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Carlos vs. Abelardo

Honorio Carlos vs. Manuel Abelardo

GR No. 146504 | April 9, 2002

Ponente: Justice Kapunan

Facts:

On October 1989, herein respondent Manuel Abelardo and his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached herein petitioner Honorio Carlos to borrow $25,000 for purchase of house and lot at Paranaque. Manuel is the son-in-law of Honorio. As a result, a check was then issued by Honorio to Pura Vallejo, seller of the subject house and lot, as full payment. On July 1991, Honorio inquired the status of the loan he extended to the spouses. Manuel acknowledged their obligation but pleaded that they are not yet in a position to make a definite settlement. However, Manuel showed violent resistance to the inquiries of Honorio, even making death threats to the latter. On August 24, 1994, Honorio made a formal demand for the payment of the loan but the spouses failed to comply with such demand. On October 13, 1994, Honorio then filed a complaint for collection of sum of money and damages against the spouses before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela. This includes collection of the principal of the loan, legal interests from the date of formal demand, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of the suit.

Being separated in fact for more than a year prior to the filing of the complaint, Manuel and Maria Theresa filed separate answers to the complaint of Honorio. Maria Theresa admitted securing the loan, but she believed the loan was payable on a staggered basis. Manuel was asked to sign and acknowledge On the other hand, Manuel admitted receiving the $25,000 amount but it is because of his share from the profits earned by HL Carlos Construction, in which he works for. Manuel also denied having made death threats to Honorio and by way of counterclaim, he asked for moral damages from Honorio for causing the alienation of his wife’s love and affection, attorney’s fees and costs of suit.

On June 26 1996, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Carlos, ordering Abelardo to pay the $25,000, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and the costs of suit. Abelardo appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court due to insufficiency of evidence to show that the subject amount was indeed a loan made by Manuel. Honorio filed for a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the appellate court.

Issues:

W/N the loan obtained to purchase the conjugal dwelling can be charged against the conjugal partnership.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court granted the petition of Carlos. The decision of the appellate court is modified.

In pursuant to Article 121 of the Family Code, the loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership. While Abelardo did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and signed by his wife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the house and lot which became the conjugal home of respondent and his family. Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of respondent, under Article 21 of the Family Code, he shall be solidarily liable for such loan together with his wife.

The loan Yes, as it has redounded to the benefit of the family. They did not deny that the same served as their conjugal home thus benefiting the family. Hence, the spouses are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan. Abelardo’s contention that it is not a loan rather a profit share in the construction firm is untenable since there was no proof that he was part of the stockholders that will entitle him to the profits and income of the company.

Hence, the petition was granted and Abelardo is ordered to pay the petitioner in the amount of $25,000 plus legal interest including moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

Article 146

Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in proportion to their income, or, in case of insufficiency or default thereof, to the current market value of their separate properties.

The liabilities of the spouses to creditors for family expenses shall, however, be solidary.

Any expenses and / or liability incurred for family purposes, shall be shouldered or paid by both spouses.

Pirovana vs Steamship Company

Article 113

Article 113.

Property donated or left by will to the spouses, jointly and with designation of determinate shares, shall pertain to the donee-spouses as his or her own exclusive property, and in the absence of designation, share and share alike, without prejudice to the right of accretion when proper.

Article 113 contemplate two situations where the property is donated to the spouses or inherited by them with designation of shares and where there is no designation of shares.

In both cases, such property belongs to them exclusively, and if there is no designation as to their shares, the property shall be divided between them, but it shall belong to them exclusively.

The rule cited is without prejudice to the right of the accretion.

Accretion is a right by virtue of which, when two or more persons are called to the same inheritance, devise or legacy, the part assigned to the one who renounces or cannot receive his share, or who died before the testator, is added or incorporated to that of his co-heirs, co-devisees, or co-legatees.

So that if the the spouse would remove her share or cannot receive it, or dies before the testator or donor, but her share would go to, or would be added to, the share of x by virtue of the right of accretion.

PROPERTY DONATED OR LEFT BY WILL TO SPOUSES

A donor or testator may donate or provide in a will property to the spouses jointly. Determinate share of each of the spouses and, in the absence thereof, share and share alike. The property of the donation well then be considered separate property of the spouse.

ACCRETION IN CASE OF DONATION

It is the incorporation or addition of property to another property. As a general rule in joint donation, one could not accept indecently of his co-donee, for there is no right of accretion unless expressly so provided. One of the exemptions is when the joint donation is in favor of husband and wife, Article 753 of the Civil Code;

Article 9

ARTICLE 9

A marriage license shall be issued by the local civil registrar of the city or municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, except in marriages where no license is required in accordance with chapter 2 of this title.

The law requires that the marriage license shall be issued in the place of habitual residence of the parties.

This is a formal requirement that a violation of the same does not render the marriage void.

It is merely an irregularity which it maybe committed in the the liability of the Local Civil Registrar who issued it knowing that the applicants for marriage license do not reside in the place where they applied for a license.

Illustrative example:

A and B , both residents of Cabuyao, Laguna, applied for and were issued a marriage license in Calamba, Laguna. It appears to be violative of Article 9 of the Family Code , but since it is merely a formal requirement, the marriage would still be valid if celebrated with the use of that license.

There is an exception to the rule, that is when marriage is one of the exceptional character where there is no need for a marriage license.

Some exceptions exist, such as customary tribal marriages, Muslim marriages, or those falling under "Art. 34 of the Family Code," where a couple has lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. These may be considered valid even without a formal ceremony but are subject to specific conditions.

Santos vs. Santos

CELERINA J. SANTOS VS. RICARDO T. SANTOS

FACTS: G.R. No. 187061. October 08, 2014 ]LEONEN, J.:

On 2007, RTC declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo had filed a petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage. In his petition, Ricardo alleged that when they move to Tarlac and things went wrong with their financial status, Celerina left to work abroad as Domestic Helper in Hong Kong and was never heard from her again; He claimed that he exerted effort to locate Celerina; that it was 12 years from the date of his RTC petition since Celerina left. He believed that she passed away. And in 2008 Ricardo remarried.

On the other hand, Celerina filed a petition that she learned about Ricardo’s petition only sometimes in 2008 when she could no longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies.

On the same year, she filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the court of appeal on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac. She also never left and worked as a domestic helper abroad. It was not true that she had been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was aware that she left their conjugal dwelling in Quezon City. It was he who left the conjugal dwelling in 2008 to cohabit with another woman. She was deprived of any notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition declaring her presumptive dead.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the declaration of appearance of a presumptively dead spouse in accordance with Article 42 of the family Code is the proper remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgement declaring presumptive death.

RULING:

Yes. An action for Annulment of judgement is proper when the declaration of presumptive death is obtained fraudulently. It is the remedy when RTC’s judgement, order or resolution has become final, and the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.

Ta's choice to file an action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie. WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for determination of the existence of extrinsic fraud, groundherefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of nullifying the effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerins for nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and the merits of the petition.

Article 44

If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law.

EXPLANATION:

A person wanting to remarry must first obtain a court decision declaring the previous marriage void before getting married.

The law makes reference of the subsequent marriage after the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse but before its court declaration, proof is required in order for the court to declare absent spouse presumptively dead.

The petitioner should prove before the court that she/he exerted earnest and diligent effort to locate the absent spouse.

If the spouse knew the whereabouts of the absent spouse or connived with subsequent spouse and files for the declaration of presumptive death of the said spouse and remarry, their act is in bad faith. The net effect in this subsequent marriage is void. There is no need to perform positive act of revocation because the law itself revokes the same and all donation by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other is also void, so all properties is reverted to the former owner.

#badfaith

Article 79

For the validity of any marriage settlement executed by a person upon whom a sentence of civil interdiction has been pronounced or who is subject to any other disability, it shall be indispensable for the guardian appointed by a competent court to be made a party thereto.

Article 79 provides the requirement for the validity of a marriage setlement when it is executed by a person who is being sentenced with civil interdiction or is subject to any other disability. It is indispensable that a guardian appointed by a competent court be made a party and one of the signatories therein.

Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage.

CIVIL INTERDICTION

A legal restraint upon a person incapable of managing his estate, because of mental incapacity, from signing any deed or doing any act to his own prejudice, without the consent of his curator or interdictor.

It must be noted that civil interdiction or civil death is merely a restriction on the capacity to act. Its effects are regulated by the provisions of Article 34 of the RPC.

Throwback Thursday!!

Paano pangitiin ang Law student?

Thanks sa supportive husband ko RexGarcia.. Hindi madali ang journey..basta nariyan kayo.. I can.. Love it!!!

#motivation #mindset

Article 9 , Family Code

ARTICLE 9

The law requires that the marriage license shall be issued in the place of habitual residence of the parties.

This is a formal requirement that a violation of the same does not render the marriage void.

Illustrative example:

A and B , both residents of San Pedro, Laguna, applied for and were issued a marriage license in Binan, Laguna. It appears to be violative of Article 9 of the Family Code , but since it is merely a formal requirement, the marriage would still be valid if celebrated with the use of that license.

There is an exception to the rule, that is when marriage is one of the exceptional character where there is no need for a marriage license.

Article 34 – No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other.

Velayo vs Shell

Facts:

Prior to 1948, Commercial Airlines (CALI) owed P170k (abt. $79k) to Shell Company. CALI offered its C-54 plane as payment to Shell Company (the plane was in California) but Shell at that time declined as it thought CALI had sufficient money to pay its debt.

In 1948 however, CALI was going bankrupt so it called upon an informal meeting of its creditors. In that meeting, the creditors agreed to appoint representatives to a working committee that would determine the order of preference as to how each creditor should be paid.

They also agreed not to file suit against CALI but CALI did reserve that it will file insolvency proceedings should its assets be not enough to pay them up. Shell Company was represented by a certain Fitzgerald to the three man working committee.

Later, the working committee convened to discuss how CALI’s asset should be divided amongst the creditors but while such was pending, Fitzgerald sent a telegraph message to Shell USA advising the latter that Shell Philippines is assigning its credit to Shell USA in the amount of $79k, thereby effectively collecting almost all if not the entire indebtedness of CALI to Shell Philippines.

Shell USA got wind of the fact that CALI has a C-54 plane is California and so Shell USA petitioned before a California court to have the plane be the subject of a writ of attachment which was granted.

ISSUE: Whether or not Shell is liable for damages considering that it did not violate any law.

RULING: Yes. The basis of such liability, in the absence of law, is Article 21 of the Civil Code which states:

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved (as it was approved), would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes.

A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute law, should be compensated by damages. Moral damages (Art. 2217) may be recovered (Art. 2219). I

In Article 20, the liability for damages arises from a willful or negligent act contrary to law. In this article, the act is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

Globe Mackay vs CA

FACTS:

Private respondent Tobias was an employee of petitioner GLOBE MACKAY as its purchasing agent and administrative assistant. Anomalies in the petitioner’s company were later allegedly discovered by Tobias regarding fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions. Hendry, Executive Vice-President and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY, confronted Tobias stating the latter as the number one suspect and ordered a one week forced leave.

When Tobias reported for work after the forced leave, petitioner Hendry called him a “crook” and a “swindler.” He was also asked to take a lie-detector test and the specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials for examination by the police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies. The police investigators, however, cleared private respondent from the said anomalies. Later, petitioners filed criminal complaints for estafa which were all dismissed by the fiscal. Tobias was also terminated by petitioners from his employment.

Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO). However, petitioner Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Eventually, private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent under the Civil Code.

RULING:

YES. Petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent under the provisions of the Civil Code.

Art. 19 of the Civil Code commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice;; to give everyone his due;; and to observe honesty and good faith. The Court said that when a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Thus, generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper

WOLFGANG O. ROEHR vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ

Facts: Wolfgang Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980, in Germany. They had two daughters. On August 28, 1996, Carmen filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage at the Makati RTC, but the petition was denied. Meanwhile, Wolfgang Roehr obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997. The custody of the two children was granted to Wolfgang by the said court.

Because of this, Wolfgang filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1999, on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the matter since there is already a divorce decree obtained abroad. Judge Guevara-Salonga granted the motion to dismiss. Carmen, however, filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, praying that the case should proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of their children and the distribution of the properties. The judge issued an order partially setting aside her order to dismiss for the purpose of tackling the issues of property relations of the spouses as well as the custody of the children.

Issue: Can our courts take cognizance of the custody issue of the children?

Ruling: Yes. First, it is important to point out that the divorce was validly obtained and is recognized in the Philippines. It has been consistently held that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. In this case, the divorce decree has not been questioned by either party. Only the custody of the children is doubted.

While the court in Germany that granted the divorce decree has decided regarding the custody of the children, as a general rule, the legal effects of divorce, even if obtained abroad, must still be determined by our courts. This includes issues on custody and care and support of children. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court. It should be noted that the proceedings in the German court were merely summary. It cannot be said that Carmen Rodriguez was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court. While Wolfgang was represented by two counsels, Rodriguez had no lawyers to assist her in the proceedings.

In addition, the divorce decree did not touch on the issue as to who the offending spouse was. Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children. This is in consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the child’s welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody.

Thus, the court may proceed to determine the issue regarding the custody of the two children.

Garcia v. Recio G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

Facts: Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, on March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. On June 26, 1992, Rederick became an Australian citizen. He then married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, on January 12, 1994. In their application for a marriage license, Rederick was declared single and Filipino. On October 22, 1995, Grace and Rederick lived separately even without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage . other party has died) bigamy commits the offence of bigamy.

Grace filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage on March 2, 1998, on the grounds of bigamy. She contended that Rederick’s previous marriage was still subsisting at the time she contracted a marriage with him. She claimed that she learned of Rederick’s marriage to Editha Samson only in November 1997. However, Rederick said that he had told Grace about his previous marriage and the dissolution thereof. On July 7, 1998, Rederick was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Australia. In this case, the Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads

A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) bigamy commits the offence of bigamy.

ssue: Did Rederick Garcia commit bigamy?

Ruling: The Court is not sure. The case has been remanded to the Court a quo for the following reasons. Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines says that the Filipino spouse can be allowed to remarry only when the alien spouse who initiated the divorce would be capacitated to remarry because of the divorce. Like any other facts, foreign laws must be alleged and proved.

There are two basic types of divorce: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The Court could not determine which type of divorce Rederick had acquired in Australia because of insufficient evidence.

The Australian law provision stated in the facts led the Court to believe that Rederick’s divorce might have been restricted. Hence, his capacity to remarry has not been proven. Thus, the Court had to remand the case to find conclusive evidence. However, the Court also ordered that if there is no proof shown that Rederick had the capacity to remarry, then the court a quo may declare the nullity of the marriage on the ground of bigamy since there are already two marriages contracted.

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR.

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and established their residence in the Philippines. They begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively. But the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982 and the petitioner had remarried also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

On July 8, 1983, Richard Upton filed a suit against petitioner, asking that Alice Van Dorn be ordered to render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila and be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.

Issue:

Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

Held: yes

As to Richard Upton, the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen. Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. The divorce is likewise valid as to the petitioner.

As such, pursuant to his national law, private respondent Richard Upton is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue Alice Van Dorn to exercise control over conjugal assets. He was bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he did not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

BUNAG, JR. vs. CA

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