State to Society @state2society-blog - Tumblr Blog

Posts

My creative writing mentor and dear friend Jan Cornall has taken the time to write about my project, a family memoir. It is a project close to my heart. It is a story of raw courage, unconditional love, and hope in the face of adversity.

Different types of jihad.

Attacks on Civilians, Reactions Differ

Civilians get attacked, killed, maimed, and forced out of their homes by all parties involved in the Afghan war. The reporting of these sinister attacks, however, carry innate biases and a selective attitude to it. I wrote 'Attacks on Civilians, Reactions Differ' to share my view on these horrendous and mostly unreported attacks.

http://www.thenewparliament.com/post/73819537322/wazir-akbar-khan-attacks-on-civilians-reactions

My article appears in the PeaceWrites journal, Sydney University.

I wrote 'Staying Positive Against All Odds in Afghanistan' as an answer to many non-Afghans asking me, in an endeavor that I truly appreciate, how things will be in Afghanistan and what is my take on our future. Please turn to page 23.

http://sydney.edu.au/arts/peace_conflict//docs/PeaceWrites_October_2013.pdf

Coinciding with Afghanistan’s beautiful springtime weather, the annual fighting season between various groups is well underway. This year, however, the wo

Governance, Judiciary, Security, 2014

Old Habits Die Hard

By Mujib R Abid

Caught in the middle of mounting political pressure and a myriad of uncertainty, millions of dollars stuffed into plastic bags handed over to Afghanistan’s President on monthly basis is not a sight that will insinuate hope. Last week, the New York Times revealed how tens of millions of dollars have been covertly flowing to Arg, the Afghan presidential palace, since late 2001. The “ghost money” came from the Langley-based CIA, notorious for its cynically realist approaches to taking care of business. President Karzai admitted to receiving money from the CIA, but toned downed the hefty amount. Both the fund and expenditure report has remained off the records. Initially, the money financed the purchase of loyalty from warlords running militias, and to some extent running the state affairs with virtually no revenue generating mechanisms – aid money still finances Afghan government for the most part. But as the Afghan state began to mature, the purchase order started including lawmakers, informal meetings, travel arrangements, secret trips, and other such ventures.

It is believed the CIA money was supposed to buy a place at the heart of the Afghan leadership. But not only did it fail, according to anonymous sources that New York Times cite, it also fuelled corruption and made warlords richer.

The CIA has a long history of pouring money into problems. To them, and perhaps for good reason, money can buy allegiance and promote causes of different natures, some violent and some regime changing. For example, in 1973, a CIA program resulted in toppling socialist President Salvador Allende of Chile in a bloody coup. It was replaced by a military dictatorship. Separately, in October of 1962, the CIA’s ruthless anti-Castro clandestine operations in Cuba brought the world to the brink of nuclear conflict. But of all the places CIA has left a mark, Afghans know exactly how that plays out.

It started in April of 1978, after Afghan communists took power in the “Sour Revolution,” an army coup. A year later, the CIA started an agenda to defame the socialist blocks in Afghanistan by targeting Afghan president Hafizullah Amin, the American educated PhD dropout from Columbia University. He was ruthless and committed to his socialist aspirations, which made him very controversial. Soon counter-propaganda that Amin was a “CIA Agent” started floating around, CIA capitalized on his education background in the US. Spetsnaz executed Amin upon the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan a mere six months into his presidency mainly because they bought the story – and a few suspicious meetings that he had with the US ambassador. A great majority of Afghans to this day believe he was a CIA agent. He was not.

The CIA role intensified to unprecedented levels during the 1980s and peaked in 1987 with a budget of $650 million a year. Mujahidin groups would fall from US’s good graces constantly depending on how well they fought and how close they were to Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI). The further down the list, the less funding a group would get – Massoud, Hekmatyar and Abdul Haq were some of the closest to CIA over the years. The payments stopped in 1989 and so did American interest in the region. It took Americans ten years to divert attention back to Afghanistan when in 1999, Northern Alliance finally convinced the CIA to restart the liaison – at the $200,000 in cash monthly. Once the invasion took place, many warlords and former Mujahidin were paid to help CIA and US Special Forces who were only a handful, hunt down al-Qaida members. Qasim Fahim, Rashid Dostum, and Atta Muhammad Noor were a few of those warlords who reaped the benefit of the CIA money once again.

The Langley-based Agency has traditionally enjoyed greater levels of freedom and less oversight from Capitol Hill and the White House due to the nature of their business. Normally espionage and information gathering comes in return for cash. But to do it so bluntly and in such a messy form, CIA fails to realize that their short-term calculations contradict long-term American interests and Afghan goals. It also equips CIA with foreign policy making capacity, something with which John Kerry will definitely take issue. It is time some oversight is injected into CIA and for Karzai Administration to start respecting its own institutions, which his ad-hoc behavior undermines.

Written on 6 May 2013 by Mujib R Abid, Kabul-based Researcher and Political Commentator.

#CIA #Mujahidin #Propaganda #Money #Corruption

Ernesto Che Guevara, the glamorous Argentinean native who made a name for himself in Cuba under Fidel Castro and lost his life in jungles of Bolivia, is immortalized in contemporary world literature. He is been referred to as the "most complete human being of our time" and is one of the most iconic figures in world history. It is, however, upsetting to me that a violent vigilante is model for so many "revolutionary figures" of today. I can't seem to able to grasp the idea behind the use of political goals as justification for violence.

#Che #Revolution

The two men without uniform were abducted last month by the Taliban. In what turned to be a disaster for the insurgent group when more than 40 militants were killed in the successful rescue operation, the two were constantly moved from place to place to avoid detection by ISAF-ANSF during the two days of their captivity. From village to village, it was decided that the next destination be Qalai Ahmad Khan, a village of few Talibs but many hardships caused by the fanatics. In order for the villagers to avoid the unwanted guests with their risky prey, the elders decided to ruin the village mosque - the one place that the community always come together and socialize - so the Taliban can't have a place to stay the few hours that they presumably were intending. Now Ahmad Khan village is without a mosque. This is the reality of life in Afghanistan where no sacred stone remains untouched and no traditionally held values unaltered. (Primary Source)

#Taliban #Islam

"I chose honest arrogance over hypocritical humility." Phil Brooke

The Need for Politics of Sincerity in Kabul

By Mujib R. Abid

Last week, the Red Cross claimed Afghanistan’s security is deteriorating after two ICRC workers were killed in the field, prompting the renowned intermediary to halt its operations for a few days in protest. Similarly, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Morgulov expressed fear over a deteriorating political and security situation in Afghanistan, alarmed that the instability could spill over into Central Asia. In addition, in what was to referred to as “productive” talks by US secretory of state John Kerry, a trilateral summit in Brussels of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and US on 24 April, President Karzai demanded cooperation from Pakistan. He threatened to stop holding meetings with Pakistan if they continued their current course of action – not cooperating with Kabul in their peace drive.

As far as Afghanistan politics go, Karzai’s comments toward Pakistan cannot be more essential in terms of momentum and timing. The country is in a tipping point; a series of rightly made moves could prevent its collapse, but even a few missteps will prove devastating. Fears of the latter mainly originate from a disappointing lack of cooperation between Kabul and Islamabad.

The elusive dynamic of Afghanistan and Pakistan and its dominant influence in South Asian regional politics – especially when India is included the geopolitical landscape – is one of complexity and treachery. Afghanistan, for the most part, has been the victim of the real politicking of its southern neighbor – a strategy that has defined Pakistan’s political landscape over the last three decades and continues. Importation of alien ideologies, imposition of bloody conflicts, treacherous civil strives, collapse of state, extremism, terrorism, impoverishment, and underdevelopment have all been consequences of a plagued and failing relationship with Pakistan.

The Afghan conflict is highly asymmetric, the parties involved have shifting positions, there is deeply rooted cultural and structural violence, a fanatic insurgency threatens the very existence of an Afghan state, and of course many other challenges innate to the region’s context. But compromise and sincere talks could prove pivotal in addressing those issues and bringing stability to Afghanistan and the region.

Afghanistan must put all its efforts in resolving the long overdue riddle of troubled Kabul-Islamabad politics. For Kabul, politics of cooperation and sincerity is both the only option and will go a long way in finally convincing Pakistan and its military to cut ties with extremist bands and approach Kabul as a responsible and equal neighbor. Islamabad treats its troubled northern neighbor as an extension of FATA and Baluchistan ripe for political testing for it provides it “strategic depth” and political confidence. Since Kabul is unwilling to ever enter into such a strategic agreement, Pakistan’s dominant army will, perhaps independently, continue undermining efforts and institutions in Afghanistan.

Despite the prospects of a new leadership in Afghanistan with the 2014 elections, Afghanistan is in a crucial situation. If the current leadership fails to fix relations with Islamabad or reconcile with the Taliban in some capacity – knowing that a military win is near to impossible – in order to avoid an all out civil war, perhaps it will be too late. The Afghan chivalry and refusal to compromise its close ties with India, its firm stance on the infamous Durand Line, or its claim to FATA could very well be the factors that drive it into chaos. These could be the factors that prove costly for Afghans and play as the final blow to a stumbling effort at state building and development in Afghanistan.

Written on April 29, 2013 by Mujib R. Abid (Twitter handle @mujibabid)

#Afghan politics #Afghanistan #Pakistan #Sincerity

Trending Blogs

Recently Viewed Blogs

State to Society