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Arif Bhatti Ki Maryam Nawaz Per Karii Tanqeed

#Arif Bhatti #Ki Maryam Nawaz #Per Karii #Tanqeed

Tanqeed: Being Female & Ahmadi | VOICES

Rabia Mehmood spoke with an Ahmadi student "to document the tribulations Ahmadi women go through once they step out of the security of Rabwah, the Ahmadi secretariat situated in Central Punjab in district Chiniot. “Aisha” — not her real name — is a young woman who has lived in Rabwah her entire life except for a few years while she went to university for her masters’ degree. During that time, as Aisha details, she faced severe harassment."

#Ahmadi #Islam #Pakistan #Tanqeed

Why The Left Is (Still) Sexist by Sonia Qadir for Tanqeed: "What is really being said when someone says “more women need to join the Left”? What is the assumption behind the statement “women need to be radicalized/awakened”? What do we imply when we say, “I have never felt harassed/discriminated against in the Left as a woman, so neither should you”? Or when we say, “The Left is very interested in The Woman Question”? What biases are revealed in the oft-repeated formulae that feminist or women-dominated groups are bourgeois and classist, whereas male dominated groups from the same social backgrounds, meeting in the same bourgeois spaces, are not?"

#Leftism #Sexism #Tanqeed

تنقید مت کرو ـ کہ زمانہ خراب ہے چپ چاپ دوســـتوں کے چلن دیکھتے چلو

محسن نقوی

#Urdu Poetry #Mohsin Naqvi #tanqeed #zamana #kharab #chup chaap #doston #chalan

Like most people, Hakim Hakimullah’s mind had the unfortunate habit of releasing a floodgate of worries right as he lay his head on his pillow each night. Like most people, Hakim would reluctantly bulldoze his way through these anxious thoughts, disposing of some through denial, others through belligerent optimism (which is often, but not always, the same thing). Any problems left after all this he would transfer unto God’s court, like most people would do.

Like most people, Hakim’s anxious thoughts revolved largely around his job, and specifically around his worries about how a downturn in his employment could derail the future for his family, but like most people, these worries were largely idealised. What Hakim really worried about (like most people) was the sense of self-worth his job provided, and the fear of having none left if he were to lose his job. A stagnant career, diminishing prospects, redundant responsibilities – these concerns animated Hakim’s anxiety, like they do for most people.

So here was Hakim, lying on his charpai, unable to sleep since he lay down five hours ago. Hakim knew he had to start getting ready for work in the next fifteen minutes, even though he had no energy left inside of him. The whole night had been spent worrying about what his immediate supervisor, a burly fellow named Baitullah, was thinking of him these days.

For what was probably the one hundred and thirty fourth time that night, Hakim recounted the entire cycle once more inside his head. He had been one of the star students at his seminary and had been head-hunted by his current employers even before he graduated. In their interview – well, meeting-to-announce-job-offer, really – they had made special mention of how impressed they were with his people skills, an obvious hint that they saw a future for him in upper management.Hakim recalled with a swell of nostalgia how limitlessly possible those days used to feel. Their company was going places, it had international recognition, and even though he was just an entry-level employee at one of their larger regional subsidiaries, he still felt a pulsating sense of idealism pervaded everything they did. More importantly, he genuinely admired… actually, and Hakim was not ashamed to say this, he loved his branch manager; a philosophical, genial man called Ehsan Khalid who insisted everyone call him Sajna. Sajna loved to come over to Hakim and ask him for advice on little matters, a gesture which Hakim realised meant more than anything even his father had ever done for him.

Like most people, Hakim had then used the good fortune in his career to plan for his personal future. He married one of his younger cousins, built a separate annex for them in his father’s house, and soon became the father of two girls. As he lay in bed this night, Hakim could physically feel the taste in his mouth turning bitter as he remembered how he gotten up for Fajr one spring morning many years ago and thought if life could get any better.

Well it certainly got worse.

First there was the workplace accident which killed Sajna. Hakim felt as if he had lost not just a father, or even a mentor, but the axis of his world. He had feared that the office-politics that had been held at bay due to Sajna’s dexterous diplomacy would now explode and engulf them all. He was right. The new boss immediately decided on who he liked and who he didn’t, and Hakim fell in the latter camp.

At first, it looked like Baitullah would fire Hakim, but Sajna had trained Hakim for working in the IED Division, and Baitullah transferred him there. What was worse, Baitullah pretended as if this was some huge favour he was bestowing. Hakim was a humble man who sought to quell his own ego, but he couldn’t help shivering with shame when his thoughts went back to that day when Baitullah assembled the whole office and announced Hakim as the Manager of the IED Division – a division of which he was also the sole member.

Like with most people suffering from such a humiliating incident, Hakim grew paranoid and withdrawn, constantly feeling like people were plotting against him. As he lay in the charpai, even he realised that the people skills he was famous for had deserted him, and that he had no friends, forget allies, left at work. Ultimately, because Hakim (like most people) drew most of the idea of who he was from what he did, this realisation had crushed him.

Eventually, Hakim put his hand under his pillow and fished out his mobile phone. His eyes took a few seconds to adjust to the neon-yellow screen, and he realised that he was already running late. He was about to groan when the thought came to him again, perhaps because he was holding the phone.

The thought that struck Hakim was this – there was an international competitor of their firm which had been particularly aggressive in moving into his company’s operations. They had been secretly advertising huge cash rewards for inside information, and many of Hakim’s colleagues had discussed the rumours amongst themselves. Unlike most of these people, Hakim had never even considered the possibility of selling out the company for his own good.

But as he realised for the one hundred and thirty fifth time that night, what good was the company doing for him? I mean, half of Hakim’s mind argued, what would most people do in my situation? Hakim convinced the other half of his mind, and typed out his office’s coordinates into an SMS, which he then sent. Like most people, Hakim realised that the only one who could help him was himself.

#taliban #writing #south asia #tanqeed #wah

In February 2010 Iftikhar called his family from Quetta and informed them that he will be returning home after months of labor at a construction project in Chaman. After four months of agonizing worry and wait, afraid that Iftikhar had been kidnapped or killed, International Committee of the Red Cross informed his family that he is being held at Bagram. Mentally ill prior to his imprisonment at Bagram, the physical and psychological torture he was exposed to in incarceration took a visible toll on him and Iftikhar’s mental health deteriorated. He was repatriated to Pakistan on 15th May, 2015 and is currently in detention at Central Jail, Sahiwal. His hopes for freedom dashed, Sahiwal Jail proved to be another Bagram for Iftikhar and his illness exacerbated. On 24th July 2014, Justice Khalid Mehmood Khan of the Lahore High Court, after ascertaining Iftikhar’s mental ill-health, ordered the Punjab government to transfer him to a private mental health facility. Pakistani detainees in US custody have spent years at Bagram without charge, trial or access to a lawyer. In their absence their families endured trauma, economic hardship and social stigma. Amal Khan spent twelve years at Bagram without ever having presented a charge sheet of his alleged crimes. Eighty-four year old Bismillah Khan’s children struggled to make ends meet as he counted days of his nine years long imprisonment. These men represent some of the poorest and most marginalized communities in Pakistan with little knowledge of the complex repatriation procedure and no money or social clout to wrestle their rights. Since the first Pakistani detainees started trickling back, lack of clarity and transparency has shrouded the repatriation process. According to an estimate from 2012, Bagram housed forty Pakistani inmates; of which sixteen have since been released while twenty four remain in US custody. For the past four years, JPP has been pushing the governments of United States and Pakistan to release official confirmation on the names of Pakistanis in US custody at Bagram. After tremendous effort and repeated requests, earlier this month, advisor to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs, Sartaj Aziz, released a list of twenty-four Pakistani detainees at Bagram. However, this is accompanied by a disclaimer that the government is still in the process of ascertaining their nationalities and is not sure who these people are. Despite its fundamental responsibility to assist Pakistanis in indefinite detention, the government has done little to make the process more comprehensive and transparent. If the government abdicates as it has, then who will take what constructive effort to bring Pakistanis home, particularly in light of the compounded challenges caused by US withdrawal from Afghanistan?

.....of broken lives and endless wait

#pakistan #politics #south asia #tanqeed

On June 15th, the Pakistani state launched operation “Zarb-e-Azb,” a full-fledged military assault on North Waziristan, one of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that form Pakistan’s northwestern border with Afghanistan. The stated aims involve a “comprehensive operation against foreign and local terrorists who are hiding in sanctuaries in North Waziristan” according to the military. With hundreds of thousands of people displaced and hundreds killed, the operation is another attack on the people of Pakistan, like those that have come before it.

Since 2001, a global “war on terror” has been waged under a grand narrative of secularism and civilization combating Islamic fundamentalism, and has dovetailed conveniently with wars conducted under that other grand narrative of supporting democracy against dictatorship.1 In fact, as the political economist Adam Hanieh argues, there is a single imperialist war on the people of the region at large, a war that stretches from Libya and Egypt in North Africa, to Somalia in East Africa, to Syria and Iraq in West Asia, to Afghanistan and Pakistan in South Asia. It is worth noting that most of these countries have Muslim majorities.

Defining a pro-people politics and initiative in this mess is difficult. In Pakistan, an old left, eager not to be on the wrong side of secularism, civilization and democracy, has frequently found itself degenerating into liberalism, siding explicitly or implicitly with imperialism.2 Some younger radicals have also been prone to confusion.3

Accordingly, advancing a new, pro-people politics in Pakistan, where ruling classes have polarized the discourse, first requires revisiting some basic questions around state and society in relation to the Waziristan issue and secondly, analyzing how imperialism operates as a class force in Pakistan. This is where the analyses of progressives, liberals and Marxists alike, often fall short.

Such analyses argue that politics in Pakistan is dominated by “the establishment,” whose chief component is “the military,” that is, the Pakistan Army and under its command, the main intelligence agency, the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The military, we are reminded, has ruled Pakistan for around half of the country’s existence, and is liable to interrupt the democratic process at any time in order to secure its pernicious, institutional interests in maintaining and projecting power inside and outside of Pakistan.4 Indeed, if a military operation was being prevented until now, it was due to the ISI playing a “double game” — on the one hand taking aid from the U.S. that was actually meant for combating militants, while on the other, supporting militants for the military’s interests. Such explanations assume a normative ideal of state and politics, exemplified for progressive leftists in the post-colonial world by Indian liberal democracy. They explain the problems of Pakistan’s state and politics as a result of deviating from this ideal type due to the predominance of the military and its pernicious, institutional rationality.

#pakistan #south asia #long reads #tanqeed