"The bottom line is that by abandoning formal and final causes, modern philosophy necessarily denied itself any objective basis for morality. If nothing is objectively for anything - if nothing has any inherent goal, end, or purpose - then reason is not objectively 'for' anything either, including the pursuit of the good. Hence there cannot possibly be any way of grounding morality rationally. And if there are no essences or forms in the sense affirmed by the classical realists (whether Platonic, Aristotelian or Scholastic), then there is no sense to be made of the good as an objective feature of reality anyway. The good becomes a function of our subjective preferences, desires, sentiments, or 'intuitions', and reason is 'for' whatever we want it to be for, which may or may not include the pursuit of what traditionally has been called 'morality.' There is just nothing else for the good or for reason to be if one follows the mechanistic line. Like causation, or free will, or knowledge, or the concept of a person, or the idea of natural human rights, morality in general becomes an illusion, a 'projection' or convenient fiction at best, when one follows through consistently the implications of the moderns' anti-Aristotelian revolution. Indeed, insofar as personhood and free will are themselves necessary prerequisites to morality, the very possibility of a rational system of ethics is triply undermined by the moderns."