“In the history of philosophy, antinomy, not only has not yet found a solution, but expanded its presence to every aspect of life. Nobody can talk without attributing absolute value to his own word and, at the same time, nobody can hope that the absolute value attributed to his own word might be recognized by others. If tomorrow I doubt of today's word, why not express doubts about it?
One can become more knowledgeable of the characteristics of antinomy by moving from the consideration of the history of human thought to that of the history of one's thinking. I am here writing what I am writing, and I am living according to the conviction of my statements. If when I write, I have doubts, I would express them. However, in expressing them, I would also transcend them because I am aware of their absolute certainty. Therefore, I am living the absolute.
Nevertheless, even yesterday I wrote in the same way and with equal commitment. Today, as I read again what I wrote, I have doubts about it and, consequently, I notice its limits and even renege on it or destroy it. Yesterday and today: two words expressed with the same conviction and with the same awareness of the absolute—one relative and ephemeral, the other absolute and assertive. This is my concrete experience. All my life has been like this. Now, I cannot act differently: I cannot help that my yesterday's word appears relative to me, while the word that I am uttering possesses the certainty of the absolute. If I talk, my word becomes the joy of the world and resounds in me with sure evidence. I can also admit that tomorrow I will doubt it, but for now this word is my entire life and to express doubt has no meaning.
The antinomy has become part of my conscience. Now, I can no longer laugh about the certainty with which philosophers talk about prophets: I also talk, and I cannot help but talk in the same manner, even if day after day, and even hour after hour, I become the witness of the congealing of my word, its progressive restriction and, finally, its resolving into another word. If all philosophers delude themselves, so I deluded and continue to delude myself.
I have totally internalized the problem and I cannot help but deal with it. If the certainty of my word is an illusion, I also need to find an explanation for it. I can no longer attribute naiveté or folly to philosophers from Talhes [of Miletus] on. I must look for a word, a way of expressing myself that reflects awareness of the illusion of the absolute. It is necessary that the consciousness of tomorrow—which is different from that of the present—removes from today's word its unlimited presumption of truth.
No matter the effort I can make, I cannot utter a word that doubts its own meaning. The observation of the antinomy that goes hand in hand with the entire history of my thought is not strong enough to stop me and to eliminate the apodictic dimension present in my discourse. I will continue to express myself with absolute conviction and at the same time experience the decay of my word from absolute to relative. The awareness of this fact and the impossibility of changing it are the only elements at my disposition that make me conscious of the situation in which I find myself. However, if the recognition that the certainty of my statement amounts to only to an illusion and yet does not permit me to change my attitude, it means that at least it is an illusion sui generis, whose peculiarity must induce me to structure the problem ex novo, in more adequate and non-contradictory terms. It is necessary to see if, far from being an illusion, the terms of the antinomy are both valid, and if the antinomy is not just a pure appearance since thesis and antithesis can and must coexist without excluding each other.
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At this point, the omnicentrist hypothesis is born. According to this hypothesis, each word—just like every other aspect of the universe—is a manifestation of the whole implicit in it: the unification of the microcosm with the macrocosm. In the act of uttering a word, my entire reality—and, therefore, all the reality of which I am a manifestation—exists in that word and in that word only, so that, being nourished by the whole, it cannot help but have absolute value, being itself one with the absolute. On the contrary, once that same word is uttered, it becomes the object of a new consideration which centers itself on a new word, as the previous word becomes peripheral, a word among others, all parts of a different absolute center. Words are always absolute and yet always relative: always absolute in relation to the center and relative in relation to the periphery. It is not surprising then that my word as the center—by the mere utterance of it—is, and cannot help but be, aware of its own absoluteness. Then my word becomes relative in relation to a different word, transforming it into its object as an element of the universe that finds its own center. All philosophers, in truth all men, talk with an absolute voice since they are the absolute in the infinite determinations of reality that they represent. However, all their philosophies, even all their words, are arranged within the context of any other philosophy and of every other word in relation to the different perspective that each one of them constitutes.
Expressed in these terms, the omnicentrist hypothesis appears to be a lot like common relativism. Indeed, even relativism claims the infinity of perspectives, and with it, the infinity of truths to which these perspectives correspond. Relativism, however, by claiming that everything is relative, is either limited to affirming nothing or to detaching the affirmation of relativity itself from its own criteria. This leaves us either with an inconclusive discourse or with a discourse that, by making itself absolute, contradicts itself at the very same time it attempts to affirm itself.
Relativism constitutes the most salient aspect of contemporary thought. The most pressing preoccupation of every new philosophical current is that of avoiding the accusation of dogmatism conceived as metaphysical absolutization. Relativism has been viewed and continues to be viewed as a critical stance against any conceivable absolute. The whole anti-metaphysical polemics is reduced to the interpretation of relativism as opposition to the absolute. In the meantime, relativism, notwithstanding its many attempts, failed to substantiate its position and free itself of its inherent contradiction. This is the reason for the continuous tailure of anti-metaphysics and for our constant finding out the dogmatic character of any philosophical current that aims to interpret anti-metaphysics. The Achilles' heel of anti-metaphysics can always be found in the insurmountable vicious cycle of every skepticism, that is, in the necessary absolutist attitude of those who want to exclude the absolute. Contemporary relativism cannot have a plausible outcome along this path even if it continues to form the foundation of most of the philosophical inquiry today and, above all, of the spiritual atmosphere of our society, increasingly intolerant of rigid presuppositions and schemes.
For relativism to become coherent and bear fruit—thereby truly representing the revolutionary state of mind of our time—it is necessary that it overturns its fundamental assumption by transforming it from negative to positive, thus freeing it from the necessity of contradicting itself. Not everything is relative, rather everything is absolute: the whole is in everything and, therefore, nothing is in vain.” - Ugo Spirito, ‘Inizio di una nuova epoca’ (1961) [p. 275-280]