#tathandlung

[weidenkatze]

(tathandlung)

[fliesskrotzen]

Das Ich setzt sich selbst, und es ist, vermöge dieses bloßen Setzens durchs sich selbst; und umgekehrt: Das Ich ist, und es setzt sein Sein, vermöge seines bloßen Seins. - Es ist zugleich das Handelnde, und das Produkt der Handlung; das Tätige, und das, was durch die Tätigkeit hervorgebracht wird; Handlung, und Tat sind Eins und ebendasselbe; und daher ist das: Ich bin Ausdruck einer Tathandlung.

Johann Gottlob Fichte: Erster, schlechthin unbedingter Grundsatz (Tathandlung durch Selbstsetzen), aus: Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre

[atpeaceamongstchaos]

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Es geht euch nicht um Fuszball, es geht euch nicht um Sport, wenn ich euch so sehe, hab' ich Angst vor Völkermord. "Man darf doch wohl noch stolz sein, die anderen sind's doch auch." Arme kleine Deutsche, hört zu jammern auf.

Tathandlung - Euer "wir" (Nie wieder Deutschland)

[mayo-ultras-blog]

"Nach Deutschland fährt man am besten mit dem Panzer"

Passend zum 08. Mai gibts neuen Kirmestechno von Tathandlung <3

[eidetisch]

What is the Science of Knowledge or die Wissenschaftslehre?

What is the nature and aim of the Fichtean Wissenschaftslehre (the doctrine of science = Science of Knowledge)? Die Wissenschaftslehre is the authentically radicalized idealism and elevates Kant's philosophy to the level in which the science of knowledge becomes an evident and intuitive science as the philosophical basis for the transcendental philosophy. This evident science (Fichte's philosophy) seeks to eliminate the dualism of intuition and thinking on the one hand and dualism of knowledge and volition on the other so as to attain absolute monism. In other words, this evident science demonstrates both these dichotomies as deducible from one and the only one principle, namely the activity of the sole ego (die Tathandlung des einzigen Ichs). Why this evident science is called die Wissenschaftslehre is because it adequately and ultimately answers the question,

How is knowledge (Wissen) possible? and How is experience possible?

This is not the science about "fact", but the science about "knowledge" (die Wissenschaft von Wissen). In Kant's terms, it is the transcendental philosophy. This "knowledge" does not include our everyday practical knowledge and common-sense knowledge, but exclusively deals with the knowledge of sciences. To Fichte, this knowledge (Wissen) includes not only common sense but the totality of all the scientific disciplines. Therefore, die Wissenschaftslehre is to intuitively elucidate the structure of our consciousness functioning both in our mundane life and in all the special sciences. Die Wissenschaftslehre deals with the necessary ideas or the necessary actions, while the other special sciences deal with arbitrary (willkürlich) ideas or action (=behavior). For example, we can arbitrarily represent the idea of triangle or circle, while the idea of space for instance is necessary and cannot be arbitrarily abstracted. Die Wissenschaftslehre intends to deal with those necessary ideas (=representations).

Why did intellect come to term with sensitivity? Why did intellect come to intuitively know space and time? Why did intellect create such specific categories as substance and causality?

Kant adequately described the activities of the intuitive spirit and the speculative spirit, but as answers to the above questions, these activities are to be demonstrated as necessary and to be deducted from the basis of all consciousness, i.e., from the Tathandlung des absoluten Ichs. Die Tathandlung is contrasted to die Tatsache. Die Tathandlung is also called pure activity. The self is according to Fichte nothing but this pure activity of the self or ego. Die Wissenschaftslehre deduces everything systematically from the self as the pure activity (Tathandlung). the highest pure activity of the self forms three principles.

The Tasks of The Wissenschaftslehre (Science of Knowledge) (1) the Tasks Kant had left unsolved (viewed from Fichte's viewpoint) a) Radicalization of idealism b) Systematization of idealism both of which is supposed to lead to the completion of idealism

(2) The Details for The Completion of Philosophy of Idealism Theoretical Philosophy Form and Matter Form The forms of thought (=Categories) The forms of sensibility (Space and Time) Matter That which is affected through senses by Thing itself ` Understanding and Sensibility

Practical Philosophy The origin of the affirmative proposition The relation between the Moral Consciousness and the Natural Impulse

The Relationship Between theoretical and Practical Philosophy (3) Choice of Philosophical Stand. The Theoretical Justification The Practical Justification

The Choice of either Realism (Dogmatism) or Idealism

(4) Nature of Wissenschaftslehre

II. The Three Basic Principles (Die drei Grundsätze) The highest forms of Tathandlung take three distinct Principles. They are led by the need for self reflection. In the case of thinking, What does the self necessarily do? It is the fact that in case of thinking (being conscious of) anything, the I inevitably thinks (is conscious) of one's own self and that we are not able to abstract this I or self from this activity at all. That, I think, means either that the I affirms my self or that the I posits my self. Here it becomes obvious that thereby the affirming I and the affirmed I become apart, the positing I and the posited I, the thinking I and the I being thought of, distinguish themselves within the I or ego. This means further that the I or self is the subject and the object at the same time. The nature of self consciousness consists in the very identity of the representing and the represented. Such pure I or self is not a fact (Tatsache), but an activity (Tathandlung). this activity (Tathandlung) takes place unconsciously and it is by intellectual intuition that the self is aware of this unconscious pure activity. This is the meaning of the First principle. The First Principle says,

Das Ich setze ursprünglich schlechthin sein eigenes Sein.‹Grundlage, p. 98

[The self primarily and directly posits its own being.]

That is, "the I or self (=ego) posits itself"(Das Ich setzt sich selbst. [p. 96]), or more simply, "I am", (Ich bin. [p. 96]). The nature of the self is no other than its activity that the I posits itself as my own being. The Cartesian "I think, therefore I am", as well as Kant's "synthesis" are this Tathandlung itself. Logically speaking, from this Tathandlung, the principle of identity ( A=A ) is deduced. In the categories, Kant's category of reality may be deduced from this. This First Principle is that by which the I thinks of itself, and yet in the fact of our experiential consciousness, together with the I's positing itself, something other, "something opposite and foreign" comes to appear. Needless to say, what is something opposite is no other than opposite to the I itself (for nothing else does exist). Thus The Second Principle states:

"Against the I the non-I posits itself".

From this Second Principle, the logical Principle of Contradiction is deduced and the Category of Negation is deducible. The First Principle and The Second Principle are to be reconciled. Since both the I and the non-I are opposing each other within the (original) I itself, they are to be posited as mutually limiting. In other words, they are to be posited as mutually annulling its own portion, i.e., they are to be posited as being divisible (teilbar). Thus The Third Principle states:

"Ich setze im Ich dem teilbaren Ich ein teilbares Nicht-Ich entgegen." [p. 110].

From this Third Principle the logical Principle of Reason (der Satz des Grundes), for that principle contains the reason for the synthesis and unity of the I and the non-I. The Category of Determination (die Kategorie der Bestimmung) is deducible from this. Simply, the I (without its opposing non-I) as such and the non-I (without its opposing I) as such alone are indeterminate, infinite. By the Third Principle, they are now determined as the divisible I and the divisible non-I and being posited as opposite, they are now mutually determinant and in consequence determined, definite. This is what Kant called the Category of Limitation. Those three Categories which are deducible from the three Principles belong to The Categories of Quality (Reality, Negation and Limitation). The I that is the object of the intellectual intuition is the I which serves as the Ground of all beings, and is by no means an individual I. It is the I-ness, the Spirituality as such (die Geistigkeit überhaupt), the Eternal Reason itself (die ewige Vernunft). This I as the Eternal Reason is both common to and the one with every I that is. It appears in every thought and exists in it as its ground. To this absolute I an individual I is merely its accident (die Akzidenz), its means or its particular expression. this absolute I is pure activity and not a Substance. The pure I could not be conceived as an entity existing before this pure activity. Being is the accident and the result of this pure activity. The pure activity of the I is primary, the substance is secondary. In Goethe's Faust in Studienzimmer Szene (1224-1237), Faust opened with the beginning of the Gospel according to St. John in the New Testament, and wondered about the proper translation for the Greek word, "Logos" in the context of "In the beginning was the Word (Am Anfang war das Wort [Luther's translation]). Instead of "the Word", Faust tried, "Meaning" (Sinn), then "Power" (Kraft), then finally he settled on the word "Action" (Tat). According to Fichte, this Tat is no other than his Tathandlung, the pure activity of the absolute I. The three activities expressed by the above Three Principles are isolated, mutually independent activities of the I. To the contrary, these three positings (Setzungen) are but one and encompassing, total activity. It is the beginning of the total system of the unconscious various activities and the inquiry into these various activities is the task of the Wissenschaftslehre. In the Wissenschaftslehre the thesis (=the position of the I), the antithesis (=the position of the non-I), and the synthesis (=the position of the I and the non-I in mutual limitation) repeatedly appear to elucidate Fichte's thought and this is the very forerunner of Hegel's dialectic. This may trace back to what Kant called "eine artige Betrachtung", his Categories. If we may go further back, we may find it in Jacob Boehme. Within The Third Principle, there are two propositions included:

1) Das Ich setzt sich als bestimmt durch das Nicht-Ich. (The I posits itself as determined by the non-I.) 2) Das Ich setzt sich als bestimmend das Nicht-Ich. (The I posits itself as determining the non-I.)

1) deals with the cognitive activity of the self, while 2) deals with the practical activity of the self.

III. The theoretical I (the I as cognitive faculty)

One of the two propositions,"the I posits itself as being determined by the non-I" which are contained in the Third principle purports the cognitive act of the self. Furthermore, this proposition contains two more propositions:

1) "The non-I determines the I." In other words,, the I is "affected" by the other, namely "The I suffers(leidet=is acted upon) by the non-I". 2) "The I posits itself", i.e., "the I determines itself", that is,

the I posits by itself its own determination. Namely, "The I is active (=tätig)".

These two propositions are to be reconciled in such a way that a portion of the I is viewed as determining, while the other portion of the I is viewed as being determined. Needless to say, this is based on the Third Principle that reveals that the I is divisible(=teilbar). This "being divisible" means "being capable of quantity." That one portion of the I is viewed as determining, while the other portion of the I is viewed as being determined is the same as the I posits in itself the negation in as much as posits in the non-I the reality, i.e., the same reality that is negated in the I is to be posited in the non-I. from here the Category of Quantity is derived. Quantitatively viewed, the being acted upon (=leiden) of the I is no other than the decrease of being active of the I. Being acted upon (=leiden) is a certain quantity of being active, i.e., that of the I. Unless the I is active, it is acted upon, or unless the I is active, the non-I is active. In short, the non-I is after all a portion of the I itself. Fichte tried to demonstrate this relationship of the I and the non-I by means of the analogy between the light (das Licht) and the darkness (das Finsternis), Reality, Negation and Limitation. Thus from the Limitation as one of the Categories - the Third Category of Quality, the Categories of Relation are to be derived. In the propositions, "The I is acted upon by the non-I" and "The I is active", the relationship between the I and the non-I are carefully examined, then the Three Categories of Relation, namely, 1. Mutual Determination, 2. Causality, 3. Substance,

1. The Category of Mutual Determination (Wechselwirkung): The Reality, once negated in the I, is posited with equal quantity.

As determinatio est negatiois said, between the I and the non-I the determination is mutually done by negation.

2. The Category of Causality: The cause of the I's being-acted-upon is the non-I, and as its result, the I's being-acted-upon (suffering=leiden) is produced. Thus the Category of Causality is derived.

3. The Category of Substance: The being-acted upon (leiden=suffering) of the I is the limitation of the I upon itself. Since the I's being-acted-upon (suffering=leiden) is viewed as an accident at its very portion, the activity of the I is fundamentally the substance. Thus from this the Category of Substance is derived. So subsist the necessary relationships among the three Categories of Relation which are derivable therefrom.

Furthermore, these categories represent three philosophical positions:

1) In view of Causality, Dogmatic Realism, e.g., Spinoza's philosophy.

2) In view of Substance,

Dogmatic Idealism, e.g., Berkeley's philosophy.

3) In view of Mutual Determination,

Critical Idealism, Kant-Fichte's philosophical system.

That the I possesses Substantiality, while the non-I possesses Causality, can be viewed also as these two functions contained the (absolute) I, or this can further construed as the two, opposite directional powers. This power as a whole is the striving to infinity and it is also said to be the limitless productive power (Produktionsvermögen). Compare with Kant's distinction of Imagination;

Die Einbildungskraft

die reproduktive Einbildungskraft = Synthesis by association in accordance with empirical rules.

die produktive Einbildungskraft = Spontaneität.

Its effects: Schemata The Medium to mediate categories and perception between concepts and intuition

The effect of the productive imagination is the object as such. The totality of the (external) reality is produced by this imagination.

Ohne diese wunderbare Vermögen läßt sich gar nichts im menschlichen Geiste erklären, und auf welches dürfte sich gar leicht der ganze Mechanismus des menschlichen Geistes gründen [Grundlage, p. 208]).

The production of the productive imagination is prior to our conscious activities and unconscious activities. Therefore, we believe that objectivity (the external reality) appears to be discovered. The various representations are the various steps of the unconscious productivity. Thus, from the pure activity of the I, namely from the productive imagination, the fact of consciousness in general must be explained. This Fichte called "die Deduktion der Vorstellung".

The Deduction of Representations

1) Feeling (Gefühl) or sensation (Empfindung)

i.e., "In-sich Findung", to find in itself (the I itself). However, The I or self finds (this) as something other and yet finds in itself. In sensation no distinction between the being conscious and the being-conscious-of.

2) Intuition (die Anschauung).

When the I reflects upon its own sensation, and posits that which limits the I and looks at it, this act is Intuition (Anschauung), in which the non-I is intuited, and what is intuited appears as if it were the product of the non-I.

3) The reproductive imagination (= das Nach-bilden).

Taking into itself the intuition the I reproduces(nach-bilden) the intuition. its product is a "picture" (das Bild), i.e., das Nachbild to be exact. While this Nachbild is our representation, its original (das Vorbild) is the thing in itself. Here the thing in itself (das wirkende Ding) and the picture (das Bild) are distinguished. Thus the I reproduces (pictures) the Intuition (its own product as the non-I) in itself. In other words, the I consciously reproduces what the I unconsciously produced. Thus, while the productive imagination produces reality, the reproductive imagination produces representation.

4) Understanding (der Verstand):

According to Fichte what produces the Categories is also imagination. Understanding simply makes the categories applicable to the laws. Fichte even argues that Hume was right in maintaining that Causality is a product of imagination, although Hume erred in failing to recognize the objective validity of causality. Kant viewed the Categories as the primary forms of thinking, i.e., that the Categories originate from Understanding, and he had to elaborate in the Schematism the Categories in conjunction with productive imagination in order to make the objective application of the Categories possible. In contrast, according to Fichte, Kant was right in the lawfulness of the Categories, and yet erred regarding the origin of the Categories. The Categories are not the products of Understanding, but they arise at the same time as objectivity, (external) reality and solely on the basis of the productive imagination. Space and Time, too, according to Fichte, have their origin in imagination. While Kant discovered Space and Time as the a priori forms of intuition, Fichte attempts to deduce a priori Space and time. As a result, they are demonstrated as existing in the I. Understanding solidifies the fluid intuition by means of concepts so that by understanding, the product of imagination becomes objectivity, the (external) reality.

5) Judgment (die Urtielskraft):

Judgment is the free ability (das freie Vermögen) of reflection. It is the ability whether or not to direct reflection to a certain object. It freely abstracts a certain object of understanding and it is an ability to, at will, connect or separate certain characteristics (Merkmale).

6) Reason (die Vernunft):

While understanding is the ability to abstract a certain objectivity, Reason is the ability to abstract objectivity itself as a whole. Reason is conscious of itself as the ability of abstraction which does not direct itself to a particular object. it is the I in its absolute, pure subjectivity. The significance and ability of Reason is Self-Consciousness. The freer Reason becomes from objectivity, the closer the empirical I comes to pure self consciousness.