At Least Coffee 110, or Why All the Hatred?
A terrible disease is spreading across the country. Personally, I call it “Antibabisium dementis.” It affects mainly supporters of the currently unsuccessful opposition. It emerged the moment Babiš’s ANO movement made it not only into parliament but also into the government. At that moment, everyone began to fear what Babiš was proclaiming. That he was opposed to political corruption. And because virtually every incumbent politician was more or less implicated in something, and a tycoon like Babiš was so wealthy that he didn’t need any “kickbacks”—and thus there was nothing to blackmail him with—a systematic wave of hatred began.
I admit that I wasn’t the one who brought him into parliament. Back then, I was still voting for Sobotka’s ČSSD. I ignored Babiš at first. And I kept it up for a long time. Until the moment when the aforementioned disease began to manifest itself. Then I slowly began to switch to his side. Precisely because I sensed how everyone was trying only to harm him, yet they were unable to offer a single reasonable argument.
I had a lawyer acquaintance at the time who was able to explain quite a few things to me. So, for example, I know the exact course of his dispute over his entry in the StB registry.
– In February 2014, the District Court in Bratislava ruled, based on Andrej Babiš’s lawsuit against the ÚPN, that Andrej Babiš was listed in the ÚPN’s files of StB secret collaborators without justification
– A year later, in June 2015, the Regional Court of Appeal in Bratislava upheld this ruling; the ÚPN filed an appeal against it with the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic
– In February 2017, the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic again upheld the lower courts’ decision that Andrej Babiš was listed as a secret StB collaborator without justification, whereupon the ÚPN filed a constitutional complaint
– October 2017: The Constitutional Court turns the entire matter “on its head,” overturning all previous decisions of the lower courts on the grounds that the ÚPN cannot be the defendant in the dispute; it does not address the merits of Andrej Babiš’s collaboration
– January 2018: The Regional Court in Bratislava, in accordance with the decision of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic, issues a final ruling dismissing Andrej Babiš’s lawsuit against the ÚPN, in which he claimed he was wrongfully listed in the files as a StB collaborator.
Thus, ALL levels of the general courts in the Slovak Republic have concluded in the case of Andrej Babiš’s lawsuit against the ÚPN that Andrej Babiš is wrongfully listed in the ÚPN’s files of secret StB collaborators
“The evidence presented thus demonstrated that the plaintiff never signed a commitment to cooperate with the StB, nor did he knowingly cooperate with this organization as a secret collaborator; he was not recruited for cooperation in the manner prescribed by the Guidelines for Working with Counterintelligence Collaborators (RMV No. 3/1978), he did not maintain conspiratorial contact with StB agents, did not carry out any tasks for the StB, did not provide the StB with any intelligence information or findings, nor did he provide this organization with any assistance or services that would need to be kept secret. The evidence presented demonstrated that the BUREŠ file was maintained only formally, without any actual cooperation by the petitioner as a secret collaborator, and in light of these facts, his registration as a secret collaborator of the StB was and is unjustified.
The contested judgment of the court of first instance is therefore substantively correct, the court of first instance conducted proper evidence-gathering in the case and, by evaluating the results of the evidence-gathering in accordance with Section 132 of the Code of Civil Procedure, reached the correct factual conclusions and, on that basis, also drew the correct legal conclusion in the case itself… For all the reasons stated above, the appellate court then affirmed the contested judgment of the court of first instance as substantively correct within the meaning of Section 219(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, noting the correctness of its reasoning pursuant to Section 219(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The fact that the Constitutional Court ultimately ordered these decisions to be formally set aside and Andrej Babiš’s action to be dismissed does absolutely nothing to alter the judicial findings and conclusions contained therein. It simply means that, although those findings were made, Andrej Babiš no longer has formal recourse to them and will seek to enforce them through a new lawsuit in light of the “changing case law according to the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic.”
And in the end, Babiš reached an out-of-court settlement with the Slovak Ministry of the Interior, stipulating that the judgments of the Slovak courts are valid and the record will be expunged.
I was able to recognize that the dispute over Čapí hnízdo was artificially created. Because the facts regarding the farm’s separation and the subsidy application speak clearly.
There are several inconsistencies in this case that the anti-Babiš movement ostentatiously overlooks.
1. The independent company (not yet known as Čapí hnízdo at that time) was officially registered in the Commercial Register on December 1, 2008
2. The grant program was announced on December 20, 2008.
3. Establishing (spinning off) a company requires some administrative time, estimated at a minimum of three months. The period from filing the application for registration to the completion of the registration is 30 days—that is, one month. The application was filed on November 1, 2008. Preparations for the spin-off, in the best-case scenario—including a notarized certificate of incorporation, deposits into the account, and other necessary steps—can be estimated to take two months. I speak here from my own experience from the time when I established a limited liability company with a colleague.
4. Who knew that such a grant program would be available in 4.5 months? If so, who can prove that they told Babiš, who decided to spin off a loss-making part of Agrofert just for 50 million?
5. The total value of Čapí hnízdo exceeds 700 million. So that grant is just the “icing on the cake.” They simply gave it a try, and it worked out.
6. The grant was reviewed several times by every possible authority, including the Ministry of Finance under the leadership of a certain Kalousek.
7. It has never happened before that, upon discovering a violation of grant conditions—often even an intentional violation—criminal proceedings were initiated against the grant recipient. In such cases, either part or all of the grant was always returned, and a fine was imposed.
So the political agenda is absolutely clear from this.
And the rumors about how he acquired his wealth are also completely misleading. Because Babiš acquired his wealth in the same way as many others did during that wild post-November privatization period. But unlike other famous privatized companies, Babiš managed to build a holding company that controls a large part of Europe. Two hundred companies located in Germany, Hungary, and many other European countries. When you compare this to Kladno’s Poldovka, Pilsen’s Škoda, and other proud Czech companies, you have to admit that Agrofert is a successful company. An international company. And if someone doesn’t like that Babiš plays hardball in business, then know that there’s another way to put it. Yes, he plays hardball too.
His opponents are constantly harping on about a conflict of interest. And also about how Babiš influences Agrofert. But those who babble like this are incapable of understanding that he has long since had his own people running the holding company and that he really doesn’t know what every single janitor is doing where.
In his dispute with the president, Babiš currently has only two options, and consequently only two possible outcomes. Either he stands behind Minister Macinka and simply sends the president where he belongs—to Lány. Or he gives in and adds the president to the accreditation list. In the first case, he’ll face a storm of criticism from Pávek’s supporters, but he’ll gain support among voters of the coalition parties. In the second scenario, however, he will lose support among his own voters, and he will also come across as weak in Ankara, especially since it’s clear that Pávek will complain about the government and badmouth it just as he has done so far, and Babiš will face pressure from NATO partners, to whom it will be difficult to explain that Pávek has no authority to approve anything. So now it depends on whether he realizes this and stands by his foreign minister. So that everyone speaks with one voice in Ankara.
So I recommend sitting down calmly and having a good cup of coffee.