#three dialogues

[the-ephemeral-ethereal]

Few men think; yet all will have opinions.

from Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous by George Berkeley

[elle-if]

[aviel]

Cy Twombly, Three Dialogues, 1977

[thetldrplace]

How the Trick was Done

Berkeley’s Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonus George Berkeley was a proponent of what came to be known as subjective idealism, a theory that denied the existence of material substance, contending that such things could only exist in the mind.

 The dialogues are fictional exchanges between Philonus, the subjective idealist, and Hylas, his friend who holds to the existence of matter.

Having read the dialogues, I found myself completely unconvinced. But I wanted to understand how Berkeley constructed his argument- and what he did to skewer the argument in his favor. So I went back to the first dialogue and paid particular attention to the form.

 The basic premises are as follows. Philonas argues there is no such thing as material substance. Material substance is defined as that which can be perceived by the senses. A material substance, in order to be perceivable, has sensible qualities. If one were to remove those qualities, then there would remain nothing to be sensed, and therefore, sensible things are nothing but so many sensible qualities.

 Hylas notes there is a difference between existence and perception.

 Philonas offers the example of heat. If heat is something real, it must exist without the mind. This would include heat’s existence to all degrees. The most intense degrees of heat bring great pain. And something that can’t sense is incapable of sensing pain. He then asks if the material substance is senseless? Or sensible?

If it is incapable of sense, it is incapable of pain, and therefore it can’t have the property of heat, since great heat would produce pain and it is incapable of sensing pain.

 Hylas correctly observes that pain is distinct from heat.

 Philonas responds with the observation that if you put your hand closer to the fire, you sense both great heat and pain, so they are indistinct. Therefore, great heat can’t exist apart from a mind perceiving it.

 There are two misdirects I see in Philonus arguments. The first is when he tries to tie sense with the sensible qualities of heat. Granting that heat has sensible qualities, it does not follow that heat only has effects on a material substance that can sense.

Berkeley understands this by having the hypothetical friend observe that pain is distinct from heat.

But Berkeley unfairly narrows the scope of the material substance in question to those that can sense.

 It’s true that for a creature that can sense, high heat will be accompanied by pain. But pain is distinct from heat. Heat will have an effect on a wood structure even though the structure doesn’t feel it. The sensible qualities don’t have to be sensed to be real, which we can see when a fire burns a house down. A man can stand a mile off and watch a house burn down without feeling pain.

 So the trick is to convince your opponent that the scope of the argument must necessarily be narrowed to the scope that achieves what you want. At the point he buys in and accepts it as true, then it is conflated out to cover a scope where it doesn’t work. It is an ancient trick: it’s true, but it’s not the whole truth.

[kalosophia]

Three Philosophic Dialogues — Introduction

It is quite an honour that can befall someone to be asked to write an introduction to the work of someone else. It is the peculiar function of the introducter that one becomes the medium between two parties who didn't know each other to become acquainted, this by telling something about one to the other. So, dear visitor to this blog, it will be possible for you to become acquainted with three dialogues by my friend Guy in Kalosophia, which will be presented to you in serialized form in the coming time.

Now it can be said that just some texts and words are a bit impersonal, yet it is the characters described and depicted by these words that are worth meeting. Maybe the names of for instance Socrates and Plato will ring some bells with some of you, but, to keep it short, it is the case that these two great philosophers from over two millennia ago will figure prominently. Some other characters will be present too, some of equal degree and some a bit less. As in the dialogues of Plato you will find Socrates conversing in different situations, and at this point you might object and say: What value is there in becoming acquainted with fictional characters in imaginary situations? A good question indeed, as the real Socrates and Plato can be said to be no longer living, and that these characters in these dialogues are not them actually, and the described situations cannot be proven to have happened. So am I introducing you here to what could be presumed with these fictional and imaginary things as a frivolous spending of your time? Not at all, and actually quite the opposite. A bold statement, you might say, but here it is where perhaps the actual introduction will come about.

Just as this introduction, the texts and words, the characters and situations, you will find that the conversations will be a means to investigate and discover things that are personal and important to you and me. Philosophy, in this sense, might be the only way we can truly approach these things and come to know them, as they are not tangible and unmeasurable, and thus unattainable by the scientific method, but also because philosophy is only concerned with the truth of these things and the truth itself.

For us it will be our task to follow the reasoning and inspect what follows when a proposition is affirmed or denied, but also to see what happens to ourselves when we come face to face with that what the conclusions indicate and define. Because sometimes we find that what we believed, or accepted as true before, must be replaced or refined with what might not be as easily acceptable for everyone, even when the conclusion is inevitable. It is one of the beautiful things of genuine philosophy, not only will one be able to test and gain a better understanding of the world we live in, but we also get to know ourselves.

So to help us on our way in doing this, one of the dialogues will deal with this question: what is this being which is that what we truly call ourself, and the reason or the why that is. Because if we are not certain about this, how can we know what is good for us and why this is? And this will connect with the second dialogue, as this will investigate what it is we consider as happiness and if this is desirable and attainable. Because many are seeming to strive for this in many different ways. But why is this and can we ever truly hold on to this?

But let us first go to that situation where we find Socrates in his cell the night before his death. Here a conversation will take place between him and the servant who will give him the cup with hemlock that following morning. The question of the servant concerning the very being of truth , justice and such like things, leads into a investigation of reality and real things, and what the relation is of these things with each other, the universe and us.

I hope you feel that it may be worthwhile to accept the hand of friendship offered to you and come along on a voyage of discovery. For myself I can only say I'm happy to have followed along on this adventure and am thankful for Guy to have offered these works from his love of wisdom and dedication to truth, and the many real benefits he knows to have gained over the years in close acquaintance with Philosophia, and the gratitude to all those who were friends of her too.

— Stefan

[warningsine]

― George Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous