Defining Philosophy in Early Modern Germany (IX): Keckermann on Why Philosophy Cannot Be Defined
Stefan Heßbrüggen-Walter
In the last post of this series, I have discussed Crellius's attempt to define philosophy as a composite habit and Keckermann's criticism of ancient conceptions of philosophy. Now I want to turn to Keckermann's criticism of his contemporaries. Pace Keckermann, their majority aims to defend one or another definition from the ancient catalogue discussed in the last post. Only a minority (sunt nonnulli) believes that the rules of logical judgment (regulae iudicii logici) provide enough substance to resolve this question without an appeal to authority. The most prominent of these recentiores is Guilio Pace, because he claimed that philosophy cannot be defined, because it contains distinct forms of knowledge.1 Keckermann agrees and wants to defend the thesis that philosophy is not simple, but an aggregate. It is therefore not a distinct species of a higher genus.2 This has the consequence that a perfect real definition of philosophy is impossible, because such a perfect real definition must grasp the essence of the definiendum: it is an explicatio essentiae. A perfect essence of philosophy must, however, be indivisible and distinct from the essences of other things. Philosophy does not fulfill these criteria. So the best we can hope for is a description of philosophy: For Keckermann, philosophy is an aggregate (compages) of science and prudence. This combination is, however, not arbitrary: parts of philosophy belonging to science and parts of philosophy belonging to prudence hang together in a meaningful way (apta connexione et unione inter se conformata).3 To hang together in a meaningful way is for Keckermann equivalent to having a form.4
In this model, itt is the parts of philosophy, i.e. the three contemplative sciences and the three forms of prudence that qualify as 'matter' of philosophy. Aggregates that have a form are structured or organised (in this context, Keckermann again talks about conveniens unio). Examples for this are the world, a school, or the Church.5 harmony of shared principles. Intellect and will count as one object. Perfection of these objects as one end. And if one wants to know one liberal art, she must know all of them.6 But if all parts of philosophy originate in the same principles, have human capabilities as objects and share the common goal to make these capabilities better, why does Keckermann deny that philosophy is a unified whole that can be defined through its object, end, and principles?
Keckermann's Criticism of his Contemporaries
Keckermann criticises Fortunatus Crell explicitly. With regard to Timpler and Casmann we can only infer his targets from the fact that their viewpoint is identical with what Keckermann has to criticise, namely the definition of philosophy as an ordered system of liberal arts (Timpler) or as system of Christian wisdom that contributes to our spiritual wellbeing (Casmann).
Crellius's attempt to define philosophy as a composite habit is for Keckermann incoherent. If philosophy consists of two partial habits, it is an aggregate and cannot be defined. If we can propose a unified definition for philosophy as a such a composite habit, philosophy cannot be such a composite habit, because, if something can be defined, it is eo ipso a unity, in this case a habit that is in turn a species of the category of quality.7 But Keckermann himself asserts that there can be kinds of unity (namely a harmony of disciplines originating in common principles) that need not imply that this unity is the unity of a unified habit.
Timpler's definition is too wide, including disciplines which are neither science nor prudence: logic and rhetoric are no parts of philosophy proper.8 Casmann's definition employs a conception of wisdom that is misleading, because it includes habits that should be characterised as science or prudence. If a proper understanding of wisdom is substituted, the definition does not cover the practical part of philosophy, because it includes only metaphysics.9
Philosophy: in Books and Souls
Keckermann is more sympathetic to Timpler's idea that philosophy can be understood either as a habit in the mind or as an aggregate of precepts existing e.g. in books.10 Apparently, Keckermann agrees with Timpler that both view points can coexist. In one sense, philosophy sense resides in our minds. But equally well it makes sense to think about the cause of these habits, namely the system of precepts that 'shows us the way' how to develop these habits. This way is, of course, method. So Keckermann links Timpler's suggestion to his (Zabarellian?) notion of method.11 He explains the distinction between method and result, precepts and habit, through a reference to logic: At times we regard logic as the habit we want to acquire. At times we regard it as the aggregate of teachings (comprehensio praeceptorum) that can serve as the cause of the logical habit, following Lucian who defined an ars as a system of precepts that are useful in the human life (a definition that Melanchthon, as mentioned by Keckermann, takes up, e.g. in the Praefatio in officia Ciceronis. The same is true for philosophy. It is perfectly legitimate to refer to Aristotle as summus philosophus, and, therefore, to philosophy as a habit in Aristotle's mind. And it is equally justified to refer to Aristotle's philosophy - a reference that does not refer to Aristotle's bygone mental habits, but to his writings that allow us to acquire Aristotle's philosophical habits. In this second sense philosophy must be understood as a discipline that contains itself the way of learning everything that is contained in it (the methodus omnium praeceptorum).12
But it should be kept in mind that writings for Keckermann still are a means to an end: his cursus philosophicus is written philosophy. But its only goal is to allow its readers to acquire philosophical habits. Accordingly, he structures his presentation of what we should know beforehand, the praecognita in such a way that he deals first with the methodus praeceptorum, the 'way of learning precepts of philosophy', then with the habit that comes from these precepts.13
Conclusion
These reflections lead us back to another thinker defending the undefinability of philosophy, namely Piccart: for him, a teacher had been an indispensable instrumental cause of philosophy. In a different context, I had already pointed out that Keckermann does not agree (see here). In this post, we have learned his general justification for this stance.
The multifaceted debate on what constitutes philosophy in early modern Germany with its wild variety of influences, standpoints, and arguments is in need of more research than I can provide in a series of blog posts. Any kind of summary of my findings in this series would necessarily be limited and preclude other avenues of research. Still, I hope to have shown that this fascinating topic deserves further study.
Cf. Keckermann 1612, p. 12f: "Iam quod ad recentes autores videmus plerosque veterum recitatas descriptiones retinere. Sunt tamen nonnulli, qui rem non tam autoritate veterum, quam Regulis iudicii logici cupiverunt expensam, inter quos est clarissimus aeque Iurisconsultus ac Philosophus Julius Pacius. Is enim in Prolegomenis Physicis in hac se ait esse sententia, quod philosophia accurate definiri non possit." Keckermann refers to the following passage in Pace's Naturalis auscultatio (Fracofurtum 1596), p. 337: "Philosophia lacte accepta, suo ambitu complectitur metahysicam, mathematicam, physicam, politicam,et logicam. Et in hac significatione, ut opinor, definiri non potest: quia non est verbum synonymum, sed continet scientias omnino diversas et separatas: utcumque variis modis describatur ab Ammonio in praefatione in Isagogen Porphyrii. Recte autem dividitur in contemplativam, activam, et rationalem seu logicam." ↩︎
Cf. Keckermann 1612, p. 8: "Sed non est Philosophia univocum quid et simplex; sive non est distincta rei species; sed ex eorum numero, quae aggregata et collectiva Logici vocant." ↩︎
Cf. Keckermann 1612, p. 8f: "Quod perfecte definitur, id perfectam naturam et essentiam habeat necesse est; cum definitio sit explicatio essentiae: perfecta autem natura et essentia haec duo habet 1. ut sit unica et in se indivisa, id est, ut habeat essentiam simplicem et impartibilem 2. ut sit ab aliis omnibus divisa, ut specie et natura sua distincta sit ab omnibus aliis rebus, quaesunt in mundo. Talis non est philosophiae natura, utpote in qua multae simul disciplinae colliguntur velut in fasciculum et aggregantur. Quapropter errant, qui Philosophiae accuratam Definitionem audari posse existimant, aut solicite inquirunt; ; quanqoquidem unius essentiae explicatio, id est, Definitio, eius nulla est, quod unicam et simplicissimam essentiam non habet, ex quarum rerum numero Philosophiam esse vel ipsa explicatio vocabuli manifestum facit. Quod ergo definiri exacte non potest, ita describamus: Philosophia est compages scientiae et prudentiae, apta connexione et unione inter se conformata." ↩︎
Cf. Keckermann 1612, p. 15: "Forma philosophiae est illarum diversarum materiarum et partium inter sese conveniens unio, et connexio in certis principiis, obiecto et fine." ↩︎
Cf. Keckermann 1612, p. 14f: "Dum autem scientiae et prudentiae compagem Philosophiam dicimus, quandam eius materiam et formam notamus. Materia Philosophiae sunt partes, ex quibus ea colligitur et integratur; nimirum tres scientiae, et totidem Prudentiae. Ea quae Logici vocant aggregata et collectiva, hoc habent proprium, ut ex multis velut materiis et partibus constituantur. Ita mundus constat ex omnibus Dei creaturis, velut materia: Schola constat ex Praeceptoribus et discipulis, tanquam sua materia: Ecclesia ex multis Christi membris. Sic ergo etiam philosophia suam habet materiam, eamque non unicam, sed variam et diversam, constantem nimirum ex scientiis multis et prudentiis." ↩︎
Cf. Keckermann 1612, p. 15: "In arte Logica docetur collectiva esse duplicia: quaedam temeraria, ut sunt acettus tritici temerere congestus, aut acervus brutorum caesorum, et in talibus nulla est forma: sed sunt alia aggregata ordinata, in quibus diversarum quidem partium congeries est; sed talis tamen, quae concinnu aliquem ordinem et unionem admittit, quale aggregatum est mundus, Ecclesia et Schola; itemque ea de qua nunc agimus, philosophia; utpote in qua diversae scientiae et prudentiae inter se uniuntur et copulantur suavissima quadam Harmonia communium primorum principiorum, a quibus omnes scientiae et prudentiae pendent, posteriam unius obiecti, intellectus nimirum et voluntatis humanae, cui philosophia omnis destinatur, et denique unitus etiam finis, qui est humanae mentis et voluntatis perfectio, ut suo loco dicetur. Et propter hanc arctissimam partium philosophiae unionem, dixerunt veteres omnes artes liberales inter se velut manus iungere mutuas operas tradere, ut qui unam perfectissime scire velit, necesse habeat omnes cognoscere." ↩︎
Cf. Keckermann 1612, p. 13: "Fortunatus Crellius in Prolegomenis commentariorum super Acroamaticos Aristotelis, Philosophiam ait esse habitum animi, qui scientia et prudentia constat. Sed dum habitum definit videtur ea opinione fuisse, quod Philosophia unicum quid sit et simplex, sicuti quidem, animi habitus certa est et determinata qualitatis species; […]". This however cannot be true, because philosophy is not a determinate quality, as Keckermann adds in a footnote: "Omnis habitus certa est species Qualitatis; Philosophia non est certa species qualitatis: est enim omnium habituum congeries. Ergo Philosophia non est habitus." ↩︎
Cf. Keckermann 1612, p. 13f: "Post Crellium alios reperio scriptores Philosophos, qui Philosophiam sic describunt: quod sit ordinatum artium liberalium Systema. Item, quod sit Systema Sapientiae ad salutarem tum veri cognitionem, tum actionem boni. Quarum Descriptionem prior hoc habet naevi, quod Philosophiam in latissima significatione describit, atque adeo sit ipso descripto latior: Neque enim Philosophia, si vocabulum idonee distinguas, omnes artes complectitur, sed eas tantum, quas Scientias et Prudentias proprie appellamus. Est et ipsa ars Logica et Rhetorica liberalis, neque tamen ambitu Philosophiae continetur, ut suo loco ostensuri sumus, et iam ante etiam ostendimus." ↩︎
Cf. Keckermann 1612, p. 14: "Posterior Descriptio hoc habet vitii, quod vocabulum sapientiae latissime et ambigue usurpat. Cum autem in Descriptionibus omnia debeant esse propria et perspicua, pro sapientia scientias oportebat, et prudentias nominasse, utpote a quibus sapientia proprie dicta, longissime differt. Quod si autem Sapientiae nomen proprie et distincte capias, iam descripto erit angustior descriptio, quia sapientia stricte dicta, ut supra ostendimus, unica tantum philosophiae pars est, Metaphysica nimirum. Ut ergo Commentarium hunc de philosophiae descriptione concludamus, sciant Auditores summam omnium eorum, quae hucusque dicta sunt, eo tendere, ut perspicue intelligatur, Philosophiam non esse quid unum, sed multa simul collecta; ideo non tam definiri exacte posse, quam describi ex diversarum quibus constat, rerum compage." ↩︎
Cf. Keckermann 1612, p. 15f: "Caeterum ut scientia et prudentia; ita et earum compages Philosophia dupliciter spectatur. Primo quidem ut est compages habituum in mentem humanam introdoctorum: Secundo, ut est compages praeceptorum Philosophicorum, per quae habitus isti Philosophici in mente humana acquiruntur." ↩︎
Cf. Keckermann 1612, p. 16: "Nos in hac tractatione Philosophiam interdum accipiemus, prout in mente humana consideratur: interdum vero prout Methodum habet omnium praeceptorum, quibus Philosophiae disciplinae traduntur." ↩︎
Cf. Keckermann 1612, p. 16f: "Ab initio nostri Systematis Logici monuiumus, vocabulum Logicae artis interdum sumi pro ipso habitu, qui est in Logici mente: Interdum vero sumi pro comprehensione praeceptorum Logicorum, ex quibus tanquam causis habitus iste Logicus in mentem Logici introducitur, quomodo etiam Lucianus laudante Philippo Melanchthone, artem definit Systema praeceptorum utilium in vita humana. Quod ibi de Logica diximus, id de omnibus in universum disciplinis intelligendum est, atque adeo etiam de Philosophia Scientiarum et Prudentiarum compage; quod nimirum interdum ista compages ipsos scientiarum et prudentiarum habitus in mente hominis comprehendat: ut cum dicimus, Aristoteles fuit summus Philosophus, per Philosophiam accipimus compagem habituum in mente Aristotelis: interdum ver non ipsi habitus scientiarum et prudentiarum notantur, sed comprehensio praeceptorum, ex quibus isti habitus acquiruntur; ut cum dicimus, Aristoteles nobis Philosophiam perscriptam reliquit, non intelligimus relictos Aristotelicae mentis habitus, qui perscribi non poterant, sed praecepta, quibus tum Aristoteles istos habitus acquisiverat, tum nos etiam assequi possumus." ↩︎
Cf. Keckermann 1612, p. 17: "Et cum dicimus cursum Philosophicum nos tractaturos, non de habitibus loquimur, sed de praeceptis, quorum Methodum in isto cursu Philosophico sumus tradituri, sic ut Auditores istos habitus Philosophicos dextre ac facile possint acquirere. Caeterum quando nos praecognita Philosophiae hoc loco tradimus, sciendum est ea accommodata esse quidem ad ipsam Methodum praeceptorum, de qua diximus: post etiam ad Habitum ex ea Methodo oriturum." ↩︎
