#hyperscience

[lindortech]

HyperScience, the machine learning startup tackling data entry, raises $30 million Series B HyperScience, the device learning company that turns humankind readable data into device readable data, has today announced the close of a $30 million successions B funding circular led by Stripes faction, with participation from existing investors FirstMark Capital and Felicis Ventures, as well as brand-new investors Battery Ventures, intercontinental Founders Capital, TD Ameritrade and QBE.

[jimivaey]

HyperScience, the machine learning startup tackling data entry, raises $30 million Series B

HyperScience, the machine learning startup tackling data entry, raises $30 million Series B

HyperScience, the machine learning company that turns human readable data into machine readable data, has today announced the close of a $30 million Series B funding round led by Stripes Group, with participation from existing investors FirstMark Capital and Felicis Ventures as well as new investors Battery Ventures, Global Founders Fund, TD Ameritrade, and QBE.

HyperScience launched out of…

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[jimivaey]

HyperScience, the machine learning startup tackling data entry, raises $30 million Series B

HyperScience, the machine learning startup tackling data entry, raises $30 million Series B

HyperScience, the machine learning company that turns human readable data into machine readable data, has today announced the close of a $30 million Series B funding round led by Stripes Group, with participation from existing investors FirstMark Capital and Felicis Ventures as well as new investors Battery Ventures, Global Founders Fund, TD Ameritrade, and QBE.

HyperScience launched out of…

View On WordPress

[clodia-metelli]

Whenever the accusation of pseudoscience is made, or wherever it is anticipated, its targets commonly respond by making elaborate displays of how scientific they really are. Pushing the weird and the implausible, they bang on about scientific method, about intellectual openness and egalitarianism, about the vital importance of seriously inspecting all counter-instances and anomalies, about the value of continual scepticism, about the necessity of replicating absolutely every claim, about the lurking subjectivity of everybody else. Call this hyperscience, a claim to scientific status that conflates the PR of science with its rather more messy, complicated and less than ideal everyday realities and that takes the PR far more seriously than do its stuck-in-the-mud orthodox opponents. Beware of hyperscience. It can be a sign that something isn’t kosher. A rule of thumb for sound inference has always been that if it looks like a duck, swims like a duck and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck. But there’s a corollary: if it struts around the barnyard loudly protesting that it’s a duck, that it possesses the very essence of duckness, that it’s more authentically a duck than all those other orange-billed, web-footed, swimming fowl, then you’ve got a right to be suspicious: this duck may be a quack.

Stephen Shapin

[ombredundoute-blog]

Hyperscience et Pseudoscience?

Steven Shapin, historien des sciences bien connu au moins depuis Léviathan et la Pompe a air, donne dans la London Review of Books une recension d'une monographie portant sur Velikovksy, que vient juste de publier Michael Gordin. Il y a dans cet ouvrage et dans la recension de nombreux points qui intéresseront sans doute tous ceux qui se sont penchés sur la cosmologie, les datations ainsi que le "catrastrophisme", mais ce qui a retenu mon attention se trouve à la fin de la recension de Shapin. Celui-ci en effet, note, que si les spéculations de Velikovky ont vite été qualifiées de "pseudoscientifiques", il n'est pas évident de donner des critères de cette pseudoscientificité. En particulier, Shapin va jusqu'à dire que pseudo-science n'est pas "antiscience", et que, bien souvent, les affirmations de vertu scientifique peuvent servir de critère assez sûr de discours pseudoscientifique. Il s'agirait là de mimer la science, de pratiquer ce que Shapin appelle le service comm" de la science ("PR of science"). L'argument de Shapin est assez convaincant si l'on a en tête les "accusés" --- que l'on pense à la manière dont l'ID se bat sur les définitions de la science dans les procès ou dans les textes de lois que ses défenseurs tentent de faire passer --- mais ce qui reste dans l'ombre ci-dessous concerne le côté de l'accusation. Pourquoi la surenchère sur la "scientificité" ne se trouverait-elle que du côté de celui qui est accusé de charlatanisme ou, plus poliment, de pseudoscientificité? Par ailleurs, s'il est clair que le contexte est sans doute essentiel pour faire le départ entre une défense raisonnable de modes de raisonnement attestés, ou encore de principes, méthodes et résultats qui forment l'ossature de ce que l'on entend par "science", comment va-t-on décrire le changement de contexte qui fait passer d'une défense raisonnable à une surenchère pathologique? Il est possible que la solution esquissée ci-dessous pose plus de problèmes qu'elle n'en résout:

Gordin sides with those – like Einstein and a number of modern sociologists and philosophers – who doubt that universal and context-independent criteria can be found reliably to distinguish the scientific from the pseudoscientific. But here is a suggestion about how one might do something, however imperfectly, however vulnerable to counter-instances and however apparently paradoxical, to get a practical grip on the difference between the genuine article and the fake. Whenever the accusation of pseudoscience is made, or wherever it is anticipated, its targets commonly respond by making elaborate displays of how scientific they really are. Pushing the weird and the implausible, they bang on about scientific method, about intellectual openness and egalitarianism, about the vital importance of seriously inspecting all counter-instances and anomalies, about the value of continual scepticism, about the necessity of replicating absolutely every claim, about the lurking subjectivity of everybody else. Call this hyperscience, a claim to scientific status that conflates the PR of science with its rather more messy, complicated and less than ideal everyday realities and that takes the PR far more seriously than do its stuck-in-the-mud orthodox opponents. Beware of hyperscience. It can be a sign that something isn’t kosher. A rule of thumb for sound inference has always been that if it looks like a duck, swims like a duck and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck. But there’s a corollary: if it struts around the barnyard loudly protesting that it’s a duck, that it possesses the very essence of duckness, that it’s more authentically a duck than all those other orange-billed, web-footed, swimming fowl, then you’ve got a right to be suspicious: this duck may be a quack.