Debate #5: Conditioning Aid on Rights for SOGI/LGBTQ Populations (Simon)
Background: On February 24th, 2014, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni signed the Anti-Homosexuality Act (AHA), also known as the âkill-the-gays bill,â a modified version of a tabled 2009 Anti-Homosexuality Bill, sentencing those convicted of homosexuality to life imprisonment and requiring âcitizens to report anyone suspected of being gayâ (see the Economist editorial). After Museveni signed the AHA, Norway, the Netherlands, and Denmark cut aid to Uganda; Sweden and the United States redirected aid from the Ugandan government to civil society and NGOs; and the World Bank postponed a $90 million loan to Ugandaâs health service sector (see Saltnes, 11 and Economist). Conditional and values-based aid has been a popular tactic by states and international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF for decades (see Ramcharan, 3). Yet the effectiveness and morality have also been hotly contested. Within the context of Ugandaâs 2014 AHA, our âdebateâ seeks to highlight four perspectives on conditioning aid based on the rights provided to particular sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI)/LGBTQ populations and these perspectivesâ arguments for and/or against the practice.
Aid-Giver Perception In Favor Of Conditionality
Since Uganda is a geopolitically small nation, it can be easily pressured by Western countries to improve gay rights, unlike a larger nation that lacks in gay rights. Regardless of the precedence that it could set, imposing financial pressure on Uganda to change a policy that is radical, even by the standards of most anti-LGBT government policies.
President Yoweri Museveni has been ruling Uganda autocratically since 1986, so it is hard to argue that Ugandaâs policy decisions reflect the beliefs of the Ugandan population as a whole (Britannica). Though on paper, Uganda holds multiparty elections, Museveniâs victories have been accused of being fraudulent and he has recently been accused of attempting to position his son as the successor of the Ugandan presidency. As a result, foreign aid should consider the fact that Ugandan governmental policy is non-representative of the Ugandan population, and the funding itself doesnât undergo the same internal due-diligence that a functioning democracy should. As a result, it is impossible for Uganda to enforce change from the ground up, and these types of interventions could uniquely target the political elites of Uganda and enact important changes such as gay rights. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Yoweri--MuseveniÂ
As argued by former US Secretary of State John Kerry, Ugandaâs uniquely extreme new policy is comparable to anti-semitic policy in Germany and apartheid policy in South Africa (BBC). Since this is an apt comparison, it is difficult to assert that states and international organizations should tacitly approve of such extreme policies by maintaining the status quo of foreign aid just because they are being made in the geopolitically insignificant country of Uganda. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26378230
Aid-Giver Perception Against Conditionality
Geopolitical incentive to provide aid that competes with the non-conditionality of Chinaâs foreign aid(Wan)https://amp.dw.com/en/how-unconditional-is-chinas-foreign-aid/a-43499703Â
The poverty rate in Uganda is around 40%, therefore it would be cruel to withhold aid, even though the Ugandan government has no political interest in improving gay rights (World Bank).
In terms of the World Bank specifically, its goal is to tackle extreme poverty, so its withholding of funding for the Ugandan health system shouldnât be based on the condition of gay rights(Leach). Furthermore, this diversion of focus could lower the effectiveness of the World Bank in doing its prescribed job, therefore they should focus on reducing poverty and not try to branch out to approaching more social causes.
Efforts by Western countries to diffuse LGBT rights in Uganda overshadows the fact that Western countries are culpable of causing Ugandan homophobia in the first place through mechanisms of intervention (Weiss, 6). By continuing the regime of imposing policies on a country receiving foreign aid, the providers of foreign aid risk sabotaging their current efforts to enforce gay rights in the event that a new administration takes over the conditioning of foreign aid and carries a different moral compass but maintains the bargaining chip of influencing gay rights.
Homophobia is an easily diffusible political norm due to its lack of necessity for a self-defined group, whereas LGBT advocates have to organize at a lower level in order to influence political elites (Weiss, 5). In addition, the diffusion of LGBT advocacy only follows diffusion of political homophobia, as a non-homophobic society logically doesnât need LGBT advocacy (Weiss, 16). As a result, it is uniquely difficult to effectively install progressive LGBT policy since the precursor to this policy is always the existence of homophobia. In this case of Uganda, it might prove to be ineffective to direct a change in such a pervasive ideology in a way that doesnât come from the direction of compelling elite political circles from the ground-up, as opposed to from the top down in the case of foreign aid. Historical Perception In Favor Of Conditionality
The argument can be made that aid itself lacks historical effectiveness in many cases, therefore the restriction of aid wouldnât necessarily make donors the culprit of a negative humanitarian impact in a situation where funding largely leads to corruption that worsens the condition of democracy and money often doesnât arrive in the humanitarian-oriented places that it should. Alternatively, the use of this funding on a conditional basis that stipulates for progressive policy could seriously impact the political elites of Uganda in such a way that motivates them to change their political ideology.
In the case of Lebanon, its $133 billion of capital inflows from 1993-2012 havenât tangibly led to an increase in development or quality of life (Finckenstein, 2). https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/updates/LSE-IDEAS-How-International-Aid-Can-Do-More-Harm-Than-Good.pdfÂ
Foreign aid can lead to increased corruption and therefore increasingly undemocratic political systems in recipient states(Finckenstein, 3)
Unconditional aid can give recipients the idea that their behavior and level of implementation of aid is unimportant in the process of gaining further funding(Finckenstein, 6).
When compiling a large number of cases, the correlation between official aid and economic growth is statistically insignificant, but slightly positive(Edwards).https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2014/11/how-effective-is-foreign-aid/ Historical Perception Against Conditionality
Sanctions havenât worked historically and even when they have, there have been significant negative externalities that make sanctions a far less attractive tool in enacting change.States have still signed discriminatory laws/ignored the threats of sanctions
Targets states rather than norm influencers such as NGOs and churches
IMF loans with high amounts of contingencies have led to anti-democratic political consequences for Latin American countries between the years of 1998-2003 (Brown, 431). https://www.jstor.org/stable/25652919Â
In the last 30 years, foreign aid has accelerated GDP growth by an annual 1% in the most poor recipient countries.(Edwards)https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2014/11/how-effective-is-foreign-aid/Â
The effectiveness of pushing for the achievement of specific reforms in aid conditionality is less effective than focusing on a broader qualification of progress(Spevacek)https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnadm068.pdfÂ
âa review of all U.S. sanctions since 1970 shows that targeted countries altered their behavior in a way that the U.S. hoped they would just 13 percent of the timeâ(Hirsch)
Harsh sanctions can often have such an impact on humanitarian conditions that it turns citizens against sanctioning countries(Hirsch)
In the example of Iran in 2012, sanctions that kicked Iran off the SWIFT transaction system successfully pushed Iran to accept limitations to its nuclear program, but the externality of this sanction caused a plummet in Iranian living standards, and eventually caused Iran to suffer disproportionately in the COVID-19 pandemic, as they were unable to gain access to medical supplies (Hirsch). In this historical example of what is a successful use of sanctioning/aid restriction to compel change in a single policy, there was such an extreme negative outcome in human rights that the value of such imposition of policy is questionable.