Though both sides possessed nearly equal manpower, about twenty-five hundred troops apiece, Rutledge and his council heard reports that exaggerated the size of Prevost’s force. Believing he faced a British army of close to eight thousand men and realizing that Charleston’s fortifications were unfinished and weak, Rutledge called a meeting of the Privy Council and a group of officers. At the meeting Laurens argued that the city could be held. He did not believe that Prevost would attempt to storm the city because he could not risk the high casualties. On the other hand, a siege bought time for the Americans, allowing Lincoln to arrive and trap the British army. With characteristic bravado, Laurens assured the others that he would gladly defend ‘the weakest part of the line with the worst troops,’ though his right arm was incapacitated because of his wound. When the meeting concluded, Laurens believed his impassioned appeal had persuaded the civilian authorities to defend Charleston.
After Laurens’ departure, however, Rutledge and the council had second thoughts. By a five to three vote, they offered to surrender Charleston and South Carolina on the condition that the state be deemed neutral and that its eventual fate be decided by the outcome of the war. When Moultrie and some council members approached Laurens and requested that he carry the proposal to the British, he responded ‘that he would do any thing to serve his country; but he could not think of carrying such a message as that.’
Two other officers proved willing to carry the neutrality proposal. As he came to Charleston as a military commander, not in a civil capacity, Prevost refused to deal with South Carolina’s civilian leaders and he demanded that the entire city surrender as prisoners of war. That demand called for a response from Moultrie, the ranking military officer in Charleston. He informed Prevost that if the British wanted Charleston, they would have to take it. Laurens immediately exclaimed, ‘thank God! we are upon our legs again.’
The following morning Charlestonians awoke to find their city no longer threatened. The British had withdrawn. Prevost, as Laurens had predicted, decided that storming the city would be too costly and that a siege exposed him to capture once Lincoln had arrived with his army. As soon as the immediate crisis passed, prominent Carolinians circulated stories, asserting that Rutledge and a majority of the council offered to surrender as a ploy, hoping to buy time in negotiations and allow Lincoln to trap Prevost.
More plausible were counter arguments that linked the neutrality proposal with John Laurens' black regiment plan. Rutledge and other state leaders had desperately wanted Continental Army reinforcements. Instead Congress responded by sending one young officer with a proposal to arm blacks. Contrary to Laurens' belief that Americans held no separate interests, Rutledge and a majority of the council believed it was against their self-interest to adopt a plan that threatened the bedrock of South Carolina's economy and aroused the frightening image of slave insurrections. These men had a limited commitment to independence, based on the fulfillment of reciprocal obligations between the state and the Confederation government. Believing that Congress had not fulfilled its obligations to South Carolina, they decided that neutrality was preferable to arming slaves.