The question of ethical universals is one of the deepest in philosophy, straddling the line between the descriptive (what moral rules do all societies share?) and the normative (what moral rules should all societies share?). The search results provide a rich, multi-layered answer, revealing that there is strong evidence for certain foundational universals, even as the debate over their origin and application continues.
Here is a breakdown of the proposed universals of ethics, organized by their basis in human nature, cross-cultural consensus, and philosophical frameworks.
I. The Foundational Universals: Sympathy, Fairness, and Reciprocity
Perhaps the most robust evidence for ethical universals points to a few core principles rooted in our common humanity. Philosopher Peter Singer, reviewing the work of James Q. Wilson, affirms that there are significant "moral universals" recognized by virtually every human society. The key features he identifies are sympathy (or empathy) and a sense of fairness or reciprocity. This isn't just a human trait; Singer notes that these features extend to our closest nonhuman relatives as well, suggesting a deep evolutionary basis for these ethical building blocks.
Reciprocity as the Golden Rule: This principle is the most widely cited universal. Patrick Colm Hogan, writing for the Literary Universals Project, points out that Peter Singer identifies "the notion of reciprocity may have served as the basis for the 'Golden Rule'–treat others as you would like them to treat you". A 'Declaration of a Global Ethic' approved by many cultures explicitly includes the Golden Rule as "the irrevocable, unconditional [ethical] norm for all areas of life". Its formulations can be found across a wide array of traditions, from Zoroaster and Confucius to the founders of Jainism.
II. Universals as a Framework for Dialogue: A Proposed Code
The practical need for a shared moral language in an interconnected world has led to efforts to compile a set of universal ethical principles. One such framework, developed by Larry Colero and hosted by the UBC Centre for Applied Ethics, has been used across five continents. It organizes principles into three overlapping categories, visualized as a flame to show their interrelationship. This framework is grounded in what Colero calls the "mother of all principles – unconditional love and compassion," which he distills into the first principle: "concern for the well-being of others".
Interpersonal Ethics: Concern for well-being of others; Respect for autonomy; Trustworthiness & honesty; Benevolence; Preventing harm; Basic justice (fairness).
Application: General expectations of any person in any society. The "morality" we try to instill in children.
Professional Ethics: Impartiality; Openness (full disclosure); Confidentiality; Due diligence; Fidelity to professional responsibilities; Avoiding conflict of interest.
Application: Formal duties for those in a professional capacity (doctors, lawyers, engineers, employees).
Global Ethics: Reverence for life; Interdependence & responsibility for the 'whole'; Global justice; Environmental stewardship; Reverence for place.
Application: An evolutionary ideal for humanity to aspire to. Responsibilities that come with power and global citizenship.
III. Philosophical Foundations and Counterarguments
The search for ethical universals is an ancient project. The search results highlight two major, contrasting philosophical approaches.
A. The Rationalist Foundation (Immanuel Kant)
Kant's work is a cornerstone of universalist ethics. He believed that a universal code of ethics could be built by applying reason. His famous Categorical Imperative provides a test for moral action: one should "act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law". For example, if everyone stole, trust and property would be impossible, so stealing is inherently unethical. For Kant, morality is a matter of rational duty, binding on all rational beings, not just a matter of personal feeling or cultural convention.
B. The Relativist Challenge (Marx, Engels)
The idea of universal ethics is not without its powerful critics. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels argued that there can be no universal code because ethics are relative to the economic and historical situation of each society. What is considered moral in a feudal society may differ fundamentally from what is moral in a capitalist one. For them, morality is an ideological superstructure that serves the interests of the ruling class, and it changes as the economic base of society changes. This view poses a direct challenge to the very possibility of timeless, universal moral truths.
Philosophical arguments for universals:
Kant's categorical imperative claims to derive universal moral laws through pure reason. Act only according to maxims you could will as universal laws. This generates duties (don't lie, keep promises) that apply to all rational beings regardless of culture.
Natural law theory suggests morality is grounded in human nature and the requirements for human flourishing. Since humans share a common nature, basic goods (life, knowledge, friendship) and corresponding duties are universal.
Social contract theories argue that rational agents in certain idealized conditions would converge on similar principles. Rawls's veil of ignorance, for instance, is meant to generate principles any rational person would accept.
The challenges:
Cultural relativism: Anthropological evidence shows enormous moral diversity. Practices condemned in some cultures (infanticide, slavery, cannibalism, honor killing) were accepted or even required in others. What seems universal often dissolves under scrutiny—even the incest taboo varies in who counts as "too close" to marry.
Interpretation problems: Societies might share abstract principles (fairness, harm avoidance) but disagree radically about their application. Is capital punishment murder? Is abortion harm? Everyone agrees harming innocents is wrong, but "innocent" and "harm" are culturally constructed categories.
The problem of moral progress: If morality is truly universal and objective, why has humanity taken so long to recognize basic human rights? Why did brilliant thinkers like Aristotle accept slavery? Universalists must explain widespread, long-lasting moral error. Relativists can say moral standards just changed; universalists must say nearly everyone was wrong for millennia.
Whose universals?: Critics note that supposedly "universal" principles often turn out to reflect Western, educated, industrial, rich, democratic (WEIRD) societies. When philosophers claim to discover universal ethics through reason, they're often universalizing their particular cultural assumptions.
Middle positions:
Minimal universalism: Perhaps only very thin principles are universal (don't cause gratuitous suffering, reciprocate kindness) while thick moral systems vary legitimately. This acknowledges both commonality and diversity.
Capabilities approach: Philosophers like Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen argue for universal human capabilities (health, education, political participation) that all societies should protect, while allowing cultural variation in how these are realized.
Evolutionary ethics: Some argue that evolution has equipped humans with universal moral intuitions (fairness, harm avoidance, in-group loyalty) that then get culturally elaborated in diverse ways. The universals are psychological dispositions, not specific rules.
Overlapping consensus: John Rawls suggested people from different comprehensive doctrines (religions, philosophies) might endorse the same political principles for different reasons. Universal agreement on practice doesn't require universal agreement on foundations.
IV. Descriptive vs. Normative Universals: A Crucial Distinction
A key nuance raised in the search results is the difference between a universal description and a universal prescription. Patrick Colm Hogan stresses that his work on ethical universals concerns the description of norms found across cultures, not their normative force. Even if every culture shared a particular ethical belief, that would not automatically make it morally right (as the example of universally held, but abhorrent, beliefs from a hypothetical successful Nazi propaganda campaign shows).
However, Hogan argues that identifying descriptive universals can still be valuable for normative debates. If a principle like the Golden Rule is found across diverse cultures, it provides a common ground for dialogue and disables the simplistic cultural relativist claim that "my culture's different values are just as valid as yours".
V. Conclusion: The Evolving Search for a Shared Moral Language
The "universals of ethics" are not a single, definitive list of rules. Instead, they represent an ongoing conversation about our shared moral inheritance and future.
Empirically, we find strong evidence for core principles like reciprocity, care for kin and group, fairness, and the prohibition of violence across cultures.
Philosophically, thinkers like Kant provide a rational foundation for universal moral duties, while others like Marx warn that such claims can mask economic interests.
Practically, frameworks like Colero's offer a toolbox for navigating global ethical dilemmas, grounded in principles like concern for others, which are a secular distillation of the Golden Rule found in virtually all faiths and belief systems.
Ultimately, the universals of ethics may be less about a rigid code and more about a shared orientation: a recognition of our interdependence, a capacity for empathy and fairness, and a need for a common language to resolve the inevitable conflicts that arise in a diverse and interconnected world. As one analysis concludes, "the value lies in the search for principles that can be shared by all and can underpin the framework for global dialogue on ethical issues".
There seem to be recurring moral themes across cultures—concern for harm, fairness norms, in-group loyalty, authority respect, purity/sanctity—but their relative weight, application, and even content vary enormously. Perhaps the universal is the structure of moral thinking (evaluating actions, making distinctions between right/wrong, feeling moral emotions) while the content is substantially variable.
The question ultimately connects to deeper issues: Is morality discovered or invented? Are humans fundamentally similar or diverse? Can reason alone generate ethical truths, or is morality inseparable from culture, emotion, and practice?
Putting Others First got me riding the Angst Train to Painville and I’m picking up passengers. Who wants to hop on? Okay, great.
Hey! I see you in the back, sneaking on without a ticket. What kind of a post do you think this is? Go back and get your free ticket and complimentary tissue box. I will not stand for this kind of disorder.
Alright, everyone settled in? Too bad we’re pulling out anyway.
Our first Side Stop (I think I’m clever, let me have this) is Patton, the Mayor of Muchkinland. He’s been struggling lately with his perception of Thomas as a perfectly good person and the appearance of Remus and the conflict between the wedding and the callback. As Patton explains at the end of the episode, he’s been struggling to do his job as Thomas got older. He’s gone overboard and hurt Thomas with his overzealous enforcement of ideals. Now he’s trying to reign himself in, back off while still doing his job and that balancing act is no easy thing.
He’s trying not to force Thomas while still steering him on the right path. He’s trying to listen to and respect Roman when he disagrees adamantly with him. He’s trying and he’s out of his element. Can Lying Be Good showed that while Patton has a lot of feelings about right and wrong he has very limited knowledge of philosophy (if any at all). All the philosophical arguments made (unknowingly) by Roman and Patton during the episode could have gone smoother if they had the precedent of arguments for and against different normative ethical theories.
Next Side stop, our very own gay Disney prince, Roman.
Roman has been making a lot of effort lately. He’s trying to be nicer to Logan, a threat to his popularity. He’s trying to be nicer to Virgil, the first ‘dark side’ he encountered on the show. He’s making an honest effort to be better for Thomas and not put his dreams/desires/goals first all the time (see Thomas’ sentence in Selfishness v. Selflessness).
He said he was the most important side in Learning New Things About Ourselves and now he’s willing to give up more control and give it to Patton because he believes that that is what Patton and Thomas need to be a better person. That’s a huge sacrifice for him, on the heels of sacrificing the callback to attend Lee and Mary Lee’s wedding.
Roman is still by no means blameless in this video, but he's been trying a lot harder. And then laughing at Janus, far from his best moment. It was petty and cruel, but Janus had it handled. He's a snake and he struck Roman where it hurt. Thomas or Patton could have said something to Roman about crossing a line, could have addressed it immediately in a way that made it clear that they support Roman if not his actions. Their silence shut Roman down hard.
Roman is supposed to be a 'hero'. A hero needs a villain. At first it was Virgil, then Logan, recently Deceit. Now Janus is getting 'a seat at the table' and I can't imagine how Roman sees that. Like he's been defeated and each of his 'villains' has triumphed over him? He's losing his narrative and that has got to sting.
And the little nod Janus gives Roman when Thomas confirms Roman is his hero, Roman takes that as confirmation Thomas is lying to him. And Patton says 'we love you' and again, Roman doesn't believe him because Deceit has a seat at the table now.
And here we are at our third stop, who could forget Logan and his Lowdowns?
The whole episode Logan is trying to be less invasive, less in their face, but he still has a job to do. He's trying to provide relevant facts to support the emotions playing out. Support! He's not hurrying them to a predetermined conclusion. He's not ignoring them or viewing their contributions as unimportant, he knows better now.
Patton immediately calls him 'optional'. And Roman chooses ignorance, pushing Logan's button without hesitation or remorse. Thomas interrupts him. So Logan tries to present his information silently, which also doesn't go well.
When he has 'too much' to say Roman cuts him off, very literally, and the only one Thomas expresses concern about is Patton.
Patton calls on him, finally asking Logan for his input, and Patton skips him because he doesn't like what Logan is saying. He devalues Logan's contribution "Well, you can't really learn how to take care of others from a book" and Logan is kidnapped by Deceit.
And then, oh dear, when Logan comes back Deceit immediately curses, making his displeasure at Logan's arrival known. "Not that any of you care". Logan is Thomas’ logic. He's known for stating facts and he believes the other sides and Thomas don't care about him
"Then I will do you all a favor and spare you my company." Even in the face of what Logan believes is their apathy, he still cares about them. Knows his presence is unwelcome and is willing to leave them alone. He gives his very helpful information before taking his leave, unthanked, unappreciated, and does not return.
Which brings us to Janus
Janus, who’s been slow to join them, slow to drop the 'I'm the scary bad guy' persona. He shows his vulnerability, his name, and is immediately attacked for it. And how he handled it, lashing out? That response was far too quick to be incidental. He's had to defend himself before. He's been hurt before.
The overwhelmingly positive response when he gets Thomas to repeat that, for once, Thomas thinks Janus is right? He’s been starved for validation and approval from the person he exists to serve. And he needed Thomas to say it twice, not because he didn’t hear the first time (I’m not buying that) but because he needed confirmation that Thomas meant it. This may be a moment he never thought he’d get to have.
And consider this, all of Thomas's sides in this episode are hurt in one way or another. Patton is confused and at a loss for how to keep Thomas on 'Santa's nice list". Janus makes himself vulnerable and is attacked. Roman is trying so hard to be better and still doesn't get the good ending. Logan is ignored and neglected. If four out of six of Thomas' known sides are hurting, how must Thomas feel?
Welcome to Painville and thank you for joining me on the Thomas Sanders Sides Angst Express. Enjoy your stay and your complimentary tissues.
Special Thanks to DeathShadowRules for convincing me to share the train with everyone.
The ontology of ethics is one of the most foundational and contested areas of philosophy. It asks: What is the fundamental nature of moral values, duties, and virtues? Do they exist independently of human minds, or are they human constructions? If they exist, what kind of reality do they have?
In essence, the ontology of ethics investigates the mode of being of the ethical. It is the inquiry into whether "good," "right," "evil," and "obligation" name features of reality itself or are projections of human subjectivity onto a morally neutral world.
Here is a systematic exploration of the ontology of ethics, mapping the major positions and the arguments for and against each.
I. THE CORE ONTOLOGICAL QUESTIONS
The ontology of ethics can be organized around a series of fundamental questions:
Do moral properties exist?
If they exist, are they objective?
If they exist, are they natural or non-natural?
If they don't exist, what are we doing when we moralize?
II. MORAL REALISM: THE CLAIM THAT MORALITY IS REAL
Moral realism is the view that moral properties exist objectively, independently of human beliefs, feelings, or conventions. Just as scientific claims aim to describe a mind-independent physical world, moral claims aim to describe a mind-independent moral reality.
A. Naturalism: Morality as Part of the Natural World
Moral naturalism holds that moral properties are natural properties—the kind studied by the empirical sciences. "Goodness" might be identical to "pleasure" (utilitarianism) or "that which promotes human flourishing" (Aristotelian naturalism).
Utilitarian Naturalism: Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill effectively identified the good with pleasure and the absence of pain. These are natural, empirically observable states. "Right" actions are those that produce the best balance of pleasure over pain.
Aristotelian Naturalism: Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse argue that moral goodness is analogous to biological flourishing. Just as a good oak tree is one that realizes its natural potential (deep roots, broad canopy, abundant acorns), a good human is one that realizes human natural potential—through virtue, reason, and community.
Cornell Realism: Richard Boyd and David Brink argue that moral properties are natural properties (like "conductive to human flourishing") that can be investigated empirically, though they may not be reducible to simpler natural properties.
Strengths: Naturalism makes ethics continuous with science. It avoids mysterious, non-natural entities. It provides a method (empirical investigation) for resolving moral disputes.
Weaknesses: The "open question argument" (G.E. Moore) suggests that for any natural property proposed as identical to "good," we can intelligibly ask: "But is it good?" This seems to show that "good" is not identical to any natural property. Also, deriving "ought" from "is" remains problematic (Hume's guillotine).
B. Non-Naturalism: Morality as Sui Generis
Non-naturalism holds that moral properties are real and objective but not reducible to natural properties. They are sui generis—of their own unique kind—and known through rational intuition rather than empirical observation.
G.E. Moore's Intuitionism: In Principia Ethica, Moore argued that "good" is a simple, indefinable, non-natural property. Just as "yellow" cannot be defined to someone who hasn't seen it, "good" cannot be defined but only directly intuited.
W.D. Ross's Pluralism: Ross argued that we have immediate, self-evident intuitions of prima facie duties (fidelity, gratitude, justice, beneficence, non-maleficence, self-improvement). These duties are objective but may conflict; judgment is required to determine our actual duty in concrete situations.
Rational Intuitionism (Audi, Huemer): Contemporary intuitionists argue that we have intellectual seeming or rational insight into basic moral truths, analogous to our insight into logical and mathematical truths.
Strengths: Non-naturalism preserves the objectivity of ethics while respecting the uniqueness of moral discourse. It explains why moral truths seem categorically binding, not merely hypothetical.
Weaknesses: Critics charge that non-naturalism posits a "queer" kind of property (J.L. Mackie)—utterly unlike anything else in the universe—and a mysterious faculty of "intuition" that lacks explanatory power. It also struggles to explain moral disagreement: if moral truths are self-evident, why do intelligent people disagree so profoundly?
C. Moral Realism in Theological Context
Classical theism provides another form of moral realism: moral properties are grounded in the nature or will of God.
Divine Command Theory: Moral obligations are commands of God. Right actions are those God commands; wrong actions are those God forbids.
Divine Nature Theory (Aquinas, Adams): Moral goodness is not arbitrary divine will but is grounded in God's necessary, unchanging nature. God's commands are expressions of this nature.
Strengths: This view provides a robust foundation for moral objectivity and explains the categorical, authoritative character of moral demands.
Weaknesses: The Euthyphro dilemma remains powerful: Is something good because God commands it (which seems arbitrary), or does God command it because it is good (which makes God subject to an independent standard)? Also, this view is unavailable to non-theists.
III. MORAL ANTI-REALISM: THE CLAIM THAT MORALITY IS NOT REAL
Moral anti-realism denies that moral properties exist objectively and independently. There is no moral reality to be discovered; morality is something we create, project, or express.
A. Error Theory: Morality is a Mistake
Error theory, most famously defended by J.L. Mackie in Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, holds that:
Moral claims purport to describe objective, mind-independent moral facts.
But no such facts exist.
Therefore, all positive moral claims are false.
Mackie's "argument from queerness" contends that objective moral properties, if they existed, would be utterly unlike anything else in the universe—they would have to be both intrinsically action-guiding and objectively prescriptive. Since we have no reason to believe in such queer entities, we should conclude that they do not exist.
Strengths: Error theory takes moral discourse seriously (it doesn't reinterpret it as something else) while maintaining a naturalistic worldview. It explains moral disagreement and the historical variability of moral codes.
Weaknesses: If all moral claims are false, then "murder is wrong" is as false as "murder is right." This seems deeply counterintuitive and undermines the practical function of morality. Error theorists struggle to explain why we should continue moralizing at all.
B. Expressivism (Non-Cognitivism): Morality as Attitude
Expressivism holds that moral claims do not describe facts at all; they express attitudes, emotions, or prescriptions.
A.J. Ayer's Emotivism: "Murder is wrong" does not state a fact but expresses disapproval: "Murder, boo!" It is more like an exclamation than a statement.
C.L. Stevenson's Emotivism: Moral terms have both descriptive and emotive meaning. They express attitudes and are used to influence others' attitudes.
R.M. Hare's Prescriptivism: Moral language is prescriptive—it tells someone what to do. "You ought to X" means something like "Do X!" combined with a commitment to universalize the prescription.
Simon Blackburn's Quasi-Realism: Blackburn attempts to capture the benefits of realism (the appearance that we are talking about objective facts) while maintaining an expressivist foundation. We "project" our attitudes onto the world and then talk as if they were properties of the world.
Strengths: Expressivism fits naturally with a naturalistic worldview. It explains the intimate connection between moral judgment and motivation (if moral judgments are expressions of attitude, their motivational force is built in). It handles the open question argument effortlessly.
Weaknesses: Critics charge that expressivism fails to capture the cognitive content of moral discourse. When we say "torture is wrong," we seem to be saying something about torture, not just expressing our feelings. The "Frege-Geach problem" challenges expressivists to explain how moral terms function in unasserted contexts (e.g., "If torture is wrong, then what X did was wrong"). Expressivists have developed sophisticated responses, but the debate continues.
C. Constructivism: Morality as Rational Construction
Constructivism offers a middle path between realism and anti-realism. Moral truths are not discovered (realism) nor merely projected (expressivism); they are constructed through rational procedures.
Kantian Constructivism (John Rawls, Christine Korsgaard): Moral principles are those that would be agreed upon by rational agents under conditions of fairness (Rawls's original position) or that are constitutive of rational agency itself (Korsgaard).
Humean Constructivism (Sharon Street): Moral values are constructed from our contingent, evaluative starting points through a process of reflective equilibrium. There is no Archimedean point outside our evaluative perspective.
Strengths: Constructivism avoids the metaphysical commitments of realism while preserving moral objectivity (at least relative to a procedure). It explains why moral reasoning matters: we are working out the implications of our own commitments.
Weaknesses: Critics question whether constructivism delivers genuine objectivity. If the procedure is itself a matter of choice, the results may be less binding than moral truth requires. The scope of constructivism (can it generate all moral truths?) is also contested.
IV. THE METAPHYSICAL DEPTH OF ETHICAL ONTOLOGY
The ontology of ethics is not merely an abstract exercise. The position one takes has profound implications for how we understand:
Moral Motivation: If moral properties are real and objective, why should they motivate us? Realists must explain the connection between recognizing a moral fact and being moved to act. Expressivists build motivation into the moral judgment itself.
Moral Disagreement: Realists must explain how sincere, intelligent people can disagree about objective moral truths. Anti-realists must explain why we argue as if there were objective truths.
Moral Progress: If morality is constructed or projected, can there be genuine moral progress? Realists can say we have discovered truths previously hidden. Constructivists can say our constructions have improved. Error theorists face a challenge: "progress" must be defined in non-moral terms.
The Meaning of Life: For many, the reality of moral value is essential to a meaningful life. If morality is an illusion, is life itself illusory? Existentialists like Sartre embraced this conclusion; Camus defiantly affirmed meaning despite the absurd.
V. CONCLUSION: THE UNFINISHED INQUIRY
The ontology of ethics remains one of philosophy's deepest and most contested domains. After millennia of debate, there is no consensus. Each position captures something important:
Realism captures the sense that some things are truly wrong, not just matters of opinion.
Naturalism captures the continuity between ethics and our empirical understanding of the world.
Non-naturalism captures the unique, authoritative character of moral demands.
Theological realism captures the sense that morality is grounded in something transcendent.
Error theory captures the difficulty of fitting morality into a naturalistic worldview.
Expressivism captures the intimate connection between morality and emotion/attitude.
Constructivism captures the active, reasoning dimension of moral life.
Perhaps the deepest truth about the ontology of ethics is that it forces us to confront our own nature as beings who experience the world as morally meaningful. Whether that meaning is discovered in the fabric of reality or projected from the depths of our own subjectivity, the experience of obligation, of value, of right and wrong is as fundamental to being human as perception itself.
In the end, the ontology of ethics is not just about the status of moral properties. It is about who we are—creatures who cannot help but see the world in moral terms, who argue about right and wrong as if it mattered absolutely, and who, in doing so, reveal something essential about the kind of beings we are. Whether that something is a perception of ultimate reality or a reflection of our own deepest nature remains, and may always remain, an open question.
The ethics of rationality explores the moral dimensions of reasoning—how we ought to think, why we are obligated to be rational, and what responsibilities come with our reasoning abilities. It bridges epistemology, moral philosophy, and cognitive science by asking not just what is rational, but what is right about being rational.
1. Is Rationality a Moral Obligation?
One central question is whether individuals have a duty to be rational:
Epistemic responsibility suggests that we are morally accountable for our beliefs, especially when those beliefs affect others.
Believing things without evidence, or engaging in self-deception, can be viewed not just as cognitive failures, but as ethical wrongs—especially in areas like science, politics, and public discourse.
2. Rationality and Integrity
To act rationally often means to act consistently with one's beliefs, values, and reasons. This consistency is tied to:
Moral integrity: Acting out of principle and not merely impulse.
Autonomy: Respecting oneself as a reasoning agent. Failing to be rational can thus be seen as a betrayal of one’s moral character—like abandoning truth for convenience.
3. Rationality and Others
The ethics of rationality is not just personal—it’s relational:
Deliberative ethics: In discourse or argument, we owe others clear reasoning and intellectual honesty.
Cognitive empathy: Understanding others’ perspectives fairly is a rational and ethical act. This is why fallacies, propaganda, and manipulation are not just illogical—they're unethical because they degrade trust and shared understanding.
Moral rationality: Asking whether the goals themselves are justifiable. Someone may be "perfectly rational" in a narrow, utilitarian sense but still act immorally if their aims are unjust. Ethical rationality calls for reflecting on our ends, not just our means.
5. Bias, Ignorance, and Willful Irrationality
Modern ethics must deal with cognitive biases and motivated reasoning—tendencies to think in self-serving or tribal ways. The ethics of rationality thus includes:
Critical thinking education: A moral good in society.
Intellectual humility: Recognizing limits in our knowledge.
Moral courage: Willingness to question one's own deeply held beliefs.
Summary
The ethics of rationality challenges us to treat thinking itself as a moral act. It asks:
Are we reasoning in good faith?
Are we being intellectually honest?
Are we using our minds to uphold truth, justice, and shared understanding?
Being rational is not just about making "smart" choices—it’s about honoring the deeper responsibility of being a moral agent in a complex world.
Waarom het utilitarisme (waarschijnlijk) geen goede theorie is - een persoonlijke ervaring
Halfweg maart. “Het virus” was nog maar pas in het land. Overgewaaid vanuit Italië. Wie kan eerlijk zeggen dat hij toen al bewust was van wat er op ons af ging komen? In ieder geval, ik was destijds actief op OkCupid, een datingsite. De eerste (en voorlopig voorlaatste) persoon op die app die mij ooit als eerste een berichtje stuurde, was een Nederlander.
We begonnen te chatten en ontdekten al vlug dat we vrij goed met elkaar konden praten. Gelijkaardige interesses en voorkeuren. Al vlug was er een klik. Toen kwam de eerste lockdown al vlug, maar we hadden elkaar, dus we konden door die lockdown heen gezellig blijven online daten. Nu ja, zo gezellig was het ook weer niet, want door de idiote sluiting van de grenzen, moest onze eerste date vier volle maanden wachten! Hadden die grenssluitingen er niet geweest, waren we zeker al na een week of twee op date geweest.
Tijdens die vier volle maanden zijn we wel elke dag blijven chatten. En niet weinig. Elke dag wisselden we wel gedachten, muziek, foto’s, ervaringen, gevoelens uit met elkaar. Ik voelde een steeds hechtere band met die jongen, en ik werd er dolgelukkig van. Onmetelijk was dan ook mijn opluchting toen op 25 juni eindelijk het verdict viel dat de Belgische grenzen weer open mochten. Slechts enkele dagen later was onze eerste date.
Die date ging heel goed, het was in Leuven, een mooie stad zeker, en ik heb er enorm van genoten. Ik dacht echt: dit wordt de eerste relatie van mijn leven, ze zal zeker lang duren, en het wordt direct een spannende, toffe en liefdevolle relatie. Toch bleek een week later - de avond voor onze 2de date gepland was - dat hij geen serieuze relatie met mij wilde. Hij liet me het weten in een uitgebreid chatbericht, die eerlijkheid waardeer ik, ook al deed het nog zo veel pijn.
Wat zegt de utilitarist?
Het utilitarisme (een monster van een woord, zeg ik) is een consequentialistische ethische theorie. Dat wil zeggen dat volgens het utilitarisme handelingen goede gevolgen moeten hebben. En goede gevolgen betekent: gevolgen die welzijn verhogen. Maar wat is welzijn? Utilitaristen hebben hier verschillende definities aan gegeven. De eerste utilitaristen (Jeremy Bentham en J.S. Mill) dachten dat welzijn gelijk staat aan aangename ervaringen. Genot in feite.
In mijn situatie zou je kunnen zeggen dat ik, toen ik verliefd was op die jongen, en mij totaal niet bewust was dat de liefde niet wederzijds was, dat dat een goede situatie was. Dat is dan ook een klassiek tegenvoorbeeld tegen utilitarisme met genot als definitie van welzijn (ook wel “hedonistisch utilitarisme” genoemd): een persoon die verliefd is op een ander, en die zich totaal niet bewust ervan is dat die ander de liefde niet beantwoordt.
Een hedonistische utilitarist zou kunnen tegenwerpen dat dit toch slechte vormen van genot zijn, omdat er vroeg of laat iets gebeurt waardoor juist veel leed ontstaat. Dat is ook bij verslavingen zo. Maar wat dan met situaties waarbij er vrijwel geen kans is dat dit ooit zal gebeuren? Zoals het voorbeeld van de peeping tom, waarbij een man een vrouw stiekem begluurt en zelfs fotografeert, zonder dat die vrouw dat ooit zal ontdekken. Dit voorbeeld toont dat dit problematisch blijft voor hedonistische utilitaristen.
Bovendien, op het moment zelf voelt men zich goed, en dat is volgens het hedonistisch utilitarisme het enige wat telt. Een hedonistische utilitarist zou zijn definitie van welzijn wellicht kunnen verfijnen van “genot” naar “genot dat geen negatieve gevolgen kan hebben.” Maar dat zou dan weer het probleem opleveren dat we nooit risico’s kunnen nemen in het leven. Wie nooit eens een tegenslag wil riskeren, zal waarschijnlijk nooit een relatie krijgen, en op die manier juist ongelukkiger worden en minder genot hebben. Hedonistisch utilitarisme blijft dus problematisch.
Well-being as satisfaction of desire
Daarom hebben sommige utilitaristen hun definitie van welzijn veranderd naar “het vervullen van verlangens”. Zo’n utilitarist zou dan mijn situatie toch kunnen afkeuren, omdat mijn verlangen naar een relatie met die jongen nooit vervuld werd. Ook dat kunnen we in vraag stellen: ik werd inderdaad heel ongelukkig dat mijn liefde onbeantwoord was. Maar betekent dat dat we de hele situatie moreel moeten afkeuren?
Uiteindelijk heb ik met de situatie (toch wel na enkele maanden, toegegeven) vrede kunnen nemen, en ik kan er juist heel positief op terugblikken. Niet alleen, zoals een hedonist zou stellen, omdat die vier maanden toch zeer gelukkige maanden waren voor mij, maar ook omdat die jongen mij van mijn lichaam heeft doen houden op een manier die anders wellicht nooit gebeurd zou zijn. Nooit eerder had ik mij zo begeerlijk gevoeld en dat is een waardevolle ervaring, zelfs als ik er nu geen genot meer uit haal (op rechtstreekse wijze althans) en mijn verlangen naar een relatie niet vervuld werd.
Conclusie
Deze persoonlijke ervaring toont volgens mij aan dat het utilitarisme - zowel in de hedonistische als wensvervullingsvarianten - erin faalt om mijn ervaring met die jongen adequaat moreel te beoordelen. Het was immers zo dat ik na die vier maanden met heel veel emotioneel leed te maken kreeg, en mijn verlangen naar een relatie nooit vervuld werd. Een utilitarist zou dus negatief moeten zijn over mijn ervaring. Toch ben ik positief, omdat de hele ervaring mij als nooit tevoren het gevoel heeft gegeven dat ik geliefd én begeerd kan zijn. Dat had ik nog nooit eerder zo gehad.
Dit zijn ervaringen die mij bij toekomstige dates altijd zullen blijven ten goede komen, ongeacht hoe groot mijn emotioneel leed destijds was en ongeacht hoe groot mijn teleurstelling was dat ik toen geen relatie kreeg. Ongeacht deze zaken, heeft deze ervaring mijn karakter en zelfvertrouwen op een positieve manier gevormd. Ik ben daar dankbaar voor en het is ook daarom dat die jongen en ik nog altijd goed overeenkomen, zelfs als ik volledig aanvaard heb dat we nooit een relatie zullen hebben. Uiteindelijk heb ik zo veel liefde ontvangen van die jongen, dat ik bereid ben om mijn volgende serieuze date nog meer liefde terug te geven.
Dat de ervaring positief is, omdat ik er meer romantisch en seksueel zelfvertrouwen uit gehaald heb, is iets dat je met het utilitarisme niet of nauwelijks kan beargumenteren. Er zitten namelijk elementen in die genuanceerder zijn dan genot of verlangens, namelijk persoonlijke groei, zelfliefde, zelfvertrouwen. Dit zijn in feite deugden, en het is dan ook geen wonder dat de deugdethiek als ethische theorie mijn voorkeur verdient.
De zaken die ik net genoemd heb - persoonlijke groei, zelfliefde, zelfvertrouwen - zijn namelijk allemaal deugden, en als deugdethicus kan je wel zeggen dat de ervaring goed is, omdat ze mijn deugden en karakter dus bevorderd heeft. (Feministische ethici zouden trouwens ook terechte kritiek kunnen leveren op de utilitaristische afkeuring van mijn ervaring, omdat die afkeuring geen rekening houdt met elementen zoals lichamelijkheid, relaties en persoonlijke evolutie.)
This may or may not end up being a sort of preliminary comparative analysis of Bataille and Kant's respective takes on universality, as opposed to something more thorough. After all, it may seem as if Bataille doesn't say too much regarding universality--at least not explicitly. Of course, this is not really true insofar as Bataille develops normativity in terms of universality--namely, at the very beginnings of Erotism: Death and Sensuality Bataille precisely develops the case for the presence of the taboo as culturally universal despite what may be brought to hand as empirical violations of these very taboos.
Bataille and Kant on the Problem of Cultural Universality
The Investigation of Cultural Universals
After all, it would seem that no matter what norms are considered as "culturally universal"--key rites of passage for example--these norms can always turn up an exception. Easiest to observe is the fact that supposed norms against murder and incest nonetheless seem to be asserted as present irrespective of the aggregate level at which these very behaviors are partaken in, in a community. In other words, the sociologist and the anthropologist, when making claims about the presence of cultural universals, immediately confront the difficulty of scientifically bringing into account such universality. The measure of the presence of a norm seems to be impeded by the fact that norms themselves are internally comprised of the contradictories of an idealization of the social functioning of the given society, insofar as the society itself is seen as actually endorsing its own professed aspirations, and of the observed dynamics of behavior in that society in spite of such professions. To be able to measure, then, the presence of norms in a society is at the same time to necessarily presuppose precisely that more hidden relation between what is professed and what is not done, for otherwise there would seem to be an impossibility of the very idea of a cultural universal.
Nonetheless, with the presupposition acquired, the very objectivity of that cultural universality would seem to empty itself into a subjective generalization of the defense of the cohesion necessary to the given norms. Thus, the norms immediately turn into the empty rituals of institutional mechanisms of enforcement at the same time that the norms achieve only a subjective reality. For this very reason, the anthropologist and sociologist who see themselves as reasonable and empirical sacrifice the initial objective search for cultural universals, in order to initiate the objective search of institutional dynamics instead. The institution, in this case, is the universal, or the cultural universal. But this is merely a sly act of moving the goalpost, for the institution is precisely predicated on the lack of universality--that is to say, its internal structure and function leeches off cultural particularities so that it may persist. This temporal persistence evidences a kind of universality, but it's not a universality of culture--it's a universality of both the technical and the social. It is also only a contingent universality, as not all institutions survive the test of time, and not all of them arose in some perennial fashion. In this way, any generalizability of the institution itself already rests in the aforementioned presupposition immanent to the given culture itself.
Kant and Bataille's Respective Solutions
How, then, does one make an objective case for cultural universality? By abandoning this very project of empirical objectivity. Here is where Kant and Bataille seem to have some agreement. When expounding on universality, in this case of culture (or a sort of descriptive ethics), there must be a formalistic approach--it cannot be merely empirical. Where Kant and Bataille would nonetheless disagree is that the former thinks this involves an objective process of extraction from empirical content or a normative process of confirmation built into the relevant propositions about culture (which renders it a priori while nonetheless synthetic), while the latter thinks the investigation of the form of culture or the community involves precisely an investigation into the structures of objective, external facts and observations to see what they say about subjectivity. Kant, in other words, sees the problem in terms of the conditions of possibility for thinking culture and community which one cannot get behind and which transcend all experience of culture and community, while Bataille sees this problem in terms of the conditions of possibility for culture and community as such evident in the structure produced and enacted by cultural and communal participants. In other words, there is a methodical difference. Bataille, then, retreats precisely into the structure of the subjectivity which grounds the relations amongst the objective facts observed in culture, rather than to the objective features necessary to an epistemic access to culture and community (e.g., the properties of thoughts or propositions regarding some object--e.g., culture or community--which render them intelligible and truth-functional). The result of Kant's method would be close to mere definition (whether analytic or synthetic), while the result of Bataille's method would be an exposition of the dynamics inherent to the production of culture. Bataille, in this sense, is more in line with Hegelianism (and Heideggerianism) than Kantianism, although he still breaks from all of these thinkers in that both Hegel and Heidegger still posit their own version of a transcendent (respectively, the teleological terminus or the ontological difference/gap).
To be fair, of course, Heidegger and Hegel's respective "transcendents" are a lot more ambiguous than Kant's insofar as they precisely either violate the dichotomies Kant constructs, or otherwise posit a functional binary that, in being ontological rather than epistemic, obliterates the problem of realism and epistemic access (or at the least, their relevance). Of course, it also may be somewhat unfair to depict Kant as blind to the subjectively enacted structure necessary to community. After all, insofar as his social/political philosophy, Kant seems to have an awareness of the impossibility of perfectly following the categorical imperative--particularly in public life--and seems to understand rather implicitly, as in his philosophy of religion, that there is a sort of assent to the community as such (the commitment to the existence of the community as a prerequisite to its flourishing) which is requisite for being bound to morality. In Kant's case, this community is idealized as religion, and the metaphysical notions within a religion are precisely of a practical import to the creation and sustenance of the community. That is to say, individual caprice can be subject to the ideal of duty-for-its-own-sake most optimally only when a means of rational discourse and deliberation is present, and this is present only when the notion of existent community is assented to without need of proof (when the idea of the most perfect and rational being is assented to as a matter of faith). This is why Kant's concept of faith plays an important part in his epistemology--without it, there would be a disunity between his epistemology and normative ethics. It's also a way of solving the issue of being bound to Kant's notion of proper morality, while the fulfillment of that notion in the aggregate of the public arena is practically impossible.
But this merely brings us back to the original problem. Rather than synthesize it, Kant's approach sustains the contradiction: the community or culture (or God) exists by means of its lack of existence. This may of course not be surprising given Kant thinks there are limits to reason (exemplified in his exposition of the antinomies of pure reason). Nonetheless its worth noting the inadequate attempt at tying the knot back together. The subjective provision for the objective lack of community/culture/God (via faith in the lack of this lack of community/culture/God) is done as a matter of moral necessity. Is it not clear in that case that, in the context of trying to resolve the problem of (descriptive) cultural universals, Kant would merely lapse back into the methodically confused investigation of the sociologists and anthropologists as previously explained? With practical reason, the divisions of a priori, a posteriori, synthetic and analytic judgment break down. Given Kant's approach to morality, this is made invisible by the treatment of ethical claims as a priori synthetic claims insofar as they rely on a metaphysics--but the result of such a notion is precisely that ethical claims fail to fulfill their function, even by Kant's own standards, without faith deployed in metaphysics, which disregards the requirements of a priori synthetic claims.
This outcome, of course, does not so much prove Kant entirely wrong as it much more proves the limitations of his framing--namely, his understanding of universality. Of course, one can argue that Kant's notion of a priori synthetic truth precisely suggests some unity of normativity and evidentiality or justification that may be compatible with his notion of faith, as for such type of truth propositional meaning and method of confirmation are in unity. This is simply not the case, however, as his notion of faith is precisely not about a provision of evidence or justification--it is disconnected from this epistemic concern, precisely so a priori synthetic claims have full force. Notice the structure of what occurs here: practical reason, which relies on a grounding metaphysics, must take an exception to its own grounding so that its aspect of practicality remain intact. In other words, we've landed back to moving the goalpost from the issue of normativity (the existence of descriptive cultural universals) to that of institutional dynamics (the action/reaction patterns of social actors). Indeed, one is also immediately reminded of the structure of Bataille's notion of the taboo.
For Bataille, the universal is not so much found in its global applicability as precisely in its particularity--it has a precise and particular relationship to the possibilities of experience as a whole, and this whole is not exhausted in it but, rather, must always pass through it. Thus, the particular character of the exceptions to an otherwise universal is itself supremely important to whether the universal is indeed actually absent or obliterated. When one mentions the exceptions to a cultural universal it is necessary to look at the character of these exceptions to see if they precisely constitute that universality. In other words, how the purported exceptions are necessary to that universality. How is it possible to distinguish this? Bataille isn't clear, but throughout Erotism: Death & Sensuality there's a sentiment that any exception which finds its necessity in the universal or whose practice must be rationalized through the constraints of the universal is constitutive of that very universal. For example, when Bataille discusses the taboo on violence, this taboo is for him culturally universal, despite that violence nonetheless exists in various cultures. But this violence nonetheless occurs always from the standpoint of this prohibition--either the violence infects those who, in its enthrallment, are both threatened and aroused into their own explosion of violence for the sake of snuffing out the violence confronted and effectively stopping it in its tracks, even if at the danger of succumbing entirely to this very violence, or the violence is given a habitual and regulated procedure of enactment such that it must incorporate an antithetic movement towards the affirmation of the scandal that is that violence. Consequently, cultures are equally fascinated and disturbed by violence precisely because it is universally prohibited. In sum, for Bataille, the universal could be seen as merely a particularity privileged as the frame of reference through which its negated contra-possibility is structured. E.g., "non-violence" is privileged as the frame of reference through which the real and undeniable possibility of violence is engaged and made intelligible. Unexceptional exceptions are what Bataille terms "transgressions."
Universality in the Categorical Imperative
Admittedly, Kant's discussion of universality of normative ethics is being treated as transferable to a discussion of descriptive ethics (or, cultural universals), while Bataille's discussion of descriptive ethics (or, cultural universals) is being treated as transferable to a discussion of normative ethics. But in fact, insofar as the implications of the thesis of universalism is extremely similar whether applied in normative or descriptive ethics, I believe I am justified in making this seemingly asymmetric comparison/contrast. There is nonetheless a difference between normative and descriptive ethics, but this is precisely where the implications of, say, Bataille's views become interesting as they cross-pollinate with concerns in normative ethics, especially in the context of Kant. Famously, Kant's categorical imperative legislates the moral law on the basis of internal conceptual coherence of some verbal phrase in an imperative, provided its own conditions of effective possibility. That is to say, in the example of whether one should lie when a murderer is asking about the location of his victim, the condition for the effective possibility of telling a lie is that there is some standard of honesty as a frame of reference by which the lie can be made. But if one suppose everybody lied all the time, lying would be inherently impossible. Hence, it fails the test, and lying is no longer a moral option.
Relation between the Categorical and Hypothetical Imperative
While Kant disassociates this categorical imperative from the hypothetical imperative, given that its supposed to be unconditional, it is possible to analyze the categorical imperative in terms of the hypothetical imperative. After all, despite Kant's banishment of the passions as arbitrary sources of moral decision-making, it is necessary that Kant extract his purely rational ethical formalism through abstracting from these desires and passions, thereby entering into the cognitive site of discourse by which rational deliberation is made upon the economy of desire, yet in spite of it. Which is to say, where pain or any other emotion may so be deliberately undertaken for the sake of the rationality of some decision, and no decision made for the sake of the passions and desires. But essentially what this means is simply to isolate reason from the material accidents which spur such passions and desires, and thereby to distill any empirical content (the observation of the fact that we "feel" like doing something or "enjoy" doing it [or otherwise]) as source of justification for our actions from rational deliberation. This is so even if the undertaking of action must, after this, still find itself under the forces of the experiential world and confront them.
Hence, in the context of the hypothetical imperative, what Kant is essentially doing is subtracting the accidental character of the antecedent: "If I want eggnog, then I must go and buy it at the liquor store." While there may be reason, material or otherwise, to mentally associate the given content of the consequent with the antecedent, the antecedent, despite its lack of dependence in this context as the clause that stands as independent variable in the conditional, is largely accidental. For the subject need not want eggnog. It could aim for any sort of thing. So, what Kant is trying to do is make this un-accidental by reducing the antecedent to its formal nature, susceptible to purely rational deliberation: "If I want X, then I must go and buy it at the liquor store." While "want" gives a sense of passion and desire, it could be seen as a trivial expression for "aim": "If I aim for X, then I must go and buy it at the liquor store." The subject here has a variable aim whose value is, if analyzed simply in terms of the possibility of what may be aimed for, rationally discernible in terms of the weighing of logical possibilities. The logical possibilities are already delimited by Kant's own valuation of the subject as, via rationality, a self-controlled and self-legislating, and thereby free, subject. They are also delimited precisely by the distillation given his exposition of the forms of knowledge: this aim must be both a priori and universal. Indeed, also synthetic insofar as this aim is not already thought in any of these particular aims, even in combination. They may or may not be contradictory at any given time, but this would not tell us much about their decidability as this contradiction does not conceptually derive from these aims. Nonetheless, contradiction is another thing to avoid, but what contradictions matter? Those that derive from application. Already, the unity of universality with applicability--the practical expression of universality--arises. The universal applicability of what, then? Of some maxim, as a maxim sums up an aim in its generality. That, in sum, is the categorical imperative.
In this way, the given aim--the categorical imperative, or its allowable maxims--can be inserted for any other aim into the hypothetical imperative, but consequently disbanding a subset of the possible aims by also restricting the consequent. In fact, the consequent is largely irrelevant except in this act of restraint on possible ends. Notice that the consequent takes the nature of a means for achieving the antecedent likewise the nature of the causal/logical outcome of the antecedent. In other words, the means by which one abides by the maxims allowed for by the categorical imperative (as well as more unsurprisingly, the material consequences) are irrelevant. The means, through their irrelevance, are an indirect way through which to restrict achievement of the aims to those means which precisely abide by the aims, for their sake. The relationship between the means and the aim here seem reciprocal, but they are not--the mean is subordinate to the end. They are asymmetric simply because of the very functional difference between the antecedent and consequent clause of a conditional: in completely abstracting and formalizing the antecedent, what is being done is a contradictory movement whereby the consequent, whose conceivable content is dependent on the content of the antecedent, plays no content-based role in relation to the antecedent. That is, it loses its role as means or effect, and so leads to the disconnection of action from both those conditions necessary to act (means) and those effects which may or may not affect the presence of such necessary conditions (of such means). The issue, then, is that the categorical imperative restricts the moral possibilities far more than is rationally necessary (e.g., the categorical imperative would seem to restrict one from killing another relentless person trying to kill oneself [killing is non-universalizable]), but also does the opposite in another respect (e.g., the categorical imperative cannot decide between a maxim of self-defense v. that of pacifism--even as it restricts one from killing another relentless person trying to kill oneself!).
Issues with the Categorical Imperative
First, in applying a criterion of coherently, logically possible universal applicability to the aim or end alone, it assumes that the resultant incoherence of a universal case is somehow transferable to the actual case such that a value judgment can follow directly from it. There is simply no reason to assume this even with Kant's rationalist approach. Even if we treat autonomous actors as ends-in-themselves, this does not mean non-universalizeable actions violate this treatment given that non-universalizeable actions can in fact protect the necessary conditions for other people's exercise of their autonomy, or may involve a dilemma in which two actor's autonomies' are mutually exclusive (the perfect [Kantian] example of the latter is whether one should lie to a killer about the whereabouts of his victim, while an example of the former would be something like homosexuality). In addition, even if we take that autonomous activity which is an end-in-itself to be precisely characterized by abiding to the categorical imperative rather than the possibility of doing so, it would then not be autonomy in Kant's sense. If non-universalizeable actions or maxims a priori negate the presence of autonomy then Kant has betrayed his own notion of autonomy by which freedom is expressed in terms of self-legislation. If it is required that one decide not to kill oneself, for example, so that autonomy is to have been exercised, then it would seem respect of the moral law supersedes the mere possibility (thus freedom) of respecting it when it comes to the presence or lack thereof of autonomy. Again, this would be bizarre, even if it would be consistent with his condemnations of suicide, given another of Kant's objections to lying is that it withdraws others' ability to exercise autonomy in their decisions (suggesting that it is the possibility to act out of duty that makes autonomy what it is, rather than conformism to the moral law).
Further, even if we take that, while non-universalizable action does not necessarily violate treating autonomous actors as ends-in-themselves, it is still immoral based on the categorical imperative, the fact that that which is tested for universal applicability is one's aim (whether understood as action or translated as maxim) is actually entirely arbitrary on the part of Kant. Testing one's aim for coherently, logically possible universal applicability is testing just one aspect of action--thinking actions can be morally valuated in a way intrinsic to that action, which is also to say in terms of good will, does not necessitate they be evaluated only as (logically possible) ends. Even further, it seems this cognitive universalizing of a maxim or action is largely merely a heuristic and not strictly a rational affair: for example, that effective lying universalized is in tension with its presupposition of a frame of reference of expected honesty and the presence of truth, does not make the scenario presented incoherent. It is enough for there to be a possibility of truth for lying to likewise be logically possible, and so a case of universal effective lying has nothing incoherent about it. It is not even a performative contradiction. It would be like saying that universal darkness is impossible because darkness assumes a frame of reference where one could conceive of the presence of light. The fallacy is just less obvious because we're dealing in the "ought" realm.
A Bataillian Take on Universal Imperatives
The real concern here, again, would have to do with the conditions of possibility for lying. Once that is realized, however, the categorical imperative ceases to make much sense--the test of universal applicability doesn't really tell us about the conditions of possibility for lying, besides that condition in which honesty must be a logical possibility as well, at the very least. What's of real relevance, then, are the material conditions under which lying could obtain, but even more the conditions, rational or otherwise, where it would or should obtain--simply thinking of the conditions under which it could not logically obtain leaves us empty-handed as to its value in any possible conditions. If indeed it could not obtain without a frame of reference of actually expected honesty and actually-occurring frequent honesty, as well as the existence of truth, then this is merely a factual case of implausibility (or in the case of an absence of truth, impossibility), wherein the implausibility or impossibility is through some sort of moral alchemy transformed into a value judgment that transfers over cases where it is in fact plausible or possible.
First of all, why is universalized lying's implausibility or impossibility married to lying being bad? If its to do with the notion of a rational ethics (e.g., lack of contradictions are the criterion rather than the limitation of ethical judgment), then it is the resultant irrationality of the universalized act that is immoral, and not the act itself. Bringing up respect for autonomy here as a defense doesn't exactly help as it merely raises objections already made previously. Especially given the autonomy nonetheless assumes a capacity for rational, and thereby universal, moral judgment (predicated on this very logic!)--and it is this capacity which requires we treat others as equally capable legislators of morality (i.e., that we respect their autonomy!). Would not a universal morality require that the goodness or badness of an act obtain regardless of whether everyone was or was not doing it? In which case, what relevance would its badness in a scenario of the act's own implausibility/impossibility have in demonstrating the possibility of the universality of morality as opposed to the morality of something universalized? If rationality were what were key it would seem that an autonomous agent would have to admit to being lost precisely in the seeming accident of aims. There is no need to be a consequentialist to see that our ends only gain any discreteness as a result of the properties of the very objects of our aims--their bounds, their relations, their structure (topology), their causality, their contingency. Hence, our aims are never isolated, but collide and intercourse with each other, in ways not merely accidentally related to the aforementioned external factors. If true moral claims must be synthetic, it would be a testament to this fact.
Kant here is simply performing the move of the exception yet again to get out of this rut, as this is precisely what gives the enactment of his morality an aura of impossibility, and thus of absurd harshness of moral judgment--that is why Kant's political-juridical notions seem at times far removed from his normative ethics. Bataille allows us, with his own notion of universality, to think this very exception Kant performs back into Kant, as woven more directly into a synthesis of his philosophy. Not only does a universal ethic allow for lower-order precepts, actions, or granular moral valuations which cannot be universalized in the way Kant wishes but may still hold correct in lieu of the highest-order universal precept, action, or value--and thus already accounts for exceptions to ethical judgment that apply universally--but the universality of one's aim is largely irrelevant the possibility of universal morality. The universal ethic is not universal because it is applied to an object thought of, or which actually is, universal--this is Kant's mistake--but because the object of the universal ethic is irrelevant.
It may seem as if Kant agrees with this, but he doesn't--he rails against any particular, empirically filthy aims determining the moral law, but only to take the rational form of the aim as such and extrapolate an aim from it, however abstract (e.g., the "maxim"), which all are subject to. This is precisely why for Kant it is not enough to simply conform to the maxim--it must have been one's deliberate aim, e.g. it must be that one acted out of duty. So, he still technically holds to the relevance of the aim, and thus of the universality of the object of moral judgment, as relevant to the establishment or demonstration of a universal normative ethics. In other words, contrary to Kant, the universality of a moral "law"--under a universality holding a similar structure to Bataille's taboo--holds by virtue of a particular relation this law has to "the whole." That is, a relation such that any action, maxim, etc., passes through it even if it is not exhausted by it. Hence, under a Bataillian normative ethics, exceptions do not count against the universality of the moral law insofar as they precisely constitute the conditions of possibility for the binding nature of the moral law. This take, therefore, sees the universal moral law as, while applied by individuals, only rendered possible at the societal systemic level, via institutions insofar as institutions provide the medium through which exceptions to the moral law are incorporated or taken into account at this societal-systemic level. Thus, in this case the individual subject's ethical position on what comprises this moral law also immediately forces always a confrontation with the whole of society, requiring the enactment of that moral law's ownmost exception insofar as a reflection of its impossibility within that society. That is, the moral law, whatever it may be, even if it should be followed by everyone at all times, is nonetheless regrettably capable of challenge if done as a testimony to the societal impossibility of this moral law and done in the spirit of this law.
On Mondays I have a lot of free time between classes. Today I occupied myself for a bit with the highly productive activity of scrolling through my Twitter feed. I found this article in the Daily Nous. I’m not going to get into the details of the case, mostly because I don’t know enough of the facts, so I have nothing interesting or useful to say about it. I want to just make a few comments about…
