Hello Professor, I was recently reading an article by Maxim Kholod (The Macedonian Expeditionary Corps in Asia Minor, 336–335) in which he argues that those two years significantly shaped Alexander’s own official campaign in Asia Minor. He also suggests that the Persians were very much aiming for a major pitched battle, to the point of deliberately avoiding any disruption of the Macedonian crossing of the Hellespont.
This made me wonder how plausible it really is that Memnon was genuinely advocating a ‘destroy‑and‑wait’ kind of strategy. Hindsight is a wonderful thing, and probably that would have been the correct approach (bonus for the Greek man for pointing it out!), but the Persians (and Memnon himself) had to work with what they knew at the time: they had managed to push back the first Macedonian corps (despite being at a numerical disadvantage), they were facing a new and young king, and they had every reason to try to stop the invasion once and for all.
I don’t know how plausible my line of thought is, but I’ve always felt that devastating one’s own lands is a last resort, not the first option one would normally pick out.
Kholod is a good, solid scholar. I've not read that particular article, but I'd be interested in his argument when I have time. (Right now, I'm limiting academic reading only to material for the monograph, which at the moment, is largely about Diodorus, as I'm on that chapter. Ha)
And yes, I think he's right that the Persians wanted a pitched battle. that appears to be the gist of their arguments. Whether Memnon agreed, I'd want to see what Kholod said to support it. Memnon may have had a bit of insider knowledge that led him to worry about Alexander, especially if he'd had word about Thebes (and any of the Thracian or Illyrian campaigns).
But as noted, I've not read that article, although I'm familiar with Kholod's work and respect it. He may be right.
