#naples1815

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Helfert, Joachim Murat, Chapter 6, Part 1

Waiting won’t make it any better. Let’s get this over with.

6. The tragedy of Pizzo.

October 1815.

Ferdinand's unfortunate adversary had landed in the gulf of Frejus on May 28th, had stayed a few days in Cannes, then had gone to Toulon and had taken up residence nearby in a country house belonging to General l'Allemand. He had lived here as a simple private, but some of his followers had started to join him: in addition to his travelling companions Bonafour and Roccaromana, General Rosetti, all three of his former adjutants, the naval officers Blancard, Donnadieu, Langlade, one of his former orderly officers Obrist Maceroni, and finally a Corse named Galvani, whom Joachim later appointed as his confidential secretary.

It seems that Murat wrote to his imperial brother-in-law soon after the catastrophe at Tolentino, asking him for permission to come to Paris; Napoleon, however, had Monsieur de Baudus tell him that he was to choose a place to stay between Sisteron and Grenoble until the people of Paris were sufficiently prepared to see him again in their midst; it would also be advisable for the queen to appear before him "so that the public might become accustomed to his obscurity".

Here the author inserts a footnote in which he doubts the date of the letter he has just quoted from, April 19, 1815, and suggests dating the letter later, to April 29 or even May 19. Napoleon's current correspondence still lists the letter under the old date:

Paris, April 19, 1815. Note for the Minister of Foreign Affairs Baudus is to leave at once to go to the Gulf of Juan. He will tell the King of Naples that His Majesty wishes him to choose a suitable place between Grenoble and Sisteron to live in until the arrival of the Queen and until the news from Naples is determined. He will testify to him in honest and reserved terms the regrets the Emperor feels because the King attacked without any consultation, without treaty, without any measure taken to be able to instruct the faithful subjects of Italy of what they should do, nor to direct them in the direction of the common interest. The king decided last year the fate of France by paralysing the army of Italy, since it resulted in a difference of 60,000 men to our disadvantage. It is not very suitable that the king comes to Paris. The queen must come there before him, so that the public becomes accustomed to his disgrace. Baudus will console him and assure him that the Emperor forgets all his wrongs, however serious they may be, to see only his misfortunes. But he does not want him to come to Paris until everything that concerns him has been decided. Baudus is charged with this mission of confidence, because it is known that he is very agreeable to the king. He will correspond directly with the minister. He can tell everything about the private and political conduct of the king. Baudus, agent of the Emperor, must make him feel: That, if the Emperor had wanted him to enter Italy; he would have made known to him his understandings; That proclamations dated from Paris would have produced a completely different effect; That he lost France in 1814; in 1815 he compromised it and lost himself; That his conduct in 1814 lost him in the minds of the Italians, because they saw that he was abandoning the Emperor's cause.

This is, if the date is indeed correct, only four days after he ordered an investigation into Murat’s conduct in 1814. The tone seems to be somewhat friendlier. So, did Napoleon have a change of heart? Helfert continues:

From Toulon, Murat had sent a courier to Fouché to offer the Emperor his arm and his sword, but he had received a cool, evasive reply. In the meantime the ex-king's stay had grown more uneasy with each passing day, until at last the news of the event of Waterloo, June 18, brought the whole of south-eastern France into arms against Napoleonic rule. Murat had to find a hiding place, wrote to the departmental authorities, to whom he pledged calm behaviour, and wrote to King Louis XVIII, whose magnanimity and generosity he invoked. He turned again to Fouché, who might procure him a passport to England, where he would live quietly and subject to the laws as a private citizen while waiting to see what the sovereigns would decide about him. For the same purpose he sent Colonel Maceroni to the Duke of Wellington in Paris and approached Lord Exmouth with the request to take him under the protection of his flag. But Maceroni was arrested in Paris, and word came from the Admiral that he could only receive the ex-king on board his ship as a prisoner.

Murat's situation became increasingly dangerous. The royal commissary in Toulon, Marquis de la Rivière, whose life he had saved years before when he was one of Cadoudal's co-conspirators, but who now could not show himself sufficiently devoted to the old dynasty, ordered a police officer, Joly-Claire, to seize the person of the he-king; the latter, however, refused to carry out such a spiteful measure, for which he later lost his job. Even a price was offered on Murat's head, and the idea was spread among the populace that he was carrying immense treasure, in order to incite them still more against him. It was now decided by Murat's followers that the "king" should remain hidden on the lonely coast nearby, while they themselves would find an opportunity to bring him to Havre-de-Grace, from where he should return to Paris and place himself under the protection of the allies. The pursued man now wandered about for two days and two nights without a morsel of food, until he found lodgings with poor people, who recognised him, but did not betray him; for patrols passed through the whole region. He stayed in a hole in the ground, the entrance to which was covered by his protectors with wood and dry leaves.

In the meantime, his aides had managed to hire a merchant ship in Toulon, while the three naval officers were supposed to scout out his hiding place with Galvani and bring him to the beach. However, due to a misunderstanding, the rendezvous failed; by the time Murat arrived at the appointed spot, his men had long since set sail again and could no longer see the man wandering on the shore, who was now forced to return to his good-natured lodgers. Finally, on the 22nd of August, on the same day that Murat sent a new letter to Fouché from his deep concealment "du fond de son ténébreux asyle", the three naval officers succeeded in providing him with a small vehicle from Toulon, on which he entrusted himself to the waves with them. The waves were very high, however, so that the journey was fraught with danger. Then they discovered a merchant ship sailing for Toulon, towards which they drifted, calling to the captain to take them on board and, for good money, to set sail for Corsica instead of France. But they were not heeded and the ship brushed against them as it sailed past, so close that their frail craft was about to tip over and bury them in the waves. The daring sailors were already beginning to despair when, towards evening, they spotted the Balancelle, which provided the regular mail service between the French south coast and Bastia. The captain seems to have been in agreement or at least to have known that the Muratists were seeking passage to Corsica, had them approached and took them on board while the vessel they were leaving was sinking before their eyes.

[josefavomjaaga]

Murat’s last decree

In the appendix, Helfert cites the decree that was found in Murat’s wallet and that sealed his fate (if there was still any doubt about it). The author follows a copy made by Austrian ambassador Jablonovski. the document is once more in Italian which I do not speak, so I’ve done my best with the help of online translations. The decree is of some interest because, as Helfert points out, there are notes in Murat’s own hand on it:

Royal Decree of Joachim Murat.

(Written in French in Ajaccio around September 25, later translated into Italian by Galvani. Murat seems to have had some textual changes in mind. This is indicated by the various additions or improvements made to the copy on which the Jablonovski copy is based, which undoubtedly originate from Murat's hand, and which are shown in italics in the following print, and the passages in the manuscript that have been crossed out are enclosed in brackets. In a final note appended to the Jablonovski copy, it says of these "aggiunzioni" [additions] that they were "nell' originale scritto col Lapis di un carattere poco intelligibile e che dalla sua ortografia sembra di essere stato fatto da un Francese". It should be noted that the "Decree " was found with Murat only in manuscript, not like the "Proclamation" in a printed copy, so it seems that only the latter, but not also this one, was printed in Ajaccio. Since, by the way, most of the handwritten additions and improvements are also found in Franceschetti a. a. D. p. 65-70, they must have been retranslated from the Italian and subsequently added to the French handwritten text).

- nell originale…: in the original written in pencil in a barely intelligible handwriting and which from its spelling seems to have been done by a Frenchman

Joachim Napoleon King of the Two Sicilies

We have decreed and declare the following

Article 1

The Constitution will be executed as from 1st January 1816. Provisions will be made for the prompt meeting in Naples of the Parliament and the House of Commons. The Members of Parliament and the House of Commons shall assemble at ... immediately upon receipt of news of our landing.

The order of convocation

Arrangements will be made for the prompt convening of Parliament in Naples.

R. d. Ma.

Article 2

All employees dismissed after 21 May of this year shall return immediately to the exercise of their duties.

Article 3

All persons employed by Ferdinand after the aforesaid time shall cease their functions from the day of the publication of the present decree or from the day of the new publication of our landing. Those who, after this publication or after the new one, will persist in maintaining their posts or in giving any disposition, will be considered as Rebels, Traitors of the Homeland, and as such will be punished with all the severity of the Laws.

Article 4

Any Minister of Ferdinand, any employee who, after the publication of this decree or the news of our landing, retains the power to execute the orders of his Sovereign, or who orders measures or dispositions to impede the execution of our orders, will be declared a Rebel, a Provocateur of the Civil War, a Traitor of the Fatherland and the King, banished from the Law and judged as such and every good Napolitano is ordered to commit their persons to public force.

Article 5

Any official who, having sworn an oath of allegiance to us, wishes to continue to exercise his functions in the name of Ferdinand shall be declared perjured and shall lose his employment forever.

Article 6

All Our Ministers and Councillors of State, upon the publication of this decree or upon the news of Our landing, shall return to the exercise of their functions.

Article 7

All Grand Officials of Our Crown, all Civil and Military Officials of Our Royal House shall immediately return to the exercise of their functions.

Article 8

The ancient organisation of the Army is maintained. However, numbers 11 and 12 in the Infantry Line are provisionally suppressed because they are composed of foreign soldiers. The officers of these two regiments will be employed in the other Corps to replace foreign officers who have had to leave the Kingdom.

Every soldier, whatever his rank, who has asked for his discharge or who has received it without having asked for it, shall be reinstated.

All promotions made and all rewards awarded by Us during the last campaign shall be retained.

We reserve the right to rule definitively on those that Ferdinand granted after 21 May.

Article 9

The Swiss Regiment is preserved in its present organisation.

Article 10

Soldiers who have received rewards on the Domain of the Marches of Ancona will receive the equivalent on the Domain of the State.

Article 11

Those of Our subjects who, in return for their services, have been endowed with titles or donations, and who have been dispossessed of them, shall return to the enjoyment of their property.

Article 12

The good and faithful Security Guard of Our good City of Naples is maintained; it will continue to do the same service it did at the time of 21 May. We declare the faithful officers of the Security Guard as Guards of the Corps.

Article 13

Our Royal Houses of Naples and Portici, the Royal Museum and all public establishments, as well as the persons and properties of Our good Napolitans, are under the special protection of the Security Guard.

Article 14

All Our properties are under the responsibility of the Grand Bailiffs, each for the part that concerns him.

Our First Squire, and all Our Squires in the absence of Our Grand Squire, shall guard the King's horses, crews and carriages.

The Security Guard shall support them in case of need, as well as Our Grand Marshals.

Article 15

All Public Treasuries will be closed at the time of the publication of this Decree or of the news of our landing.

All employees of the Royal Treasury, those of the Bank, of the Amortization Fund, of the General and Particular Receivers of the Lottery, of the Customs and reserved or consumer rights, and those of the Civil List shall be responsible for all funds that will arise from their respective coffers after the publication of this Decree or of our new landing.

Any operation of annuity or transfer of any kind shall be temporarily suspended.

Article 16

All our vessels, our frigates, in a word, any armed or unarmed ships, all our ar-

land all weapons

senals and the Marine Artillery are under the safeguard and responsibility of the Marine Corps.

(to the land arsenal)

and the land and sea artillery

Article 17

The Chiefs of the Provincial Legions are appointed Commanders of their respective Provinces, except for Naples,

e rittimentar [word does not make sense, according to Helfert’s footnote].

which will have its own government: they will immediately gather their Legions in the capital of the district closest to the Capital and they will have the high police until Our entry into Our good City of Naples. I am specially charged with the (Provisional) execution of Articles 2 3 4 and 5.

Article 18

All Our Field Marshals and Ordnance Officers who are in the Kingdom shall immediately report to Our Headquarters.

Article 19.

All Our Subjects, all those who are true Neapolitans and true friends of the King, are authorised to decorate themselves with the

being [???]

Medal of Honour. The colour Amaranth is declared the national colour (the Neapolitan ladies are invited to wear this colour) in person and in all the Kingdom.

Article 20

All Patriotic Societies in the Kingdom are under the special protection of Our Government.

Joachim Napoleon.

Given on October 1815.

What can I say? Count on Joachim Murat to make me laugh at least once even in the saddest of moments. That Article 19 and Murat’s additions to it just are hilarious.

[josefavomjaaga]

Helfert, “Joachim Murat”, Chapter 4, Part 5

We left Murat after the defeat of Tolentino and now have a look at what was going on with the other King of the Two Sicilies, the one actually sitting in Sicily, Ferdinand.

Among the motives that led Joachim to consider a speedy retreat to Naples was the impending danger from Sicily.

There were still British garrisons on the island, and Ferdinand IV himself desired it, although he was almost constantly at odds with their leaders, and especially with England's diplomatic representative. A'Court was full of complaints about him. "The foundations of the constitution," he had written to Castlereagh on January 5, 1815, "or rather I should say its rhymes, for it has never had any foundations, are being swept out of the way on all sides, and it appears as if, as soon as Naples is won again, everything will revert to a mild despotism, or else, if the court does not succeed in this, will take on a strictly aristocratic character and make the already overconfident barons fully masters of the king as well as of the people." The parliament had recently convened on October 22, 1814, and had been in session for months into 1815, constantly preoccupied with the financial question, which it had been unable to resolve satisfactorily. There had been some of the most heated exchanges; one day towards the end of January, the deputies literally got into each other's hair, so that the guards had to intervene to break them up. When the English had cancelled the King's subsidies of 400,000 pounds sterling annually, which were to be discontinued on 1 March, the matter had become so urgent that Ferdinand IV had had to resort to an extraordinary measure, which, as we remember, was taken on both sides of the Faro at times of need. By royal decree of 18 February, until the parliament had succeeded in restoring financial order, the salaries of all civil servants and officers due at the end of the month had been suspended, which not only exposed the majority of those initially affected to bitter shortages and worries, but in its further consequences also had a terrible effect on public safety; hardly a night went by in Palermo without houses being broken into, the inhabitants robbed, everything that could be carried away stolen, so that all better-off families were in constant fear of their lives. But all these sufferings and worries now took a back seat to the greater events taking place on the mainland, which were bound to change the situation on the island.

On April 29th, an alliance treaty was concluded in Vienna between Austria, with the accession of Russia and Prussia on the one hand, and the Court of Palermo on the other, by virtue of which the latter, represented by Prince Leopold and Commander Ruffo, undertook to put 30,000 men into the field and to bear all the costs of the campaign. In the second article, the conditions were expressed under which Ferdinand was to take over the government of Naples again: no investigation and persecution, recognition of the sale of state property, guarantee of public debt, keeping the new (Buonapartist) nobility on an equal footing with the old, and generally maintaining all the honours, promotions and pensions conferred by the previous governments. On the evening of May 4, the Prince and the Minister departed from Vienna, and from that moment there was no longer a "King Joachim", no longer a "Queen Caroline", but only a "Mme Murat", a "Marshal Murat", of whom Castlereagh said in the British Parliament that he owed his fall only to the ambiguity of his attitude: "if his sentiments could have been relied upon, he would not have been deprived of his crown". In Bianchi's main quarters, in accordance with the instructions received from Vienna, the royal title was still maintained; only Lord Burghersh, following the example of his compatriot Bentinck, did not allow himself to be deprived of speaking of anything other than "Marshal Murat", even in official dispatches.

On April 30, the day after the Treaty of Vienna, of which Palermo was of course not yet aware, the king announced his imminent departure for Naples in a solemn parliamentary session and demanded the necessary means, which the Estates willingly provided. To his Neapolitans, however, Ferdinand issued a manifesto, dated May 1st, which his supporters were to smuggle in and distribute in both Calabria and the other provinces as well as in the capital. Mistakes that had been made were deplored without any intention of punishing them; peace and harmony, general forgiveness and forgetting, the retention of all civil servants and officers in their ranks were promised; laws were envisaged that would serve as a basis for future state institutions and as a guarantee of civil liberties. Ferdinand did not wish to wait for the final outcome of the war before preparing to sail to Naples; he decided to go to Messina for the time being in order to be closer to the development of events.

A British fleet of 20 warships of various sizes under Admiral Bellew sailed in the Tyrrhenian Sea and kept an eye on the coasts of the mainland.

In Naples, after the first unfavourable news had arrived in April, extensive precautions had been taken to put the capital and Capua in a state of defence, especially Gaëta, where a whole suburb was razed, all the inhabitants who did not know how to provide themselves with food for months were expelled from the city, and the government palace was prepared to receive the royal family. But all these measures, initiated with strength and prudence under the rule of the regent, could no longer help a cause which made the rampant licentiousness in the ranks of the army appear to be already lost.

On May 4, after the second day of the battle of Tolentino, the general retreat of the royals had begun, more sinister than the previous defeat. The Carafa brigade disobeyed its commander and the soldiers ran in groups towards the Neapolitan frontier. General Lecchi had to report to the king that he was no longer able to keep his soldiers in obedience; the situation was no better with the legion of the wounded d'Ambrosio; Carascosa alone led his "legion" back in good order. The closer they came to the borders of their homeland, the more numerous the deserters became. The onset of severe frost, "not like in the Italian spring but like in the gruesome winter of Switzerland", as Colletta puts it, plus heavy rain that drove all the water over the banks and thus caused stagnation in the columns, were as much occasions as cloaks for the desertion. With bitter sorrow, the king saw such a beautiful army, his pride and his joy, disappear before his eyes, dissolve into its components; his otherwise cheerful countenance, smiling happily for everyone approaching, was now darkened by heavy grief and large tears streamed from his eyes down his cheeks. It was at the passage over the Tronto, at the border of his kingdom, which he was to cross again as a defeated man, where the word "abdicate" was spoken before him for the first time. In the first surge of his anger he wanted to strike down with his own hand the general d'Aquine, who had hitherto always played the humble servant; but he restrained himself and merely relieved him of the command which he had not held with great glory. The king, for his own part, even in this ignominious retreat, often performed miracles of valour. General Colletta relates an instance in which the king, who was brave to the last moment and the last in the train, helped with his own hand to barricade a road at the entrance of which a detachment of Austrian cavalry was charging and firing. But Joachim could not be everywhere, and where he was not, there was nothing but disaster. The imperials made one capture after another. At Lanciano, 23 cannons, 10 howitzers, 20 ammunition carts and their crew fell into their hands. Manhès, who was only strong when he was raging, abandoned his position at the Garigliano, the important border river, on 6 May, without having seen anything of the enemy, so that the Queen relieved him of his command and persuaded the Minister of War to take his place in the field. On May 10, Joachim was in Bopoli, on the 11th he held a review of his troops; he still had 14,000 men with 16 guns. But already the apostasy in the provinces began to spread, which also had an effect on the ranks of the army. In those days, an appeal arrived from Isernia from the sub-intendant Milizia, in which the soldiers were called upon to abandon Murat's cause. When the king heard of this he exclaimed painfully, "And I, who have done nothing but good to this man!" He made a last attempt to retain the loyalty of his people and sent the General and State Councillor Colletta to the capital, where, together with Minister Zurlo, he was to draft the outlines of a constitutional charter; but Joachim urged them not to be too generous with the concessions to the people.

[josefavomjaaga]

Helfert, Joachim Murat, Chapter 6, Part 3

We left with Murat kinda hiding in the open on Corsica while fantasizing about sneaking into the royal palace of Naples.

A flicker of prudence came over him when he decided to send one of his confidants, Simone Cambruschini from Bastia, who was to visit Elba and Naples: there to contact General Dalesme, the commandant of the French garrison left behind by Napoleon; here to obtain information about the prevailing mood in the city and the country. But weeks would pass before the messenger could return with his news, and was Murat, once his head was on fire, the man to bide his time?

Elsewhere in Europe, it was not known for a long time what had become of the ex-king. On 23 July, London papers had brought the news that he had left Toulon, but they did not know where he had gone. Some thought he had gone to Tunis, and Murat himself had helped to spread this rumour; others had him sailing for America; the third wanted to know that he was near Paris, in Fontainebleau, in Compiègne. According to still other rumours, he was lying near Lyon - the country house of the president of the Court of Appeal was called Vouti - mortally ill from wounds he had received, or was wandering about on land or at sea.

Here, again, there is a somewhat cryptic source in a footnote:

M*** Vie de Joa. Murat p. 95 f., probably written in September, at any rate before the bloody drama in Pizzo: "Murat ne parait pas s'être éloigné de la Provence"; he is said to have spent some time in Antibes and then been in Toulon, "enfermé avec divers corps armés qui, comprimant le voeu bien prononcé du peuple, méconnaissaient encore l'autorité du Roi ... Il erre maintenant dans des montagnes déguisé sous des vêtements communs et suivi, dit-on, de deux seuls domestiques". The "Journal du Departement du Var", on the other hand, brought the news that Murat, who had pretended to be a naval officer named Campomele, had been recognised and arrested on his arrival in Bastia.

The text continues:

In the meantime, without paying attention to such groundless talk, diplomacy in Paris dealt with the future fate of the dethroned king. According to a document signed by Prince Metternich on September 1st, Emperor Franz offered him admission and protection in his states, provided that he accepted a private title, possibly the one chosen by his wife, and undertook not to leave his place of residence without first obtaining the consent of the emperor. A passport for him was also issued on the 7th under that name "von Lipona", "in order to go from southern France to Trieste", by the Imperial and Royal Court Chancellor Count Mercy, signed by the English envoy Lord Steward.... It was previously related that Colonel Maceroni, whom Murat had sent from Toulon to the Duke of Wellington, had been arrested in Paris; the latter was now brought out of his custody and entrusted with the task of delivering the two documents to his former king and master. Maceroni left without delay for the south, where it was already known that Murat had succeeded in escaping to Corsica, and that is where the colonel went in the second half of September, first to Bastia.

In Naples, too, people were not only aware of Murat's presence in Corsica at this time, they also suspected that he was up to no good against the kingdom. Perhaps it was precisely Lambruschini's mission, whose appearance and covert reconnaissance could not have escaped the attention of the police, that caused the first unrest in Neapolitan government circles. Lambruschini had reached Porto-Ferrajo on September 1st at a time when General Dalesme, in accordance with an agreement concluded with the Tuscan troops, was about to evacuate the island. The first part of his mission had thus come to an end and only the second remained: to find out the prevailing mood for the ex-king on the Italian mainland. Consequently, he had gone to Livorno, to Florence, to Rome, September 8 to 11, where he endeavoured to put his travel documents into order so as to be able to sneak into Naples. It is certain that both in the capital and in Gaëta, still occupied by Lauer's troops, fears were harboured in the second half of September about Murat's activities in Corsica and from Corsica. On the 18th, our envoy had a lengthy discussion on this matter with the King, to whom he advised: first, to have several larger warships cruise along the most exposed stretches of coast from Gaëta to Terracina, then along the Calabrian shores; second, to reinforce the garrison of Gaëta with Sicilian troops; third, to have the forts of Naples provisioned for at least a fortnight. It does not appear, however, that these precautionary measures were carried out in any great hurry; at least there was no sign of frigates crossing the coasts for a long time. On the other hand, the Minister Medici sent a trusted man, Ignazio Carabelli, in a hurry to Corsica, from where he was a native, with the order to approach Murat and to talk him out of any hostile enterprise against King Ferdinand.

Lambruschini did not arrive in Naples until September 28th, where he had secret talks with both General Filangieri and the banquier Falconet, both of whom implored him to leave the city as quickly as possible, since the police could track him and them down and the mood in the country was such that his patron should not entertain any favourable expectations. At this, Lambruschini, after barely a four-day stay in Naples, left for Rome again, with the firm resolution to dissuade the king in the strongest possible terms from carrying out his foolhardy plan.

But in the meantime everything had changed on Corsica. Verrière had retreated to the Citadelle in the face of Murat's daily growing number of followers and, on September 15, issued an appeal in which he called Murat a "disturber of the peace", an "agitator" and called on the loyal followers of King Louis to take up arms and be ready to march out against the high-treasonous gatherings in Vescovato.

Now Murat too believed that he should no longer delay. On the 17th, he set off with his men from their previous base, but not to Bastia, but over mountains and valleys in short marches to Ajaccio. On the 20th they camped for the night in Bogognano, from where Murat sent General Franceschetti on ahead to Ajaccio to hire vehicles in the harbour for the crossing, but also to find money and bills of exchange, as the funds he had taken with him on his escape from Naples were running out. It was also in Bogognano that Murat dictated into the pen of his secret scribe a very verbose manifesto, which he intended to distribute on entering the soil of his kingdom. "Neapolitans," it said, among other things, 'do not fear that the allied powers will arm themselves anew against your king. Your Joachim never abdicated. A military failure could not make him lose the crown of Naples. By regaining his throne, he only imitates the example of the sovereigns who have regained theirs. The Emperor of Austria, who, misled as to the true policy of the Cabinet of Naples, and thinking that your Joachim was in agreement with Napoleon, has overtaken him with such a disastrous war, will again become his ally, do not doubt it." He spoke of his conciliatory disposition, with a scarcely veiled sidelong glance at Ferdinand who, as his courtiers had always told him, was nothing but a hateful tyrant: "Your King does not speak to you of forgiveness, you have never offended him, he rather renews the oath he made to you in former times: to make you happy. He will not be like those who pause only for the moment with their revenge, in order then to allow it to shoot the reins all the more freely". This was followed by outbursts at Ferdinand's letter to Bianchi, in which Murat's troops were spoken of in a contemptuous manner, at the treaty of May 20: "the castle of Casa Lanza, this monument to Ferdinand's disgrace, shall be razed to the ground, and Ferdinand, who has called your brave army covered with glory a bunch of enemy bands, shall be declared by the nation unworthy to govern it and deprived of the throne!"

Sometimes I wonder if these men, as they had grown up in the army, simply were mistaken about the little importance military matters had for most civilians, particularly in times when everybody was so war-weary. I do not think many people outside the army were ready to rise up against a king because he had talked badly about the army.

But seeing how so many people actually tried to save Murat’s life, with him actively working towards his own distruction, is heartbreaking.

[josefavomjaaga]

Mier's letters from Naples, mid-March 1815

Things are starting to fall apart.

Mier to the Duke di Gallo (Copy) Naples 12 March 1815 (morning).

The departure of His Majesty the King, announced as very near, for Ancona, the movement almost general of Neapolitan troops from the interior towards the frontiers of the Kingdom, the order given to the Royal Guard to be ready to march, and many other circumstances and measures taken, prove only too well that His Neapolitan Majesty has projects in view which it is important for Austria, friendly power of the King, to clear up, principally in the present circumstances.

The undersigned Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria to the Court of Naples therefore has the honour of addressing His Excellency the Duke of Gallo, Minister of Foreign Relations, in order to obtain from His Excellency prompt and categorial clarifications and answers in this respect, so that they can be brought to the attention of his Court as soon as possible.

In requesting His Excellency to send him His reply today to be sent by a courier which he is sending tonight to Rome, he has the honour to renew to Him on this occasion etc.

(Signed) Mier. To His Excellency the Duke of Gallo etc.

That sounds a lot like a diplomatic ultimatum. And I can't help but be reminded of the letter Eugène wrote to Murat the year before ("So ... you with us or against us, buddy?")

Mier to Metternich. Postscript

Naples, March 12, 1815, evening.

My Prince!

1) The greater part of the garrison of Naples set out this morning. The few troops which still remained will start tomorrow. Veterans and invalids have occupied all the posts. The officer carrying my present expedition will be able to verify in his journey the number of those who have taken the road to Rome, and will report to Marl Bellegarde; all the rest of the garrison and the troops of the surroundings will have marched towards Ancona. The field crews, the King's treasury, and many people, both civil and military, attached to his person, are leaving tomorrow. Everything proves that the King has made up his mind and that He is only waiting for the first news of Napoleon's enterprise to act. I do not believe that He has the project to march into France. He will try to raise Italy and take possession of it; it will be necessary therefore that He fights with us. Although one wants to make believe that these steps are concerted with Austria, consternation is general here, people distrust the King's head and foresee misfortunes.

2) This morning there was a Circle at Court; several Englishmen attended to take leave of the King. He gave them a long speech on the recent event that occupies all minds. He said that he had news of the Emperor from Grasse; that everywhere he was received with enthusiasm and that there was no doubt that he would succeed in his enterprise; that he could not but ardently desire it, the Bourbons having declared themselves openly his enemies in spite of all the steps and advances he had made to render himself sympathetic; any change of dynasty in France could only be advantageous to his interests; that it would be quite indifferent to Him whether it were Napoleon or some other French general who occupied the throne of France, provided it were not the Bourbons: "I am their enemy, as they are mine". He said that he marched his troops towards the frontiers to be more in touch with events; that moreover his policy remained invariably attached to that of Austria; ... and much other drivel which relates to his military career and his elevation to the throne of Naples.

3) The Princess of Wales left this morning for Rome, from where she intends to go to Civitavecchia and embark for Genoa on the English frigate which had come to Naples to fetch her. She wanted to follow the King to Ancona, but yesterday morning he had his Grand Equerry tell her that the political situation prevented him from receiving her in Ancona. It is said that she was furious and decided to go to Genoa.

4) As the Duke of Gallo has not yet sent me an answer to my note of this morning, and seeing the urgent need for Your Highness, and Mar Bellegarde to whom I am writing at the same time, to be informed of what is being prepared here, I have decided to send my mail to Rome without waiting for this answer, which I will send to Your Highness as soon as I have received it.

5) My position here is becoming very embarrassing and I beg Your Highness not to forget me and to give me His orders as soon as possible.

6) I have the honour of sending herewith to Your Highness the two proclamations of Napoleon to his army in France. I have the honour etc.

Mier.

The proclamations are not cited but according to the author, vary only in details from those in Napoleon's correspondence. Mier actually even received Gallo's reply before sending off this letter to Metternich.

Gallo to Mier

Naples, this 14th of March 1815.

My Lord Count! Having had the honor to submit to the King the note dated the day before yesterday which you did me the honor to address to me: S. M. could not read without surprise that you show concern about the march of His troops towards the frontier when it is known that France gathers considerable forces in Grenoble and Dijon with hostile aims against the King, as the Cabinet of Vienna itself is convinced.

In addition, the extraordinary and unexpected events which are taking place at this moment and which can set the continent ablaze again, are of such a nature as to require that the King be in a position to act for his own preservation, and as a result of the answers which His Majesty impatiently awaits to the overtures which His ministers have been ordered to make to the Cabinet of Vienna.

I have already had the honour of speaking to you about these overtures, as well as about the journey of His Majesty into the provinces and countries occupied by His troops, a journey which was decided upon and announced, as you know, My Lord Count, at the beginning of the winter.

I have no doubt, My Lord Count, that you will find in these clarifications very natural motives for justifying the movements in question.

Please accept the repeated expression of my highest consideration

The Duke of Gallo.

I'm not sure if di Gallo actually expected Mier to believe this.

Mier to Metternich, Postscript

Naples, March 16, 1815.

My Prince!

1) Today at three o'clock in the afternoon I received an invitation from Her Majesty the Queen to come and see her. I hastened to go and found Her Majesty very distressed. The King had just received a letter from Florence from General Pignatelli announcing the arrest of Madame Mère and Princess Pauline by the Commander of our troops at Villa Reggio [correct: Viareggio]; that they were being treated there as state criminals; that one of our officers was always keeping watch over them. The Queen told me that this news had enraged the King, and that she was very saddened by it. I tried to reassure her that there was surely some exaggeration in this report; that I supposed that these ladies having landed at Villa Reggio, the Governor of the Principality of Lucca would have thought it necessary, in the present circumstances, to oblige them to remain there until he received orders concerning them from the Marshal, the Count of Bellegarde; that everyone in his place would have done the same; that moreover I could assure her that these ladies would not be mistreated. The Queen informed me that the King had sent General Filangieri to Marshal Bellegarde to urge him not to oppose the continuation of the journey of these two Princesses to Naples, and that he had charged her to ask me in his name to support this request. I replied that I would do so willingly and that I would take advantage of General Filangieri's departure to write to General Bellegarde, as I did indeed as soon as I got home, and I had my letter delivered to the Queen's Cabinet. This evening Mr. de Gallo gave me the attached note, which I have the honour of bringing to the attention of Your Highness. I confined myself to acknowledging its receipt and to informing him that I had already written on this subject to Marshal Bellegarde at the invitation of Her Majesty the Queen. She must also have addressed His Imperial Highness the Grand Duke of Tuscany to ask him to take an interest in this matter and to try to arrange it in accordance with their request.

The note Mier refers to is not cited, but seems to have repeated Caroline's protest against the way Letizia and Pauline had been treated.

2) I found the Queen very distressed and dismayed at all the King's actions. She repeated to me what she had already told me in this respect, and assured me that she was doing everything in the world to prevent the King's departure, because she foresaw the consequences; that twice in succession he was about to get into a carriage to leave Naples and that she had succeeded in diverting him from it; that in order to persuade Him to give up this journey She had declared to Him that She did not wish to take charge of the regency, or to interfere in any way whatsoever with the affairs of the government in His absence; that if He left She would retire to Portici to live there in the greatest seclusion, and that She did not wish to receive any minister there, and much less to talk to him about business. This statement greatly embarrassed the King; for He knew that in His absence no one was in a position to conduct business but the Queen.

3) She told me how the notes which Your Highness had addressed on February 26th to Campochiaro and on the 25th to Talleyrand had had a bad effect on the King's mind; that in them there was no question of defending the King, but rather the Princes of the House of Austria; that the King believed himself to be on the eve of being sacrificed by our Court. He claims that we have been sparing Him and lulling Him into hope until the moment of a definitive arrangement with the other powers, and that we are now gathering troops in Italy to dictate to Him the rules. The Queen told me that She was far from admitting his ideas, having too high an opinion of the loyalty of the Emperor Francis, but that with the distrustful character of the King it could not be put out of His mind; that these ideas and the appearance of the Emperor Napoleon on the scene at the moment when He believes Himself sacrificed, have turned His head. "He believes that Napoleon's possible successes may help to keep Him on the throne of Naples. You know," she continued, "my opinion in this respect; I do more; I advise the King that if Austria replies that she is determined to oppose the possible successes of the Emperor Napoleon, He should join her, and follow in everything her system and policy. You see that my particular affections and the torment of seeing my family persecuted and covered with disgrace give way to the duties of a mother and those of a Queen of Naples. The King must hold on to a great power which protects Him; if He ventures to fly on His own wings He is lost. I once held to the system of France to the last extremity, because I was convinced that our interests required it. Events have had to change our policy; I have convinced myself that our salvation depends on our intimate union with Austria, and I hold to it with my heart and soul. The Emperor Francis has supported us until now as a loyal ally, and I am sure that He will not abandon us, if we deserve it. It is His duty, His own interests command it." I replied that this was an excellent response. I observed to Her that Austria could not be satisfied with the conduct of the King, mainly in what relates to our Italian provinces and to the affair of the Marches. She tried to defend Him and contradicted several statements I had made in support of my thesis. "But the King's last steps," I said to her, "can only increase our distrust and discontent?" "I fear," she replied, "that they will produce this effect; you know how much I have fought against them; but do not look for much malice in them; it is a spur-of-the-moment move, a foolishness which is repeated and which I hope will not be supported. The King is calmer, more reasonable, and I flatter myself that this state of affairs will continue." She could hardly speak, so weak was she. "You see", she said to me, "in what state my sorrows and the continual debates I have to support have reduced me, I often lose courage. I observed to Her that She would make a well-deserved reproach to herself all her life if at such a decisive moment She allowed herself to become depressed and discouraged, and did not use all her power to prevent false steps. May Your Highness please accept etc.

Mier.

Sort of typical: So the boys made a mess of things, and the one woman around is supposed to reproach herself for not having prevented it.

[josefavomjaaga]

Helfert, “Joachim Murat”, Chapter 5, Part 1

(Continuing with the text, as there seem to be no letters or documents for chapter 4. The next document Helfert cites is already Murat’s proclamation from September 1815.)

5. King Ferdinand and Prince Leopold

May to September 1815.

On May 21, Prince Leopold arrived from Teano at Bianchi's main quarter. In an appeal to the Neapolitans he made them aware of his arrival and assured them of the conciliatory and benevolent disposition of his royal father. The Abruzzi, Molise Capitanata, Terra di Lavoro had already declared themselves for their old royal house; there was no doubt about the voluntary adherence of the other provinces, least of all that of the two Calabrias.

In Capua, the agreement of the 20th had scarcely become known when all order broke down in the Carascosa division, which formed the garrison, the only one where a trace of discipline remained. By use of force, they pushed their way out of the city towards Naples. Guglielmo Pepe, otherwise very popular with the army, strove in vain to maintain the soldiers in line of duty; he, like the other officers, had lost their prestige, no order was heeded any more. In the city, which had been evacuated by the troops, the Muratists attempted an uprising and opened the gates of the prisons. Pepe sent an express messenger to the imperial headquarters with the request that he be allowed to move in as soon as possible, and then rode after his fugitive soldiers into the capital. Two squadrons of hussars were ordered from the Austrian camp, and their appearance restored order.

The situation appeared more ominous in the capital, where Caroline Murat, after having renounced the title and functions of a regent, had to seek refuge in the Fort dell'Uovo. All the streets were filled with wild mobs, to whom the numerous military fugitives had to surrender their weapons. Murat's coats of arms, colours, insignia, everything that could recall the rule of the overthrown son of the Revolution, were torn down, the amaranth of the Bourbons and the name of Ferdinand took their place. In between, shrill shouts: "Death to Joachim! Death to the French!" Some of the latter, caught up in these wild mobs, fell victim to the popular fury. The citizen's guard wanted to keep order, but their mere appearance, as a Muratian institution, aroused rage and outbursts of anger; they gave fire to the mutineers, whose savagery was only increased by it. Terrified, the queen, accompanied by Agar, Zurlo, Macdonald and a few other faithful, left the fort to seek shelter on Campbell's ship. The night of the 21st to the 22nd of May was one of the most terrifying that had been experienced in Naples since 1799. A city of 400,000 inhabitants exposed to a mob of 40 to 50,000 heads of the wildest rabble! In addition, as always on such occasions, the criminals rattled at their dungeon doors, the Lazzaroni made efforts to free 600 galley convicts by force. Blood had already been shed on both sides. Deputations of the nobility and the bourgeoisie rushed to Capua to ask the imperial commander-in-chief to occupy the city without delay, although according to the military convention this was not to take place until the 23rd. The same request was made by Mme Murat to the British Commodore, who put several hundred men ashore and ordered them to move into the city, where they were joined by the extremely hard-pressed civil defence. Bianchi also hurriedly ordered General Neipperg to Naples, who set off with two cavalry regiments and a battery on horseback and arrived on the 22nd at two o'clock in the morning, just in time to assist the armed citizens and Campbell's marines, who were defending the royal palace with their last forces against the onslaught of the ravening mob. Order was soon restored and law and order reigned again.

But the two days of rampages and fighting had cost about a hundred lives; the number of wounded was much greater. Sent by Leopold, Prince Atajano arrived in the capital and had the proclamations of the king and the prince made known, which caused joy everywhere. The people, quickly transformed, cheered the Austrians wherever they appeared. San Genuaro himself, it was said among the Lazzaroni, had served the cannons of the imperials. In the evening the city was festively illuminated.

On the 23rd, Bianchi's columns set out from Capua. The magnificent road via Aversa to Naples, through the middle of the most luxuriant stretch of land in the old world, was strewn with discarded shotguns, sabres, cartridge bags, etc.; 22 cannons, 97 ammunition carts, 2 field forges, abandoned by their covering, also fell into the hands of the Austrians.

This made me laugh because it almost sounds as if the Austrians had been especially indignant that the Neapolitans had littered the beautiful landscape with all that rubbish. »Now look at that! Pick that up, boys, we’ll return their waste to them and teach’em to dispose of it properly.«

Then, amidst excessive displays of joy by the population, with music and all the pomp of war, Bianchi and Burghersh, in their midst Prince Leopold of Sicily, made their entry into the city. On the 26th the Prince went with a large escort to the cathedral, where a solemn thanksgiving service was held. The streets of the capital were filled with officers from various countries: Sicilian with English uniforms, Neapolitan with French uniforms, British, Tuscan, Modenese, and the first and most numerous of all: Austrian. City and country paid homage to the imperial colours. On 28 May, General Napoletani surrendered the fortress of Pescara, on 29 Montemajor the fort of Ancona. Only in Gaëta, from the bare rock whose battlements crown the old Torre d'Orlando, the French-Napolitan tricolour still flew lonely and deserted. General Begani refused to surrender, and it was necessary to make arrangements for a formal siege.

Caroline Murat was still in the Gulf. From on board the Tremendous, the unfortunate princess had to hear the celebrations, the salvos of the cannons, all the festive noise and hubbub, the city lights, the bonfires on the surrounding heights, with which the son of her victorious rival was greeted by those who had cheered her and her husband a few weeks, even days before. Admiral Exmouth would not hear of the promise Campbell had made to her about a communication to the British Cabinet; he claimed that the Commodore had not been authorised to make such a concession. Caroline asked Count Neipperg, whom she had known personally since January 1814, for an interview, not as a princess but as a person seeking protection. She declared her intention to give herself into the power of Austria, and so, with the consent of Prince Leopold and Lord Burghersh, an agreement was reached according to which Caroline, who took the name of a "Countess of Lipona" (an anagram of "Napoli"), was to be taken with her family for the time being to Trieste to await the resolution of Emperor Francis. She sent for her children from Gaëta; on the Austrian side, Major Baron Sunstenau was to escort the abandoned woman. She still received individual visits from her husband's faithful, to whom she confidently expressed her optimism that not four months would pass and she would return to her throne, for Napoleon would not tolerate the Austrians in Italy.

That last bit is, according to a footnote, from General Pepe’s memoirs (and thus possibly to be taken with a grain of salt):

Pepe I S. 311... From General la Vauguyon, p. 311 f., he learned some details about life at Murat's court, "and especially of the queen, which to me seemed but a dream, and yet very true: that princess thought of nothing else but the crown which she must wear after the death of her husband".

I imagine that of course Caroline would try to console her last followers somehow, even against better judgement.

I had had no idea that things had become so violent in Naples as well. Pretty much the same thing as in Milan in April 1814.

[josefavomjaaga]

Helfert, “Joachim Murat”, Chapter 4, Part 3

Neapolitan retreat, Austrian advance, and preparations for battle on both sides.

On the 12th, Mohr moved from defence to attack and, from the bridgehead at Occhiobello, broke through the Neapolitan position at Ravalle and Casaglia, finding the way to Ferrara open on the 13th. At the same time FML Bianchi advanced to the Panaro, on the 14th to the Secchia, on the 15th forced back General Pepe, commanding in Carascosa's absence, behind the Reno, and on the 16th made his entry into Bologna, which King Joachim had to leave in such haste that he could not collect the war tax he had imposed on the city. At Bologna, where the commander of Lombardy, G. d. C. Baron Frimont, was present, a council of war was held and, against Bianchi's opinion, it was decided that the imperial army should henceforth split and move in two directions towards the south: Count Neipperg on the right wing with 16,000 men and 20 guns along the Adriatic shore, Bianchi with the centre with 12,000 men and 28 guns through Tuscany, to which Nugent, with not quite 3,500 men and 4 guns forming the outermost right wing, was to prepare the way.

King Joachim, apparently soon enough aware of this division of the Austrian army, took his countermeasures without delay.

Again judging from Helfert’s footnotes, he follows Italian writer Colletta in this. According to Pepe, Murat learned much later about it. Helfert seems to be a bit lost between his sources here as Colletta seems to describe events in a much more positive light.

His plan was to retreat slowly from Neipperg and to keep him in sight until Bianchi was separated from him by a long distance, so that one army could not quickly bring help to the other, and then to attack and defeat one after the other, Bianchi first, with his combined superior force.

Sounds like a very Napoleon-like plan.

At the same time he decided to enter the path of negotiation, if only to gain time by stalling. To this end he sent off Legation Councillor Questiаux to his Vienna Congress Legation, April 18, and sent Colonel Carafa as parliamentary to General Neipperg with a letter addressed by his Chief of General Staff Millet to the Imperial Commander-in-Chief, in which he sought to portray the forward movement of his army as a mere security measure, since he was unclear about Austria's intention, April 21. But Questiаux, who arrived in Trieste on the latter day, was not allowed to continue from there, but had to turn back without having achieved anything, and on the 24th Neipperg replied "that the supreme commander had given the most definite instructions to continue the operations with the greatest zeal".

In the course of these days the king, followed at a reasonable distance by Neipperg, had successively evacuated Imola, Faenza, Forli, while in the west his guard legions were retreating from Florence via Arezzo and Perugia towards Foligno. When the Austrians entered Forli, they were told that King Joachim had expressed his intention to fight a battle at Cesena, but then, whatever the outcome, to withdraw within his borders and offer a truce, lest it should appear that he was making common cause with Napoleon.

Uhm... but he had only just received Napoleon’s brother ...? Surely he must have suspected the Austrians to be aware of such communications?

In fact, the Neapolitans under Lecchi's leadership seemed to want to dispute the imperials' passage over the Ronco, which brought about a fierce battle that ended with the retreat of the former behind the Savio. The king, after having deployed in battle formation south of the river at Bertinoro and Cesena, broke camp and in the night of the 22nd to the 23rd retreated via Savignano to Rimini. It was of little comfort to him that here he received a letter from his wife, with a message from his imperial brother-in-law, who was quite delighted with the king's enterprise. But the question was whether Caroline's letter, which Joachim showed around to his generals, was not intended solely to raise the sagging courage of the army, which was retreating from one position to another.

So, Caroline with a fake letter would have supported an enterprise she had so fiercely opposed? I’m confused again.

At Cattolica, on April 26 and 27, the king again seemed to want to engage Neipperg, had entrenchments thrown up in order bring in batteries, but finally changed his mind and went back to Pesaro, Fano, Sinigaglia. His rearguard suffered one defeat after another. On the 28th, already in the darkness, the G.St. Captain Count Thun and Captain Monbach attacked a Neapolitan detachment at Santa-Marina near Pesaro, then entered the city at the same time as the fugitives through the open gate, where Pepe was just having dinner with a friendly family, while Carascosa was already in a deep sleep, caused hopeless confusion among the garrison and, carrying three and a half hundred prisoners with them, withdrew from Pesaro, which the royals now evacuated in a despicable haste.

On the 29th Joachim was in Ancona where he issued an army order to his troops: "the long-awaited moment of battle had come, the previous retreat had been a feint, victory over the Austrians was easy and certain". On the 30th he arrived in Macerata, where the two legions of his guard had already moved in.

FML Bianchi had arrived in Florence on April 20, and with him Grand Duke Ferdinand III. Here, if it had not happened earlier, he was joined by the British envoy to the Court of Tuscany, Lord Burghersh, who from then on remained in his main quarters and, when it came to fighting, was regularly at his side, sometimes intervening himself. On the 23rd Bianchi was in Arezzo, Starhemberg with the advance guard in Cortona on the Tuscan-Roman frontier. Even further ahead, already deep in the Papal States, in Bolsena, Monte-Fiascone and Viterbo, stood Nugent that same day, hurrying in forced marches towards the area of Naples.

In a letter of the 29th, FM Prince Schwarzenberg informed Bianchi that "His Majesty has deigned to transfer to you the command of the army against Naples"; in fact, Bianchi had taken it over even before he had received this communication, because Frimont, called away by other business, hurried back from Pesaro to Lombardy on the 29th. The Vienna Cabinet continued to show the greatest consideration for his opponent. On May 3, Baron Frimont received a letter of order stating that the King of Naples, by his attitude, had given Austria the means to assert the right of conquest against him in the fullest sense. "Nevertheless," it continued, "Murat has been recognised as king by our government, and His Majesty therefore wishes him to be treated as such until the last moment and to be called King Joachim in all negotiations and public writings until further notice." From this letter one can see that on our side, in the higher ranks, modesty and caution set the tone, while the officer and the common man were burning with the joy of battle, as if everything had to succeed. That is the right relationship. The soldier should and, with good leadership, will always consider himself invincible; it is up to the commander not to triumph too soon, to consider all the vicissitudes of the fluctuating fortunes of war. Over in the Neapolitan camp, it was the other way round: great confidence, or at least the appearance of it, on the part of the king and his entourage, wavering confidence, little courage, much unwillingness in the ranks of the army.

Actually, I do read this in a somewhat less friendly manner. This clearly means that, from this moment on, Murat’s removal from the throne was the campaign’s official aim. But let’s remain polite until the last moment.

[josefavomjaaga]

Helfert, “Joachim Murat”, Chapter 4, Part 4

The battle of Tolentino

In the last days of April, Bianchi occupied the region of Tolentino, which he examined in person in all directions without delay. He had about 11,000 men at his disposal, while the king faced him with 16,000 infantry and 2,000 horsemen; for the time being, the imperial commander could only think of putting himself in a state of defence, but he decided to hold out until the end. The king had chosen his day well: General Neipperg was only at the Metauro, at four days' march from Bianchi.

At the same time, Nugent was already in the Abruzzi, marching on Antrodoco on 1 May, which General Montigny "cautiously" evacuated with 1600 men, and from there on Aquila, where Major Patrizio with the Neapolitan garrison withdrew to the fortress; but when Nugent earnestly demanded surrender, this was also carried out and the garrison departed with "all military honours". General Manhès had moved from Naples to the Liris with 5000 men and appeared before Ceprano on 2 May. It was certainly desirable for him to find the place occupied by some Roman irregulars, who fired on his invading troops, but then took to their heels; for he could now show his strength, let storm and give rein to the cruelty of his soldiers; part of the little town went up in flames. But Manhès did nothing against Nugent.

On May 1st, Murat and Bianchi faced each other without doing anything, the day passed with mutual observation and reconnaissance.

Nothing happened on the morning of the 2nd either. It was not until noon that the king, seeing that his opponent was determined to stand his ground but not to challenge, gave signal to attack, and that his columns began to move. A cavalry charge, in which Stephan Széchényi, later to become the "Great Hungarian", distinguished himself brilliantly, helped to raise the confidence of the Austrians and shake that of the Neapolitans right at the beginning of the battle. But the fortunes of war fluctuated to and fro throughout the day. An imperial detachment of chasseurs, which had been delayed, was surrounded and captured by royal cavalry. The Neapolitans made progress in detail, ours had to abandon several points to the more numerous enemy, and full of the joy of victory, Joachim sent joyful messages to Naples in the evening. Nevertheless, his army suffered a heavy loss with the wounding of Gen. Lieut. d'Ambrosio.

During the night Joachim gathered reinforcements, especially the Pignatelli-Strongoli legion; he was now almost 25,000 strong. On the 3rd in the morning, dense fog covered the area; when it lifted, the king saw the line of the imperials in a firm position like yesterday, the right wing leaning against the Chienti, the left against a steep mountain, which the Neapolitans considered useless for any gun position: however, Bianchi had used the night to have two cannons and a howitzer disassembled into their parts, brought up and then reassembled and set up again with unspeakable difficulty.

The second day of battle once again opened in the Royalists' favour. FML Mohr conceded Arancia to the enemy who was advancing with superior numbers; a fierce bayonet fight won the Neapolitans the important point of Cassone. But a miscalculated attack by General d'Aquino on La Vedove, used to his advantage by Bianchi at the right moment, inflicted the first serious defeat on the enemy; likewise, an attack by the Maio brigade on the strong position at Vomaccio on the extreme right wing of the imperial forces failed completely. After this it had become noon, a lull occurred, and the battle was at rest for more than an hour. The king decided on a main attack on the hill of Madia on the left wing of the Austrians, which he thought was defended only by small arms. His columns advanced, and the first cartridge shot fell into their ranks, which began to waver in surprise. Now Bianchi ordered the advance. His men seemed to have waited for this sign and rushed to the attack, the phalanges of the dismayed Neapolitans were blown apart; soon the right wing of the royals was struck on the head and dispersed in disorderly flight.

At this fateful moment, the King receives two almost simultaneous bad messages: one from the Minister of War, Macdonald, about the appearance of the enemy on the Liris, the alarming mood in the capital and in several provinces, especially in Calabria; the other from General Montigny about the loss of Antrodoco and Aquila to Nugent. The king is beside himself, orders a court martial against Montigny and Major Patrizio, but this does not help the matter. While he is now thinking of withdrawing his troops from the battle, Bianchi gives him no time to rally. The king's generals lose courage, the men think only of their personal safety; the soldiers, who are not helped by their nimble legs, let themselves be caught in heaps. During the night, d'Aquino and Medici appear before the king with the report that their brigades have been attacked in the darkness, that they have lost many dead and prisoners, and that the rest are scattered; Pignatelli reports that not a single company of his guard is still in order; Livron declares that he can no longer stand for the mounted guard. Not only is the day decided, the campaign is lost, the empire, the throne. Bianchi writes: "The enemy will hardly be able to withstand us in the open field."....

The loss of the Austrians in dead, wounded and prisoners amounted to 27 officers and 795 men, that of the Neapolitans in dead and wounded alone about 1700. 4 adjutants of the king, 3 staff and 35 senior officers, 2219 men were taken prisoner; captured were horses, pieces of armour, 1 cannon, 6 ammunition trolleys, etc.

In a footnote the author mentions two more sources that might be of interest but which I could not find on the spot:

In the Schels'sche Zft. 1819 III [presumably meaning: "Oestreichische militärische Zeitschrift"] there is a map of the battlefield of Tolentino. See also the biography of Bianchi p. 443-458 [I could only find entries in encyclopaedias on Vinzenz von Bianchi]. In later times, ibid. p. 473 note, the commander expressed himself: "The small number that won the victory at Tolentino deserves to be thought worthy of it and contemporaries should not withhold from it the recognition it deserves" ... Orlov-Duvall, p. 185, writes about Mack's unfortunate campaign in 1799: "L'Europe apprit avec étonnement qu'en si pen de temps la plus belle et la plus nombreuse armée qui fût jamais sortie du royaume de Naples avait été battue, dispersée, anéantie". Exactly the same could be said of Murat's campaign in 1815: the destruction did not take place "en si peu de temps", but his army was "plus belle" and "plus nombreuse" than Mack's had been.