hello anna! it's so lovely to see you back! i have a question about tennis that's been plaguing me for a while, and it's about scorelines! i know you typically answer technical questions, but i've been searching for an answer to this for a while, and haven't found one. my question is, when comparing players like jannik and carlos, who typically have similar win rates (in the last year, at least), it seems like jannik's scorelines are often far more lopsided. i personally believe they are roughly equal players at current, so what is the reason why jannik seems to more often absolutely steamroll opponents (with the score at least), while carlos wins the same # of matches, but with more measured scorelines?
i've tried to do my own research, but everyone keeps saying that jannik "suffocates" his opponents. unfortunately, i have no idea what this means, as someone who never played myself. no pressure at all to answer this, but just something i'm very curious about 💕
my dear anon, thank you. it’s nice to be back.
this is a genuinely good question, and the pattern you’re noticing is real. when two players like jannik and carlos post similar win rates over a season, you would normally expect their scorelines to look similar as well. but in practice, they do not, and that difference is not random. it comes from the way tennis scoring amplifies small point-level advantages into large-looking set margins, combined with the specific statistical profile of jannik’s game, which converts pressure on serve and return into more frequent double-break sets.
in short, they reach the same destination with similar consistency, but the mechanics of how their wins accumulate on the scoreboard are fundamentally different — and that difference comes down to the technical details of how jannik’s and carlos’s game mechanics actually work on court. so let’s dive in and explore those mechanics.
1. define the phenomenon precisely
what you’re observing is a mismatch between two things that, on the surface, should look similar:
• match outcomes: jannik and carlos win a similar number of matches over a season
• scoreline shape: jannik’s wins more often look like 6–2 or 6–3, while carlos’s wins more often look like 6–4, 7–5, or 7–6
for a viewer, this creates a strange impression. both players win just as much, but one looks like he is blowing opponents off the court, while the other looks like he is constantly fighting through tight battles.
so the real question is not “who is better,” but: why does one player turn wins into bigger-looking margins more often than the other? and the answer has less to do with talent and more to do with how tennis scoring turns small advantages into large-looking results.
2. bucket #1 — tennis scoring inflates small point advantages
2.1 non-linearity (why scorelines can mislead)
tennis is a layered scoring system: points → games → sets. you don’t win a set by winning more points overall. you win a set by winning more games. and you win games by winning more points at the right moments. because of this structure, one or two key moments can completely change how a set looks on the scoreboard.
for example: a set might be extremely competitive for eight games, with both players holding comfortably. then one player gets broken once or twice late in the set. suddenly the final score is 6–3 — even though most of the set was very close. this means: a 6–2 or 6–3 score does not necessarily mean the loser played badly.
it often means the winner was just a little better at the most important moments. so scorelines are not proportional to how close the match actually was point by point.
2.2 a metric designed for this: dominance ratio (dr)
to capture this idea, analysts use a metric called dominance ratio (dr):
dr = (return points won) ÷ (service points lost)
in plain language:
• how good are you at winning points on your opponent’s serve?
• how good are you at protecting your own serve?
interpretation:
• dr > 1.0 usually means you were the stronger player in that match
• higher dr tends to align with more lopsided set scores.
so two players can both win often, but:
• one wins with higher dr → more 6–2 / 6–3 sets
• the other wins with narrower dr → more 7–5 / 7–6 sets.
same result. very different looking matches.
3. bucket #2 — the specific stat profile that produces “steamroll” sets
if you want the simplest predictors of how a scoreboard will look, they are:
a) service games won % (how often you hold serve)
b) return games won % (how often you break serve)
because most sets are decided by breaks of serve, the player who: holds serve very reliably, and breaks serve fairly often, will naturally produce more sets decided by two breaks (6–2 / 6–3) instead of one break (6–4) or a tiebreak (7–6).
this difference looks small on paper, but it is huge in real matches. think of a typical set as roughly 10 service games total:
• at a 92% hold rate, jannik gets broken less than once per set on average
• at an 88% hold rate, carlos gets broken more often
that difference alone keeps jannik’s sets from staying close and pushes more of carlos’s sets toward 5–5 or a tiebreak.
now combine that with return ability. jannik also breaks serve at an elite rate (~32.6%), meaning:
• he breaks fairly often
• and almost never gives the break back
that combination is the classic “scoreboard efficiency” engine: one break is often enough to win the set, and a second break becomes common. that’s how you get repeated 6–3 and 6–2 scores.
4. what “suffocates opponents” means in operational terms
when people say jannik “suffocates” opponents, they are not talking about highlight shots or flashy winners. they are describing a pressure pattern. it means the opponent never really gets a break.
4.1 what that pressure looks like in a match
a “suffocating” player typically does three things:
a) keeps return games competitive
even when he doesn’t break, he often gets to 30–30 or deuce, forcing the server to play extra points under stress.
b) gives away very few free points
few unforced errors, few loose service games. the opponent must win points themselves — they can’t wait for mistakes.
c) creates constant time and depth pressure
opponents are pushed back, rushed, and forced to hit from uncomfortable positions.
4.2 what this does to the scoreboard
early in a set, games may look close. but as the set goes on:
• the opponent gets more tired
• the opponent feels more pressure
• service games become harder to hold
so breaks tend to cluster late. instead of 7–5, the set becomes 6–3. not because the early games weren’t competitive, but because the opponent can’t maintain their level for long. that’s “no breathing room” translated into numbers.
5. why carlos can win just as much with “messier” scorelines
carlos is just as dominant, but in a different way.
5.1 more variation = more variance
he uses more high-risk, high-reward tools:
• frequent net approaches
• abrupt pace changes
• drop shots
• riskier attacking patterns.
this creates:
• more winners
• more highlight moments
• but also more swings inside sets.
which leads to:
• more break exchanges
• more momentum shifts
• more sets reaching 5–5 and tiebreaks.
5.2 neutralizing first serves vs breaking quickly
carlos is the best on tour at getting returns back into play, even against big servers. that keeps return games close, but it doesn’t always lead to quick breaks.
so his pressure often looks like:
• lots of long return games
• lots of deuce games
• lots of 7–5 and 7–6 sets
instead of quick 6–3 finishes.
5.3 surface distribution can change the look
in 2025:
• carlos was unreal on clay (22–1) and elite on grass
• jannik’s biggest separation was on hard courts
hard courts reward:
• clean serving
• first-strike tennis
• repeatable power and depth
which fits jannik’s profile extremely well and produces cleaner scorelines.
6. final conclusion
jannik’s scorelines look more lopsided because his game combines an extremely high hold rate with an elite break rate and very low error levels, so small advantages turn into double-break sets. carlos’s equally strong results come through a higher-variance style that creates more break exchanges, more close sets, and more tiebreaks — even when he wins just as often.
in short: they’re both dominant. they just tell very different stories on the scoreboard.
and i hope this satisfies your curiosity. let me know if you have any additional questions.
disclaimer: i am not a tennis professional.
data sources
sinner’s 2025 service games won and related stats https://www.atptour.com/en/news/sinner-serve-return-november-2025
jannik sinner’s 2025 player stats page (serve/return percentages) https://www.atptour.com/en/players/jannik-sinner/s0ag/player-stats?surface=all&year=2025
carlos alcaraz’s 2025 player stats page (including first-serve return points) https://www.atptour.com/en/players/carlos-alcaraz/a0e2/player-stats?surface=all&year=2025
alcaraz’s first-serve return performance in 2025 (infosys atp analysis) https://www.atptour.com/en/news/alcaraz-infosys-atp-beyond-the-numbers-december-2025
This is very silly, because the answer is probably just, well they are looking for something to critique, but honestly why IS the yacht thing still a controversy even now? Carlos obviously didn't help himself with the inspiring young people to buy yachts comment and critiques of that make perfect sense to me because at best that was incredibly out of touch. I also personally believe rich people yachts are terrible for the environment and shouldn't be in use for that reason. (Although obviously the constant flying places seems like the biggest environmental issue with tennis, not individual ownership of luxury yachts.) But at least to me it feels pretty clear that the commentary from tennis big names and pundits is not about the environment or economic inequality. It all seems to circle back to this narrative that Carlos isn't a serious person, he doesn't work hard, he's flash without substance, a talented but irresponsible child who needs to be controlled because he can't make sensible decisions on his own (even though he is an adult and a millionaire and he can either afford the yacht or, frankly, is ultimately free to make unwise financial decisions if that's what this is). All of which is so odd when Carlos won all four Grand Slams and been number one, in addition to the other stuff he's accomplished.
It feels like the tennis world enjoys how entertaining Carlos's tennis (and personal charisma) can be but also wants to punish him for ever indicating he has any life outside of tennis, or for any choice he makes that doesn't adhere to a very strict (and incredibly subjective) notion of what a "classy" player would do. This controversy seems particularly ridiculous in the context of, many top players are very wealthy and do out of touch wealthy people things, including moving to Monaco and not playing taxes, and somehow those things are perfectly unobjectionable.
I guess this has spiraled out and is less a question than my commentary now, haha, but I find it frustrating that there are understandable reasons to take issue with luxury yachts but none of those reasons appear involved here and it just seems like an excuse to paint Carlos in a negative light for other reasons entirely and to further this bizarre narrative about him. Anyway thank you for bearing with me through this unnecessarily lengthy rant and if you do have thoughts in response, I look forward to them, as I find you very insightful!
my dear anon, thank you for your words and coming to my inbox. you are right that there are legitimate reasons to take issue with luxury yachts, and the “inspiring young people to buy them” comment was clumsy at best. you are also right that the environmental critique lands differently when the constant flying is the actual environmental story of professional tennis, not one player’s catamaran. and as you said — the commentary from tennis big names is not about the environment or economic inequality. it circles back, always, to the same portrait: carlos isn’t a serious person. he doesn’t work hard. he’s flash without substance, a talented but irresponsible child who needs to be controlled. what is so odd about that portrait, as you note, is that he has won all four grand slams as youngest man in history and was the world’s youngest number one.
but the yacht is a costume. underneath it is a much older argument about what kind of person deserves to be great, and what greatness is supposed to cost. it dresses itself in tennis language — consistency, focus, professionalism, discipline — but these are costumes too. underneath them is something older and more uncomfortable: a cultural argument about legitimacy. about which template of excellence the sport is willing to recognise. about what a serious champion is permitted to look like.
the argument always goes like this: greatness is earned through visible sacrifice. the legitimate champion must be seen to suffer for his art, to renounce ordinary pleasure, to subordinate every human impulse to the pursuit of excellence. his dedication must be legible. his seriousness must be performed. joy is permitted as a reward, briefly, after winning. it is not permitted as a method. the sport celebrates this logic in the stories it chooses to tell. djokovic not eating chocolate for two years and then allowing himself one tiny piece becomes not an oddity but an origin myth, proof that the willingness to deny yourself ordinary pleasure is what separates champions from everyone else. these stories do not just describe greatness. they define it. they tell you what greatness is allowed to look like, and, by extension, what it is not. but this is not a tennis idea. it is a protestant idea dressed in tennis clothes. and it has a very specific problem with carlos.
carlos does not perform suffering. he performs joy. he laughs during matches. he plays shots that have no business working and smiles when they do and when they don’t. he goes to ibiza between grand slams and tells you about it. he makes a documentary about his actual life as the best tennis player on the planet and titles it my way, which is about as clear a statement of intent as an athlete can make. the establishment received it as a provocation. it was meant as a declaration.
because what carlos communicates, in the documentary and in every press conference and in the yacht purchase and in all of it, is something the template cannot accommodate: that his relationship with tennis is not one of sacrifice and duty, but of love and play. that the joy is not the reward for the work. the joy is the work. that the ibiza trip is not a lapse in professionalism but an act of self-knowledge — a deliberate recharging of the emotional state that his tennis requires to function. in a culture built on the djokovic chocolate story, that is not an explanation. it is an admission. and admissions get used.
he has the results to prove it is not a rationalisation. every time the joy has been suppressed — by pressure, by expectation, by the weight of being compared to nadal before he could shave — the tennis has suffered. every time it has been restored, the tennis has returned. it is not a theory about carlos but a fact about him. and yet the establishment cannot accept it, because accepting it would require acknowledging that the template is wrong. and the template is not just a preference. for the people who hold it, it is a moral framework. to say that joy works as well as suffering is not just to say something about tennis. it is to say something threatening about the value of their own sacrifices, their own renunciations, their own carefully constructed origin myths. if joy can produce the same results, then suffering loses some of its authority. if fulfillment can coexist with greatness, then the old bargain begins to look less inevitable than they were taught to believe.
the template says: the work happens in the dark and the suffering happens in private and what you show the world is either the performance of dedication or the reward of victory. it does not have a slot for someone who shows you the joy in the middle of the work itself, who makes the process look like play, who seems — genuinely, disturbingly — to be having fun. and fun is suspicious. fun implies you could be trying harder. fun implies you do not fully understand what is at stake. fun, in the moral economy of elite sport, is something you have not yet earned. it is not something you are permitted to claim is the reason you got there. carlos keeps claiming it anyway and then keeps winning.
and perhaps the strangest part of all of this is the contradiction you pointed to, the one that sits underneath everything else: the tennis world loves to watch carlos win. it loves the shots that have no business working and the electricity of someone who seems to be genuinely, unguardedly having fun on the biggest stages in the sport. all of that is celebrated, consumed, held up as evidence that tennis is alive and vital and worth watching. and then the same world that was just applauding reaches for the template and finds him wanting. they want the product without the conditions that produce it. they want the joy on court and the suffering off it. they want the freedom in his game and the discipline in his choices. they want everything he is when he walks onto a court and none of what he is when he walks off one. and the thing that never gets said is that those two things are not separable. the joy is not decorative. it is not a side effect of the talent. it is the mechanism. if carlos ever actually became what the narrative demands, the thing everyone loves to watch would quietly cease to exist. what the tennis world keeps trying to punish him for is precisely what it cannot stop watching.
and you noted the double standard precisely. there are, of course, understandable reasons to take issue with luxury yachts — but as you say, none of those reasons appear to be what is actually operating here. the other athletes own luxury cars, live in monaco and maintain millionaire lifestyles, and none of it generates a syllable of concern about distraction or values or whether a champion should be spending his time this way. those things are perfectly unobjectionable. the environmental concern evaporates when it cannot be aimed at carlos specifically. the financial responsibility argument dissolves when applied to monaco residency. the double standard is not incidental to the argument but the argument itself.
and so the italian tennis figures who reached for the yacht as a weapon — binaghi, panatta, piatti — were not inventing something new. they were activating an existing circuit. the narrative infrastructure was already built. the inconsistency label had been attached to carlos since before he was 20. the netflix documentary had given the establishment its most explicit target yet: a young man saying on camera that he needed to enjoy himself to perform, that tennis should not feel like a duty. there was a sustained public chorus suggesting he would not win grand slams living that way. that was april 2025. since then he won three more grand slams by february 2026, completing the career grand slam while becoming the youngest man in history to do so.
the prediction was wrong. the narrative survived the prediction being wrong. the story did not update. it did not pause to ask whether its assumptions required revision. it just waited for the next hook. the yacht arrived on schedule. and this tells you everything about what the narrative is actually measuring. it is not measuring results. it is not measuring focus or professionalism or any of the tennis language it wears as costume. it is measuring legibility whether carlos’s excellence is performed in a way the establishment can recognise and sanction. and he keeps refusing to perform it that way. so the story keeps running, impervious to evidence, because evidence was never what it was about.
what makes this more than a story about one player is what it reveals about the people telling it. the critics are not hypocrites in the ordinary sense i.e. people who know the truth and say otherwise. they appear to genuinely believe the template. they have internalised a model of excellence so completely that they cannot see excellence that does not fit it. when they look at carlos they see waste: all that talent moving through the world with such apparent ease, such visible pleasure, such refusal to look tortured by the responsibility of being extraordinary. it offends something in them that they probably cannot fully name.
what it offends is the idea that suffering is ennobling. that the value of achievement is proportional to its cost. that a grand slam won joyfully is somehow worth less than one clawed from the darkness of total sacrifice. it is a moral position disguised as a tactical assessment — and like most moral positions held without examination, it becomes most aggressive precisely when the evidence contradicts it. the contradiction makes it louder, not quieter, because what is being defended is not an argument about tennis. it is an argument about meaning. about what all that sacrifice was for.
which brings us to ferrero and the comments about the yacht. whether he was misquoted or not is almost beside the point. because ferrero knew. that is the thing that sits at the centre of all of this. he had spent seven years watching the mechanism work in real time, identifying when the joy was gone, working to restore it, crying when it came back. he understood, from years of evidence and six grand slams, that this was not a flaw in carlos to be managed but a condition of his excellence. and yet he never seemed fully at peace with it.
because ferrero is not just a coach with a personal preference. he is a product of the spanish school. a tradition that has theorised suffering so completely it has written books about it. academy after academy across spain teaches young players from the earliest age to be fighters, to suffer on the court, to endure, to push to the breaking point and never cave in. toni nadal built an entire coaching philosophy around it. david ferrer embodied it so completely it became his identity. the spanish school does not merely value sacrifice. it has codified it, systematised it, passed it down through generations of coaches. ferrero was formed by that tradition as completely as anyone. the djokovic model, so often held up as the ideal, with the chocolate years and the monk-like existence in service of the game, is simply the international version of what spanish tennis had been teaching all along. and when ferrero looked at carlos and felt that sense of something unresolved, he was not being idiosyncratic. he was likely expressing the tension inside the tradition itself. and carlos, who had come through that same system, who had left el palmar at 15 to go to villena and absorb exactly that philosophy, arrived at a different answer. not through rebellion but through experience. he found, in his own results and his own life, that joy worked. that freedom worked. that what the tradition treated as a reward could also be a prerequisite.
and perhaps that is the deeper story behind the academy in el palmar. because it predates ferrero. it predates the spanish school’s influence on carlos. it is where he first learned that tennis was something done with passion and love, something chosen rather than endured. when ferrero and the family disagreed about how to manage carlos’s career, they may have been arguing about contracts and practical decisions. beneath that, however, sat a deeper question: what should tennis cost you? ferrero’s answer emerged from a tradition that has long treated sacrifice as the price of greatness. the answer represented by el palmar appears to have been different. not your joy. not yourself. that carlos is now gravitating back toward that environment, training there regularly and helping build a methodology around his own experience, may be less a business decision than a statement. not a manifesto. simply a return to the place where the answer had always been different.
that the partnership eventually ended is not a surprise. what it ended over, a contract, terms on a page, is almost beside the point. the real ending had been accumulating for years, in the space between a coach who knew what made his player great and a template he could not stop measuring that greatness against. and once the relationship ended, that private tension became public framing. the ibiza trips were recast as warnings. the joy was recast as recklessness. the very thing ferrero had spent years restoring in his player was now offered to the narrative as evidence of an ungovernable nature. not because he was lying. because he was hurt. and because people often interpret disappointment through the beliefs they already hold. few beliefs in tennis run deeper than the conviction that greatness must be paid for in suffering.
and carlos will not give them what they want. not because he is rebellious — he is, by all accounts, a remarkably good-natured person who genuinely does not wish to offend anyone — but because he cannot. the performance of suffering would require him to suppress the very thing that generates his best tennis. and carlos will not give them what they want. not because he is rebellious. he is, by all accounts, a remarkably good-natured person who genuinely does not wish to offend anyone. but because he cannot. the performance of suffering would require him to suppress the very thing that generates his best tennis. asking him to be like djokovic is not asking him to be more disciplined. it is asking him to be worse at being himself.
he knows this. he has known it for years. he made the documentary knowing what it would cost him. he bought the yacht knowing what would be said. he said in a press conference that he had learned to listen only to the people close to him, that he was going to keep following his own path. this is not stubbornness. it is a clear-eyed understanding of who he is and what he requires, an understanding that most of his critics, for all their decades in the sport, have not managed to reach about him. this is what the narrative cannot metabolise. it is designed for a player who is either vindicated by conforming to the template or destroyed by refusing it. carlos refuses it and then gets vindicated anyway. the story has no ending for him. so it just keeps starting over: with a new hook, the same argument, the same conclusion held in place regardless of what the scoreboard says.
the saddest thing about this is what it says about joy itself. we have built sports cultures, and perhaps broader cultures, in which joy is categorically suspect as a mode of excellence. suffering is legible as effort. pleasure is legible as distraction. the person who makes hard things look easy is accused of not trying hard enough, as though difficulty must be worn on the face to count. the person who finds genuine happiness in his work is suspected of not understanding the stakes.
carlos understands the stakes exactly. he has understood them since he was 19 years old and winning us opens and telling interviewers that smiling was the key to everything. he was not being naive. he was describing, with precision, a psychological architecture that most coaches and sports psychologists would recognise — the relationship between positive affect and executive function, between play states and peak performance, between the freedom of genuine enjoyment and the capacity to make extraordinary decisions under pressure. the science is not complicated. the resistance to it is. he just described it in the language of a 19-year-old who actually feels it, which is a language the tennis establishment does not entirely trust. they wanted him to speak in the language of sacrifice. he kept speaking in the language of love. eventually he stopped trying to translate.
he called the documentary my way. and then he went and lived it, with a smile through all of it, through every sports commentator and former player and compatriot who lined up to explain what a serious champion looks like. after the split with ferrero, the chorus grew louder. without the structure, without someone telling him no, he would not win the australian open. he would not win a grand slam in 2026. the ungovernable nature everyone had been warning about would finally catch up with him. he won the australian open less than two months later and completed the career grand slam at 22. he did it while appearing, by every available measure, to be enjoying himself. the template has spent years trying to read that as a warning sign. the record keeps reading it as something else entirely.
but the story will keep running. it does not need to be true to run. it needs to be comfortable — and the alternative, that joy is a legitimate path to greatness, that the template is wrong, that you can be the best in the world while appearing to enjoy being alive, is profoundly uncomfortable for everyone who built their understanding of excellence on the assumption that it costs. to accept carlos on his own terms is to accept that the chocolate years might have been optional. that the boat could have been allowed. that the suffering, so carefully cultivated and so proudly displayed, was perhaps not the point after all. that is a very difficult thing to accept. much easier to wait for the next yacht. and the historic record is the answer to the story. it has always been the answer. the story just refuses to read it.
thank you for bearing with me, and sorry for turning this into an essay. i seem to have, as usual, far too many thoughts about all of it.
hi anna! how did medvedev play today? i wasn't able to watch ☹️
hi p, medvedev has been playing well this whole tournament, but today it was an extraordinary performance from him. not just because he beat carlos in straight sets, but because of how he did it. he was controlling the whole match with aggressive shotmaking, and carlos even said afterward, “i have never seen daniil playing like this.”
what made it stand out is that this wasn’t the usual version of meddy who mostly absorbs pace, extends rallies, and waits for errors. he still did those things, but on top of that he was much more proactive than usual. tdi classified about 30% of his shots as attacking compared to 22% for carlos, so medvedev wasn’t just defending better — he was actually the one taking initiative more often. that’s a big tactical shift in a matchup where carlos usually dictates the play.
the serve was probably the biggest technical difference. medvedev won 74% of his second-serve points, saved 4 of 5 break points, and when he faced two set points at 4–5 in the second set, he served aggressively and forced errors from carlos. overall he had the better serve rating, more aces, no double faults, and much stronger second-serve output. against someone who returns as aggressively as carlos, that’s a massive advantage.
what’s especially interesting is that medvedev didn’t win this match by overwhelming him with winners. carlos actually finished with more winners (24–15) and slightly better return and backhand quality metrics. but medvedev still won 73 of 137 total points, protected his serve better, and was far more efficient in the key moments. he only had two break chances and converted both, while carlos had five and converted just one. so the difference was much more about efficiency, scoreboard pressure, and decision-making under stress than about sheer shot volume.
the rally-length numbers also show how complete the performance was. medvedev won the 0–4 shot category 47–38, which means his serve +1 patterns and early-ball execution were working well. that’s important because against carlos he often gets dragged into reactive tennis too early. today he was getting on top of points quickly. but what makes the performance even more impressive is that he also won the 9+ shot category 13–7, so once rallies became long — which is usually where meddy thrives — he still had the edge. in other words, he beat carlos in both the short-point and long-point battles.
a few technical aspects really stood out. one was his forehand quality. surprisingly, medvedev actually graded slightly higher than carlos on forehand shot quality. that’s significant because the forehand is often the shot that determines whether meddy is simply solid or genuinely dangerous. when that wing is stable enough to redirect and flatten out without leaking errors, his whole game becomes much harder to attack.
another key factor was his ability to defend without becoming passive. he still used his depth, movement, and elasticity to make carlos hit extra balls, but he was much quicker than usual to step in when he got a neutral or slightly shorter ball. that balance between defense and controlled aggression is probably why the performance looked so different from typical medvedev matches.
his error profile also helped. medvedev finished with 22 unforced errors compared to 30 for carlos, and his misses were spread rather than coming from one breakdown pattern. meanwhile carlos gave away several cheap points in return games and early exchanges. over time that added up, because medvedev kept forcing him to execute one more difficult attacking shot.
mentally he was excellent as well. in the second set carlos raised his level, broke, and went up 3–1, which could easily have turned the match. but medvedev stayed calm, broke back, saved two set points at 4–5, and then won six straight points in the tiebreak before finishing with an ace. that’s not just good tennis — that’s elite scoreboard management.
so overall, medvedev played a version of himself that was technically clean, tactically proactive, and mentally rock-solid. he served better in the biggest moments, attacked more than usual without losing discipline, won both the short- and long-rally battles, and was far more efficient under pressure. if he brings that level to the final, he definitely has a real shot.
data sources
atp match statistics centre: carlos alcaraz vs daniil medvedev – indian wells atp masters 1000 semifinal (2026). https://www.atptour.com/en/scores/stats-centre/live/2026/404/MS002 
tdi match statistics dataset: carlos alcaraz vs daniil medvedev – indian wells atp masters 1000 semifinal (2026). https://results.tennisdata.com/en/results/39581465-d6ef-45a6-8bc5-efcc4aed235b
carlos alcaraz’s pre-season serve retool: modern efficiency, not imitation (and why it fits melbourne perfetly)
carlos’s alcaraz's 2026 serve has quickly become one of the most talked-about technical changes of the season. it started with a noticeable visual shift during the off-season and then got even more attention after novak djokovic jokingly mentioned “copyright” during his australian open press conference. naturally, that sparked the narrative again that carlos has “copied” djokovic’s serve. it’s an understandable take, but it’s not really an accurate one.
what carlos has actually done is bring in modern efficiency principles and build them into his own athletic framework. the result is a serve that looks a bit like djokovic’s in rhythm and compactness, but is still built very differently under the hood and, more importantly, looks extremely well suited to ao conditions.
if you’re interested in learning more, let’s dive in.
1. why the serve was changed in the first place
according to carlos himself, the changes weren’t about copying anyone or making some dramatic overhaul. he has been very clear that his serve is something he is always working on, with small tweaks, small adjustments, and little refinements every day. it is simply part of his normal process. he has also said that he did not go into the off-season trying to reinvent his serve, but that he is constantly looking for better rhythm, better timing, and a motion that feels more natural and repeatable under pressure.
that mindset shows up clearly in the 2026 version of his serve, which is built around:
a more neutral starting position
holding the ball closer to the racket tip
a more compact lag with a bent arm and wrist
a smoother and more continuous rhythm
fewer moving parts and timing checkpoints
this is classic modernisation. it is not about chasing a few extra miles per hour. it is about building a motion that holds up when the body is tired, the nerves are high, and the returners are standing on top of the baseline. the real goals are:
more reliable timing
better consistency late in matches
a safer and heavier second serve
cleaner energy transfer from the legs into the arm
in other words, the serve is being built to survive five-set matches, aggressive returners, and long slam runs, which is exactly what melbourne demands.
2. why it now “looks like djokovic’s”
at first glance, it’s easy to see why people immediately think of djokovic when they watch carlos’s new serve. the two motions now share a lot of surface-level similarities:
the ball is held much closer to the racket tip
the takeback is more compact with a semi-abbreviated lag
the arm and wrist are bent earlier in the motion
the rhythm is smoother and more continuous
the setup is cleaner and more neutral
visually, it has that same calm, efficient, almost effortless look that people associate with djokovic’s serve. there are fewer moving parts, fewer dramatic positions, and less visible “work” being done. everything just flows.
but that style isn’t unique to djokovic either. it’s the modern efficiency look, the same design philosophy you see in the serves of fritz, medvedev or zverev, and a lot of the current top players. over time, elite serving has converged toward a narrower range of solutions that maximise speed, consistency, and joint safety.
that’s the resemblance djokovic was joking about when he made the “copyright” comment. he was reacting to the aesthetic, the rhythm, the compactness, and the economy of motion.
but looking similar doesn’t mean being the same. once you slow it down and look at how the serve is actually built from the ground up — from stance and leg drive to hip loading, elbow position, and wrist timing — the differences become obvious. the two motions may share the same modern design principles, but they’re executed through very different athletic structures.
in other words, carlos isn’t copying djokovic’s serve. he’s adopting the same efficiency blueprint and running it on his own hardware.
3. where the serves are actually different
once you slow things down and go frame by frame, the differences between the two serves start jumping out everywhere. at full speed they might look similar, but mechanically they’re built in very different ways.
a) stance and leg drive — the engine of the serve
this is where everything starts. the stance and leg drive are basically the engine of the serve.
djokovic
platform stance
feet stay apart
front leg drives first
more forward momentum
carlos
pinpoint stance
back foot slides up
both legs load together
more vertical launch
this is a huge difference because it completely changes how power gets into the motion.
djokovic’s serve is built around balance and driving forward into the court
carlos’ serve is built around vertical explosion and contact height
same goal, but two totally different engines.
b) hip and spine loading
here’s where the body really starts shaping the serve.
carlos loads his left hip earlier
he creates his reverse-c shape sooner
djokovic stays more upright and leans later
that timing difference affects:
the launch angle
the swing path
the spin profile
the contact geometry
because carlos sets his body earlier, he’s building a steeper, more vertical swing. that’s a big reason why his serve naturally produces a heavier kick.
c) elbow position
this is a smaller detail, but it makes a big difference.
djokovic’s elbow stays closer to the body and sits lower
carlos’s elbow sits further away and slightly higher
that changes:
how the racket drops
how the shoulder loads
how the arm accelerates
it’s one of those personal fingerprints that makes every great serve a little different.
d) wrist timing and racket face
another big mechanical difference.
djokovic straightens his wrist before the racket drops
carlos straightens his wrist during the drop
that leads to:
different racket drop shapes
different spin behaviour
different acceleration patterns
the ball might go just as fast, but the way the racket gets there is not the same.
e) weight transfer and launch
this is where the contrast is really obvious.
djokovic is already pushing forward with his front leg
carlos is still fully loaded on both feet
at that moment:
djokovic is moving forward into the court
carlos is still loading vertically before exploding upward
different physics. different force direction. different serve.
4. why they look the same after the racket drop (and where the style comes back)
once the racket drops into the slot, the two serves suddenly start to look almost identical. but that similarity has nothing to do with copying. it has everything to do with how the human body works.
at elite speed, there are only so many safe and efficient ways to swing a racket. when you’re trying to hit 190+ km/h without destroying your shoulder, your body is basically forced into the same movement solutions.
from the racket drop onward, every great server uses the same core mechanics:
internal shoulder rotation to generate speed
elbow extension to lengthen the lever
pronation to square the racket face
shoulder deceleration to protect the joint
these aren’t stylistic choices. they’re anatomical necessities. that’s why once both players get into the racket drop, the two serves look identical all the way through the acceleration phase.
but here’s the important part: the style comes back at the finish. some players like carlos naturally let the racket swing out more to the left after contact. others, like djokovic, finish in a slightly more compact and controlled way. the swing path, the amount of body rotation, and the shape of the follow-through all change depending on what type of serve the player is hitting and how their body likes to move.
so the pattern is:
before the racket drop: lots of individuality
during the racket drop and acceleration: universal elite mechanics
after contact and into the finish: stylistic differences again
that’s why the serves can look cloned for a split second, then immediately start to look personal again. it’s not copying. it’s anatomy in the middle and personality at the end.
5. why this serve is perfect for melbourne
the australian open is a very specific environment:
medium-fast hard courts
high-bouncing balls
aggressive returners
brutal physical demands
a strong second serve in melbourne needs to:
clear the net safely
kick up high
push returners back
hold up deep into five-set matches
this is where carlos’s new setup really shines.
a) the pinpoint two-leg launch
his stance and leg drive:
generate more vertical force
raise contact height
create a steeper swing path
that’s ideal for a big kick serve on hard courts.
b) the earlier hip load and reverse-c
this gives:
more upward brushing
a more vertical spin axis
a higher bounce after the kick
that’s how you make the ball jump above a returner’s shoulder in melbourne heat.
c) the compact lag and neutral setup
this helps with:
timing under pressure
toss consistency
late-match reliability
which is exactly where ao matches are decided.
put simply: this serve isn’t just compatible with melbourne — it’s built for it.
6. djokovic’s joke and what elite development actually looks like
djokovic’s “copyright” comment was exactly what it sounded like: a playful nod to the visual similarity. at the elite level, nobody actually copies someone else’s serve. they copy ideas.
carlos has borrowed:
compactness
efficiency
clean sequencing
modern timing principles
and built them into:
a pinpoint stance
a vertical launch style
his own hip structure
his own arm mechanics
that’s not cloning. that’s smart evolution.
final take
carlos alcaraz’s 2026 serve isn’t a djokovic copy. it’s a modern, efficiency-driven rebuild that:
fits his athletic profile
maximises his kick serve
improves his second-serve security
and looks tailor-made for melbourne conditions.
it looks similar because modern serving has narrowed down what works best. but mechanically, structurally, and tactically, it’s a different serve. and for a player chasing a career grand slam, it’s exactly the kind of upgrade you’d expect to see.
i am not a tennis professional, and all gifs and screenshots used in this post are my own
hi anna! i was listening to this best of three podcast episode (https://open.spotify.com/episode/2j5cJ4mvyAbntOvH9w7ImU?si=dwFjH2yxSyix5TVUWPCCGQ) where they speak about sinner’s build and physicality. i found the conversation at the 16-minute mark particularly interesting:
“Much like I feel that Carlos’ athleticism has let him play ‘bigger’ than his 6 foot frame, I feel like Jannik plays more of a nimble, dare I say ‘shorter’, compact and manoeuvrable [game] at 6”3’.”
i was wondering if you think this idea has any merit to it, or is at all reflective of your own analysis of their playstyles and mechanics?
my dear anon, the podcast observation is in my opinion very sound, and that stylistic contrast they describe is genuinely there when you look at what carlos and jannik are actually doing mechanically.
how they generate power
the clearest place to see it is how each of them generates force. carlos’s forehand operates as a stretch-shortening cycle weapon: the kinetic chain loads eccentrically through hip-trunk counter-rotation, stores elastic energy in the obliques and shoulder internal rotators, then releases through a lasso follow-through that produces 3,200+ rpm topspin.
carlos hitting forehand in slow-mo during iw practice
jannik, at 191cm with long limb segments, operates more as a lever system than a rotational engine. his forehand uses a slingshot lag pattern where the racket head trails the hand through the hitting zone, storing energy in the wrist extensors before snapping forward at contact. torque equals force times moment arm, and jannik’s longer arm segments create a larger moment arm, producing equivalent racket-head speed with less angular velocity.
jannik hitting forehand in slow-mo during iw practice
the result is that carlos generates more spin and trajectory curvature, while jannik produces superior linear ball speed and depth consistency.
carlos vs jannik forehand back and front view comparison
on pure forehand quality, carlos leads. his forehand tops the atp leaderboard and is widely considered the best shot in the men’s game right now. the mechanical reason for that is the stretch-shortening cycle: the same muscle-tendon elastic loading that produces 3,200+ rpm also allows him to play bigger, heavier and higher than his 6-foot frame would suggest possible. he genuinely plays like a taller player through technique alone.
jannik tells the opposite story as at 6’3” you would expect a player who imposes himself physically through leverage and height — instead his mechanics are deliberately compact: backswing low, wrist quiet, racket head dropping through the hitting zone using gravity rather than muscular force. he plays a precise and contained game that looks more like it belongs to someone 5’10”. the compactness is not a limitation but the design.
how they cover the court
their movement patterns are equally divergent and the contrast is immediately visible in how many steps each takes to cover the same ground. carlos is widely considered the best mover on tour: he generates explosive lateral force through a low centre of gravity and wide base, producing rapid multi-directional acceleration in short bursts that look almost supernatural at full speed. the result is someone who takes many small, loaded steps, constantly firing and reloading to change direction with radical suddenness. his straight-line speed compounds this further, giving him the ability to retrieve balls that simply should not be retrievable and then reset into an attacking position within the same point.
court coverage from carlos
jannik prioritises vertical force through long-lever leg extension, which means his stride covers far more ground than carlos’s. where carlos might take four or five rapid cuts to reach the same ball, jannik gets there in two or three, his longer limbs doing the work with less visible effort and less total movement. the steps are fewer, the strides are longer, and by the time the ball arrives he is already set.
court coverage from jannik
how they construct points
the tactical identities that follow from this are almost perfectly opposed: carlos operates as a chaos agent, introducing variance, unpredictability and temporal disruption into rallies. jannik operates as a time thief, systematically reducing the opponent’s preparation window through ball speed, depth and early ball-striking that compresses their decision cycle. carlos needs time to create chaos. jannik’s system specifically eliminates time.
so to me the podcast framing holds: carlos plays bigger and more expansively than his frame suggests, and jannik plays with a mechanical containment and economy that belies his height. one wins through flair and disruption, the other through the accumulation of relentless technical pressure.
the longer game
what makes this more than an aesthetic observation is what each system asks of the body over time. jannik’s game is built to be renewable: the mechanics distribute force more evenly, gravity does much of the work, and his longer limbs mean he covers the court with less physical expenditure per step. there is no free lunch in professional tennis, but jannik’s system comes closer to one than almost anyone else on tour.
carlos’s game is the opposite proposition. every shot requires the full elastic loading and unloading of the muscle-tendon chain, every movement pattern is explosive and high impact, and the same mechanism that produces those high rpms places extreme cumulative stress across the entire kinetic chain. it is sensational precisely because it is always running at maximum output. carlos’s explosive, rotational system produces the more spectacular tennis and in many ways the more complete game. but a style built entirely on full athleticism being available at all times raises a real, non-theoretical question that jannik’s game simply does not: whether it can sustain itself across a long career without eventually demanding a technical adaptation. sports medicine experts have already noted that players with carlos’s mechanics may at some point need to adjust their technique to reduce the structural load.
in the end their career longevity may ultimately be determined by which mechanical system degrades more gracefully with age. right now the two systems produce remarkably similar results. but systems that look identical in their output can be running at very different rates of wear, and the time will only tell if it becomes visible.
hi annagoat! i was wondering if you could do an analysis on carlos' match tomorrow with zverev. i don't know much about zverev ngl, other than his big serve, as i don't make it a habit of watching his matches, so i'm not sure what to expect! i also know carlos has not really played him in a while other than cinci. anyways, if you get the time, that would be much appreciated <3! if not that's also completely fine, thank you anyway for always giving the most lovely, insightful, articulate, and well-written posts!
hiiii, for obvious reasons i’m not out here watching his matches for fun either, but i did watch his qf vs learner, then went through recaps/highlights from earlier rounds to sanity-check what kind of form he’s actually bringing into this ao run. so here are my thoughts before the semis and what to expect from this match.
what you can actually see from zverev at ao 2026
from the learner match in particular — and echoed again and again in the earlier rounds — a clear pattern emerges in zverev’s game right now: he’s constructing points around “serve → backhand stability → wait.”
against learner he hit 24 aces and only one double fault, and that matters beyond the statline. when his serve is that clean, he doesn’t have to play desperate tennis. he doesn’t need to force offense early or “win the point twice.” he can just get to neutral, breathe, and then choose when to turn the dial up. it’s the difference between a big server who’s chasing points and a big server who’s controlling points.
and once rallies start, the backhand is basically his safe house. even under stress, even when the point gets messy, he can hit that backhand hard and deep without losing shape. that’s why he can absorb a burst of chaos and then suddenly re-stabilize — like after dropping the second-set tiebreak vs learner, then coming out and absolutely torching set three. it’s not random momentum; it’s him returning to the one pattern that keeps his error rate low and his court position organized.
the backhand does three jobs for him (and this is what makes him annoying)
1. rally anchor: it’s the wing he trusts to stay deep, stay clean, and not donate. if you’re waiting for him to implode off that side, you’ll be waiting a long time.
2. directional weapon: he’ll go crosscourt all day to lock you into a groove, then sneak a down-the-line change the moment you lean or start cheating to cover. he doesn’t need to do it often, just often enough to keep you honest.
3. time-control tool: he takes the ball early enough on that side that opponents don’t get to casually set up forehands. it’s not flashy, but it robs time and keeps you from turning every rally into “forehand + options.”
so when you’re watching him this AO, you’ll see a lot of points where he’s basically saying: “you can try stuff… but you’ll have to beat this backhand wall first.” and if you can’t beat it cleanly, you end up pressing, which is exactly what he wants.
what’s “real” about his run at ao 2026
1) the learner match: serve as a life-raft + clutch reset
zverev beat learner 6-3, 6-7(5), 6-1, 7-6(3) and two things pop immediately:
• the serve is doing massive work. 24 aces / 1 double fault is not just aesthetically “big serve.” it’s “i can bail myself out any time” tennis. it means even when he plays a loose game or loses a set, he’s never far from stabilizing because his hold potential is so high.
• when momentum swings, he can re-stabilize fast. tien steals the second-set breaker after a late push, and zverev’s response is basically: okay, enough — then he wipes the slate clean in the third with a dominant, low-drama set. that’s a contender trait: not that nothing ever goes wrong, but that the recovery is immediate.
and honestly, the tiebreak detail is telling too: building a 6–0 lead in a 4th-set breaker (even if there’s a tiny wobble after) says a lot about how comfortable he is living in those “serve + big points” environments right now.
earlier rounds: dropped sets early, then got more assertive
his tournament arc makes sense when you view it as him “finding the right gear”:
• r1 vs diallo: he drops the first-set tiebreak, then rolls 6-7(1), 6-1, 6-4, 6-2. that’s zverev in a nutshell: once he locks onto rhythm and locations, the match can become very one-way.
• r2 vs muller: 6-3, 4-6, 6-3, 6-4 — not perfect, but you can see the adjustment: when he needed to, he stepped up aggression and stopped letting the match drift.
• r3 vs norrie: 7-5, 4-6, 6-3, 6-1, with a 52–29 winners-to-unforced ratio and 72% first serves in. this is important because it shows the version of him that’s most dangerous: high first-serve percentage and controlled aggression (winners without chaos).
• r4 vs cerúndolo: 6-2, 6-4, 6-4 — his cleanest performance, and the variety matters: serve-and-volley and drop shots aren’t his brand identity, they’re a sign he’s trying to avoid getting stuck in one rhythm and is willing to finish points rather than just outlast.
overall eye-test takeaway
he’s trending upward. early on he flirted with danger and had to problem-solve mid-match. by week two, he looked more proactive and more willing to finish points forward instead of just living 10 feet behind the baseline. the serve is giving him a huge floor, and the backhand is giving him a huge structure — which is exactly the combination that makes him hard to derail in a slam.
h2h vs zverev: where it stands + what their matches usually look like
their career head-to-head is 6–6, including 2–2 at slams, which already tells you a lot: this matchup doesn’t have a dominant owner. instead, it swings depending on who gets to impose their preferred match shape.
the recent context does lean toward carlos, though. carlos has won 3 of their last 4 meetings, which suggests that, more often than not lately, he’s been able to pull the rivalry closer to his kind of tennis rather than zverev’s.
their most recent meeting was at cincinnati 2025 (sf), which carlos won 6-4, 6-3. zverev struggled physically in the second set, but even before that became decisive, the pattern was familiar: carlos saved early break points, applied steady return pressure, then broke for 4–3 and never really let the match settle into zverev’s ideal rhythm.
and zooming out, their rivalry has settled into two very recognizable templates:
when zverev wins: serve dominance + linear
the clearest example is the ao 2024 quarterfinal, where zverev beat carlos 6-1, 6-3, 6-7(2), 6-4. his serve was absurd that day: 94 of 111 first serves in.
that’s the zverev blueprint at its purest:
• huge first-serve volume
• lots of quick holds
• structured baseline exchanges
• very few “messy” games
if he’s landing first serves at that clip, you’re basically trying to steal one or two points per return game and hoping for a dip. once he feels safe on serve, everything else in his game becomes calmer and more repeatable.
when carlos wins: breaks the rails → pressure + variety
the best example is the roland garros 2024 final, which carlos won 6-3, 2-6, 5-7, 6-1, 6-2. zverev can hang and even lead when the match stays scripted, but once carlos starts changing height and tempo, stepping forward, and forcing uncomfortable court coverage, zverev’s control gets disrupted and the match can swing hard.
cincinnati 2025 fits the same idea. carlos won 6-4, 6-3, saved three break points early, then broke for 4–3 and took control.
so the character of this matchup is pretty simple: zverev wants clean and scripted. carlos wants pressure and chaos. and most of their matches end up answering one question: is carlos allowed to improvise, or does zverev keep it linear?
what to expect from the ao 2026 semifinal (match shape)
zverev’s plan is pretty straightforward: protect serve at all costs, avoid neutral-rally chaos, and try to keep the match living in a narrow corridor.
that usually means:
• long stretches of comfortable holds
• only a few high-leverage games per set
• and a steady pull toward tiebreaks, where he’s statistically strong (60.5% tbs won over the last 52 weeks)
he doesn’t need to outplay carlos shot-for-shot. he wants to simplify the match, keep patterns clean, and let scoreboard pressure do the work.
if his serve is anywhere near the learner tien level (24 aces / 1 df), you should expect at least one set to drift toward 6–6. the real battle is whether carlos can create enough real return pressure games to stop that from becoming the default state.
what carlos should do to win
first: stop the match from becoming “backhand metronome tennis”. if carlos lets zverev park himself in deep, repeatable backhand-to-backhand rhythm, zverev gets to play low-variance tennis. that’s when sets naturally float toward tiebreaks — and that’s zverev’s comfort zone.
so carlos’s job is to break the rails. not with constant highlight shots, but with targeted disruption:
• change height and shape
• take time away when he gets a short ball
• finish points forward when zverev is stretched.
he’s been doing this well at ao — vs de minaur he went 18/22 at net, which is exactly the instinct he’ll need here.
the serving plan: what carlos needs to do on serve vs zverev
this is the most underrated part of the matchup. if carlos serves “normally,” zverev’s return + backhand structure can make carlos feel like he has to play perfect tennis.
1) high first-serve percentage + smart locations
zverev is tall, reads patterns well, and is very comfortable blocking returns deep and starting neutral rallies where his backhand can take over. carlos should aim for three practical targets:
• body serves: jamming zverev prevents clean backhand block returns and forces softer contact.
• wide serves: pull zverev off center and open space for the next ball.
• occasional first serves to the forehand: not because the forehand is weak, but because it prevents zverev from auto-piloting behind backhand returns on every big point.
2) serve +1 must target position, not just winners
if carlos serves and then plays a lazy neutral ball, zverev is happy — now it’s structured baseline tennis. instead, serve +1 should:
• take the first forehand early and change direction
• go behind zverev’s movement
• or finish forward when zverev is pushed wide.
3) protect the second serve
zverev isn’t the tour’s most aggressive returner, but he absolutely punishes predictable second serves by immediately initiating backhand structure.
carlos needs:
• shape and placement first
• variation in patterns
• readiness for deep, central returns.
the non-negotiables for carlos
1) don’t let this become 3–4 tiebreak sets
zverev wins 60.5% of tiebreaks. if the match becomes “serve, serve, serve, coin flip,” that favors him. carlos needs at least one real pressure game per set where he gets into 0–30 or 15–40, even if he doesn’t break immediately.
2) attack the second serve ruthlessly, but smartly
the opportunity is the second delivery and the first neutral ball after it. carlos led 2025 in first-serve return points won (35%), and this is where that skill matters most.
3) use variety to break structure
short angles, changes in height/spin, and front-court finishing when he gets a look.
4) win the scoreboard moments
convert enough chances to make zverev feel discomfort on serve. don’t let him cruise into breakers.
early signs to watch (first 4–6 service games)
signs it’s going carlos’s way:
• carlos is earning 0–30 looks on zverev’s serve
• zverev is hitting backhands on the move, not planted
• carlos is comfortable coming forward
• fewer free zverev holds.
signs it’s going zverev’s way:
• first serve looks untouchable
• rallies settling into clean backhand exchanges
• sets drifting to 5–5 with no pressure games
bottom line
zverev wants a calm, serve-led, backhand-structured match. carlos has to turn it into return pressure, disruption, and finishing. if carlos succeeds in that, the semifinal becomes a stress test — and that’s usually where his game shines.
data sources
australian open 2026 quarterfinal — zverev vs learner tien (match stats & breakdown) https://www.atptour.com/en/news/zverev-tien-australian-open-2026-qf
atp serve rating (last 52 weeks) https://www.atptour.com/en/stats/leaderboard
atp return rating (last 52 weeks) https://www.atptour.com/en/stats/leaderboard?boardType=return
atp under pressure leaderboard (tiebreak %, break points saved/converted, deciding sets) https://www.atptour.com/en/stats/leaderboard?boardType=pressure
carlos alcaraz player stats (return points won, season breakdowns) https://www.atptour.com/en/players/carlos-alcaraz/a0e2/player-stats
alexander zverev player stats https://www.atptour.com/en/players/alexander-zverev/z355/player-stats
official atp head-to-head — zverev vs alcaraz https://www.atptour.com/en/players/atp-head-2-head/alexander-zverev-vs-carlos-alcaraz/z355/a0e2
expanded head-to-head results & recent match history — alcaraz vs zverev https://tennisstats.com/h2h/carlos-alcaraz-vs-alexander-zverev-7359
australian open 2024 quarterfinal — zverev vs alcaraz (match charting) https://www.tennisabstract.com/charting/20240124-M-Australian_Open-QF-Alexander_Zverev-Carlos_Alcaraz.html
roland garros 2024 final — alcaraz vs zverev (match charting) https://www.tennisabstract.com/charting/20240609-M-Roland_Garros-F-Alexander_Zverev-Carlos_Alcaraz.html
Anna, you’re so patient and insightful with your analysis and I’m glad I discovered your account. Thank you.
I don’t know if you’ve already answered this but I wanted to ask about Carlos. Was his injury due to that one shot he played at Barcelona or was it something already bothering him for a while? We know how dangerous wrist injuries can be so do you think this is something that can reoccur through his career?
my dear anon, thank you for the kind words. carlos and his team haven’t directly shared details about what exactly is going on or what the long-term outlook looks like, so beyond that we can only make educated guesses based on what we know about the condition itself. what does seem clear is that the specific trigger was not that return in barcelona. tenosynovitis is typically an overuse condition rather than something caused by a single shot
carlos said in his barcelona press conference that his wrist gave way on a return, and revealed that it was something he had felt before. he just hadn’t expected it to get worse, dismissing it as a niggle from the demands of the week. so the wrist was already compromised before that shot. it naturally makes you wonder how long he had been feeling it and why he kept playing through it, but athletes compete through discomfort all the time, so we’ll probably never know. in that context, monte carlo already looked a little different in hindsight. his backhand, the stroke that depends most on stability in the right wrist, dropped to 79% compared with his usual 84% average, with far more errors sailing long than normal. jannik repeatedly targeted that wing in the final, and even carlos’s kick serve, arguably the most wrist-intensive serve in tennis, seemed to lack its usual bite. none of that proves the wrist was already an issue, of course, but looking back, it does make you wonder whether the signs were already there.
so where does the overuse come from? carlos’s forehand technique has been flagged as a long-term concern for a while now. he hits with a straight-arm forehand and a relatively relaxed wrist through the swing. the wrist isn’t rigidly set, but allowed to lag and then release. just before contact he pronates the forearm and snaps through the wrist extremely late and extremely fast, which is where both his racket-head speed and his trademark disguise come from. because the racket face is being manipulated at the very last possible instant, he can redirect the ball down the line or crosscourt after the opponent has already committed. the cost shows up through the release and follow-through, as the strings whip over and finish facing down while the arm wraps around the body, driving the forearm into heavy pronation and the wrist through a violent radial-to-ulnar deviation.
carlos hitting forehand during practice
the wrist looks visibly “kinked” at the top of the finish, wrenched out of line with the forearm rather than staying neutral. some analysts have suggested the whip is so elastic and so fast that the finish position isn’t really under conscious control anymore. at that racket-head speed the follow-through is largely ballistic, decelerated by passive tissue and eccentric braking rather than actively steered.
that end-range whip matters because of what’s being loaded when he gets there. the thumb-side tendons of the wrist, the abductor pollicis longus and extensor pollicis brevis, run through the first compartment over the radial styloid and are exactly the structures involved in de quervain’s tenosynovitis. reports point to de quervain’s as carlos’ diagnosis, though his team never confirmed the precise details publicly. worth noting that this is slightly atypical: forehands are more often linked to ulnar-side (ECU) wrist problems, so his injury sits on the thumb side rather than the pinky side. de quervain’s is fundamentally a deviation-and-grip injury rather than a flexion one. it’s driven by rapid radial/ulnar deviation of the wrist combined with forceful gripping, with the thumb braced hard against the handle throughout. a whippy, wrist-loose forehand loads exactly that combination: the thumb tendons help arrest a very fast deviation swing under a firm grip, hundreds of times a match and thousands of times a season, while those tendons are eccentrically decelerating a racket head moving too quickly to control precisely. tenosynovitis is inflammation of the sheath the tendon glides through, and it flares when that high-velocity, end-range repetition outruns the healing window, which a top player’s schedule rarely allows.
to be clear, nobody is saying the forehand is “wrong.” it’s arguably the best shot in the world right now, and the “flaw” is inseparable from the weapon. the same late elastic whip that generates the disguise is what removes a safer, more controlled follow-through. injuries are also almost never caused by one technical detail in isolation. it’s repetitive load accumulating over a demanding schedule, especially under fatigue, when the fine motor control needed for those last-instant adjustments degrades and the deceleration gets sloppier, forcing the joint into even more extreme end-range positions. that’s why the realistic solution is probably load management: smarter scheduling, proper recovery blocks and addressing niggles early instead of playing through them, rather than overhauling one of the best forehands in tennis. the one caveat is that de quervain’s tends to recur if the mechanical driver is still there every match, so his case may also need a small assist, whether grip sizing or easing that first-compartment load on non-critical balls, even if the core motion stays untouched.
that said, his equipment has also been flagged as something that could be compounding the issue. he plays with a full bed of babolat polyester strung tightly in a stiff babolat frame — for years that was rpm blast, one of the stiffest polys on the market, before he moved to the softer rpm team, most likely linked to arm comfort given the elbow problems he had earlier in his career. even so, rpm team is still a full poly bed in a stiff frame at tour tension, which transmits a considerable amount of shock through the arm. a wrist-intensive technique, a stiff setup and a brutal schedule add up to an enormous amount of cumulative load on one joint.
the tricky part is that the “flaw” is also the weapon. that wrist snap is where so much of the power and disguise comes from, so you can’t simply coach it out without taking away what makes his forehand so special. and honestly, why would you, when it’s brought him so much success? what will be really interesting is whether this injury prompts any visible changes designed to protect that wrist going forward, because that has to become a major priority now. chronic issues in the dominant wrist are about the last thing a tennis player wants, and can become career-defining if they aren’t managed properly.
rafa nadal himself said that carlos’s injury is the same one he dealt with in 2016 and that it “won’t be chronic” if it’s managed correctly. that’s also consistent with what we know medically. tenosynovitis is generally fully treatable when managed properly, with complete recovery expected as long as there isn’t significant tendon degeneration. carlos and his team also sound optimistic, so for now i think that’s probably the right place to land. let’s see what comes next.
Hi! I was just wondering about something and you are the tennis scholar to me! Do you know what Carlos is doing in those photos where he's got something over one eye while he's practicing? It doesn't look quite like an eyepatch, it has holes in it. Thank you for all your insights and info, I love your blog!
anon, thank you for being nice, but i’m definitely not an expert on anything. to me, though, it looks like a sports vision occluder rather than a medical eye patch because it has holes in it.
a medical eye patch is solid. the whole point is to block one eye completely. training occluders are usually perforated or have a small aperture instead. rather than taking one eye out of the equation, they degrade what that eye sends to the brain. your vision becomes less clear and less certain, so your brain has to work harder to build a usable picture from imperfect information. basically, they make the visual task harder in training so normal vision feels easier afterwards.
in tennis, this kind of tool is mostly used when training the return, and i’ve seen it used to work on things like:
• fixation and tracking - a restricted aperture punishes sloppy eye movements. you have to find the ball and stay locked onto it, right through the bounce, which is where a lot of returns are won or lost.
• anticipation - because the visual information is less reliable, you commit earlier by reading the toss, the server’s body position and the racket face instead of waiting to see exactly where the ball goes.
• depth and swerve - judging a wide serve from motion cues rather than clean binocular vision, so the read still holds up when the ball is curving away from you.
• splitting attention - keeping track of both the ball and the opponent’s court position at the same time, so the return gets placed rather than just survived.
• recovering from a late read - starting the swing from a worse position than you’d like and still finding the strings.
• contrast between training and competition - take the occluder off and everything suddenly feels brighter, wider and easier. that’s probably the benefit athletes talk about most.
it also makes sense if you think about where carlos is in his rehab. after a long layoff, the biggest challenge usually isn’t fitness. it’s timing and anticipation, because those start to fade while you’re not able to hit at full intensity. vision work is one of the few things you can really push without asking much of the wrist, so you can keep training the reading-and-reacting side of tennis while the injury is still being managed. and that’s arguably the part of his game that needs to be match-ready from day one.
it’s also not unusual for him to do such type of exercises. before rg 2025, for example, there were reports that he spent about 15 min returning serves with his eyes closed, only opening them when he heard the strings make contact with the ball. his team clearly treats perception as something you have to keep training to stay as sharp as possible.
so yeah, to me it looks much more like vision training than a medical eye patch. and if that’s what it is, it actually seems like a reasonable way to spend part of rehab to stop his timing and anticipation on the return from deteriorating.