#institutionalist

[dportermorgan-blog]

The Promise of Institutionalist Theory. Keohane and Martin (1995)

This article is a direct response to Mearsheimer's "The False Promise of International Institutions". 

Instead of asking why states are mistaken to enter into international institutions ask why they matter. Institutions should not be treated as a intervening variable or dependent variable, instead they should be seen as an independent variable that exist along with power or interests and interact with them. 

I.I.s matter for four reasons:

Provide information (both security and econ)- information can alleviate fears of unequal gains or uncertain gains

Reduce transaction costs

Make commitments more credible

Establish focal points for coordination-particularly important when working with many actors and multiple equalibria

Mearsheimer's largest criticism of I.I.s are they they ignore the problem of relative gains versus absolute gains. K & M assert that a states selection of relative v absolute gains are conditional upon a number of contextual facts such as number of actors or whether military advantage favors offense or defense. Snidal agrees that "if the potential gains are substantial, or if there are more than two states, relative gains won't be important to cooperation. To K & M, contrary to Mearsheimer, economic and military institutions are both possible and may stand long after initial incentives have faded. 

[dportermorgan-blog]

Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance. R. Mitchell (1994)

This article addresses two questions. Given the realist premise that power and interests play important roles in determining behavior at the international level, is any of the compliance we observe with international treaties the result of treaty's influence?(Yes) If they matter, what strategies alter behavior. Mitchell examines the once common practice of ballasting and tank cleaning oil offshore by oil shipping tankers. 

Mitchell examines OILPOL(later MARPOL) in their successive attempts to stop tankers from oil dumping. The oil pollution attempted two strategies to deter tankers from falling into classic environmental collective action problems. First, deterrence oriented, which would create a monitoring and penalizing organization. This eventually failed due to the difficulty of identifying tankers(monitoring) and the penalty was not harsh enough to deter the actors rational personal gains seen from oil dumping (enforcement). Second, coercive compliance, the regime reorganized and planned to force tankers to install expensive equipment(SBT or COW engines) which would monitor each tankers actions (something no actor would do of their own accord). 

The later was far more successful in altering actors behavior. Mitchell identifies 4 reasons.

enhanced transparency- easier to monitor

Facilitating potent but low-cost (to the states) sanctions- ports could legally hold the tankers in port as a penalty. 

Building on existing institutions- the port authorities already existed and were simply given legitimating power to monitor and enforce the regime

Coercive compliance>deterrence