Let us conclude by comparing our findings with more familiar measures of social class, to draw out the wider implications of our model. Firstly, although, as we have discussed, there are clear occupational profiles which map onto our seven classes, the fit is by no means clear. Given the way we have constructed our model, this is not necessarily surprising. Nonetheless, it suggests the need for caution towards those exercises, such as those of Grusky and Weeden (2001, 2008), which focus on micro-classes whereby specific occupations are clearly differentiated from each other. Leaving aside the particular case of chief executive officers who are predominantly located in our ‘elite’, we have found no clear affiliation between specific occupations and our latent classes. Perhaps, rather than seeking to locate class fundamentally in occupational ‘blocks’, the time is now ripe for a different, multi-dimensional perspective, in which occupational membership is spread (though unevenly) between different classes.
Secondly, it is striking that we have been able to discern a distinctive elite, whose sheer economic advantage sets it apart from other classes. Although this is not necessarily surprising, our analysis is the first time that this group has been elaborated within a wider analysis of the class structure, in which they are normally placed alongside a larger group of professionals and managers. Our finding here is an important critical intervention against the deployment of the ‘service class’ concept, which has failed to recognise the distinctiveness of elite groups within its number (see Savage and Williams, 2008), even though it does recognise the difference between an upper and lower service class. The fact that this elite group is shown to have the most privileged backgrounds also is an important demonstration of the accentuation of social advantage at the top of British society.
Thirdly, at the opposite extreme, we have discerned the existence of a sizeable group – 15 per cent of the population – which is marked by the lack of any significant amount of economic, cultural, or social capital. We have identified these as the ‘precariat’. The recognition of the existence of this group, along with the elite, is a powerful reminder that our conventional approaches to class have hindered our recognition of these two extremes, which occupy a very distinctive place in British society.
Fourthly, only two of our seven classes conform to older sociological models of ‘middle’ and ‘working’ class. We might see this as some evidence of a blurring and fragmentation of conventional ‘middle’ and ‘working’ class boundaries. Of course, the nature of the class boundaries between middle and working class has been much discussed in previous studies of occupational classes, as with the debate about the ‘labour aristocracy’, and ‘white collar workers’. Our way of interpreting these boundaries is to suggest that the ‘established middle class’ epitomises the characteristics of ‘service class’ as elaborated by John Goldthorpe (1982). As Goldthorpe anticipates, this is a large class, indeed the largest single class in our analysis, with a quarter of the population belonging to it. To this degree, the stable middle class are indeed a large group in British society. It does come over as secure and established across all our measures of capital.
The traditional working class might also appear to be its counterpart: the surviving rump of the working class, but they now only comprise 14 per cent of the population, and are relatively old, with an average age of 65. To this extent, the traditional working class is fading from contemporary importance, and clearly is less prominent than the established middle class.
However, only 39 per cent of the national population fall into these two classes, which conform most closely to these middle and working-class sociological stereotypes. Instead, the majority fall into classes which have not been registered by more conventional approaches to class, and require a more fluid understanding of the redrawing of social and cultural boundaries in recent years. Several of the classes thus have over-representations from white collar and blue collar jobs. The ‘collar’ line is of little value in unravelling these patterns.
Fifthly, some of these new classes do not embody conventional cultural or social capital, yet appear to have obtained moderate levels of economic capital. Here, a conventional Bourdieusian analysis which focuses unduly on the reproduction of educational advantage misses the way that both the new affluent workers and the emergent service workers have acquired certain levels of economic and social capital without access to conventional highbrow culture.
The technical middle class are also a powerful reminder that not all those with economic capital have extensive social networks, and the new affluent workers are revealing too as an interstitial class. We are thus able to challenge the perception that the problem of social and cultural engagement is more marked at the lower levels of the class structure.
The ‘new affluent workers’ and the ‘emergent service workers’ are an interesting focus. They seem, in many respects, to be the children of the ‘traditional working class’, and they might thus be said to exemplify the stark break in working-class culture which has been evident as a result of de-industrialisation, mass unemployment, immigration and the restructuring of urban space. They show high levels of engagement with ‘emerging cultural capital’ and have extensive social networks, so indicating that they are far from being disengaged in any conventional sense. To this extent, new social formations appear to be emerging out of the tendrils of the traditional working class.
Finally, in conclusion, our new model of class offers a powerful way of comprehending the persistence, yet also the remaking of social class divisions in contemporary Britain. Our multi-dimensional analysis reveals the polarisation of social inequality (in the form of an elite and a precariat), and the fragmentation of traditional sociological middle and working-class divisions into more segmented forms. We have been able to mine down into unusual detail about the educational and occupational profiles of these classes (and our future publications will do this further). We hope that our new model of class will prove a valuable resource for future social researchers in exploring the complex and multi-dimensional nature of social class inequality in the UK in a way which permits us to recognise the ongoing salience of social class divisions in the stratification of British society.
Savage et. al. - A New Model of Social Class: Findings from the BBC’s Great British Class Survey Experiment.