Herbert O. Yardley is one of the most enignmatic, interesting and fascinating personalities of the pre WWII era. He was responsible for several erly successes against Japan's codes prior to WWII...but he may also have been a traitor to his country...Read the following article and decide for yourself...AR Reviews from The Journal of Intelligence History Volume 5, Number 1 (Summer 2005) David Kahn, The Reader of Gentlemen's Mail: Herbert O. Yardley and the Birth of American Codebreaking , New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004. 368 pp., ISBN: 0300098464, $32.50 Herbert O. Yardley and David Kahn remarkably share similar experiences. In 1931 following his publication of The American Black Chamber , exposing America's codebreaking organization, Yardley was called a traitor by some, and ostracized for life by the American intelligence organization. He had revealed that America was breaking codes! Kahn, speaking to an audience at the National Security Agency (NSA) on the occasion of its 50 th anniversary on 1 November 2002, noted, "...when my book The Codebreakers was published in 1967 ... it became the subject of a ban on the part of the National Security Agency. ... Its author was anathema at the NSA. He revealed that America was breaking codes!" Yardley, despite his troubles with the U.S. government, was among the first eight cryptologists selected for the NSA Hall of Honor, created in 1999. In 1995 Kahn was named visiting "scholar in residence" by the National Security Agency and provided support for this book. Yardley, who established the United States codebreaking organization during World War I, could have no better biographer that Kahn, the ultimate historian of cryptology. Kahn meticulously traces the life of Yardley. The timeline includes his boyhood in Indiana, employment as a telegrapher at the Department of State, commissioning and transfer to US Army Military Intelligence to head a new codebreaking unit, MI-8, and dismissal when Henry L. Stimson, the new Secretary of State, dissolved the unit in 1929. Kahn provides anecdotes that describe the successes of MI-8 during its existence. These included events during WWI and its role during the Washington Disarmament Conference in 1921-22. (This supported the successful U.S. negotiations leading to Japanese acceptance of a reduced naval ratio of heavy combatant ships.) Kahn develops an intimate composite personality of Stimson, drawing from his personal diary and comments from friends, which led to his famous statement "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail" in 1929. When the Black Chamber was closed, Yardley refused employment at a lesser salary with the army. William F. Friedman, often called the father of American cryptology, remained with a small codebreaking unit in army intelligence. Following the closure of MI-8, a new life and timeline began for Yardley. Frustrated in finding employment during the depression, and near destitution, he published the secrets of MI-8 in the classical American Black Chamber (commonly referred to as the ABC ) in 1931. Kahn details the steps taken by the publisher to avoid legal action, leading to eventual publication. Kahn's discussion of the impact of the book on the code systems of Japan is one of the key issues in the book. With the ABC , a new era began for Yardley, who was unable to find employment in the U.S. government for an action that some considered treasonable. Kahn develops the frustration that plagued Yardley during these depression years, detailing various business ventures that all ended in failure, including writing screenplays and fiction. In 1933 Yardley attempted to publish another book, ghost written by Marie Stuart Klooz, Japanese Diplomatic Secrets. The book detailed the work of MI-8 during the Washington Disarmament Conference of 1921-22. It was seized by the Department of Justice before publication, and remained hidden in the Department of Justice archives until found based on a request by Kahn to the National Archives. Intimate details of Yardley's employment in 1938-1940 by the Chinese government and his life in Chungking is drawn from private letters mailed to his family and friends in the U.S. It portrays another side of Yardley, his drinking, gambling and sexual habits, particularly in China. As Yardley reported directly to the head of Chinese intelligence, Dai Li, who reported directly to Chiang Kia-Shek, this period was a mixture of both pride and frustration. Yardley created one of several code breaking units working under Dai Li, which were eventually combined. Kahn documents several of the successes of the units against Japanese codes. Yardley returned to the U.S. in 1940, hoping to gain employment again in the field of cryptology, but the ABC publication blacklisted him for any sensitive work in the government. He was, however, recruited by the Canadian government, and quickly established their cryptologic unit, showing some immediate successes. When the British cryptologic group learned of his employment, they insisted he be dismissed with the threat of severing cooperation. Yardley was fired. Returning to Washington, DC, a frustrated Yardley again sought cryptologic employment, but was rebuked and ended the war in the Office of Price Administration. Yardley died in 1958 and was buried in Arlington National Cemetery. Ironically, his last book, The Education of a Poker Player , which was written in 1957, had 14 printings and sold over 100,000 copies (and perhaps more as the book is still in print). Kahn's reexamines several key historical issues related to Yardley. The first is the impact of ABC on codebreaking. Kahn notes that many researchers, authors and cryptologist (including William F. Friedman, this reviewer, an NSA discussion of Yardley (http://www.nsa.gov/museum/museu 00004.cfm), and Kahn himself in the Codebreakers ) stated that ABC caused countries to change their codes. Kahn presents two graphs showing that the number of decrypts by the British and Germans did not decrease for the two years following this publication. Although the British may have been equal to the task of unmasking any new systems developed in response to the ABC , Kahn's additional research on the total number of Japanese diplomatic messages received from embassies and legations during the period 1929-1933 shows that the percentage of solutions seemed to increase with increases in message traffic. A related key issue is than Kahn asserts ABC actually helped American codebreaking, citing Frank Rowlett, another pioneer in U.S. cryptology, who stated the book "…promoted U.S. cryptanalysis." (As did Kahn's book The Codebreakers.) The second issue is Kahn's discussion of Japanese Diplomatic Secrets. Robin Denniston attributes the work directly to Yardley. Kahn, through details of Yardley's writing style, concludes that Marie Stuart Klooz was the author. However, the book could not have been written without Washington Naval Conference material Yardley removed from MI-8. The reason for the seizure was political, not national security. Charles Evans Hughes, who was Secretary of State during the Washington Disarmament Conference, was Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 1933, when Japanese Diplomatic Secrets was seized. His activities in 1921-22 could have been seen by some as illegal (interception of foreign communications). Kahn states the manuscript had 970 pages, which is true, but it also includes and additional 12 Appendices of 60 pages. The Ladislas Farago disclosure that Yardley sold secrets to the Japanese is another key issue. This claim has been discussed and debated in the literature since it was first made by Farago in his book The Broken Seal: The Story of ‘Operation Magic' and the Pearl Harbor Disaster in 1967. Kahn (unfortunately in a long endnote) discusses the investigation by an American Japanese linguist, Fred C. Woodrough Jr., for Vice Admiral Rufus L. Taylor, deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in 1967, which concluded that Yardley did sell secrets to the Japanese. This was based on a memorandum in Japanese archives stating Yardley sold solved Japanese messages to the Ambassador in Washington for $7,000. However, research conducted by Japanese historians in the Foreign Ministry archives failed to find the cited documents and Kahn concludes the charges are false. Kahn expands his argument citing comments by Cryptologia co-editor Louis Kruh, who stated "...a smoking gun (the cited Japanese document), if one exists, has not been found." Kruh was commenting on the Denniston article cited above, which also concluded that Yardley had sold secrets to the Japanese. This reviewer was a member of a composite military cryptologic reserve unit at the National Security Agency when the Farago book was published. At the weekly meeting of the unit, a researcher (name long forgotten) presented his research, concluding that Farago was wrong and Yardley had not sold secrets, based on his inability to find the material cited by Farago. Compounding the issue is an undated 23-page monograph " Pioneers in U.S. Cryptology ," published by the NSA Center for Cryptologic History, which states, "Independent investigations indicate that although much of Farago's description of the transaction was undocumented or wrong (e.g., the date) the basic claim was true." The questionable Japanese Foreign Ministry memorandum is then cited! It is for the reader to decide this issue. The book is much more than the story of Yardley. Periodically, Kahn presents the various interfaces between Yardley and Friedman, contrasting their personalities, skills and weaknesses. He also shows the relationships Yardley had with other early U.S. cryptologist, most now forgotten. It is a must read for those interested in this history. Extensive endnotes and lists of core and published sources will be invaluable for those who wish to pursue this interest. Emil Levine Vienna
