#ed peters

[newyorkthegoldenage]

Men trying to catch a squirrel, published on August 15, 1958.

Photo: Ed Peters for the NY Daily News via MCNY

[sonimage1965]

Ed Peters

[lascitasdelashoras]

Ed Peters

[mayanhandballcourt]

Photographer Ed Peters

[joeinct]

Tlacolula, Mexico. From Scalpels of the Sun, Photo © Ed Peters, 2016

[spiritualdirections]

Saturday, Dec 8th, 2012, the Feast of the Immaculate Conception (of Our Lady), is a holy day of obligation (1983 CIC 1246) observed in the United States. Now, every time an observed holy day of obl…

The excellent canon lawyer Ed Peters answers a question about this weekend’s Holy Day of Obligation:

Saturday, Dec 8th ... the Feast of the Immaculate Conception (of Our Lady), is a holy day of obligation (1983 CIC 1246) observed in the United States. Now, every time an observed holy day of obligation falls on a Saturday or a Monday, some people think they’ve figured a cool way make one Mass count for two obligations, namely, by attending an evening Mass on the first of the two days and counting it toward both days—you know, as if evening Mass were some sort of “Super Rite! Able to slay two obligations with a single Mass!” Not.

Two Mass obligations require two Mass satisfactions. Period...

He goes on to make the further point that it doesn’t matter which Mass it is:

Have you been told that only the Mass intended for a specific Sunday or holy day of obligation counts for the satisfaction of your obligation to attend Mass on that day? If so, I’m afraid you’ve been told wrong.

Canon 1248 § 1 states that one who “assists” (or “attends” or “participates”, etc.) at a Mass “in a Catholic rite … satisfies the obligation of participating in the Mass.” Notice, there is no requirement in the law that the Mass be the “correct” Mass for the day, or that it be celebrated licitly (or that it be celebrated in a church, or on a certain type of all altar, concerns that at various times in history impacted satisfaction of the Mass attendance obligation), in order for assistance at that Mass to satisfy one’s Mass attendance obligation. It only has to be Mass “in a Catholic rite”... For example, attendance at a wedding Mass... on a Saturday [evening] fulfills the Sunday obligation...

So, get to Mass for Sunday (even if it’s not ‘Sunday’s’ Mass), and get to Mass for Immaculate Conception (even if it’s not ‘Immac. Conception’s’ Mass), and you’ll be fine

See more posts on this topic:

https://canonlawblog.wordpress.com/2012/12/02/two-mass-obligations-means-two-masses-but/

https://canonlawblog.wordpress.com/2014/12/05/two-identical-obligations-require-two-distinct-satisfactions/

https://canonlawblog.wordpress.com/2012/12/06/status-disputationis-satisfying-mass-obligations-iii/

https://canonlawblog.wordpress.com/2012/12/09/post-script-on-mass-obligations/

[alunah-lalunah]

Training Wheels

The move from a raw, shifting field of input into a stable world of “things” feels so natural that it becomes invisible. When you walk back to your desk and see the same laptop, it feels like you are simply encountering what is there. But from the perspective opened by Immanuel Kant and pushed further by Arthur Schopenhauer, something more active is happening.

Begin with the "fuzz." Our senses provide a constant flow of signals like light, color, pressure, and sound, all happening over time and in different spaces. By themselves, these signals don’t form clear objects; instead, they create a shifting surface without distinct edges. There’s no label in this raw information that tells us, “this is a book,” “this is a desk,” or “this is the same as yesterday.”

The mind however does not tolerate that level of ambiguity for long. It organizes. It draws edges, groups features, stabilizes patterns. It says this cluster of sensations belongs together and persists even when you are not looking. That act of grouping and stabilizing is what produces an object. The “laptop” is not just given, it is the result of this structuring process.

Persistence then follows as a rule the mind applies. When a pattern reappears in a similar place with similar features, the system does not treat it as a completely new event. It links it to past encounters and says this is the same thing continuing through time. Without that rule, your world would fragment into unrelated flashes. You would not have a desk with a book on it. You would have an endless sequence of momentary impressions with no continuity.

This is where Schopenhauer sharpens the point. He takes Kant’s idea that the world we experience is representation and pushes it into a more radical form. The world as you know it is not a collection of independent objects waiting to be found. It is a constructed field in which objecthood itself is part of the construction. The laptop as an enduring thing is a way your mind organizes appearances, not a feature you can step outside of and verify directly.

A useful way to picture it is to imagine watching a film. On the screen you see stable characters moving through a continuous world. But physically, what is there is a rapid sequence of frames. Continuity and identity are imposed by the way your perception stitches those frames together. The characters feel persistent, but that persistence is an effect of processing, not something present in each individual frame. In the same way, the “same laptop tomorrow” is the result of your system binding present input to stored patterns and projecting continuity across time. This does not mean there is nothing there. It means that “a persisting object” is already an interpretation layered onto whatever is there.

And this is why the idea can feel like “training wheels” at first. It loosens the naive assumption that objects are simply given as they appear. Later, the implication becomes harder to ignore. If objecthood, persistence, and identity are part of how you structure experience, then what you call reality is inseparable from the way you are built to see. What feels most solid, the same laptop waiting where you left it, is also the clearest example of how much work your mind is quietly doing. Stability is not found, it is achieved. And once you see that, the ground does not disappear, but it stops pretending to be as independent as it looks.

[catie-does-things]

The central assertion in [John Paul II’s ap. lit. Ordinatio sacerdotalis (1994)] is not, repeat not, sacramental (about the nature of orders) nor even ontological (about the nature of women). It’s ecclesiological (about the nature of the Church). Grasp that, and one has the essence of the thing. No one disputes that the bishop who first simulated conferral of orders on a woman could himself confer orders, and no one (who’s actually read it) claims that Ordinatio formally addresses the capacity of women to receive orders. Rather, Ordinatio asserts something about the Church, namely, that “the Church has no authority whatsoever to confer priestly ordination on women”. Ordinatio is not about orders, nor even about women, it’s about the Church and about what Jesus authorized his Church to do, or not do, with priestly orders in regard to women.  Mind, there might well be sacramental and ontological obstacles to female ordination, but all we know for sure from Ordinatio is that there are ecclesiological obstacles to women priests. Permanent, insurmountable obstacles. Think of it this way: If Gabriel himself appeared in fiery splendor above St. Peter’s Basilica and proclaimed “Just so you know, women are ontologically capable of receiving priestly Orders!”, not one jot of Ordinatio would have to be changed, why? because Ordinatio is not about women or orders, it’s about the Church. The pope, shielding his eyes, could say to Gabriel, “I’m confused, does this mean that we can ordain women priests after all?” Gabriel would respond [with a face-palm], “No! for Pete’s sake, because Jesus did not give that authority to his Church! Read Ordinatio, people. It’s correctly stated in there.”

Ed Peters, About ‘women’s ordination’, what if Gabriel appeared and said…

Ordinatio Sacerdotalis