"Real" Logic
A few interesting ramifications of the empiric definition of logic:
First, logic is always an approximation. In practice, it is the best approximation of some "real" logic. But even in principle, that "real" logic is inferred from the approximation, and this inference is of course done using the approximation itself.
Second, actually empirically defining logic is like axiomatizing experience: the precise details of that process and its answer depend on the details of your experience stream. Thus, logic relativity.
Third, at any moment in any experience stream, there are are least three different things one might validly want to call "real" logic:
the logic(s) which would have predicted that experience stream so far more correctly than all other logic(s),
the best logic(s) that can actually be defined from just that experience stream so far, or
the logic(s) which could correctly model some set of realities in which that experience stream could happen.
