Someone replied to the preference-pleasure root post:
Does this suggest that preferences eventually boil down to something experiential?
Yes, but it also simultaneously suggests that the experiential stuff is a type of preference.
The original birth of this idea, which we saw in my posts from two or three years ago, was the whole "preference utilitarianism and hedonistic utilitarianism are the same thing!" epiphany I had.
Yet another way I've used to word it before, is that there is a language hole between the think-y terms like "preference" and the feel-y terms like "pleasure". The term "preference-pleasure root" is trying to fill in that language hole. Give name to the idea in the middle.
And the best way I know to move the mind into that language hole is:
Try to rigorously define preference (without using any words that are synonyms for or implicitly depend on the idea of preference).
Try to rigorously define pleasure (without using any words that are synonyms or implicitly depend on the idea of pleasure).
Near as I can tell, we can observe that pleasure boils down to an innate quality of some experiences relative to other experiences that makes them more preferable to us, and we can observe that preferences are motivated by (sometimes unacknowledged) pleasure or predictions of pleasure.
And that's obviously circular definitions. But clearly the actual reality isn't circular. It's just that the language we are using is not giving us an unambiguous word for talking about that underlying raw sense in which experiences are more or less positive to us.










