"Cognition, Convention, and Certainty"
Bizzell starts with an acknowledgement that we all know now that thinking needs to be taught, or at least controlled for, in addition to style and grammar. But there are two camps regarding what that thinking looks like:
- Inner directed (cognition is primarily within the individual)
- Outer directed (social epistemic/discourse community stuff)
"Inner-directed theorists further claim, in a similar paradox, that the universal, fundamental structures of thought and language can be taught... Once we find these models [for modeling appropriate cognitive structures], we can guide students through the process until the students' own thought-forming mechanisms 'kick on' and they can make concepts on their own" (390).
"In contrast, outer-directed theorists believe that universal, fundamental structures can't be taught; thinking and language use can never occur free of a social context that conditions them... What we should do is to teach students that there are such things as discourse conventions" (390).
It's not that students can't learn, "It's just that they can't think or use language in the ways we want them to" (392). Very Bartholomae-ish/Bruffeean. In other words: very social epistemic.
The social epistemic theorists--like Bizzell--lay emphasis on exercises that interrogate the discourse communities in order to learn about the discourse conventions.
But one or the other of these isn't wrong--they can be a "kind of fruitful exchange that enlarges knowledge" (392). So Bizzell is going to demonstrate that by combining one of each model into a new, fuller-focused model. She's going to combine Flower and Hayes' cognitive model with sociolinguistics.
She summarizes Flower and Hayes' model, but also makes some criticisms. The Monitor, for instance, is another way of saying "the writer making choices," and that places a massive emphasis on how something is decided--without actually revealing that process. It's a black box, in other words (my term) (395). She also points out that "translation" is hypersimplified--just pouring thoughts into English containers. She also points out that they separate language out of planning--language can help record it, but it's not super necessary. Bizzell counters that language "doesn't exactly teach us to think, [but it] teaches us what thoughts matter" (395). Also, where do the new goals come from? In the model, they just kinda appear. Bizzell thinks that strange.
She uses sociolinguistics to fill in that weirdly blank "translation" space. Everything depends on the discourse context, or, "educational problems associated with language use should be understood as difficulties with joining an unfamiliar discourse community" (397). Bizzell suggests what Bartholomae eventually will--that we need to explain to students more clearly what our terms are. What does it mean to be specific?
Toward the end, Bizzell notes that it's a serious problem with inner-directed models that they're so easy to develop into heuristics and textbooks, foreclosing on further thought. I can see where that would be a problem. Instead, she advocates for discourse analysis.










