Central Asia, but they were never able to establish a stable form of government themselves, nor did they seem particularly interested in doing so. Despite this, they would prove to be one of the Soviet’s most consistent and dangerous problems as they tried to consolidate Central Asia under Soviet rule.

References

Making Uzbekistan: Nation, Empire, and Revolution in the Early USSR by Adeeb Khalid

The “Russian Civil Wars” 1916-1926 by Jonathan Smele, Published by Oxford University Press, 2017

“The Basmachi or Freemen’s Revolt in Turkestan 1918–24” by M. B. Olcott Soviet Studies, no. 3, 1981

Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan by Robert F. Baumann, Combat Studies Institute, 2010.

"The Final Phase in the Liquidation of the Anti-Soviet Resistance in Tadzhikistan: Ibrahim Bek and the Basmachi, 1924-1931" by William S. Ritter, Soviet Studies, no 4, 1985

"Revolution in the Borderlands: the Case of Central Asia in a Comparative Perspective" by Marco Buttino, A Companion to the Russian Revolution, John Wiley & Sons, 2020