Here, maximum compression:
My answer to the Hard Problem of Consciousness is that phenomenal properties (qualia) are not primitively first-personal. They belong instead to an irreducible second-person register not derivable from first- and/or third-person properties. The answer eluded us because the second-person register was taken to be given as derivative, and the register-shift was not at-hand in our intuitions. In this model, phenomenal properties are the immanent character of the non-derivable second-person register, where the structural paradoxes of irreducible immanence assumed to belong to first-person properties become the functional necessities of the second-person register.
The necessities of the second-person register are as follows:
The second-person register has an accusative structure: the Other is its target, and qualia are its immanent nominative pole. The accusative object of a second-person register is necessarily not contained as a structural content of the subjectivity of the second-person register. If the second-person register is non-derivable from first- and/or third-person properties, then it necessitates an irreducible qualitative immanence whose irreducibility is structural rather than merely epistemic; Thus, immanence as the nominative of the second-person register.
