İn discussing what may be lent to someone who has vowed not to benefit from the other person, we encounter an interesting case – a man lending jewelry, nose rings among them, to another man, without the question of whether that man will wear the jewelry posing a halakhic problem outside of the matter of the vow. This might seem surprising when compared to contemporary orthodox stances on men and jewelry:
Tasks or articles that are specifically suited to one gender may not be performed/carried by members of the other gender. [...] Hence, men may not wear rings or necklaces[.]
R. Reuven Amar, The Sephardic Kitzur Shulchan Arukh
İn examining the matter of piercings for the Conservative movement, R. Lucas points to historical precedent of men wearing earrings in contexts that were specifically not femininely connotated:
Rashi refers to a custom in his day for men to wear earrings that were signs of their respective trades. While Rashi seems to understand this chip as being tucked behind the ear, Jacob Lauterbach understands it as an example of piercing.
R. Alan B. Lucas, Tattooing and Body Piercing, march 1997/, teshuvah
While less strict in his language, R. Lucas nonetheless limits precedent for acceptable male piercings to piercings of the ear related to trade. He ends up ruling permissively, citing an interesting argument:
The surgical process of piercing both the ear and the nose seems to be well documented in the Bible and the Talmud. While there are many today who would find the Biblical custom of nose piercing unacceptable, there are apparently many young people today who find it attractive. And while some are uncomfortable with men having their ears pierced, even this has a precedent in traditional literature. The only issue that seems to direct this matter is the fashions of the day. It is hard to argue from a halakhic perspective that there is a substantive difference between the nonpermanent piercing of the ear for fashion purposes and the non-permanent piercing of the eyebrows, navel or even nipple. The lack of aesthetic appeal to many of us is hardly a halakhic consideration.
ibid.
That is, as opposed to the point of view represented by R. Amar, R. Lucas posits that the permissiveness or prohibition, going hand in hand with the gendered connotation of an article of clothing or jewelry, is not inherent but situational. İn a society where piercings and jewelry on men are not overly unusual, the custom may be permitted, if that is not the case, then no.
We find a similar tension in arguments regarding women covering their hair:
Rabbi Yosef Messas, wtiting in Meknes Morocco in 1955, responded to a questioner who wanted to know the halakhic justification of wives of religious functionaries who kept their hair uncovered (Mayyim Hayyim, vol. 2, no. 110). The question made clear that even the wives of the most traditional and most learned members of the community no longer followed the age-old practice of hair covering. Rabbi Messas, unlike Rabbis Israel and Epstein of the previous century, did not condemn the new practice. On the contrary, he viewed the rulings on hair covering to be in the category of custom rather than law. Since in olden times all women – Jewish and non-Jewish – kept their hair covered, our sages felt that any woman who did not follow this style was to be judged as being immodest. "However, since in our time all the women of the world have voided the previous practice and have returned to the simple practice of uncovering their hair, and there is nothing in this which constitutes brazenness or a lack of modesty... therefore the prohibition of uncovering ones hair has been lifted."
Whereas Rabbi Messas felt comfortable with the elimination of the traditional hair covering for women, Rabbi Uziel was a strong advocate of the traditional practice. He argued that women covering their hair was not merely a sociological custom but was a Torah law. One was not free to alter such a law based on local considerations. Rather, one was obligated to observe the law since its application was immutable.
R. Marc D. Angel, Loving Truth and Peace: The Grand Religious Worldview of Rabbi Benzion Uziel
Here, too, the argument is made that the commandment is reliant on how it is perceived by contemporary society. İt is in this light that we can understand and argument occasionally made regarding halakhah and homosexuality, that one could reread the prohibition as simply meaning homosexuality is to be forbidden in societies where it is considered toeva, and permitted in societies where that is not the case. Unsatisfactory as that argument may be, we can see that the structure it is built on – including its counterarguments – is a recurring one in the shaping of halakhah.
