From the prologue of Larry Laudan's [*Progress and its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth*][1]: > To anticipate some of my conclusions, I propose that the rationality and progressiveness of a theory are most closely linked—not with its confirmation or its falsification—but rather with its _problem solving effectiveness_. I shall be arguing that there are important _nonempirical_, even "_non-scientific_" (in the usual sense), factors which have—and which should have—played a role in the _rational_ development of science. I shall suggest, further, that most philosophers of science have mistakenly identified the nature of scientific appraisal, and thereby the primary unit of rational analysis, by focussing on the individual theory, rather than on what I call the _research tradition_. This study will show, moreover, that we need to distinguish between the _rationality of acceptance_ and _the rationality of pursuit_ if we are to make any progress at reconstructing the cognitive dimensions of scientific activity. Jesus Christ, yes! No idea if he's going to follow through, but that's a hell of a good mission statement. (By the way, "progressiveness" might seem out of place in the above, but he's using it as shorthand for "[making] progress with respect to the intellectual aspirations of science".) [1]: http://www.amazon.com/Progress-Its-Problems-Towards-Scientific/dp/0520037219/ "Progress and Its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth: Larry Laudan: 9780520037212: Amazon.com: Books"