#supremecourtindia

[theindianlawyer]

WHEN TECHNOLOGY CROSSES THE LINE

WHEN TECHNOLOGY CROSSES THE LINE: SAFEGUARDING THE SANCTITY OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING - The Indian Lawyer

INTRODUCTION On 2 July 2026, the Supreme Court of India delivered a significant Judgment in Pooja Ramesh Singh v. Jammu & Kashmir Bank Ltd.

[hanifafathima]

Right to Privacy as a Fundamental Right: A Legal Perspective

"What Has the Supreme Court Said About the Right to Privacy?" has emerged as a critical query in contemporary constitutional law practice, particularly during the digital era. The concept of privacy in contemporary times has gone beyond merely relating to physical space. Rather, it includes such concepts as data privacy, bodily autonomy, communications, and human dignity. In India, the acknowledgment of privacy as a fundamental right became a watershed moment.

Right to Privacy

The concept of right to privacy can be explained in terms of a person's power to manage their information, decisions, and private life free from undue intrusion by any other body or even the state. Although there is no specific provision for “right to privacy” in the Indian constitution, this fundamental right has been interpreted judicially.

The issue regarding “What Has the Supreme Court Said About the Right to Privacy?” became significant as courts have taken contradictory views on this matter in their earlier judgments.

Development of Privacy Jurisprudence in India

Prior to 2017, there were mixed signals about the legal recognition of privacy in India. Decisions such as M.P. Sharma vs Satish Chandra (1954) and Kharak Singh vs State of Uttar Pradesh (1962) were indicative of the fact that privacy may not be considered a fundamental right.

However, subsequent decisions started changing this perception. In one case, the court admitted that under some circumstances, privacy may be recognized as a legal right. Gradually, judicial philosophy changed, understanding privacy as an integral aspect of human dignity and freedom.

Landmark Case: K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India

Finally settling the issue of “What Has the Supreme Court Said About the Right to Privacy?” is the landmark case of K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India in 2017, in which the Supreme Court gave a unanimous verdict that:

Privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution of India. Privacy is covered under Article 14, Article 19, and Article 21, specifically within the right to life and personal liberty. Privacy is an inherent part of human dignity and freedom.

In this case, the Supreme Court overturned its previous decisions and declared that the right to privacy is indeed a constitutional right.

It also ruled that privacy is not an absolute right. However, it may be restricted based on certain conditions such as legality, necessity, and proportionality.

Scope of the Right to Privacy

After the groundbreaking judgment, the ambit of privacy got widened. It now covers:

Privacy of the body (medical and reproductive rights) Privacy of information (protection of data) Privacy of communication (phone conversation and private messaging) Decisional privacy (related to lifestyle choices and relationships)

The verdict highlighted that privacy is inherently linked with dignity and liberty, thus becoming an integral part of all fundamental rights.

Consequences for Law and Society

There have been various repercussions of recognizing privacy as a fundamental right:

Enhancement of Personal Rights Individuals have increased legal recourse against monitoring and abuse of their personal data. Influence on Pioneering Cases The verdict played a pivotal role in shaping decisions like legalizing same-sex relations and adultery. Data Security and Governance in the Digital Age The verdict paved the way for future privacy laws in India. Constitutional Limits on State Action State intervention can only occur through stringent constitutional standards.

Challenges and Limitations Even with its acknowledgement, there are various limitations to the right to privacy:

Balancing between privacy and national security and public interest

Managing issues related to data protection in the age of digital economy

Tackling the issue of mass surveillance

Enforcing privacy laws

The courts have constantly reiterated that there should be a balance between privacy and other interests.

Conclusion In Right to Privacy as a Fundamental Right: A Legal Perspective, we finally learn the answer to this critical question, "What Has the Supreme Court Said About the Right to Privacy?" The historic ruling on this aspect by the Supreme Court of India has been rendered as a result of Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India case. With such an historic verdict, Indian constitution came into the modern era wherein privacy became part of life and personal liberty under Article 21. Now, with personal data and identities at stake due to rapid technological advancements in this digital age, this judgement would certainly play a significant role in the future.

[ailabormarketdisruption]

Rescuing the Expired Mandate: Supreme Court on Section 29A Extensions

Background

Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 prescribes a twelve-month period from the completion of pleadings for an arbitral tribunal to deliver its award in domestic arbitrations. Parties may by consent extend this by a further six months under Section 29A(3). Beyond eighteen months, only a court can grant further time, upon sufficient cause shown. The question that had divided High Courts across the country was a deceptively simple one: must the application for court-granted extension be filed before the statutory period runs out, or can it be filed after the mandate has already lapsed?

The Calcutta High Court in Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Limited, and the Patna High Court in a connected matter, had taken the stricter view: once the twelve or eighteen months expired without an extension application pending before a court, the arbitral mandate terminated, and the court was powerless to revive it. The Delhi, Bombay, Kerala, Madras, and Jammu and Kashmir High Courts had taken the opposite view, holding that the court retained the power to extend the period even after its expiry.

The Supreme Court, in a batch of appeals decided on 12 September 2024, settled the question conclusively in Rohan Builders (India) Private Limited v. Berger Paints India Limited, (2025) 10 SCC 802.

What the Supreme Court Held

The Court, per Justice Sanjiv Khanna, held that an application for extension of time under Section 29A(4) read with Section 29A(5) is maintainable even after the expiry of the twelve-month or the extended six-month period. The court's power to grant extension is not extinguished by the mere lapse of the statutory window.

The Court's reasoning rested on the text of Section 29A(4) itself. The provision states that the mandate of the arbitral tribunal shall terminate 'unless the court has, either prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified, extended the period.' The expression 'prior to or after' is unambiguous. The legislature expressly contemplated that an extension application could be filed and granted after the period had expired. Giving the word 'terminate' an absolute and irreversible meaning would render this phrase otiose.

The Court also noted that the word 'terminate' in Section 29A(4) is not followed by a full stop. It is qualified immediately by the word 'unless', which introduces the court's power to extend. Termination under Section 29A(4) is therefore conditional on the non-filing of an extension application, not an absolute legal consequence that cannot be undone. The Court rejected the Calcutta High Court's reliance on the legislative preference for 'terminate' over 'suspend', finding that 'suspend' was avoided not to foreclose post-expiry applications, but to prevent arbitral proceedings from hanging in limbo indefinitely when no party acts.

Crucially, the Court clarified that this does not mean extensions are granted as a matter of course after the period lapses. Section 29A(5) requires the applicant to show sufficient cause, and the court may impose terms and conditions. The first proviso to Section 29A(4) permits fee reduction of up to five percent per month of delay attributable to the tribunal. Judicial discretion remains the check against abuse.

Why This Matters for Commercial Dispute Resolution

The judgment prevents a technically lapsed mandate from becoming a jurisdictional death sentence for arbitrations that may have consumed years of proceedings and significant resources. A strict interpretation would have forced parties to abandon ongoing references mid-stream and start afresh, wasting time, money, and evidence already on record.

At the same time, the ruling is not a licence for indolence. Parties that monitor statutory timelines proactively, flag approaching deadlines, and move for extensions before expiry will always be in a stronger position.

Citation: Rohan Builders (India) Private Limited v. Berger Paints India Limited, arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 23320 of 2023 and connected matters, decided on 12.09.2024, reported at (2025) 10 SCC 802.

[ailabormarketdisruption]

The two-view rule: why courts can not rewrite your arbitration award

Background

In Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. v. State of Goa, (2024) 1 SCC 479, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether a High Court, exercising appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, could reverse findings of an arbitral tribunal merely because it preferred a different reading of the contractual terms. The dispute arose from a Power Purchase Agreement and concerned questions of variable charges, fuel pricing, and plant downrating, among others. While the arbitral tribunal had decided four of five issues in favour of the claimant, the Bombay High Court (Goa Bench) reversed substantial portions of the award in a Section 37 appeal.

What the Supreme Court Held

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's interference and restored the arbitral award. The Court reaffirmed what is by now a settled proposition: a court hearing a challenge under Section 34 does not sit as an appellate court over the arbitral tribunal. The scope of review is confined to specific grounds such as public policy violations and patent illegality. Patent illegality, the Court clarified, requires an error that goes to the root of the matter and is not merely an erroneous application of law.

Critically, the Court held that where an arbitrator's interpretation of a contract is a plausible or possible view on the facts, a court cannot substitute its own view. The High Court had re-appreciated evidence and applied contractual clauses that the arbitral tribunal had found inapplicable, which the Supreme Court treated as impermissible reappraisal. Under Section 37, the scope of interference is even narrower, being limited to the grounds available under Section 34. Concurrent findings by the arbitral tribunal and the Section 34 court should be disturbed only in rare circumstances.

Why This Matters for Commercial Dispute Resolution

The judgment draws a firm line against courts functioning as courts of appeal over arbitral awards. Parties who enter into contracts with arbitration clauses and obtain awards in their favour receive a significant degree of finality. An opposing party cannot simply argue, at the Section 34 or Section 37 stage, that the arbitrator got the contract wrong and expect the court to conduct a fresh reading of the documents.

For platforms and practitioners operating in the online dispute resolution space, this judgment reinforces the value of a well-conducted arbitration on the merits. Awards issued by experienced, sector-aware arbitrators, after full consideration of contractual terms and evidence, will withstand judicial scrutiny as long as the reasoning reflects a coherent and defensible interpretation. The institutional quality of the arbitration process, including how proceedings are documented and how the record is maintained, directly affects how protected the award is from challenge.

Citation: Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. v. State of Goa, Civil Appeal Nos. 3615-3616 of 2023, decided on 10.05.2023, reported at (2024) 1 SCC 479.

[ailabormarketdisruption]

An Arbitrator Can Grant Post-Award Interest on the Principal Alone: Supreme Court in Morgan Securities v. Videocon Industries

A question that has long troubled arbitration practitioners in India concerns the scope of an arbitrator’s discretion when awarding post-award interest. Must the arbitrator always apply the statutory rate of eighteen percent on the entire awarded sum, including pre-award interest? Or does the arbitrator retain the freedom to tailor the interest component to the facts of the case? The Supreme Court of India, in Morgan Securities and Credits Pvt. Ltd. v. Videocon Industries Ltd., decided on September 1, 2022, has answered this question with clarity.

The Background

Morgan Securities had disbursed approximately five crore rupees under a bill discounting agreement with Videocon Industries. The dues remained unpaid. After invoking arbitration, the sole arbitrator rendered an award in 2013 granting Morgan Securities the principal sum along with pre-award interest at varying rates, and post-award interest at eighteen percent per annum on the principal amount alone. The arbitrator’s decision to confine post-award interest to the principal, and not extend it to the pre-award interest component as well, became the subject of challenge before the Delhi High Court under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Both the Single Judge and the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court declined to interfere, and the matter was carried to the Supreme Court.

The Statutory Framework

Section 31(7) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 deals with pre-award and post-award interest. Section 31(7)(a) grants the arbitrator discretion to include interest at a rate it considers reasonable for the period between the accrual of the cause of action and the date of the award. Section 31(7)(b) provides that any sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award shall carry interest at eighteen percent per annum from the date of the award to the date of payment, unless the award otherwise directs.

The key interpretive question was whether the phrase ‘unless the award otherwise directs’ in Section 31(7)(b) qualifies only the rate of post-award interest, or whether it also qualifies the sum on which such interest is payable.

The Conflicting Precedents

The judgment traces the evolution of the law through two earlier decisions of the Supreme Court. In State of Haryana v. S.L. Arora, a two-Judge Bench had held that interest awarded under Section 31(7)(a) could not be included in the ‘sum’ for the purpose of calculating post-award interest, thus confining post-award interest to the principal. This decision was subsequently overruled by a three-Judge Bench in Hyder Consulting (UK) Limited v. Governor, State of Orissa, which held that the word ‘sum’ in Section 31(7)(b) carries the aggregate meaning of principal plus pre-award interest, since these two components merge upon the passing of the award and lose their separate identities. The critical question left unresolved by Hyder Consulting, however, was whether an arbitrator retained the discretion to grant post-award interest on a part of that aggregate sum, or whether post-award interest was mandatory on the whole of it.

What the Court Decided

A Bench of Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud and Justice A.S. Bopanna held that the arbitrator retains wide discretion in awarding post-award interest. The Court examined the placement of the phrase ‘unless the award otherwise directs’ within Section 31(7)(b) and concluded that it qualifies only the rate of post-award interest, not the sum. The statutory provision of eighteen percent applies only when the award is completely silent on post-award interest. Where the arbitrator has addressed the question, even partially, the award governs.

Crucially, the Court held that the broad discretion conferred on the arbitrator under Section 31(7)(a) in respect of pre-award interest would be rendered inconsistent if the legislature had intended to strip away discretion at the post-award stage. The arbitrator, the Court observed, takes into account factors such as the financial standing of the award-debtor and the prevailing circumstances of the parties before determining the appropriate rate and quantum of post-award interest. That discretionary exercise must be performed in good faith, on relevant considerations, and reasonably. But it cannot be undone by a court merely because it chose to limit interest to the principal component.

The arbitrator’s award of post-award interest on the principal sum alone was therefore upheld. The appeal was dismissed.

What This Means in Practice

For parties in arbitration, this ruling carries a practical lesson. Post-award interest is not an automatic, one-size formula. It is a matter of judicial discretion vested in the arbitrator, to be exercised contextually. An award-debtor who delays payment cannot expect a court to reduce the post-award interest on a Section 34 challenge if the arbitrator has already consciously addressed the question. Equally, where an award is entirely silent, the eighteen percent statutory rate applies on the full ‘sum’ as interpreted in Hyder Consulting.

For lenders and financial institutions who frequently resort to arbitration, the ruling confirms that a well-reasoned award addressing post-award interest is largely insulated from judicial tinkering at the challenge stage.

Morgan Securities and Credits Pvt. Ltd. v. Videocon Industries Ltd., Civil Appeal №5437 of 2022, decided on September 1, 2022, reported as (2023) 1 SCC 602.

[ailabormarketdisruption]

The Section 9 Bar: Once a Tribunal is Constituted, the Civil Court Door Shuts

ArcelorMittal Nippon Steel India Ltd. v. Essar Bulk Terminal Ltd. | Supreme Court of India | Civil Appeal No. 5700 of 2021 | Decided: 14.09.2021

The moment an arbitral tribunal is constituted, a civil court's power to entertain a fresh application for interim relief is not merely curtailed. It is effectively suspended, unless the applicant can demonstrate that the remedy before the tribunal is not efficacious. The Supreme Court's ruling in ArcelorMittal Nippon Steel India Ltd. v. Essar Bulk Terminal Ltd. has clarified exactly what this means in practice, and the answer matters for anyone who believes that filing a Section 9 application early in the day and then sitting on it is a viable litigation strategy.

The Facts

The dispute arose from a Cargo Handling Agreement between the parties at Hazira Port. After ArcelorMittal invoked arbitration in November 2020, both sides filed applications for interim relief under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the Commercial Court at Surat. The applications were heard extensively over 11 full days spanning 36 listing dates, with pleadings running to over 2,200 pages. By 7 June 2021, the matter had been fully argued and was reserved for orders.

Then, on 9 July 2021, a three-member arbitral tribunal was constituted by the Supreme Court under Section 11. ArcelorMittal immediately filed an application before the Commercial Court seeking to have both Section 9 applications referred to the newly constituted tribunal. The Commercial Court dismissed this request. The Gujarat High Court upheld the dismissal, but directed the Commercial Court to proceed to pass orders while keeping Section 9(3) in mind. ArcelorMittal then appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Core Question: What Does 'Entertain' Mean?

Section 9(3) of the Act, introduced by the 2015 Amendment, provides that once an arbitral tribunal has been constituted, the Court shall not entertain an application under Sub-section (1), unless the Court finds that circumstances exist which may not render the remedy provided under Section 17 efficacious.

The word at the centre of the dispute was 'entertain'. ArcelorMittal argued that 'entertain' means the entire process of taking up an application for consideration, right through to the pronouncement of an order, and that since the Commercial Court had not yet pronounced its orders, it was still entertaining the applications when the tribunal was constituted. On this reading, the bar under Section 9(3) would have applied, and the court would have been required to first examine whether the Section 17 remedy was efficacious before passing any orders.

Essar argued the opposite. Its case was that 'entertain' means the first occasion when the court applies its mind to the application and takes it up for consideration. Since the applications had been fully heard and reserved for orders well before the tribunal was constituted, they had already been entertained in that sense, and Section 9(3) had no further role to play.

What the Court Held

The Supreme Court settled the meaning of 'entertain' by tracing its consistent interpretation across a line of authority. Drawing on Lakshmi Rattan Engineering Works Ltd. v. Asstt. Commissioner Sales Tax and Martin and Harris Ltd. v. VIth Additional District Judge, the Court held that 'entertain' means to take up for consideration and apply judicial mind to the issues raised. It is not the same as merely filing or admitting an application. The process of consideration can continue until the pronouncement of the final order.

However, and this is the crux, the bar under Section 9(3) operates at the point when the court would take up the application for consideration. If a tribunal is constituted while the application is already in the process of being considered, having been heard and reserved for orders, the bar does not require the court to start the examination of Section 17 efficacy afresh. The court held that where an application has already been entertained and the hearing concluded before the tribunal was constituted, the commercial court is entitled to proceed to pronounce its orders without separately examining whether the remedy under Section 17 is efficacious.

The appeal was accordingly allowed only to the narrow extent of clarifying that the Commercial Court would not need to conduct the Section 17 efficacy inquiry, since the applications had already been entertained before the tribunal was constituted. The direction to proceed to adjudication was affirmed.

The Bigger Picture: What Section 9(3) Was Designed to Do

The Court was careful to explain the legislative purpose behind Section 9(3). Introduced by the 2015 Amendment, it was designed to reduce the flow of Section 9 petitions to courts once a tribunal is in place, for two practical reasons: to decongest the court system, and to allow the tribunal, which has the same powers as a court under the amended Section 17, to handle interim relief in a timely manner. An order passed by the tribunal under Section 17 is deemed to be an order of court for all purposes and is enforceable under the Code of Civil Procedure in the same manner. There is therefore no structural reason for a court to continue entertaining interim relief applications once a functional tribunal is available.

The Court was also clear that a party cannot manufacture inefficacy of the Section 17 remedy through its own conduct. If a party deliberately delays the appointment process or refuses to cooperate with the tribunal, it cannot then turn around and claim that the Section 17 route is not efficacious in order to justify approaching a civil court under Section 9.

What This Means for ODR and Institutional Arbitration

For parties using institutional arbitration or ODR platforms, this ruling has an important practical consequence. Once an arbitrator is appointed and the tribunal is formally constituted, a party that has not yet filed a Section 9 application before a civil court, or has filed one but not had it taken up for consideration, is effectively barred from pursuing that route for interim relief absent genuine inefficacy of the tribunal remedy. The Section 17 route before the tribunal is the proper and intended avenue.

This reinforces the structural advantage of institutional and ODR-administered arbitration. The moment the tribunal is constituted through the platform's appointment mechanism, the dispute resolution process is firmly in the arbitral domain. Attempts to introduce parallel civil court proceedings for injunctions at that stage will face the Section 9(3) bar, and the burden of proving inefficacy rests squarely on the party seeking to go around the tribunal.

[prithwishganguliadvocate]

⚖️ Mutual Divorce: You Can't Take Back Your "Yes" (After Taking the Cash)

The Supreme Court of India just dropped a reality check for anyone thinking they can treat a mediated settlement like a "free trial."

The Case: Dhananjay Rathi v. Ruchika Rathi (2026)

Imagine this:

The Deal: A couple agrees to a mutual divorce.

The Payday: The husband pays ₹75 Lakhs, buys a car, and returns all jewelry.

The Twist: After getting the money, the wife says, "Actually, I withdraw my consent," and files a Domestic Violence (DV) case to pressure for more.

The Court’s Verdict? 🛑 NOT ON OUR WATCH.

The Supreme Court stepped in with a massive precedent. While you technically have a right to withdraw consent before the final decree, the Court ruled that legal rights cannot be used for economic coercion.

The 3 Big Takeaways:

Settlements are Sacred: If you take the benefits of a deal, you are bound by the deal.

No "Omnibus" Allegations: Vague, "copy-paste" harassment charges filed just to pressure a spouse will be quashed.

Article 142 to the Rescue: The Court used its special powers to grant the divorce anyway, citing "Irretrievable Breakdown," even though one party tried to back out.

💡 Pro-Tip from a 26-Year Veteran:

Matrimonial law in 2026 isn't just about the sections of the IPC; it's about Equity. Whether you are in Alipore, Barasat, or Sealdah, the courts are increasingly looking for "Bona Fide" (good faith) conduct.

Facing a complex divorce or need to quash a malicious case? Let’s build a strategy that actually holds up in court.

🔗 Read the full analysis: https://blogs.prithwishganguli.in/posts/april2026/withdrawal-of-consent-in-mutual-divorce-supreme-court

📞 Consult: [phone] 📍 Chamber: Bidhannagar, Sector II, Kolkata.

[ippraesidium]

Passive Euthanasia in India

Passive Euthanasia in India is a sensitive yet crucial legal and ethical topic that highlights the balance between life, dignity, and compassionate care. With evolving Supreme Court guidelines, the right to die with dignity under Article 21 is gaining clarity through regulated processes like withdrawal of life support and living wills.

Understand the legal framework, consent requirements, and end-of-life rights in India.

Read more: https://praesidiumip.com/blog/passive-euthanasia-in-india