The only problem I have is the difficulty sometimes. I still don’t know the Chengdu “victory” conditions, and Chang’an deserves to be a smouldering ruin at this point.
"No virtue is more vital for the sovereign than discernment; when one is discerning enough to see through mischief, a whole host of villains will not be able to conceal the truth. Emperor Zhao of Han was such a sovereign. At the tender age of thirteen, he could yet perceive that the supposed letter from the Prince of Yan was a forgery, and whenever people later tried to speak ill of Huo Guang, Emperor Zhao would always fume, 'Anyone who dares to slander or defame this man will be held accountable!'
"King Cheng of Zhou was not so virtuous as he, nor could Emperors Gao, Wen, or Jing have measured up to him. King Cheng lent an ear to the slanders of Guanshu and Caishu while spurning the advice of the Duke of Shao, causing the Duke of Zhou to scamper off to the east and express his woe in 'The Owl'. Emperor Gao gave credence to the accounts of Chen Ping having 'abandoned Wei and betrayed Chu', and was thus prepared to cast out one of his closest ministers. In his haste to presume that Ji Bu was 'given to drinking and hard to keep close', Emperor Wen would have dismissed and sent home the viceroy of a vital commandery, and indulging in suspicions that Scholar Jia (Jia Yi) meant to 'usurp authority and cause confusion', he would have distanced himself from a worthy gentleman. Emperor Jing gave a slanderer his trust and Chao Cuo the axe, and once the threat of war had lifted he took the life of one of his Three Excellencies (Zhou Yafu). It is just as they say: one who nurses a doubtful heart will attract the mouths of liars.
"If only Emperor Zhao had had a helper like Yi Yin or Lü Wang (Jiang Ziya)! He would have surpassed even the reigns of Kings Cheng and Kang of Zhou. Such a shame! His regent Huo Guang lacked learning and was bereft of skill, nor were his virtues worthy of praise. And yet, during his stewardship, he lightened the burden of corvee labor and lowered taxes, gave the people rest and comfort, arranged peace and kinship with the Xiongnu, brought the masses prosperity and plenty, and oversaw the salt and iron discussions and abolished the monopoly on wine. Here was the model of a trustworthy servant and a loyal subject.
"Yet before he could be capped as a man, before his virtues and achievements could reach their full expression, Emperor Zhao expired. Isn't it painful to consider?"
Greetings. Thank you very much for your hard work and dedication for translate major parts of chinese historical sources. I wonder, in your translations section, there are ZZTJ translations of the Jin Dynasty, but the links seem to be dead like unfortunately the website itself. Do you intend to reupload them ? Thanks for your reply. Have a Nice day.
Sorry for the delayed response here. The ZZTJ translations were posted on the Scholars of Shen Zhou forum, which is currently still down due to technical issues. Those translations will eventually return, just not at the moment. Thanks for your interest in my work and I hope you continue to enjoy it.
Forgive me if this should be obvious or has been asked before, but did any of the various states following the Eastern Jin claim to rule all under heaven? Or was it the closest that China had ever come to a semi-permanent European style of division?
None of them claimed to control the whole Chinese realm (they obviously did not), but all of them claimed that they *ought* to control it. The political traditions compelled rulers to regard other states as rebels still awaiting pacification, not as legitimate neighbors.
Thought I’d do something fun to end the year. This is a composition from Tang Geng of the Northern Song dynasty. Everything is taken as-is from this Wikisource page. I’ve rearranged the entries to be in roughly chronological order and added titles for the sake of reference.
In most entries, Tang Geng first writes a summary of an event and then supplies commentary afterwards. The summaries are in quotes while the commentaries have normal spacing.
If you’re a Sun Sheng fan, beware...
X. Introduction
0. Prologue / Chen Shou’s Use of the Term “Shu”
1. Did Hua Xin Deserve To Be "Head" of the Dragon?
2. On The Usurpation Of Royal Prerogatives
3. Guan Yu and Cao Cao as Examples of Sublime Virtue
4. Should Cao Cao Have Wept For Yuan Shao?
5. Why Did Tian Chou Decline Yuan Shao But Join Cao Cao?
6. Liu Bei Advises Liu Biao to Raid Xu
7. Whether Yizhou Was A Suitable Base
8. Why Did Cao Cao Lose at Chibi?
9. The "Loan" of Jingzhou to Liu Bei
10. Liu Bei As Cao Cao's Alter-Ego
11. Was Xun Yu Wrong to Object to Cao Cao?
12. The Promotion of "Ancient Practices"
13. In Wartime, Should a Leader Celebrate or Mourn?
14. The Short Lifespans of Shu's Ministers
15. Liu Bei's Error in Strategy
16. Was Zhuge Liang Too Lenient With Fa Zheng?
17. Is It "Dissent" To Cherish Past Loyalties?
18. Sun Quan's Submission to Wei Was Expedient, Not Strategic
19. Sun Quan's and Liu Bei's Education Styles
20. Pan Jun's Service to Wu Was Disproportionate
21. Traditions of the Reign Era Title
22. Why Didn't Zhuge Liang Give Liu Shan Confucian Texts Instead of Legalist Ones?
23. Wei's Folly In Enticing Zhuge Liang
24. Was Hua Xin Guilty Of "Partial Kindness"?
25. Huang Quan Justifies Legitimacy Through Astrology
26. Zhuge Liang's Haste To Campaign
27. Zhuge Liang's Shameful Treatment Of The Three Surrendered Commandaries
28. Why Did Zhuge Liang Not Sever Relations With Wu?
29. Cao Rui's Organizational Mistakes
30. What Caused Zhang Wen's Downfall?
31. The Worthlessness of Natural Omens
32. Faulty Assumptions on the Arrangement of the Calendar
33. Sun Liang's Mistaken Stance on Pardons
34. Were Lu Kang and Yang Hu Presumptuous To Keep Peace?
35. Sima Yan Preserves The Collection of Zhuge Liang's Works
The following composition was the work of Tang Geng of Song.
Tang Geng, styled Zixi, was a native of Danleng county in Mei prefecture. He was born during the Shaosheng era (1094-1098). After achieving Jinshi rank in the imperial exams, his initial appointment was supervising the prison officials of Li prefecture. He was later transferred to be Prefect of Langzhong, then summoned to the capital to serve as an Academician of the Tutors for the Imperial Clan. Thanks to the recommendation of Zhang Shangying, he received many positions and promotions in the capital region, but he was later accused of embezzlement and malicious conduct on Zhang Shangying's behalf and was exiled to Hui prefecture. In the fifth year of Daguan (?; he lived to be fifty), he was returning north in response to an amnesty, but died on the road. His life is mentioned in more detail in the Garden of Scholars section of the History of Song.
This composition is a collection of various thoughts regarding the affairs of the Three Kingdoms era. There are thirty-six entries altogether, along with a preface. Later, editors included this composition as part of Tang Geng's Literary Works. The Records of Song list this collection as having twenty-two chapters, and the extant version of his works in modern times does contain the same number of chapters, implying that the "Thoughts" were also an original part of the collection. But according to the table of contents of Master Huang and of Master Chen, there were only ten chapters in the Works. Thus the extent twenty-two chapter of the Works must have split each of those ten chapters in half to form twenty, with the inclusion of the "Thoughts" as two additional chapters to make twenty-two in total, proving that it was not originally part of the Works. And for the same reason, although the "Thoughts" is included in the Yongle Anthology, there it is also listed separately from the Works and not included in their table of contents. Perhaps the "Thoughts" should be split in half to return to its original form?
In Chen Zhensun's "Analysis of Books and Records", he praises Tang Geng's insights in his comments and remarks. Certainly Tang Geng's comments on Zhuge Liang's leniency with Fa Zheng, his handling of the changing of the reign era title, or Xun Yu's opposition towards Cao Cao's claiming of the Nine Bestowments are all worthy alternate perspectives compared to earlier writers. Yet his revisionism on Zhuge Liang's alliance policy with Wu, where he reinterprets statecraft as moral philosophy, or on Zhuge Liang's movement of the population of the western counties, where he paints a resettlement policy as an unjust imposition on the innocent, are quite without reason. Furthermore, he includes certain musings, whether on the the calendar policy of the Shang dynasty or on the validity of the patterned stone at Zhangye compared to the Yellow or Luo River charts and the lack of wise men to discern the truth of things, which are frankly obtuse and sloppy. Still, there is much that is good to be gleaned from the rest of the "Thoughts". "The same drink may be rich and rotten, the same stone may be prickly and polished..." Let the reader take from these words what they find best.
It has been a historiographical principle for more than a thousand years, from Sima Qian's Records of the Grand Historian down to the History of the Five Dynasties from our own time, that every state in official histories is referred to as the name by which it called itself. From the legitimate dynasties to the regional warlords, from mere bandits who grasped at power to the most tiny and insignificant polities, and even the various foreign peoples beyond the borders of the realm, no one has been denied this basic courtesy. But Chen Shou alone made an exception to this with his Records of the Three Kingdoms. Liu Bei and his son ruled their state for more than forty years, and from first to last they called themselves Han, never adopting the name Shu; calling their state "Shu" was merely a vulgar convention. Yet Chen Shou, discarding the proper title of Han, saw fit to adopt the vulgar convention instead. In doing so, thus humoring the personal sentiments of Wei and Jin, he abandoned the impartiality of a historian. And having done such a thing, how are we to have faith in any of the good acts or misdeeds, the commendations or the denunciations of the rest of his work?
It is true that in their own time, Wei and Jin referred to Liu Bei's state as Shu. Yet it was also the case that the Five Dynasties derided their rivals with regional titles as well, referring to Li Jing's state as Wu and Liu Chong's state as Jin. But the History of the Five Dynasties identifies these two states by their self-adopted titles, Southern Tang and Eastern Han, and never calls them Wu or Jin. Only Chen Shou acted in this way, setting aside proper principles in favor of personal feelings.
Not so long ago, when Duke Wenzhong (Ouyang Xiu) was writing his History of the Five Dynasties, Duke Wang of Jing (Wang Anshi) advised him, "Why trouble yourself with the events of the Five Dynasties which are not worth mentioning? There were a great many amusing incidents from the Three Kingdoms era which Chen Shou discarded. You ought to do as he did." What a pity that Duke Wenzhong agreed with him and failed to include them!
1. Did Hua Xin Deserve To Be "Head" of the Dragon?
Hua Xin, Bing Yuan, and Guan Ning were all good friends. People of the time called them the Dragon: Hua Xin was the Head, Bing Yuan was the Belly, and Guan Ning was the Tail.
The Weilue states, "Bing Yuan and Guan Ning were gentlemen of abundant virtues, yet Hua Xin was the one called the Head. By this can we know what sort of person Hua Xin was." Yet according to the Book of [Later] Han, when Empress Fu was deposed, Cao Cao sent Hua Xin to lead troops into the palace to arrest her, and though Empress Fu shut the doors and hid in her chambers, Hua Xin smashed the doors open and barged into her chambers. Is this how "a gentleman of abundant virtues" acts? Cao Cao may have been the chief villain, but his followers each still had their own free wills. Besides, at the time of Empress Fu's arrest, the Cao clan was not lacking for minions: they already had people like Dong Zhao, Xiahou Dun, Jia Xu, Zheng Yu [Cheng Yu], or Guo Jia. Any of these people could have done the deed; why only send Hua Xin? But if Hua Xin had really been a man of good character, Cao Cao certainly would not have dared to give him such an assignment. The fact that he did so serves as proof that Hua Xin was not a worthy man.
When Chen Shou wrote Bing Yuan's biography, he wrote of how he and Guan Ning were both praised for their character during their youth, but there was no mention of Hua Xin. Yet when Chen Shou wrote Guan Ning's biography, he stated that Guan Ning was good friends both with Bing Yuan and with Hua Xin. How could these three have been such good friends and yet Hua Xin alone received no acclaim? Naturally there are differences even among friends, but if Hua Xin's character had been different to such an extent, how could he have been their companion? I simply cannot comprehend it.
In the second year of Xingping (195), Yuan Shu declared himself Emperor at Jiujiang, and he established sacrifices at the southern suburbs of the city (an imperial prerogative). At the same time, the Governor of Jingzhou, Liu Biao, also made suburban sacrifices to Heaven and Earth. The Han dynasty could not prevent their actions.
Only the Son of Heaven could conduct sacrifices to Heaven and Earth in the suburbs, and only the old practices of Lu could be employed for these rituals. The ceremony of the suburban sacrifices were perceived with utmost gravity by the ancient sages. Yet during later eras of turmoil, anyone who wished to seize control of the realm would inevitably begin by stealing what was held to be the most important aspects of the government. This is what the followers of Zhuangzi or Laozi mean by their saying: "So long as the sages live on, so too will there be great robbers".
Even by the time of Yangzi (Yang Xiong), he was trying to deny this idea. But when the people of Qin conducted the western sacrifices, the Zhou dynasty could not prevent their actions, and in the end the Zhou dynasty was obliged to surrender the realm to Qin. Form and function cannot help but take on a great importance. Although the Confucianists might have ardently denied the truth of the saying, even Yangzi in his discussions failed to cover the whole subject. Yangzi only recognized that it is important to keep a strict grasp on form and function in order to preside over the realm. But he did not realize that preserving form and function first requires the ability to safeguard the realm itself. When the people of Qin sacrificed in the west, it was not that the Zhou dynasty did not want to prevent them from doing so, but that their strength was insufficient to prevent it. Thus those who would preserve form and function must first be diligent in safeguarding the realm.
3. Guan Yu and Cao Cao as Examples of Sublime Virtue
When Cao Cao campaigned against Xiapi, he captured Guan Yu and brought him back to his base. But though he treated Guan Yu with great generosity, he could tell by his aspect and demeanor that Guan Yu had no intention of remaining with him forever. Cao Cao sent Zhang Liao to sound out Guan Yu's thinking.
Guan Yu sighed and told Zhang Liao, "Certainly Lord Cao has treated me well. But I owe my gratitude to General Liu, so I cannot stay here forever. I will repay Lord Cao with some great deed, then go."
After Guan Yu smote Yan Liang, Cao Cao knew that he would surely depart. He gave him further gifts and rewards, but Guan Yu sealed them all up and returned them, only presenting a letter taking his leave.
Guan Yu then left to rejoin Liu Bei in Yuan Shao's army. Cao Cao's advisors wanted to have Guan Yu pursued, but he remarked, "Everyone has their own master. Do not pursue him."
Guan Yu was not swayed by Lord Cao's generosity, and he did not forget his duty to his lord. We can praise him for this, but there were generals from the Warring States era who had done the same. Lord Cao did not kill Guan Yu after capturing him, and he was generous to Guan Yu and employed his strength. We can praise him for this, but there were rulers from the Warring States era who had done the same.
What set Guan Yu apart was how he felt obliged to repay his debt to Lord Cao by performing a service for him, how he sealed up his gifts and sent them back, how he sent a letter taking his leave before departing, and his graceful attitude in all that he undertook. Almost no one from the Warring States could have matched him in that. And what set Lord Cao apart was how he knew that Guan Yu would leave him and yet still tried to give him great rewards in order to facilitate his journey, and how he instructed his followers not to pursue Guan Yu, saying that "everyone has their own master". Within, he could temper his feelings and not consider the matter of whom Guan Yu would serve as a case of "him or me"; without, he could permit Guan Yu to fulfill his loyal purpose and not think of keeping Guan Yu's strength for himself. In this, he displayed the old spirit of the ancient sovereigns.
I once said of Lord Cao that "he was the sort of man who can do good and yet cannot help but do evil. He could do good, thus he was able to enjoy command of the state; he could not help but do evil, thus he was unable to attain the realm."
After Cao Cao had taken Ye, he offered sacrifices at Yuan Shao's grave and wept grievously for him.
The historian Sun Sheng criticized him for this, writing, "The kings of old used punishments and rewards in order to reproach and commend. By pouring out his grief for the sake of a traitor's family, Duke Cao showed how he had turned aside from the path of proper governance. The sages of former times would have been aghast at the prospect of withholding one's wrath just for the sake of a friend; though one might speak of 'offering horses to the family of a former lodgemate', still it would have been proper not to shed empty tears. Their paths had diverged and their friendship had been severed; why then should there have been any grief? Emperor Gao of Han (Liu Bang) made the same mistake on behalf of the Xiang clan (Xiang Yu); for Duke Cao to have honored and imitated this foolishness was simply an example of 'even a wise man making an error'."
When Yu the Great witnessed someone being executed in the marketplace, even he got down from his carriage and wept for the person whom he himself had caused to be put to death. Why should we expect any less from Liu Bang or Xiang Yu, who had both received their commands from King Huai of Chu and had forged a bond as close as brothers? Why should we expect any less from Cao Cao, when Yuan Shao had been his close friend since their youth and Yuan Shao had even been the leader of the alliance when they rose up together? Perhaps "their paths had diverged and their friendship had been severed", even to the extent that they sought to destroy each other. Yet I say that while Cao Cao acted for the sake of righteous principles and the public good when he campaigned against Yuan Shao, so too did he demonstrate personal feeling by weeping for him. It was neither a case of feeling smothering principle, nor principle extinguishing feeling. All was in accordance with ancient values; how could it be called an error? In making such a comment, Master Sun showed himself to be not only a partisan scholar, but a petty man.
5. Why Did Tian Chou Decline Yuan Shao But Join Cao Cao?
When Cao Cao was campaigning against the Wuhuan, he sent an envoy to recruit Tian Chou. Tian Chou instructed his followers to quickly make preparations to depart.
Someone said to him, "In the past, Lord Yuan (Yuan Shao) sent you courteous invitations five times, but you never bowed to his wishes. Yet now that Lord Cao has sent a single envoy, you are so quick to leave it's as though you fear you might not get there in time. Why is this?"
But Tian Chou only laughed and said, "You just wouldn't understand." And he accompanied the envoy back to Cao Cao's army.
Some have wondered, "When Tian Chou declined the Yuan clan's invitations but accepted Lord Cao's request, one of his followers was curious about it, but Tian Chou only laughed and refused to answer. Why was this?" I can only respond, "It's hard to say."
In former times, Emperor Ming of Han asked Wu Liang, "When His Late Majesty (Emperor Guangwu) summoned you, you never came. Why then did you join the ranks of the General of Agile Cavalry (Liu Cang)?"
Wu Liang replied, "His Late Majesty reached out to me with courtesy, thus I could courteously choose to accept his offer or not. The General imposed the law against me, thus I was obliged to bend to him."
Tian Chou's thinking was probably along these same lines. In his time, the Yuan clan governed with magnanimity, thus Tian Chou was able to refuse, while the Cao clan enforced harsh severity, so Tian Chou did not dare not to go to them. But the fact that he felt obliged to go, and did not consider himself as having been honorably recruited, explains why he ultimately never accepted a noble title from them. Although he never said so in as many words, this must have been what he was getting at.
When Cao Cao was away campaigning against Liucheng, Liu Bei urged Liu Biao to launch a surprise attack against Xu. But Liu Biao could not follow his advice.
The strategy of "controlling the Son of Heaven to compel the feudal lords" was practiced as far back as the age of Duke Huan of Qi and Duke Wen of Jin. Yet Duke Huan never forced King Hui of Zhou to relocate to his base in Qi, nor did Duke Wen coerce King Xiang of Zhou to move to Jin. So long as one quells the chaos and pacifies turmoil, restores what had been extinguished and continues what had been severed, and gains prominence by deed and example, the feudal lords will bow to them of their own accord.
Dong Zhuo made Emperor Xian move to Chang'an; Li Maozhen forced Zhaozong of Tang to go to Fenghuang. They claimed authority and issued orders, taking action by using imperial commands as a pretext. Yet the feudal lords in fact rose up against them and attacked them. Why was this? Because they had not earned a single inch of land by the strength of their achievements which might have gained the trust of the realm, and they abused the legitimacy of controlling a young sovereign to denounce and slander the feudal lords. Thus it was only natural that the lords and the rest of the realm all rose up to oppose them.
If Liu Biao had been able to carry out diligent service on behalf of the royal house of Han, as Duke Huan and Duke Wen had done for Zhou, then even without having raided Xu, how could he have failed to gain the respect of the feudal lords? But since he had not done these things, then even if he had raided Xu and taken the Emperor into his power, this would have only sufficed to make the feudal lords lead their forces against him, as happened to Dong Zhuo and Li Maozhen.
Zhuge Liang advised Liu Bei to occupy the regions of Jingzhou and Yizhou and safeguard their natural terrain; he could then await some development in the realm to take advantage of, then order a chief general to lead the army of Jingzhou towards Wan and Luoyang, while he himself led the army of Yizhou to attack Qinchuan (Guanzhong). Liu Bei approved of the strategy.
After Gaozu (Liu Bang) had routed Chen Xi at Dai and had returned to Luoyang, he sighed and said, "Dai lies north beyond Changshan, and even the mountains surrounding Zhao are south of it." Thus in order to defend this distant region, he appointed one of his sons to be Prince of Dai, and ever afterwards there was often a Prince of Dai governing that region, with Dai and Yanmen commandaries under his domain. Although the Dai region itself had natural defenses on its borders, it was still not a beneficial place to occupy.
Jingzhou too possessed mountains, but it was more than five thousand li distant from the Shu region, which lay on the far side of those mountains from it, making the Shu region a difficult place indeed. It would have been difficult enough for a leader based in Yizhou to maintain their hold on Jingzhou as well; even if they had also managed to seize control of Qinchuan, they would not have been able to hold it. What advantages did the narrow terrain of Lianzhou (Hanzhong) and Yizhou really offer? They were only sufficient to defend that region, but not for conquest or expansion. Thus Shu was never able to hold even a single inch of land that lay beyond these mountains. And after all, Gaozu had abandoned his original domain in Hanzhong in favor of making the Three Qins region (Guanzhong) his base instead.
In the thirteenth year of Jian'an (208), Cao Cao marched from Jiangling to campaign against Liu Bei. But when he came to Chibi and fought a battle with Liu Bei, he had the worst of it, so he fell back to defend Nan commandary.
Generals through the ages have always sought to increase their number of soldiers. Yet all without comprehending how difficult it is to command even as many as two or three hundred thousand! In ancient times, only the likes of Wang Jian or Xiang Ji (Yu) were able to conquer Chu with six hundred thousand or vanquish Qin with four hundred thousand, and only Han Xin was able to back up the words "the more the better".
Conversely, there have been many generals who, though possessing three or four hundred thousand soldiers, were unable to achieve their ambitions. Zhao Kuo commanded four hundred and fifty thousand soldiers, yet he lost at Changping. Gaozu (Liu Bang) mustered a coalition of the feudal lords and gathered a host of five hundred and sixty thousand, yet he was defeated at Pengcheng. Even after becoming Emperor, Gaozu brought three hundred thousand soldiers against the Xiongnu, yet he was the one who was besieged at Baideng. Wang Hui assembled an army of three hundred and twenty thousand soldiers for his planned ambush at Mayi, yet he bungled the operation. Wang Yi led a force of one million men to preserve Wang Mang's regime, yet he went down to defeat at Kunyang. The Yellow Turbans had a million devotees, yet they were undone at Shouchang. Fu Jian boasted of his eight hundred thousand soldiers, yet he was broken at Hefei. And the Sui dynasty flung nine hundred thousand soldiers against Liaodong, but without success. In all these cases, the greater their numbers, the worse their failures.
There are those who might dismiss all of the above by saying, "They were poor generals." Yet what of Lord Cao? Certainly one could call him an excellent general. Yet he too led a fleet of six hundred thousand, which he even claimed to be eight hundred thousand, to defeat at Wulin. In that year alone, he linked his battleships together and thus allowed the enemy to burn his fleet, and he camped his forces so close together that nearly half of them perished from illness. These are clear enough proofs that an increase in numbers brings with it an increase in difficulties.
Gaozu's talents were said to be fit to command no more than a host of a hundred thousand. Thus for a fleet of six hundred thousand soldiers, Lord Cao would have needed six generals of Gaozu's calibur to command it. And how easily could he have found even one such person? Thus it was only natural that he met with defeat!
Lu Su urged Sun Quan to loan Jingzhou to Liu Bei. But Zhou Yu argued that Liu Bei was a bold leader, and should not be supplied with territory to sustain himself.
At the end of the Han dynasty, Jingzhou consisted of seven commandaries. Following Liu Biao's death, although Nanyang commandary fell under the control of the Central Plains, there were still the other six: Nan, Jiangxia, Wuling, Changsha, Guiyang, and Lingling. When Liu Bei fled south, Liu Qi brought Jiangxia to support him, and four more commandaries surrendered to him afterwards, one after the other, so that Liu Bei controlled Wuling, Changsha, Guiyang, and Lingling as well. Although after Cao Ren retreated, Guan Yu and Zhou Yu squabbled over Nan commandary, Liu Bei had already declared himself Governor of Jingzhou and taken Gong'an as his base; the six commandaries of Jingzhou were already within his grasp.
During the Chu-Han Contention, Han Xin conquered Qi outright, yet he only asked that Liu Bang appoint him as "Provisional" King of Qi. Although Liu Bang hardly wished to do this, Zhang Liang and Chen Ping stepped on his foot to silence his outburst and then assured him that he only had the choice of whether or not to accept a fait accompli. Lu Su was thus arguing along the same lines by proposing a "loan"; Sun Quan may not have liked the idea of it, but it was not a question of denying Liu Bei the territory. Zhou Yu was the one who was not being realistic. How true that those who are always winning victories cannot make a proper evaluation of their enemies.
Pang Tong advised Liu Bei to seize control of Yizhou. But Liu Bei told him, "Cao Cao and I are like fire and water. He is severe while I am magnanimous; he is cruel while I am benevolent; he is false while I am loyal. Only by opposing him in every aspect can I achieve success. Yet for the sake of a minor advantage, you would have me squander the trust and respect of the realm. I cannot do it."
Magnanimity should overcome severity; benevolence should triumph over cruelty; loyalty should surpass falsity. Yet it was Cao Cao who was strong and Liu Bei who was weak, thus reversing the proper victor. Why was this? Only because Cao Cao was the thick weed while Liu Bei was the unripe grain. Even the ripe grain cannot overcome the thick weed. One cannot conclude that magnanimity and benevolence or loyalty and trustworthiness cannot triumph over severity and cruelty or falseness and guile. It was only Liu Bei in particular who could not surpass Cao Cao in particular. "The Way does not act on its own; the right person is required."
Dong Zhao proposed to Cao Cao that he ought to advance his title to Duke and grant himself the Nine Bestowments, in order to glorify his exceptional achievements. But Xun Yu, who felt that Cao Cao had risen up for the sake of protecting the young ruler of the dynasty and out of love for the people, believed that this would be inappropriate. Cao Cao was thus unsettled, and Xun Yu passed away from anxiety.
Later, people said of Xun Yu that "He had served the Cao clan root and branch, helping them to topple the Han dynasty's fortunes, yet he later clung to a sense of duty and advocated a different opinion. He could not have saved the fate of the dynasty."
During the Spring and Autumn era, Guan Zhong served as Chancellor to Duke Huan of Qi. He helped Duke Huan to campaign against the Shanrong, against Chen and Cai, against Chu, and against Jin. All this was on behalf of preserving the Zhou royal family. Yet Duke Huan developed ambitions of making feng and shan sacrifices (to indicate his intent to claim sovereignty). Later on, Wenruo served Cao Cao, and he helped Cao Cao to pacify Qingzhou and Xuzhou, Hebei and the far north, and the lands south of the Han River. All this was for the sake of preserving the Han royal family. Yet Cao Cao proposed receiving the Nine Bestowments.
Guan Zhong knew that Duke Huan could not be permitted to conduct feng and shan sacrifices, thus he put forth his arguments to oppose it; Wenruo knew that Cao Cao could not be allowed to receive the Nine Bestowments, thus he arranged his ideas to block it. Guan Zhong was fortunate in that Duke Huan accepted his advice and limited himself to having acted on behalf of the royal family; Wenruo was unfortunate in that Cao Cao spurned his counsel and pushed ahead with completing his destruction of the state. The only difference between them came down to the fortune of one and the misfortune of the other; were they not identical in sentiment? How could those who discuss Wenruo's thinking be so wrong?
In the eighteenth year of Jian'an (213), Emperor Xian of Han issued an edict consolidating the fourteen provinces then in existence into nine provinces.
When the Three Huan Clans of Lu induced the Duke of Lu to arrange his three armies in accordance with the principles of Zhou, their intention was to humble the ducal family in order to usurp its power. When Cao Cao induced Emperor Xian to consolidate the fourteen existing provinces into nine, thus echoing the Nine Provinces of the Tribute of Yu, his ambition was to increase the size of Jizhou and thus expand his own domain. Certainly not all those who rearrange the structures of state with antiquity as their justification are necessarily villains. Yet villains who want to carry out their wicked schemes almost invariably point to antiquity to justify their machinations. Those who propose such things are not always to be trusted, but neither should they always be doubted. One must be sure to investigate their motivations.
13. In Wartime, Should a Leader Celebrate or Mourn?
When Liu Bei was campaigning against Liu Zhang, he swept all before him. He held a great wine feast at Fu, where he told Pang Tong, "Today is a joyous occasion."
Pang Tong replied, "To regard the conquest of a state as joyous is not how a benevolent leader would act."
Liu Bei retorted, "When King Wu of Zhou conquered the Shang dynasty, he preceded it with a song and followed it with a dance. Do you mean to say he wasn't benevolent?"
The campaign at Fu was such an insignificant event that it's almost not even worth discussing! But the comment about whether there should be merrymaking or not under such circumstances justifies its inclusion.
In the Classics we find in one place, "When the commander is victorious, let there be a triumphant song." Yet elsewhere we read, "The victorious general takes their place as though attending a mourning." Which principle should prevail?
I have heard that the sage regards not their own feelings, but the feelings of the people. Battle is naturally a source of anxiety for the people. Yet neither can the people help but be elated at triumph. Thus there is nothing remarkable in the idea that "when the commander is victorious, let there be a triumphant song". But on the other hand, "where propriety is lost, virtue takes its place; where virtue is lost, benevolence; where benevolence is lost, righteousness; where righteousness is lost, ritual behavior". The gap between propriety and ritual behavior is thus already quite vast, to say nothing of resorting to warfare! Thus neither should one wonder at "the victorious general takes their place as though attending a mourning".
Whether one argues that such an occasion should or should not be joyous, neither side is entirely correct. The ancients resolved this dilemma by having song and dance without while occupying the mourning place within.
In the eighteenth year of Jian'an (213), as Liu Bei was advancing his army to besiege Luo county, Pang Tong was struck by a stray arrow and killed. Liu Bei wept whenever he spoke of Pang Tong.
Pang Degong called Kongming the "Sleeping Dragon" and Shiyuan (Pang Tong) the "Fledging Phoenix". Thus Shiyuan must have been younger than Kongming. By the time Kongming passed away at the age of fifty-three, Shiyuan had already been dead for twenty-two years. Thus Shiyuan cannot have lived to see thirty. Isn't it a pity?
It was not until the twenty-fourth year of Jian'an (219) that the First Sovereign (Liu Bei) became King of Hanzhong. But Guan Yu was dead by the end of that year, Huang Zhong and Fa Zheng passed away the following year (220), Zhang Fei's death was the year after that (221), and Ma Chao and Ma Liang followed them into the grave the year after that one (222). The foundation had hardly been laid before these accomplished subjects perished one after the other, as though they were being stolen away. By the next year (223), when the Latter Lord (Liu Shan) had risen to the throne, the only veterans left were Kongming and Zhao Yun. But Zhao Yun died only seven years later (229), and Kongming was gone five years after that (234). By then, the old guard was entirely extinguished.
Fa Zheng only lived to be forty-four; Ma Chao, forty-six; Ma Liang, thirty-four. We do not even know the ages of the others. Zhang Fei was said to have been younger than Guan Yu and the First Sovereign, and since Guan Yu was a few years older than him, Zhang Fei regarded him as an elder brother; he cannot have been more than fifty or so when he died. Huo Jun only made it to thirty-nine.
So many heroes and talents, snuffed out at an early age! Yet Qiao Zhou got to live to be more than seventy. Isn't it clear that Heaven did not bless Han?
In the twentieth year of Jian'an (215), Liu Bei shifted his base to Gong'an, ordering Guan Yu to struggle with Wu for control of Jingzhou. But about that time, Cao Cao launched a campaign against Hanzhong. Fearing lest Yizhou might be lost, Liu Bei arranged peace terms with Wu and split Jingzhou in half with them before withdrawing back to Shu.
When the First Sovereign learned of Lord Cao's thrust into Hanzhong, he patched things up with Wu by giving them half of Jingzhou and then retreated back to Shu. This was a mistake. At the time, Shu controlled Nan commandary, and the First Sovereign had fifty thousand Shu troops on hand at Gong'an. If he had countered Lord Cao by marching to occupy Xiangyang and then sending Guan Yu to lead an army of fifty thousand soldiers to make a sudden attack Xu, casting aside their armor and making a mad dash, Guan Yu could have reached Xu in a mere five days. If the campaign was a success, who knows whether the First Sovereign might have gained the whole realm? And even if he failed to actually take Xu, merely the attempt would have compelled Lord Cao to withdraw the Hanzhong army without any fighting. This is what the Art of War describes as "attack the place which your enemy is obliged to save".
Years before, when Lord Cao was off at Liucheng, the First Sovereign urged Liu Biao to make a sudden march on Xu. Yet once the First Sovereign was the one in control of Jingzhou, he failed to follow his own proposal. Surely this was the hand of Heaven at work.
After Fa Zheng had been appointed as Administrator of Shu and General Who Spreads Might, he never failed to repay in kind anyone who had offered him the humblest meal or the slightest scowl.
Someone reported Fa Zheng’s appalling behavior to the government. But Zhuge Liang told them, "When our lord (Liu Bei) was at Gong'an and was in dire straits, it was Xiaozhi (Fa Zheng) whom he depended upon as his wings. Now that Xiaozhi has taken flight, we cannot further restrain him. Why should we hold him back and prevent him from carrying out his wishes?"
The historian Sun Sheng criticized Zhuge Liang for this, writing, "When power and influence slip from those above, that leads to the ruin of the state. How could a mere subject be allowed to indulge their personal desires just because of some achievement? Master Zhuge's words revealed how lacking his governance or justice were."
In the Warring States era, for the sake of satisfying Fan Ju's grudge against Wei Qi, King Zhaoxiang of Qin kidnapped Wei Qi's patron Lord Pingyuan and then sent a letter to the King of Zhao demanding Wei Qi's head in exchange. During the Han dynasty, Li Guang took his revenge against the Commandant of Baling by executing him and then sent up a letter denouncing himself, but Emperor Wu of Han replied to him, "To repay a favor and avenge a grudge is only what I expect of you, General! Why should you be uncertain?" And when during the rise of our own state (the Song dynasty) Guo Jin was serving as Inspector of Shanxi and was slandered by a certain fellow as having stolen their woman, Taizu (Zhao Kuangyin) angrily told the fellow, "A rascal like you must have a rascal for a woman too; how could my honorable subject have taken any regard of her?" And he drove the fellow away. These three men were all permitted to indulge their personal grudges, and yet they repaid their states in the end with great achievements. Such were the ways in which bold leaders of the past handled their heroes and talents; they had their own conceptions of sentiment and principle, ones which Sun Sheng was too short-sighted to grasp.
Su Ze was serving as Administrator of Jincheng when he learned that Wei had replaced Han. He put on mourning clothes and wailed and grieved.
The historian Sun Sheng criticized him for this, writing, "A gentleman should not do what is not his duty, nor should he not do what is his duty. How could it have been the place of a refined and superior fellow to accept the title and position of a new court and then turn around to cherish dissent?"
Although Wei had accepted the abdication, the Emperor of Han was still alive. Thus for Su Ze to have put on plain mourning clothes and conducted mourning for him was indeed an excessive reaction. But Sun Sheng goes too far in the other direction by accusing Su Ze of "dissent".
The Viscount of Ji had been one of the "Three Virtuous Men" at the court of King Zhou of Shang. He ultimately served King Wu of Zhou instead. But after King Wu had triumphed and the Viscount was passing through the ruins of Shang, he was so overwhelmed by grief at the sight of the dilapidated and destroyed palace that he would have burst into tears if not for the presence of the court. Jizha wept for his former liege King Liao of Wu, but then served King Liao's killer Helü; Yanzi (Yan Ying) grieved for Duke Zhuang of Qi, but then served Duke Jing of Qi. To mourn for the dead while serving the living is to accord with the will of Heaven and take the place of a proper subject. How could Sun Sheng claim that this was "do what is not one's duty or not do what is one's duty"?
Sun Sheng's remarks are just the hooting of an owl; it makes one cringe to hear it.
18. Sun Quan's Submission to Wei Was Expedient, Not Strategic
In the third year of Huangchu (222), in the eighth month, Wei sent their Minister of Ceremonies, Xing Zheng, bearing a Staff of Authority to appoint Sun Quan as Wei's King of Wu and grant him the Nine Bestowments. Sun Quan accepted them.
During this year, Shu and Wu were locked in a great battle at Yiling. Sun Quan thus used humble words to submit to Wei and accept their ranks and titles purely to quash any discussion in Wei of striking him from behind. Yet the Weilue would have us believe that, since Sun Quan was already intending to claim an imperial title for himself, he did not consider it a grave matter to accept these titles; indeed, he intended to use them as an opportunity to act humble at first and then arrogant later. His initial humility in accepting Wei's ranks and titles would allow him to consolidate his power before reaching for the throne, and his later arrogance would ideally incite a campaign by Wei against him, thus stirring the anger of the people of Wu against Wei and towards him. But by the time of these events, Sun Quan was already the third ruler of his lineage to wield control over the Wu region, and his power was already sufficient to establish himself as a sovereign lord. Why would he have needed the charade of ranks and titles to achieve it?
To accept the ranks and titles of another means to place oneself in the position of the subject of another ruler, to supply them with local tribute and send them people to fill their offices, and to remove the border defenses obstructing them from one's domain. Even in the cases of dire emergencies, such a vassal is not even within their rights to call up their own forces, but must send word of their distress to their overlord and request that they dispatch troops to beat back the threat. Furthermore, one is obliged to muster all their troops to accompany their sovereign on campaign whenever the ruler chooses to send them a feather notice, and even if one is not personally required to attend the sovereign's court, there can be no avoiding sending one's son to serve in the palace guards. There can be no allowance for the slightest doubt in the conduct of a vassal; a single instance of disobeying a command can bring down a punitive campaign simply by the utterance of the ruler, and if one then raises their own troops to fight back, this is outright rebellion against the sovereign. How could Sun Quan have expected to stir up the anger of his people through such a ploy?
Wei laid upon Sun Quan the responsibility of sending his son to live in the capital, and not only was Sun Quan unwilling to do this, he ultimately rebelled against Wei. Thus he became the laughingstock of all the realm. His submission to Wei was purely a measure of expediency, meant to deal with the emergency right before his eyes, nor did any of his ministers have the insight of Lu Zhonglian, who would have advised against submitting to another no matter the situation. Yet Chen Shou makes a facile comparison by putting Sun Quan in the same league as Goujian. Certainly I have heard that Goujian submitted to Wu, but I never heard anything about him accepting its ranks and titles!
Sun Quan wished to have his Crown Prince, Sun Deng, read books and familiarize himself with recent history. He had Zhang Zhao employ a heavy handed and bothersome style to burden Sun Deng, than would have Zhang Xiu come in behind him to take up the texts and go back to help Sun Deng.
Liu Bei instructed Liu Shan by using the Book of Han, and Sun Quan too had Zhang Zhao use the Book of Han to teach his son Sun Deng. People through the ages have thus speculated that Sun Quan and Liu Bei were too ignorant to know about the incidents of the reigns of the Two Emperors (Yao and Shun) and the Three Kings (of Xia, Shang, and Zhou), thus the only education they could provide their sons was about the events of the Han dynasty. But I would say this is grossly mistaken.
When Yi Yin instructed his young sovereign, Taijia of the Shang dynasty, he spoke only of the events of the preceding Xia dynasty and made no references to events as far back as Tang (Yao) or Yu (Shun). When the Duke of Zhou was tutoring his nephew King Cheng of Zhou, he too referenced only the Three Exemplars of Shang without reaching back to discuss Tang or Yu. Are we then meant to believe that Yi Yin and the Duke of Zhou were also so ignorant that they knew not the affairs of Yao, Shun, or Yu the Great? Yet they too chose to draw from recent events, restricting their lessons out of the necessity of the circumstances.
Sun Quan and Liu Bei were surely not so intelligent or learned as Yi Yin or the Duke of Zhou. Yet when it came to educating their sons, by not neglecting the recent past in favor of antiquity and by not exalting style at the expense of substance, they were only following the models handed down by Yi Yin and the Duke of Zhou.
Wu was going to send an army of ten thousand to campaign against Fan Zhou. But when Sun Quan consulted with Pan Jun, Pan Jun said that five thousand would be sufficient to capture Fan Zhou, and he discussed how Fan Zhou could be routed. Impressed, Sun Quan assigned him the five thousand soldiers, and Pan Jun put down Fan Zhou and took his head.
When Sun Quan conquered Jingzhou, almost all of the Shu generals and officials quickly surrendered to him. Pan Jun alone lay in bed and refused to bend. Yet when Sun Quan paid him a visit to personally convince him, Pan Jun thanked him and became overcome with grief. Why such an overwrought reaction to such a gesture? And when Fan Zhou sought to occupy Wuling and return it to Shu's control, Pan Jun devised a full strategy for Sun Quan on how to deal with Fan Zhou and even personally led the army that crushed him. Why such a generous repayment for such a pittance? Even for the sake of one's lord, some things simply cannot be done!
I have heard that after Yue Yi left Yan to serve Zhao, Zhao wanted to use him to campaign against Yan. But Yue Yi wept and said, "My service to Yan then was as sincere as my service to Zhao now." Yue Yi had left Yan in ignominy and been obliged to seek refuge in another state, and yet to the end of his life he never dared to help Zhao to plot against the slightest wastrel, much less his own former state. If we assume that Yue Yi was simply a dullard, that would be one thing. But if we permit him the slightest amount of sense, then we must conclude that Pan Jun was not without guilt.
In the third year of Zhangwu (223) in the fourth month, Liu Bei perished at Yong'an Palace. In the fifth month, Liu Shan rose to the throne at Chengdu. He changed the reign era title to the first year of Jianxing.
It was traditional that, when one ruler succeeded another, they waited until the rest of that year had elapsed before beginning the first year of their reign at the beginning of the following year. Yet the Latter Lord declared his new reign era immediately, in the fifth month of the same year as his father's death. Chen Shou intended for this to be seen as one of Kongming's shortcomings, for having permitted this to happen. Yet in my view, it does not seem to have been a fault.
It is true that the ancients made distinctions between what might be called "accessions", the mere transfer of power, and "coronations", the official rising to the throne. It was the latter ceremony which would take place in the first month of the following year. History books would later associate this coronation with the declaring of a new reign era, and later ages inherited the practice. But since it was this coronation that was taking place in this instance, why should a new reign era not have been declared? Thus I say it was not a fault.
It is also true that the ancients did not consider a ruler to be entitled to a sovereign title if their reign did not last until the following year. Thus Zimeng was not recorded as a King, though he reigned over Zhou, and Ziban's son Chi was not recorded as a Duke, though he presided over Lu. Later ages followed this precedent. But since the Latter Lord was already being referred to as a sovereign, why should a new reign era not have been declared? Thus I say it was not a fault.
During the Spring and Autumn era, since the counting of years was only ever in relation to the ruler at the time, there could never have been an instance where the same year could have two titles; the final year of Duke Yin of Lu's reign was necessarily called "the eleventh year of his reign", and it would have been impossible to further call it "the first year of Duke Huan's reign". But after the innovation of the reign era title, there were many instances where a year began with one title and ended with another, and in fact there were even times when the reign era title was changed three or four times in the same year. Where then could there have been any source of jealousy, to say that this practice could not be done? Thus I say it was not a fault.
And beyond these particular points, what we in modern times refer to as "changing the year" is different from how the ancients understood that term. For them, "changing the year" necessarily implied the first year of the reign of a certain ruler, thus the necessity of needing to wait until the beginning of a new year before it could be carried out, as I have mentioned above. But in more recent times, "changing the year" does not necessitate the beginning of a new reign entirely. Thus it was permissible either way, whether one changed the year right at the time of succession or only at the beginning of the following year.
22. Why Didn't Zhuge Liang Give Liu Shan Confucian Texts Instead of Legalist Ones?
Zhuge Liang composed lessons for Liu Shan, based on the writings of Shen Buhai and Han Fei and the texts Guanzi and the Six Secret Teachings.
There are learned people who have criticized Kongming for failing to use the Confucian classics and other such works as the basis of his guidance for his young sovereign, and for using the Six Secret Teachings, the Guanzi, and the writings of Shen Buhai and Han Fei instead. But I do not agree with them. Whether it comes to quelling an age of chaos or preserving an era of peace, one must perceive which fundamentals a sovereign needs to learn first. In the Latter Lord's case, he was already tolerant and generous, benevolent and principled; he had an abundance of magnanimity. What he lacked was calculation and cunning, intelligence and broadmindedness, and everyone who was perceptive at the time worried about these things. The Six Secret Teachings discusses military affairs and remarkable strategies, the Guanzi prioritizes power and influence, Shen Buhai analyzes what seems to be and what truly is, and Han Fei addresses rules and regulations.
These were the pressing issues which needed addressing; this was the illness that ailed the Latter Lord. Medicine is never good or bad in and of itself, but only to the degree by which it addresses the illness. What use is the most expensive and exquisite medicine if it cannot cure the affliction?
In the fourth year of Huangchu (223), several of Wei's chief ministers each wrote letters to Zhuge Liang, including the Minister Over The Masses, Hua Xin, the Minister of Works, Wang Lang, the Prefect of the Masters of Writing, Chen Qun, the Grand Astrologist, Xu Zhi, and the Supervisor of the Left of the Diplomats, Zhuge Dan. They explained to him the passing of Heaven’s Mandate and the circumstances of human affairs, hoping to have him offer up his state as a vassal. But Zhuge Liang refused to submit.
Truly one could describe these Wei ministers as being uneducated, unskilled, and entirely blind to either knowledge or sentiment! If they had been educated and skilled, knowledgeable and wise, people like Xiao Wangzhi of Han, they never would have attempted such a thing.
During the reign of Emperor Xuan of Han, the Xiongnu leader Huhan (Huhanxie) came to the border passes of the realm and asked to have his forces submit to the Han dynasty as a vassal state. But Xiao Wangzhi argued that they should only receive him with the courtesy due to a guest, then determine a day to expel him, rather than accept as a subject one who would inevitably rebel. Emperor Xuan followed his advice. Surely it was because, although the Xiongnu had grown weak by that time, they had always been regarded as sworn enemies of the state, and could not be compared to occasional enemies like Eastern Ou or Southern Yue. Huhan might have claimed a momentary allegiance, but his nature could not be so easily changed, and at some point he would have rebelled and abandoned the dynasty. And how then ought the dynasty respond? If they wished to send out soldiers to punish him, they lacked the power to achieve it. But if they meekly let him leave and did nothing, they would no longer be able to enforce their authority within the realm. Thus to receive Huhan purely as a guest and not as a subject, even when he was at his most yielding and submissive, was not simply in order to display modesty and virtue, but must have also been out of concern for the long-term consequences.
How could the ministers of Wei have possibly felt that the power of their state was equal to that of the Han dynasty in the time of Emperor Xuan? And although Wu and Shu were weaker than Wei, the difference in strength was not so great as existed between the Han dynasty and Huhan's forces. Even if Zhuge Liang had actively offered to submit to Wei as a vassal, they still should not have accepted him as a subject, much less when Kongming did not wish to yield and they were the ones trying to coerce him! Besides, hadn't Sun Quan only recently accepted their ranks and titles before playing them the fool? Yet here they were, trying the same thing by attempting to make a vassal out of Shu and yet receiving no response from Zhuge Liang. From north to south and from east to west, no one wished to submit less than he did.
There was an occasion where Cao Pi granted as gifts to his ministers women who had become government slaves. Hua Xin was the only one of them who dismissed the women he had been granted and sent them off to marry whomever they liked. Cao Pi sighed in admiration of this.
But the historian Sun Sheng criticized Hua Xin, writing, "When Zhongni's (Confucius') disciple Zilu (Zhong You) took the initiative to hand out his own stores of food to the people, Zhongni smashed his food containers; when the Tian clan of Qi presumed to distribute their own favors, Zhongni criticized them in the Spring and Autumn Annals. To relieve or to injure the people are the prerogatives of the state, and its authority must be respected. One may be moved to pity at witnessing some given sight, but a partial kindness is impermissible. Now Hua Xin had a role at the right hand of the sovereign, and what he ought to have done in regards to this mistaken policy was to speak out against it in open court. Yet he accepted his sovereign's gift without a murmur, in order that he alone might demonstrate the conduct of a ‘superior fellow’. Perhaps this could be called the benevolence of a common person, but I cannot consider it to be in accordance with propriety."
Sun Sheng was a man of harsh and mean character who got his learning in a rough and careless environment during an age of lawlessness and turmoil; both nature and nurture were foul, thus his criticisms and remarks all turned out this way.
When King Xuan of Qi refused to allow an ox to be led to sacrifice but permitted a sheep to take the ox's place, simply because he had witnessed the one but not the other, Mengzi (Mencius) still called that a form of benevolence. How could anyone describe it as "a partial kindness"? No doubt if Sun Sheng had been Minister of Justice during the reign of Emperor Wen of Wei (Cao Pi), he would have convicted Hua Xin of "presumptuous kindness and personal favors" and sentenced him to death. The fact that Sun Sheng had no career under Eastern Jin was no error.
25. Huang Quan Justifies Legitimacy Through Astrology
Cao Rui asked Huang Quan, "Three states have now established themselves; which one is legitimate?"
Huang Quan replied, "Legitimacy can be determined by the heavens. Last year (226), when Mars was dwelling in the Heart constellation, Emperor Wen (Cao Pi) passed away and yet there was no misfortune in either Wu or Shu. This is proof of Wei's legitimacy."
Huang Quan may not have necessarily been wrong to claim that Wei was the legitimate state. But I am afraid I cannot accept his argument when he bases it solely on astrology without offering any other proof.
In the fourth year of Huangchu (223), in the third month, on the day Guimao, the Moon wandered into the Heart constellation. It is the traditional claim of the diviners that the Heart constellation symbolizes the Heavenly King, and any disturbance of that constellation bodes ill for the sovereign of the realm. But the following month, on the day Guisi, it was the First Sovereign of Shu (Liu Bei) who expired at Yong'an Palace. Both Shu and Wei thus had a claim to legitimacy based upon the movements of the heavens; how then could Huang Quan have made such a confident declaration?
The Astrological Records of the Book of Jin assures the reader that, although the two Shis (Shi Le and Shi Hu of Later Zhao) falsely claimed the imperial title, the ebb and flow of their strength could be witnessed according to what took place in the Hairy Head constellation; there was no correlation between the events of their reigns and the Forbidden Enclosure or the Purple Palace constellations, where the omens of the real sovereign would occur. Yet if we study the astrological events of that era further, we see that there was a comet in the Purple Palace shortly before Liu Cong of Han-Zhao expired, there was a broom star in the Forbidden Enclosure just before Fu Jian of Former Qin was defeated, and Mars took up residence in the Heavenly Seat just as Lü Long of Later Liang was crushed. Any one of these warlords might thus have reasonably had a claim to legitimacy.
Yu Yi of Jin once wrote to his elder brother Yu Bing, "The Year Star (Jupiter) crossed into the Heavenly Gate, and yet though there was no disturbance in the Southland (where Jin was), Jilong (Shi Hu) has frequently closed his gates in recent years. This is ample proof that the movements of the heavens are essentially random and source of proof for anything." Oh, when people pay so much attention to the heavens, is it not liable to disappoint them?
In the fifth year of Jianxing (227), the Prime Minister, Zhuge Liang, marched out to camp at Hanzhong.
This was a Dingwei year, being the same year as Wei's first year of Taihe and Wu's sixth year of Huangwu. Emperor Ming of Wei (Cao Rui) had already been on the throne since the previous year, and there was no discord between him and his ministers. And even before this, Wu had already attacked Xiakou and besieged Shiyang, but without success.
Hadn't Kongming been the one who had originally given this advice to the First Sovereign (Liu Bei)? "You should defend and obtain Jingzhou and Yizhou, form ties with the Rong tribes of the west and reassure the Yi and Yue peoples of the south, reach an understanding with Sun Quan, and cultivate your government within, while awaiting some development in the realm. Once the opportunity arrives, send a chief general to march towards Wan and Luoyang, while you personally lead an army towards Qinchuan. Then the conquering enterprise can be achieved, and the house of Han may be restored." Such had been his own strategy. Yet at this time, there were no such "developments" in the realm to take advantage of. Yet Kongming abruptly marched north. Why was this?
27. Zhuge Liang's Shameful Treatment Of The Three Surrendered Commandaries
When Zhuge Liang marched out of Qishan, the three commandaries of Nan'an, Tianshui, and Anding went over to his side. However, when Ma Su was defeated shortly afterwards, unable to hold these three commandaries, Zhuge Liang took more than a thousand families from the western counties to resettle in Hanzhong.
When the Han dynasty was at its greatest extent and still fully intact, its splendor was a match for the Sun and Moon; everyone upon whom the Sun shone was one of Han's little children. But later, when Han's virtue diminished, it was no longer able to protect its people. Thus it gave up the Southland and abandoned it to Wu, and carved off the lands north of the Wei River and yielded them to Wei. It was not a case of the people abandoning Han, but of Han abandoning its people.
When Zhuge Liang marched out of Qishan, these three commandaries went over to his side, yet Zhuge Liang proved unable to defend them. This too was a case of Zhuge Liang abandoning the people, not of the people abandoning Zhuge Liang. At the time of these events, Zhuge Liang ought to have gathered together everyone that had come under his protection and bitterly reproached himself for his failures before sending them away. If he had done so, he would have made very clear to everyone living between the Xiao and Long Mountains (that is, Guanzhong) of his sincere intentions towards them, and whenever he made subsequent campaigns in the region, he would not have needed to worry that they might not support him. At the very least, he would have left them in place. But instead of this, he took more than a thousand families from the western counties and moved them to Hanzhong instead. Not only was this insufficient to do any harm to his enemy, but he caused the innocent people to have to leave behind their homes, abandon their clans, and desert their family graves. How could the people of the three commandaries have possibly intended this when they went over to his side?
Even if this was a common occurrence when it came to the people in the borderlands, Kongming should not have done such a thing. I consider it a pity.
28. Why Did Zhuge Liang Not Sever Relations With Wu?
After Sun Quan declared himself Emperor, there were those in Shu who proposed that there was nothing further to be gained by being allied with Wu and that Sun Quan's new rank and pretensions could not be tolerated, thus it would be best to break off relations with Wu. But Zhuge Liang did not consider it feasible.
People have asked, "In refusing to break off relations with Wu, was Kongming demonstrating expediency? Or principle?"
I would argue, "It was principle, not expediency."
During the time of the Six States (the Warring States era), all the feudal lords claimed titles for themselves. Yet Mencius felt that these so-called Kings did not deserve immediate punishment; he argued that they should be taught first, and only after refusing to change their ways should they be punished. Those who had not yet been taught the errors of their ways ought not to be punished. And considering Kongming's power, he was not yet in a position to instruct Wu. Thus Wu's pretensions could not yet be denounced. It was a principle of how to handle pretenders, not an expedient measure of the moment.
After Cao Rui came to the throne, he granted the privilege of a Separate Office to several of his chief ministers: the Grand General Who Nurtures The Army, Sima Yi, the Grand General Who Guards The Army, Chen Qun, the Grand General Who Conquers The East, Cao Xiu, and the Grand General of the Central Army, Cao Zhen.
The Han dynasty began by creating the staffs of the Prime Minister and the Imperial Secretary; next came the staffs of the Three Excellencies. Then whenever generals or commanders went out on campaigns, they created their own field staffs, which would be abolished once the army was disbanded and did not remain in permanent use. Yet here, near the beginning of the Wei dynasty, Sima Yi and the others had all been appointed as Grand Generals and been granted their own staffs on a regular basis within the capital region. Where was the sense in this? The humbling of the royal house must have stemmed from this moment.
When the Shu general Li Ping (Li Yan) heard that Sima Yi and the others had been granted these staff privileges, he recalled Kongming to consult with him, but Kongming belittled him. At the time, the people of the Central Plains considered Chen Changwen (Chen Qun) to be the greatest, yet he permitted this situation to come about. The others could not have been very principled either.
When Zhuge Liang heard of Zhang Wen's downfall, at first he could not comprehend it. But after pondering for several days, he concluded, "I understand it now. He was too clear in making distinctions between clear and turgid, between good and evil."
To make too clear a distinction between good and evil is indeed a path to destruction. Yet when people experience doom and disaster, there are cases where it was because they stuck to their principles and cases where it happened because they failed to do so. The downfall of someone like Zhang Wen could be described as the latter outcome. What is there to explain as the reason?
In the second year of Qinglong (234), a patterned stone was discovered in Zhangye commandary. It was one zhang and six chi in width, one zhang, seven chi, and one cun in height, and five zhang and eight chi in circumference. The stone was of a deep blue material, but the designs were in white. Some figures resembled qilins, and others phoenixes; some resembled tigers, or oxen, or centaurs. Some were like eight-trigram patterns, or constellations, or shooting stars. There were written characters on the stone, but although they were legible, they were incomprehensible. The people of that time considered it an omen for Wei and Jin.
Ouyang Yongshu (Ouyang Xiu) has already provided a forceful argument demolishing the credibility of the so-called omens of the Yellow River Patterns or the Luo River Book. When reading about the patterned stone mentioned here, what makes it any different from those? Oh, but what a shame that there was no one in those days who were like Fuxi or Sage Yu (Yu the Great) who might have been able to comprehend this, with the credulous even believing that the stone was an omen for Wei or Jin. Would we really not have been able to discern if Wei or Jin acted with good principles or not without the presence of things like the Eight Trigrams or the Nine Fields? It's random chance that essentially determines even the luck of an ordinary life, much less mortal affairs. How exhausting.
32. Faulty Assumptions on the Arrangement of the Calendar
In the first year of Jingchu (237), the Wei officials petitioned that, as Wei governed by the aspect of Earth (as opposed to Heaven or Humanity), it should adopt Chou (the Twelfth Month) as the beginning of its calendar year. Thus the third month of that year was altered to be the fourth month, as the beginning of summer.
Tradition has it that the Xia dynasty governed by the aspect of Humanity and took Yin (the First Month) to be the beginning of its calendar year; the Shang dynasty, Earth and Chou (the Twelfth Month); the Zhou dynasty, Heaven and Zi (the Eleventh Month). But this belief is mistaken.
Before even the Xia dynasty came the august rulers Yao and Shun. Yao governed by the canon of Xihe, and in his reviewing of the canons Shun maintained it. Thus during the age of Tang and Yu (Yao and Shun), it was surely the case that Yin was the beginning of the calendar year. By the end of the Xia dynasty, the laws were even more orderly and arranged, and Xia's books and records which have been passed down to later ages describe it as the Xia minor calendar. Although Kongzi (Confucius) mentioned it and advocated for its use, he did not claim that the practice of using Yin to begin the calendar year only began with the Xia dynasty.
It was not until the reign of King Cheng of Zhou that there was a tradition of using Zi to begin the calendar year. But even then, they did not dispense with the seasons of Xia, which they referred to as the "proper year".
Later scholars, noting that Xia began its calendar with Yin and Zhou began it with Zi, made the assumption that, since the Shang dynasty was between these other two and that it would not have broken the implied sequence, Shang must have adopted Chou as the beginning of their calendar. The association with the three aspects (Heaven, Earth, and Humanity) then flowed from that idea.
That the Xia dynasty took Yin to be the beginning of its calendar year can be seen from the Analects, where Kongzi advises, "Follow the seasons of Xia." That Zhou adopted Zi to be the beginning of its calendar year can be discerned from the Spring and Autumn Annals, which records one year where "in the tenth month (the beginning of winter), a layer of frost killed the pulse plants" and another where “in the third month (the end of spring), there was no ice". But there is simply no evidence in the Classics to be found to substantiate the assertion that the Shang dynasty adopted Chou to be the beginning of its calendar year; it was only an inference without any proof. One who puts Zi as the beginning of the calendar may justly divide the year into twenty-four solar-terms, and one who puts Yin as the beginning of the calendar may reasonably divide the year into four seasons. But how is one to properly divide a year when Chou is adopted as the beginning of the calendar? Thus we can see how it doesn't make sense.
In Sun Liang's second year of Taiping (257), an imperial kinsman, Sun Ji, stole one of Sun Liang's carriage horses. Sun Ji was arrested and handed over to the justice officials.
One of Sun Liang's Palace Attendants, Diao Yuan [Diao Xuan], submitted a petition stating, "By law, Sun Ji deserves death. Yet, as he is the son of the late Prince of Lu (Sun Ba) who himself died young, I hope that Your Majesty will take pity on Sun Ji and pardon him."
Sun Liang said, "The law applies to everyone in the realm; how can I violate it just for the sake of personal sentiment? But consider some justification for me to release him."
Diao Yuan replied, "There are varying degrees of amnesty: some which apply across the realm, some within an area of a thousand li, and some within five hundred li. By this method, you could attain your wish."
Sun Liang thus declared an amnesty strictly within the palace, and Sun Ji was able to escape his fate.
For this incident, we might say that both the lord of Wu and his minister took up the wrong positions. During the Han dynasty, whenever one of the princes or feudal lords committed a crime deserving of death, it was the chief ministers who would present a petition asking for the law to be applied: the Prime Minister, the Imperial Secretary, the Director of Canons, the Superintendent of the Imperial Clan, and the Minister of Justice.
Then the Emperor would reply by edict, "I cannot bear to go so far as the law demands. Let the nobles and the Two Thousand Bushel rank officials discuss this further."
Next the Prime Minister, the Imperial Secretary, and the rest would present a further petition, stating, "We have taken careful consultation with the nobles and officials, yet even they all say, 'Let the law be done'."
But again the Emperor would respond, "Even so, I truly cannot bear to go so far as the law demands; let the guilty be deprived of his title as Prince, or let him be stripped of some of his territory."
Thus the person pushing for the law to be enforced would be the officials who sought to preserve the law, while the person who could not bear to go so far as the law demanded would be the ruler who wished to consider virtue. Yet here was Sun Liang, the ruler, advocating for the law while Diao Yuan, the minister, appealed to sentiment. They had exchanged their proper roles, thus one could say that they took up the wrong positions.
34. Were Lu Kang and Yang Hu Presumptuous To Keep Peace?
According to Sun Sheng's Annals of Jin, when Sun Hao heard that Yang Hu and Lu Kang had formed an understanding and agreement, he criticized Lu Kang. But Lu Kang told him, "It is not so much as that. I am simply doing enough to counter his virtue, so that Yang Hu does not do us any harm."
Some have criticized both Yang Hu and Lu Kang for this incident, believing that they surrendered their duties as subjects. According to this line of thinking, promoting friendship or good relations is strictly the role of the state, and generals and commanders are called upon purely to devise schemes to overcome the enemy. Yang Hu and Lu Kang were such generals and commanders, yet they were carrying out state policy. Thus commentators have disparaged them as abandoning their prescribed roles. Yet I would venture to say that this is not so.
Warfare requires many different arts. It is true that one must pit strength against strength and match wits against wits, but there are also occasions for testing virtues against virtues. From the time of Qin and Han onwards, people had only considered guile or strength. If one side decided to employ virtue, they may yet have made a mess of things in the end, but those who had no conception of testing virtues against virtues could only ever develop schemes, nothing more. How could one consider it "surrendering one's duty"?
Yet Sun Sheng claims Yang Hu and Lu Kang actually developed "the same friendship as Zichan and Jizha". This is to go too far in the other direction. The Art of War advocates practicing deception; how could it allow for a kinship like that between Zichan and Jizha? And if it really had been like Sun Sheng said, then the two of them would not have been worthy of praise. Why so? Because in that case they would not have been acting as "partisans of Wu and Zheng", but simply as acquaintances like Zichan and Jizha; not as border commanders interacting with one another, but as friends forming personal ties across the borders of their states. There would be no reason to commend Yang Hu or Lu Kang for that.
35. Sima Yan Preserves The Collection of Zhuge Liang's Works
One of Jin's Palace Attendants, Xun Xu, and its Prefect of the Palace Secretariat, He Qiao, presented a petition reporting that one of the Authors of the Imperial Library, Chen Shou, had finished compiling the various records of Shu's late Prime Minister, Zhuge Liang, in twenty-four chapters as "The Collected Writings of Master Zhuge". Emperor Wu of Jin (Sima Yan) accepted the collection.
After Emperor Wen of Wei (Cao Pi) became the sovereign, having sought out and reviewed Kong Rong's various writings, he declared that Kong Rong was not one whit inferior to Ban Gu or Yang Xiong. And after Emperor Wu of Jin rose to the throne, he issued an edict declaring that Zhuge Liang's writings were of the same quality as the Instructions of Zhou in the Book of Documents. Now Kong Rong had been Wen of Wei's hated enemy, and Zhuge Liang had been Xuan of Jin's (Sima Yi's) implacable foe. It would have been understandable if these two rulers had wished to have nothing to do with the work of such writers. Yet in both cases, they collected and preserved their compositions, fearing lest they might be lost to time. In demonstrating such a lack of personal animosity, they demonstrated how the principles of utmost impartiality of the kings of old still lived on. It's for such reasons that I favor Wei and Jin.
Chen Shou wrote, "Shu never established a Scribal Bureau or had a department for taking notes and records, thus there were many omissions in the records of its activities and gaps in the compilations of disasters and phenomena. Although Zhuge Liang was an adept administrator, his work was not comprehensive in this regard."
It is true that the Book of Rites states that every word uttered by the ruler was recorded by the Scribe of the Left, and every action taken by the ruler was written down by the Scribe of the Right. Yet although the Rites of Zhou lists the preparations for establishing bureaus, it makes no mention of such scribes; though it listed the position of the Grand Scribe, "taking notes and records" was not listed as among its duties. At the time that the Rites of Zhou was written, even the feudal lords all had their own scribes; how could the Son of Heaven alone have lacked them?
During the Spring and Autumn era, the activities of discerning the best layout for houses and fields or interpreting the weather patterns of the Sun and clouds were all attributed to the Grand Scribe, as though the Grand Scribe were a practitioner of the Naturalist philosophy. Yet the historians Zhao Dun and Cui Zhu were also recorded as being Grand Scribes, implying that the Grand Scribe was a keeper and compiler of notes and records. It must have been that during that time, learned people all understood astrology and divination, but one did not have to resort to consulting the yarrow stalks or reading the tortoise shells simply to predict the rise and fall of states. Grand Scribe Bo both spoke of the achievements of Zhurong and asserted that Chu would surely rise; Grand Scribe Zhao both regaled the virtues of Yu Shun and predicted that the Chen clan were not yet doomed. Considering that they spoke of and discussed events both that had already occurred and that had not yet taken place, it seems clear that the Grand Scribes handled both divination and recordskeeping. And during the Han dynasty, where both Sima Tan and his son Sima Qian served as Prefect of the Scribal Bureau, although they described themselves as recordskeepers, yet they also handled the astrological bureau. That provides a clear example of the combined duties of the role.
It was only during the interval between Wei and Jin that the post of Author of the Imperial Library first appeared and the duties which had previously all been handled by the Grand Scribe were split into two roles. This had not yet taken place during Kongming's day. Furthermore, we read that in the Latter Lord's (Liu Shan's) first year of Jingyao (258), there was a general amnesty and a changing of the reign era title when "the Scribal Bureau reported the sighting of a brilliant star". Yet Chen Shou claims that "Shu never established a Scribal Bureau". It was a hasty remark.
Jiang Wei and others guarded Jiange to resist Zhong Hui's invasion. Zhong Hui thus distributed a proclamation to the generals, officials, gentry, and people of the Shu region:
"It was not so long ago, at the final decline of the Han dynasty, when the realm was split asunder and the lives of the people were nearly snuffed out. Yet there were great men who stood against this looming disaster. First was Emperor Wu, Taizu (Cao Cao), puissant in war and sagacious in thought; he quelled chaos and restored order, steadied what was about to topple, and 'laid the foundations of our kingdom' as King Wen of Zhou once did. Next was Emperor Wen, Gaozu (Cao Pi), who heeded Heaven's will and respected the wishes of the people by accepting the Mandate and ascending to the imperial throne. Then came Emperor Ming, Liezu (Cao Rui), who added still more luster and glory to the dynasty and who expanded and improved the legacy of his forbearers. Yet despite the great strides made by these leaders, there still remained pockets of resistance beyond the distant mountains and rivers, leaders of illegitimate governments and mistaken traditions who steered the local populace away from receiving the blessings of the sovereign's moral transformation. How deeply did our three founders regret in their final moments that there remained those deprived of the royal sway!
"Our current sovereign (Cao Huan) is wise and virtuous, respectful and discerning, and he is a worthy successor to the enterprise of his ancestors. He is aided by the Regent Chancellor (Sima Zhao), who is loyal and reverent, perceptive and profound, and who has devoted his every effort to the cause of the imperial family. They promote wise government and offer deep kindness, and all the states of the world have replied with accord and harmony; they display virtue to every crude tribe, who have in turn humbly yielded and presented tribute. And they lament the obstinacy of the regions of Ba and Shu, who insist upon their robber state, and pity the people of these lands, who have been forced to toil and work incessantly. Thus have they ordered the Six Armies (of imperial authority) to set force on campaign against these bandits, acting as the instrument of Heaven's judgment. Even now, the armies of the General Who Conquers The West (Deng Ai), the Inspector of Yongzhou (Zhuge Xu), and the General Who Guards The West (Zhong Hui) are all advancing along five roads.
"Still, it has ever been a principle of warfare that the general takes benevolence as the foundation and supplements it by righteous principles, and that the commander of the sovereign seeks to secure submission without resorting to force of arms. Thus did Yu Shun (Emperor Shun) gain the obedience of the Youmiao people purely through the awesome display of a wardance; thus did King Wu of Zhou demonstrate propriety by distributing the bounty of Shang and the grain of the treasury and by honoring the villages of the esteemed servants of the fallen dynasty. It is therefore the firm wish of the General Who Guards The West, although he wields a terrible authority and commands a powerful host, to extend a courteous lesson and invitation to the enemy for the sake of preserving the lives of the people; it is his aim not to inflict total war or destructive battle, but merely to hasten the day of unification under one government. He hopes that this brief explanation of the certainties of danger and the prospects of peace may therefore find a receptive audience.
"What can be said of the First Sovereign of Yizhou (Liu Bei)? Though he possessed courage and ability and rose up with troops in the wilds of the far north, he suffered and stumbled through the regions of Jizhou and Xuzhou, and he served as the minion of Yuan Shao and of Lü Bu. Despite these things, Taizu (Cao Cao) saved and rescued him and showed him exceptional grace and favor. Yet in the midst of such treatment, the First Sovereign still turned his back on Taizu, abandoning the common cause in favor of his own ambition. Then there were Zhuge Kongming (Zhuge Liang), who schemed to take Qinchuan, and Jiang Boyue (Jiang Wei), who repeatedly invaded Longyou; both of them caused trouble and disturbances in our border regions and harried and harassed our Di and Qiang peoples, and it was only because of the many domestic troubles that occupied our attention that we refrained from punishing their nine offenses through a punitive campaign.
"Yet by now, our borders are peaceful and tranquil and our interior is without concerns, and we have nursed our strength and awaited the right moment. We have mustered our forces and have sent them against a single front, while even your forces of the single province making up Ba and Shu have been split up and stretched thin to defend multiple garrisons; how can they resist the hosts of all the realm? Your soldiers are still suffering from the wounds and the despair of their defeats at Duan Valley and at Houhe; how can they resist the solid discipline of our armies? Not once in recent years have your people been spared from military adventures, and your young men have grown weak and haggard; how can they compare with the strength and readiness of our populace? Gentlemen, these are all facts with which you are personally acquainted. And recall that as the Chancellor of Shu, Zhuang, was ultimately captured by the state of Qin, so too did Gongsun Shu eventually surrender his head to the Han dynasty; as it is said, 'no family has sole claim to all the narrows of the realm'. Gentlemen, you are doubtless aware of these stories.
"The wise perceive danger before it even takes shape, and the intelligent prevent disaster before the slightest bud appears. The Viscount of Wei abandoned the Shang dynasty and thus enjoyed an enduring legacy under the Zhou; Chen Ping defected from the Xiang clan (of Xiang Ji) and thus achieved great deeds for the Han. Why then should you gentlemen sit idly while the poison sets in, clinging to your posts and salaries rather than adapting to the circumstances?
"The court has ever extended Heaven's grace towards those who opposed it, and the Regent Chancellor has oft demonstrated the virtues of magnanimity and forgiveness, for they prefer mercy to judgment and seek to spare rather than to kill. In recent times, there was the Wu general Sun Yi; he raised his forces to come submit to the state, for which he was granted a lofty position and shown exceptional favor and payment. And there were Wen Qin and Tang Zi, who caused great harm to the state, serving as war leaders for despicable bandits rebelling against their sovereign. Yet although Tang Zi was captured in the heat of battle and Wen Qin's two sons yielded, all of them were still appointed as generals and granted marquisates, and Tang Zi was even granted a role in state affairs. Now consider how well these fellows were treated and favored, although it was only after all hope was lost that they at last heeded the Mandate. How much greater rewards can be expected for you gentlemen of Ba and Shu, who might yet recognize your situation and take the first step?
"We sincerely urge you to deeply consider your prospects of victory or defeat and to take this chance to tread a nobler path. Follow in the footsteps of the Viscount of Wei and imitate the example of Chen Ping. There is still time for you to secure the same blessings as these ancients and to leave a fine legacy for your descendants. Let the people be assured of their possessions and secure in their livelihoods; prevent the farmers from losing their fields or the merchants from being deprived of their goods. How glorious would it be if you could abandon a position as precarious as a stack of eggs in order to attain blessings of eternal repose? Yet if you do nothing and let this chance slip by, then once our great army is flung against you, the jade shall be smashed along with the stone. Even should you have regrets by then, it will be too late for you.
"Such are the General's views on your situation, and how you may yet secure good fortune for yourselves. Let word of this be spread far and wide, so that all may know of it."
"Years ago, Wu of Wei (Cao Cao) bitterly mourned the death of his son Cangshu (Cao Chong), and Sun Quan was beside himself with grief for the loss of his son Sun Deng. I always used to think that those two rulers went far beyond the standards of acceptable conduct for proper gentlemen, swept up by emotion and love. Yet in the brief span of time since I've lost my son Murong Ye, my hair has already turned half to white. Only now do I appreciate what those two men went through."
Honestly I want to double check my sources on past things I’ve said about Chen Dao because I no longer remember where I read the things I read. So I hesitate to say anything at this time.
Here’s what Rafe had to say:
Chen Dao [Shuzhi]: Runan. Chen Dao joined Liu Bei when he was in Yu province during the mid-190s, and followed him thereafter. Noted for loyalty and courage, in the time of Liu Shan the Second Sovereign, Chen Dao became Area Commander on the Yangzi Gorges, with rank as a general and enfeoffment as a marquis.
SGZ only has one minor note about him that doesn’t say much more than what de Crespigny recorded, tucked in near the end of scroll 45.
I recall someone on Shenzhou saying some time ago that there was a mention of him in a letter from Zhuge Liang to Ma Liang that identified him as a commander of elite troops but I don’t know what the source is; presumably somewhere in Zhuge Liang’s personal writings, which I’m not even going to try to sort through because that’s way above my pay grade.
I was going off of memory. Just checked wiki to see if it has the source text, and it does. But who knows if it’s fucked. It’s at least sourced to ZGL’s writings in the Taping Yulan
"Elder brother you suspect Baidi's troops are not elite, [Chen] Dao's command is Xianzhu's bannermen the White Flag [division], the west's top troops. [You] suspect they are few, then [I] will again divide Jiangzhou's troops, to expand and increase them."
This passage comes from an entry in the military chapters of the Taiping Yulan; it was chosen purely because it was part of a list of various passages providing examples of people using the character 毦, defined by the TPYL as "a hair/feather ornament", that is, a plume. Zhuge Liang happens to use the character 毦. Chen Dao, if he is indeed the person being referred to here, is entirely incidental.
"...Elder Brother, you seemed hardly impressed by our garrison at Baidi. Do you think them unskilled and lacking in discipline? But their commander [Chen] Dao was the leader of the First Sovereign's (Liu Bei's) White 毦 'Plume' Tent Guards, and they are the finest troops of the west. And do you think them too few? Then perhaps we ought to send some troops from Jiangzhou to bolster their ranks..."
Considering Zhuge Liang refers to Liu Bei by his posthumous title and identifies Chen Dao as the leader of the Baidi garrison (essentially the same place as Yong'an), if this letter is genuine, it was probably written sometime around 228. Presumably, Zhuge Jin had written an earlier letter in which he disparaged the garrison at Baidi/Yong'an, and Zhuge Liang seems to be making a playful jest about potentially putting more troops on the Wu border. However, I'm not sure under what circumstances Zhuge Jin would have been able to appraise that garrison. Did he make another diplomatic visit to Shu around that time? Or was he reading a report about it?
Zhuge Liang came to visit Liu Bei (at Xinye ~208). Liu Bei had a fondness for 旄 “plumes”, and when Zhuge Liang arrived, Liu Bei was tying together a bunch of ox-tail hairs that someone had given him. Zhuge Liang declared, “General, you ought to be focused on lofty ambitions! Or is bundling a 旄 ‘plume’ your only desire?” Liu Bei then recognized that Zhuge Liang was no ordinary fellow, and he cast aside the 旄 “plume”, saying, “A mere idle fancy!”
Honestly I want to double check my sources on past things I’ve said about Chen Dao because I no longer remember where I read the things I read. So I hesitate to say anything at this time.
Here’s what Rafe had to say:
Chen Dao [Shuzhi]: Runan. Chen Dao joined Liu Bei when he was in Yu province during the mid-190s, and followed him thereafter. Noted for loyalty and courage, in the time of Liu Shan the Second Sovereign, Chen Dao became Area Commander on the Yangzi Gorges, with rank as a general and enfeoffment as a marquis.
SGZ only has one minor note about him that doesn’t say much more than what de Crespigny recorded, tucked in near the end of scroll 45.
I recall someone on Shenzhou saying some time ago that there was a mention of him in a letter from Zhuge Liang to Ma Liang that identified him as a commander of elite troops but I don’t know what the source is; presumably somewhere in Zhuge Liang’s personal writings, which I’m not even going to try to sort through because that’s way above my pay grade.
I was going off of memory. Just checked wiki to see if it has the source text, and it does. But who knows if it’s fucked. It’s at least sourced to ZGL’s writings in the Taping Yulan
"Elder brother you suspect Baidi's troops are not elite, [Chen] Dao's command is Xianzhu's bannermen the White Flag [division], the west's top troops. [You] suspect they are few, then [I] will again divide Jiangzhou's troops, to expand and increase them."
This passage comes from an entry in the military chapters of the Taiping Yulan; it was chosen purely because it was part of a list of various passages providing examples of people using the character 毦, defined by the TPYL as "a hair/feather ornament", that is, a plume. Zhuge Liang happens to use the character 毦. Chen Dao, if he is indeed the person being referred to here, is entirely incidental.
"...Elder Brother, you seemed hardly impressed by our garrison at Baidi. Do you think them unskilled and lacking in discipline? But their commander [Chen] Dao was the leader of the First Sovereign's (Liu Bei's) White 毦 'Plume' Tent Guards, and they are the finest troops of the west. And do you think them too few? Then perhaps we ought to send some troops from Jiangzhou to bolster their ranks..."
Considering Zhuge Liang refers to Liu Bei by his posthumous title and identifies Chen Dao as the leader of the Baidi garrison (essentially the same place as Yong'an), if this letter is genuine, it was probably written sometime around 228. Presumably, Zhuge Jin had written an earlier letter in which he disparaged the garrison at Baidi/Yong'an, and Zhuge Liang seems to be making a playful jest about potentially putting more troops on the Wu border. However, I'm not sure under what circumstances Zhuge Jin would have been able to appraise that garrison. Did he make another diplomatic visit to Shu around that time? Or was he reading a report about it?
Anyone with more knowledge on Northern Wei than me able to verify if this guy is real? I can’t find a single thing in English, even using fucking wade-giles, to find out if he is real or not…
Yang Jun, styled Wenchang, was a native of Huayin county in Hongnong commandary. As a young man, he served in the local princely fief first as Prefect of Gaolu, then as Marshal on the staff of the General of Agile Cavalry and the General Who Guards The Army. Later, after his daughter was chosen to be the new Empress, he suddenly occupied a much higher position, and was transferred from General Who Guards The Army to General of Chariots and Cavalry. He was also appointed as Marquis of Linjin.
Those who understood the implications of such things told one another, "The purpose of establishing feudal lords is to have them serve on the borders as shields for the royal household, while the Empress should remain within the capital in order to provide for the sacrifices and expand inner learning. Yet the Empress's father has just been appointed as a Marquis with Linjin as his fief. This is an omen of turmoil."
Two of the Masters of Writing, Chu Lüe and Guo Yi, both petitioned that Yang Jun was a man of meager talents, and could not be entrusted with important matters of state. Emperor Wu ignored them.
Beginning with the Taikang reign era (280), since (after the conquest of Wu) there were no longer any pressing issues in the realm, Emperor Wu no longer concerned himself with the duties of rulership. He only indulged himself in wine and sensual pleasures. At this time, he began to favor the partisans of the Empress, who openly came to visit him and make requests. Yang Jun, Yang Yao, and Yang Ji wielded great influence over the realm, and the people of that time called them the Three Yangs.
Emperor Wu became critically ill, but he had not yet drawn up a last will. Most of his veteran and accomplished ministers had already passed away, and the court ministers were fearful and uncertain, for they had no plan to follow. Yang Jun ousted all of the chief ministers from the bedside and replaced them with his own underlings. Indeed, he replaced and changed all of the nobles and chief ministers with his own associates. At that time, Emperor Wu's illness somewhat abated so that he regained lucidity, and when he saw that his original appointees had been pushed out, he sternly said to Yang Jun, "How has this come about?"
Emperor Wu then ordered the Palace Secretariat to compose an edict appointing the Prince of Runan, Sima Liang, as a co-regent to serve alongside Yang Jun in support of the royal household. But Yang Jun was afraid that this would mean he would lose his current favor and influence. So he went to the Palace Secretariat and borrowed the draft edict in order to look at it, then hid it away somewhere. The Chief of the Palace Secretariat, Hua Yi, was concerned, and he continually demanded Yang Jun return the edict, but to no avail. Then word arrived that Emperor Wu had fallen back into senility, and when Empress Yang Zhi presented a petition asking that Yang Jun be made the sole regent, Emperor Wu nodded in approval.
Yang Zhi then summoned Hua Yi and the Prefect of the Palace Secretariat, He Shao, and verbally told them that Emperor Wu had ordered them to compose a will, stating:
"In ancient times, Yi Yin and Lü Wang (Jiang Ziya) served to support the state, and their diligence has provided an immortal example; the Duke of Zhou and Huo Guang heeded the command to preside over the court, and their reputation has shone through the ages. Now the Palace Attendant, General of Chariots and Cavalry, acting Grand Guardian to the Crown Prince, and acting General of the Front, Yang Jun, has cultivated virtue and walked the path of good fortune. He is discerning, intelligent, wise, and far-seeing, and he has done much to assist the two palaces (of the Emperor and the Crown Prince). He is highly loyal, most respectful. He ought to occupy the chief position and preside over the government, following the same precedent as A-Heng (Yi Yin).
“Thus I hereby appoint Yang Jun as Grand Commandant, Grand Tutor to the Crown Prince, Credential Holder, and Commander of all military affairs; he will keep his existing positions as Palace Attendant, chief of affairs of the Masters of Writing, and acting General of the Front. I also appoint six Army Advisors, three thousand infantry, and a thousand cavalry to be assigned to him, drawn from the staff of the former Guard General, Yang Yao. If any assistance is needed from the palace guards, then twenty people from each of the Guard Commanders shall be assigned to Yang Jun, along with ten people from the Marshals of the Palace Commandant. Yang Jun is empowered to go in and out with weapons at hand."
When the edict had been completed, Yang Zhi had Hua Yi and He Shao present it to Emperor Wu, who looked at it without saying a word.
Two days afterwards, Emperor Wu passed away.
Yang Jun now claimed his new role as regent, and he moved his residence to the Taiji Hall. Emperor Wu's coffin was then placed in the mourning hall, and the people of the six palaces all came to pay their respects. However, Yang Jun did not leave the Taiji Hall, and he had a hundred of the Guards Rapid As Tigers assigned to protect him. This was the beginning of his lack of respect.
Emperor Hui having risen to the throne, Yang Jun was promoted to Grand Tutor, Grand Commander, and Bearer of the Yellow Battle-axe. He was placed in charge of the court and the government, and all the ministers had to heed his commands.
Concerned that the people around him might not support him, Yang Jun had his nephews Duan Guang and Zhang Shao appointed to close positions. And whenever an edict was to be sent out, once Emperor Hui had completed the draft, it would first have to be presented to the Empress Dowager, Yang Zhi, for her approval, and only then would it be carried out.
Yang Jun knew that the new Empress, Jia Nanfeng, would be difficult to control, and he greatly feared and dreaded her. So he placed many of his associates and partisans in control of the palace guards.
The noble families were stirred to anger against Yang Jun, and all the realm was indignant at him. His younger brothers Yang Yao and Yang Ji were both men of talent, and they often remonstrated with him together. But Yang Jun could not use their advice, and thus he brought his family to ruin in the end.
Yang Jun was blind to ancient traditions, and he frequently violated the established canons. He did not observe the usual practice of waiting until the beginning of the following year to begin a new reign era, but immediately ended the current one and began a new one in the middle of the year. People objected that this violated one of the principles of the Spring and Autumn Annals, according to which the final year of the reign era of a newly-deceased sovereign should be allowed to run its full course before the new reign era was declared at the beginning of the following year. The court ministers regretted the prospect of abandoning this precedent, nor would the Astrologists Bureau accept it. Thus, in the first month of the following year, the reign era title was changed once again.
Since Yang Jun himself knew that he had little support or favor and was afraid that he would not be able to ensure the obedience of those near and far, he followed the example of Emperor Ming of Cao-Wei (Cao Rui) when he had come to the throne by greatly distributed titles and rewards, hoping to thus please others. But Yang Jun ruled sternly and followed only his own counsel while ignoring criticism, so he did not satisfy the hearts of the people.
The Administrator of Pingyi, Sun Chu, had long enjoyed Yang Jun's favor. He now advised Yang Jun, "You are someone who is only related to the imperial family by marriage, yet you now occupy the same regency role as Yi Yin or Huo Guang; you wield great influence, and you oversee a tender ruler. In your conduct of affairs, you ought to consider the actions of the ancients, and you ought to make every effort to act justly, honestly, and with humble submission. Remember that during the Zhou dynasty, the Dukes of Zhou and Shao acted to support their king, while during the Han dynasty, the Marquises of Zhuxu and Dongmou (Liu Zhang and Liu Xingju) helped to purge the clan of Empress Dowager Lü. There has never yet been an instance where someone of a different surname from the royal family wielded control over the court and still met a good end. In our own time, the imperial clan is great and powerful and the princes each have their strong garrisons on the borders, yet you do not solicit their help in attending to the affairs of state. Those within harbor doubts and suspicion about you, and those without are all considering their own personal interests. Disaster is not far off."
Two of the Palace Gentlemen of the Central Hall, Meng Guan and Li Zhao, had both long been disrespected by Yang Jun, and they secretly criticized him, saying that he was going to usurp the state. Jia Nanfeng for her part wished to exercise control over the government as well, but she feared that Yang Jun would never allow her to do as she wished, and she could not bear being inferior in womanly affairs to the Empress Dowager, Yang Zhi. And one of the Yellow Gate Attendants, Dong Meng, had originally served Emperor Hui during his time as Crown Prince as Chief of the Ministry Men and had kept Jia Nanfeng informed of what was happening in the Eastern Palace. So Jia Nanfeng now secretly sent word to Dong Meng, plotting to depose the Empress Dowager. Dong Meng, Meng Guan, and Li Zhao secretly planned to support one another.
Jia Nanfeng also ordered Li Zhao to pay a visit to the Grand Marshal and Prince of Runan, Sima Liang, and have him bring his troops to move against Yang Jun. But Sima Liang told him, "Yang Jun is a wicked and violent man, and his downfall and death are only a matter of time. He is not worth worrying about."
Then Li Zhao went to see the Prince of Chu, Sima Wei, and Sima Wei agreed to help with the plot. Sima Wei then sent a request to the capital asking to serve on the court (which would cause him to give up his military authority at his fief). Yang Jun had long feared Sima Wei, and he had originally even wanted to summon Sima Wei to the capital as well, to prevent Sima Wei from causing any mischief from his border post. So when Sima Wei himself submitted his request to come to court, Yang Jun allowed him to do so.
After Sima Wei arrived in the capital, Meng Guan and Li Zhao informed Emperor Hui of the plot. That night, they composed an edict. Everywhere was placed under martial law, while agents were sent to present an edict with orders to depose Yang Jun and force him to his Marquisate estate. The Duke of Dong'an, Sima Yao, was ordered to lead four hundred men from the imperial guards to accompany the agents and attack Yang Jun.
Duan Guang knelt before Emperor Hui and said, "Yang Jun received the grace of His Late Majesty (Emperor Wu), and he is fully devoted to supporting the government. Besides, he is a widower without any sons; how could he have any reason to rebel? Your Majesty, please reconsider."
At this time, Yang Jun was living in Cao Shuang's former residence, south of the Arsenal. When he heard that there was some disturbance in the city, he summoned his officials to discuss what to do.
His Registrar as Grand Tutor, Zhu Zhen, urged him, "We may know who the source is of this current disturbance; it is certainly those loathsome eunuchs carrying out Empress Jia's plot, and it cannot mean anything good for you. You should set fire to the Yunlong Gate as a show of strength. Then once your affairs are in order, you may force open the Wanchun Gate, send in the soldiers of the Eastern Palace and the outer camps while you secure the Crown Prince, and march into the palace and arrest the culprits. Anyone inside the palace halls who is trembling with fear should be killed and thus sent off. If you do these things, you can escape from danger."
But Yang Jun had long been timid and apprehensive, and he could not make up his mind. He even said, "The Yunlong Gate was a great achievement of Emperor Ming of Wei (Cao Rui); how could we burn it down?"
One of the Palace Attendants, Fu Zhi, reported to Yang Jun during the night, and asked that he and Wu Mao go through the Yunlong Gate to observe the situation and see how things were progressing. He then said to the other officials, "The palace should not be left empty." Fu Zhi then got up and saluted, and the officials all fled.
Soon, the palace guards marched out and set fire to Yang Jun's residence. Crossbowmen were also posted atop a pavilion near the residence, where they began shooting at it, so that Yang Jun's soldiers could not get out. Yang Jun fled to a stable, but was then killed by a halberd.
Then, heeding Jia Nanfeng's secret orders, Meng Guan and the others executed all of Yang Jun's associates and partisans as well. All of them had their clans exterminated to the third degree, and the dead numbered several thousand. They also ordered Li Zhao to burn Yang Jun's private correspondence as well, for Jia Nanfeng did not want the will that Emperor Wu had written (which Yang Jun had then taken) to be generally known among the realm either.
After Yang Jun was executed, no one dared to come and claim his body. Only one of his retainers as Grand Tutor, Yan Zuan of Baxi commandary, prepared a coffin and held a service for him.
Earlier, Yang Jun had tried to recruit the hermit Sun Deng, and he sent him a gift of clothing and a quilt. But Sun Deng ripped apart the quilt at his doorway, greatly sighing, "Hacked and torn, hacked and torn!" And for several days he claimed to be ill and pretended to have passed away. At this time, his prediction proved correct.
During the Yongxi reign era (290), there was a supposed madman in Wen county who wrote a message stating, "Glory Wenchang shall know well, great halberds on his walls shall dwell. But medicine can poison too; this halberd's blade shall turn on you." And indeed, Yang Jun had kept halberds in his residence for defense (and in the end was killed by a halberd).
During the Yongning reign era (301), Emperor Hui issued an edict stating, "My uncle (Yang Jun) was without principle and so brought about the fall of his family and his clan. Yet when I think of the Weiyang poem (which laments the loss of a relative), I cannot help but be moved by grief. I hereby appoint the Marquis of [艸+務] district, Yang Chao, as Honoree of the Court and as a Cavalry Commandant, in order to ease the grief of the loss of family, as expressed by the Liao E poem."
Yang Yao, styled Wenju, was the younger brother of Yang Jun. He served as Prefect of the Masters of Writing and then as Guard General. He had long enjoyed a good reputation, and he thus won the favor of Emperor Wu. During Emperor Wu's reign, Yang Yao had more influence than Yang Jun.
Once Yang Jun became more exalted and powerful, Yang Yao knew that this greater favor and influence would not last. He wished to resign his own positions, and several times made a request to do so, but Emperor Wu never did agree to let him resign. But earlier, when the betrothal of Yang Jun's daughter Yang Zhi to Sima Zhong (Emperor Hui) had first been arranged, Yang Yao had submitted a petition stating, "From ancient times until now, whenever the same household has provided two empresses, it has never been able to preserve itself; all met with disaster in the end. I beg that you preserve this petition in the ancestral temple, and if my words should prove true, then I may use this petition to avoid disaster." Emperor Wu did agree to this request.
The Commander of the Right, Zhao Xiu, sent up a letter remonstrating against the amount of power the Yang brothers had been allowed to wield, stating, "Remember that (the usurper) Wang Mang and his four brothers all held powerful roles. Now in our own time, the three Yao brothers each have great offices. Furthermore, there have been several sightings of disturbances in the heavens. I humbly implore Your Majesty to consider this."
Yang Yao was now even more afraid, and he insisted on being allowed to resign. Emperor Wu at last heeded him, and he gave him gifts of a million gold and five thousand bolts of fine silk.
At first, Yang Yao received praise for yielding his offices and retiring. But later, he got together with his friends and partisans and agitated to have the Prince of Qi, Sima You, sent away. The General Who Guards The Army of the Center, Yang Xiu, and the Palace Marquis of the Northern Army, Cheng Can, plotted to go see Yang Yao, holding blades in their hands to kill him. Yang Yao knew about it, and he claimed illness and would not come out. He arranged for the officials to censure Yang Xiu, and Yang Xiu was transferred to be Minister Coachman. But from then on, during court meetings, Yang Yao never dared to prevaricate, but always spoke his full mind.
As Yang Yao was about to be executed, he pleaded that he was innocent, and said, "I have a petition encased in stone pardoning me. Ask Zhang Hua about it." And everyone at that time said that Yang Yao had indeed warned about the danger posed by his brother Yang Jun, and had thus been following the same example as Zhong Hui's brother Zhong Yu once had. But the members and partisans of the Jia clan held a grudge against the whole Yang clan, and they compelled the executioner to behead him anyway. There was no one at that time who did not sigh in sympathy for Yang Yao's fate.
Yang Ji, styled Wentong, was the younger brother of Yang Jun and Yang Yao. He served successively as General Who Guards The South and General Who Conquers The North, and he was then transferred to be Grand Tutor to the Crown Prince.
Yang Ji had talent and skill. He once accompanied Emperor Wu on a hunt beneath the Beimang Hills (north of Luoyang), where he and one of the Palace Attendants, Wang Ji, both wore special attire as they rode horses and wielded bows, riding in front of Emperor Wu's carriage. A fierce beast suddenly appeared, and Emperor Wu ordered Wang Ji to shoot it; the beast fell with the twang of Wang Ji's bowstring. Soon, another beast emerged. Emperor Wu now ordered Yang Ji to shoot, and he too felled the beast. The soldiers of the six armies hailed them both with a great shout.
In many cases, Emperor Wu appointed those of honorable family and great influence to the most important military positions. Yang Ji received acclaim and appointment due to his martial skills.
Yang Ji and his brother Yang Yao were both quite worried about their positions, so they joined with their uncles, Li Bin and others, to harshly remonstrate together. It was thanks to Yang Ji's proposals that Yang Jun had Wang You denounced and sent away to serve as Administrator of Hedong, and that the imperial heir was established.
Earlier, Yang Jun had been suspicious of the Grand Marshal and Prince of Runan, Sima Liang, and had compelled him to return to his fief (at Xuchang). Yang Ji and Li Bin remonstrated against this several times, trying to get Yang Jun to drop the idea, but this only alienated him from them.
Yang Ji said to Fu Xian, "If only my elder brother could merely recall the Grand Marshal to the capital while personally steering clear of him, then the status of our family could be secured. Otherwise, it will be a red end for us."
Fu Xian told him, "So long as you summoned the Grand Marshal to come back, and could act in joint regency together with him, then that would lead to a general peace, and there would not even be any need for your elder brother to withdraw. The issue is merely that no one minister should amass all power for themselves, much less a marital relative of the royal family! Now the members of the imperial clan are distant because the associates of your own clan are secure in their positions. But should your family be threatened, you ought to be able to count upon the support of the imperial clan, like the lips protect the teeth. That would be a good plan."
Yang Ji was now even more afraid, and he asked Shi Chong, "What are people really saying about us?"
Shi Chong replied, "Your worthy elder brother is grasping the reins of power, while keeping the imperial clan at a distance. He ought to share his power with all within the Four Seas."
Yang Ji said, "Go and see my brother, and try to persuade him of this."
So Shi Chong went to see Yang Jun and conveyed his advice, but Yang Jun did not listen.
Yang Ji was later killed with his elder brothers.
On the morning of his final day, Yang Ji was summoned to the Eastern Palace. Yang Ji asked Pei Kai, "What should I do?"
Pei Kai replied, "As you are the Grand Guardian and Grand Tutor for the Crown Prince, you ought to report to the Eastern Palace."
Yang Ji had enjoyed hunting, and he had commanded infantry and cavalry for a long time, so he had more than four hundred strong fellows from the Qin region among his retainers, all crack shots. They all wished to save Yang Ji's life. But by then, Yang Ji had already entered the palace. They all sighed in regret for his fate.
Was 荊州牧 an important post once Liu Biao was removed from the picture? I noticed that Gan Ning's descendant ended up getting it at one point despite their not being anything really recorded about him that would warrent it.
That position is usually translated as Governor of Jing Province (or Shepherd or Protector). It was an extremely important position (although I’m not sure one of Gan Ning’s descendants held it. I haven’t heard about that).
Jing was pretty much 1/3rd of Wu’s territory. The head of the province wielded enormous influence and power. Lu Xun held this position from 222 until his death in 246, with added authority over all of the province’s armies. Zhuge Ke held this position when he was regent. Zhuge Dan was briefly given the title when he defected to Wu (although in his case it seems mostly nominal), Sun Chen held it when he was regent, etc.
It was one of the most important positions Wu had.
Hua He, styled Yongxian, was a native of Wujin county in Wu commandary. He was originally appointed as Commandant of Shangyu county (in Kuaiji commandary) and as an Agricultural Supervisor. Later, because of his literary education, he was summoned to the capital (at Jianye) to serve as a Gentleman of the Imperial Library, then transferred to be an Assistant to the Palace Secretariat.
When Shu was annexed by Wei (in 263-264), Hua He visited the gates of the palace to present a petition. He wrote, "Lately I have heard that the rebel armies (of Wei) have swarmed together and marched west (against Shu). People always claimed that the west possessed such difficult terrain that there would be nothing to worry about from that direction. But by now, I have heard that Lu Kang has sent a petition reporting that Chengdu (the Shu capital) has fallen, the lord of Shu and his ministers have gone into exile, and the altars of their state have been toppled.
"In ancient times, although the state of Wey was initially destroyed by the state of Di, Duke Huan of Qi was still able to restore Wey in the end and preserve it. It may be true that the road to Shu is long and distant. But are we truly not going to offer our assistance to them and thereby abandon a region which has entrusted itself to us and abandon a vassal state which has been offering us tribute? Foolish though I may be, I cannot help but be unsettled by this prospect.
"Your Majesty (Sun Xiu) is sage and benevolent, and your mercy and grace comfort even those in distant places. Surely, having heard such news as this, you will sympathize with the plight of our allies. As for me, being unable to master my feelings of distress and despair, I have respectfully presented this petition for your consideration."
After Sun Hao came to the throne (in 264), Hua He was appointed as Marquis of Xuling District.
In the second year of Baoding (267), Sun Hao began building a new palace; the design was on a grand and luxurious scale, adorned with pearls and jade, and the expense was very considerable. People were conscripted as workers to build the palace, even though it was during the height of summer, which caused a considerable shortage of labor for farm work.
Hua He sent up a petition to remonstrate against what Sun Hao was doing. He wrote, "I have heard that during the reign of Emperor Wen of Han, the Nine Provinces (the whole realm) enjoyed an age of peace; the people of the Qin region (Guanzhong, the capital region for Western Han) were glad to have been spared from the burden of onerous laws and were supportive of the royal Liu clan because of their generous and benevolent policies. The dynasty had reduced corvee labor demands and simplified the laws, granting the people a new beginning, and they had appointed younger relatives of the clan as Princes across the realm to serve as shields for the imperial line. Truly one could have described that era as being 'as secure as Mount Tai, with a boundless foundation'. Yet Jia Yi was still able to bring up 'three sources of grief and six potential concerns' for the realm, and he described the situation as being as perilous as 'a man who has piled up firewood and then gone to sleep on top of it, thinking himself perfectly safe just because no sparks have yet appeared'. Indeed, the disasters and disturbances which came afterwards all proved to be just as he described. And though I might be an incompetent fool, certainly no peer of Jia Yi, still I cannot help but feel that the situation of our time has much in common with those days which Jia Yi described.
"Jia Yi warned that within a few years, the Princes of the realm would have become so powerful and so many of their Tutors and Chancellors would have resigned on claims of illness that 'even ancient sages like Yao and Shun would no longer be able to restore peace and order to the realm'. And what sort of situation do we face now? Our great enemy (Jin) occupies the region of the Nine Provinces (the Central Plains) and controls more than half the population of the realm, and they have an abundance of experience and skill in battle and warfare. Considering the difference in strength between the two sides, if we intended to contend for control of the Middle Kingdom with them, we would not even have the rough parity between Chu and Han during their contention, but we could only muster the power of Han's Princes of Huainan and Jibei. What Jia Yi considered 'a source of grief' is insufficient to describe how dire our own disparity is, and his example of 'a man sleeping on firewood' still does not match our distress.
"The Grand Emperor (Sun Quan) reflected upon the events of past dynasties like this, and he considered the circumstances of his own times. That was why he expanded and encouraged agriculture and silk cultivation among the people, built up incalculable supplies, spared the people from excessive labor demands, and tended to and nurtured his warriors and officers. The great and small were moved by his grace, and all submitted themselves to his wishes.
"Yet before the Grand Emperor could fully realize his designs, he left us before his time. From then on, powerful ministers dominated the government; above, they defied the circumstances of the time, and below, they ignored the advice of the counselors. They disregarded the things which lead to peace and stability in order to chase after momentary gains. They repeatedly engaged in military adventurism and used up and exhausted all the stores and supplies; the soldiers were worn-out and the people distressed, and at no time did they enjoy repose.
"What we have left by now is no more than the remnants of a strained army and the leftovers of a grieving populace. Our military is pitiful and bare, our warehouses and stores have nothing of substance, we lack enough cloth and silks to distribute to protect the people from cold and heat, and the people's livelihoods have suffered so much that the families and households cannot provide for themselves. Meanwhile, the northerners (Jin) have been stockpiling grain and tending to their people, their hearts are set towards subduing the east (Wu), and they have no other disturbances to distract them.
"Shu was our western shield: it was a region of strong natural defenses, and it was skillfully led and overseen by the Former Lord (Liu Bei). People said that thanks to Shu, our western flank would always be well-defended. Who could have expected that Shu would topple and fall in a single morning? 'When the lips are gone, the teeth will be cold', as the ancients feared. And the commandaries of Jiaozhou are the southern regions of our state. Yet by now, Jiaozhi and Jiuzhen have already been lost, and Rinan is isolated and threatened. It is difficult to know whether we will be able to hold the region or not, and all the people north of Hepu (on the coast) have been disturbed by the turmoil. In order to avoid conscript labor, many people have deserted or turned rebel, yet local defenses have been gradually diminished and the authority of the garrisons has been scorned. I have often feared that this could breathe life into new developments. And in past years, pirates have been scouting out the eastern counties, taking many people there as captives, and accustomed as they are to both land and water, they have plundered the region incessantly.
"Thus there is suspicion from front and rear, and many difficulties from head and tail, so that the state and the court find themselves in a perilous situation. If there is any need for corvee labor, it should be for augmenting our military defenses and preparations; otherwise, the people should be encouraged to see to their livelihoods in order to spare themselves from hunger and poverty. I only fear that the farming season may already be too far gone, and that we may be too late to prevent our enemies from turning east; if anything should happen, our defenses may not be sufficient. But if we neglect this urgent task and expend all our efforts in projects, then we will be unprepared for any sudden development. Better for us to be building boards and frames to serve as walls and setting up beacon fires to act as warning signals. If we stir up the anger of the people through projects such as this one, then if we send our people into the fray, our great enemy will take advantage of their rage to turn them against us. And if we only use the people to man our defenses and let the days slip by, then our military supplies will surely be exhausted, and our warriors will be defeated without even crossing blades with the enemy.
"In ancient times, during the reign of Tai Wu of Yin (Shang), a mulberry tree and a millet tree suddenly grew within the courtyard, but when Tai Wu feared this omen and cultivated his virtue, the evil subsided and the Yin dynasty flourished. And in another instance, when Mars resided in the Heart constellation of the night sky, the state of Song took it as a warning; Duke Jing of Song heeded the advice of Gu Shi, causing Mars to retreat, and Duke Jing enjoyed a long life. These things demonstrate that changing one's behavior can be sufficient to ward off omens, and the words of mortals can be perceived by the spirits.
"Now I am merely an ignorant and obscure fellow, most unworthy of the close position I have been granted, and I have no hopes of demonstrating any understanding or benevolence which might capture the attention of the spirits. Looking up, I feel guilty, and gazing down, I feel ashamed; there is no place for me to turn to. But as I withdraw, I cannot help but dwell upon this subject. The movements of Mars and the growth of the trees were omens sent by Heaven to the two lords as indications of its feelings, even as are the most insignificant of oddities. The smallest of occurrences within the gate or in the courtyard are none other than the expressed intentions of Heaven and Earth, who have repeatedly made manifest their will; such incidents as the discovery of a bright pearl or the observation of white swallows are bound up in the significance of all things and are the omens of the very spirits.
"The Nine Regions (the whole realm) are all one residence; the people of the realm are all one family. The movements of any one affect the movements of all. Besides, the current palace was the one built by the past sovereigns, and when they studied the ground and soil upon which it was to be built, they found no cause to think that the site would be ill-omened. Furthermore, the ground and soil of the Yang Marketplace is already adjacent to the existing palace. Even supposing that the great project of building the new palace will be successful, it will become the new imperial residence, and the spirits of the household will all be properly shifted there, I still fear that the process will take a long time to carry out. Nor is it certain that the new palace will prove superior to the old one in the end. And the constant movements of the imperial residence to new sites are sure to arouse the jealousy and suspicion of the people left behind. These are the things which cause your foolish subject to burn with worry, day and night.
"From what I have studied of the 'Monthly Restrictions' chapter of the Book of Rites, the height of summer is not the time for undertaking any earth-shifting projects, for assembling the feudal lords, or for raising troops and undertaking military activities, and that any great endeavor begun at such a time will surely come to a bad end. Although we may not be 'assembling the feudal lords', calling together their soldiers (for the building project) is no different. And on the Wuji day of the sixth month, earth was shifted for the royal project, which violates these restrictions, and this took place during the farming months, which goes against the natural cycle of agricultural work.
"In ancient times, Duke Yin of Lu heedlessly walled Zhongqiu during the summer months, and the Spring and Autumn Annals records his error as a warning to future generations. Now Your Majesty wishes to build this new palace to serve as a long-lasting foundation for generations to come. Yet in the process of building it, you are violating the great restrictions of Heaven and Earth, going against the principles laid out in the Spring and Autumn Annals, and neglecting your supreme duties of paying your requests. Your foolish subject cannot help but be concerned for you.
"Another concern is that, when you summon the deserters to come back, some of them may refuse to return. If you take time to punish them, you will divert efforts from your labors to deal with this issue instead. But if you do not punish them, then the people will grow slacker and more indolent by the days and months. Furthermore, you have mustered a great deal of people for these efforts, and it is a rare thing indeed when such a gathering of people does not result in some outbreak of illness.
"People are content to consider themselves good subjects in times of peace, but when they must toil, they are driven to hatred and rebellion. Now we may pride ourselves on the fact that our soldiers of the Southland are so skilled that the northerners must oppose each of our soldiers with ten of theirs to stand a chance. But this principle also applies in reverse, and considering that the realm has not yet been settled, it is a matter of serious concern. Suppose in order to complete Your Majesty's new palace, five thousand of our people either perished during their labors or ran off to become rebels. That would be effectively the same thing as increasing the ranks of the northern army by fifty thousand troops. And if we increase the number of losses on our side to ten thousand, then for the enemy it is a gain of a hundred thousand. Illnesses among the laborers here will lead to further losses from those laid low or killed, and rebels from deserters of this project will spread evil tales about us to dishearten the people. These are things which our great enemy would welcome with glee. When we lock horns with the Central Plains, it will be a contest of pure strength, and the margin between us is narrow enough as it is. Shall we then diminish our own side and bolster the enemy's by adding to the burdens and toils of our people? These are things which deeply concern bold heroes and calculating strategists.
"I have heard that the ancient kings believed that 'if there is not a surplus sufficient for three years, the state cannot continue.' Even in an age of peace and tranquility, such preparations were a necessity. Isn't this even more the case when we are faced with a strong and powerful enemy while having neglected agriculture and turned away from livestock?
"Although our population is not insignificant, recently we have lost people due to flooding, making it even more imperative that the survivors should devote themselves to weeding and harvesting. Yet the chief local officials, ignoring the natural cycle, have gathered together the men of several commandaries to wade through the mountains and forests and exert all their strength for felling trees, thus abandoning their agricultural and other duties. The wives and children left behind are weak and small, barely able to make any effort towards farmwork, and if there should be any flooding or famine, then none of them will be able to obtain anything to sustain themselves. The provinces and commandaries ought to be focusing their efforts on rice. Only then will they be prepared to deal with any emergency, keep the people and the army fed, and use what is left over to fill the government stores. But if both those above and those below exhaust all their supplies and leave nothing behind to sustain anyone, then once the northern enemy crosses our borders, even if the Duke of Zhou or Duke of Shao were reborn or Zhang Liang or Chen Ping appeared among us, they would not be able to come up with any wise plans to save Your Majesty.
"I have heard that the lord is wise when the servants are loyal, that the master is sage when the ministers are candid. Quivering with fear and trembling at the prospect of going against the heavenly authority, I beg that you will condescend to take pity on me."
Hua He's petition was accepted, but Sun Hao did not heed his advice.
Later, Hua He was appointed as Prefect of the Dongguan Bureau (of historical writing) and as acting State Historian of the Right. He sent up a petition attempting to decline this honor. But Sun Hao wrote in response, "I have received your petition. But the staff of the scholars of the Dongguan Bureau should be supervised by someone of considerable literary skill and elegance. I have pondered and considered deeply about who would be best for the role. During the Han dynasty, it was always a famous scholar of considerable learning who held this post, and I too wanted to seek out a great and worthy person as well.
"As for what I have heard about you, they say that you are a man of exceptional study and detailed knowledge, and many have heard of your deep learning and reflection. Surely you could be described as someone who takes joy in the rites and music, in studying the Book of Poetry and the Book of Documents. You ought to be raising your writing brush with a flourish and glorifying and praising the events of our age; your work would surpass even those of Yang Xiong, Ban Gu, Zhang Heng, or Cai Yong. How strange, then, for you to be so modest about your brilliance and to belittle yourself so greatly. You should be rushing to prepare for your new role and striving to inherit the legacy of the ancient worthies. Let there be no further delays."
At this time, the grain stores had no reserves, while the common trend was towards decadence and luxury. So Hua He sent up another petition. He wrote, "We currently have an abundance of powerful enemies, and we have campaigns and expeditions yet to conduct. But at home, we lack several years' worth of supplies, and in the field, we shall be no match for the enemy's reserves of food. These are things which those with a clear understanding of the state find deeply concerning.
"The food and goods of the state are all produced by the people; following the natural cycle of agriculture and encouraging the people in their farmwork is the most important duty of the state. Yet all of the capital ministries have been diverting the people to other tasks, each with their own agendas, and heedless of how much strength the people can even offer for such work, they press for labor conscripts to be sent to them at once. For their part, the chief local officials are terrified of being accused of some crime if they fail to meet these central demands, and so day and night they are harrying the people; totally neglecting agricultural affairs, they carelessly set days for the people to assemble and then rush them off to the capital. Thus in some instances these local regions are totally bereft of supplies, for the people have all been hurried away to waste their strength and squander the season. By the time the autumn months arrive and the harvest must be brought in, there is often little to be reaped, for the time for sowing and growing was taken away from the people. Yet they are still not spared from the full tax demands of grain to be sent to the government for the year. Some people, unable to pay, resort to going into hiding or even hanging themselves. So the taxes come up short, and this leads to families and households being poor and destitute, without enough food or clothing to sustain themselves.
"We should halt labor demands and spare the people from conscription, focusing all our attention on farming and silkworm cultivation. The ancients believed that 'for every man who does not plow, someone will go hungry; for every woman who does not weave, someone will go cold'. Thus when the kings of old governed their states, they took only agriculture to be their duty. Military affairs and conscript service have always been lesser concerns, for they divert the farmers from 'tending to their south-facing fields' and distract the women from their business at the looms. Whenever such conditions are imposed, then quite a few people will be short on food and long on hunger, lacking clothing and treading on ice.
"I have heard that there are two things which the lord demands from the people, and three things which the people desire from the lord. The lord demands that the people offer up their labor and their lives; the people hope that the lord will give them food when they are hungry, rest when they are tired, and rewards when they have done good works. When the people strive to fulfill the two demands, and yet the lord fails to satisfy their three desires, then anger grows in their hearts and nothing can be achieved. Right now, the people are striving diligently to carry out their corvee labor, yet the treasury has no reserves of food. The lord's demands are being carried out, yet the people's desires are not being repaid.
"Someone who is starving will not wait to be offered delicious morsels before they will eat; someone who is shivering will not insist upon fancy furs before wrapping themselves in warmth. Taste is only a luxury for the mouth, and patterns and brocades are only ornaments for the body. At the moment, there are many pressing matters, yet we are engaged in numerous projects; the people are in poverty, yet we live extravagantly. The workers are building things which are of no use, while the women dress themselves in finery, adorning their clothes with embroidery rather than frugally using hemp. Everyone is trying to imitate one another, and no one feels shame. Even the families of the soldiers and the common people are still following this custom; though they do not even have a jug's or a bushel's worth of grain stored up, when they go out they also dress themselves in fine silks. And things are so bad that the families of rich merchants and wealthy traders dazzle themselves with gold and silver and indulge in outrageous displays of excess. At a time when the realm is not yet at peace and the common people have no food stored away, we ought to be returning to the foundation of the peoples' livelihoods, and devote our efforts to filling the valleys with grain. Yet we are throwing away this worthy endeavor in order to craft decadent and flashy things and encourage more and more harmful extravagance by the day. Above, there is no distinction made between the esteemed and the lowly; below, there is great spending of wealth and dwindling of fortunes.
"Very few of the families of officials or gentry have no children; most of them have three or four, while a smaller share has one or two. But let us simply assume a single daughter for every household. That would mean a hundred thousand daughters across a hundred thousand families. If each of those daughters weaved and produced one bolt of cloth in a year, they would produce a hundred thousand bolts altogether. And if all the people within every corner of our territory were as industrious as this and devoted to the same task, then within the space of a few years, we would have a ready supply of cloth and silk. Let them indulge themselves in the Five Colors, so long as they labor, but forbid them from adding useless embroidery or designs. Besides, a remarkable appearance does not depend upon ostentatious clothing to be exceptional, nor does a glamorous figure require patterned designs to be lovely. The Five Colors are sufficient adornment to provide beauty. Ugliness will not be hidden even by heavy powder and makeup or lavish clothing; beauty will still shine through even without floral patterns or intricate embroidery. And if these principles be accepted as true, that possessing such finery gives no advantage and removing it imposes no loss, then why treasure such things rather than forbid them for the sake of meeting the pressing needs of the treasury?
"To spare the people from poverty is the greatest duty of the ruler and the basic enterprise of a wealthy state. Even if Guan Zhong or Yan Ying were born again, they still could not change this fundamental truth. During the Han dynasty, Emperors Wen and Jing ruled over a peaceful age for consecutive reigns; the realm was already at peace, and there were no enemies in any corner of the land. Yet even they felt that artisanal crafting was a distraction from farm labor and brocades and embroideries harmed women's work, that the path to prosperity for a wealthy state was through preventing suffering from hunger and cold. Doesn't this apply even more to our times, when there are enemies on every side and wolves and jackals fill the roads, when our weapons are never laid aside and our armor is never put away? How then can we fail to expand the foundation of the peoples' wealth and fill the treasury with grain reserves?"
Sun Hao felt that, since Hua He was an older man, he would be proficient in cursive script. He commanded Hua He to compose a petition in the cursive style, but Hua He did not dare to do so. Then Sun Hao pressed his demand: he ordered Hua He to write out a draft in cursive script, and finish before Sun Hao had sat back down. So Hua He wrote out the following verses in cursive:
On many occasions, Hua He wrote petitions explaining beneficial policies, recommending good and able people, or defending those who had been accused of crimes or faults. He wrote more than a hundred petitions, all addressing how to deal with deficiencies, and his writings were too numerous to be counted.
In the first year of Tiance (275), because of some trifling incident, Hua He was censured and removed from office. He passed away several years later.
The discussions and petitions which Wei Zhao and Hua He wrote were all passed down through the generations.
Zhao You, styled Yuansun, was a native of Huainan commandary. His family had served as conspicuous generals for generations. He was recruited by the provincial office as a Registrar.
At that time (in 301), the Inspector of Yangzhou, Chi Long, had received the proclamation from the Prince of Qi, Sima Jiong, calling on the ministers and generals of the realm to join his uprising against Sima Lun, who had usurped the throne from Emperor Hui and named himself Emperor. Chi Long was hesitant on how he ought to respond. He considered supporting Sima Jiong's cause, but his sons and nephews were hostages in the capital at Luoyang, and he feared for their lives; he considered doing nothing for now and watching to see which side would prevail in the struggle, but he was worried that Sima Jiong would hold him responsible for not helping at once. He could not make up his mind alone, so he summoned a meeting of the officials of Yangzhou to discuss the matter.
Zhao You advised him, "The Prince of Zhao (Sima Lun) is a usurper and a traitor, and everyone within the Seas despises him. Even now, soldiers are rising up against him like a gale for righteousness, and he is certain to be defeated. Commissioner, if I may offer my strategies for you, the best plan would be to personally lead your best soldiers and meet up with the other loyalists at Xuchang. The next best would be to bide your time briefly before sending a fierce general to join the others. The worst thing you could do would be to just send a small army at the very end, to assist in following up on the victory."
Chi Long replied, "I have received favor from both Emperors (Emperor Hui and Sima Lun), and I cannot throw my support behind either side. I will defend my province, and do no more."
Zhao You and others objected to this, including one of the 治中s, Liu Bao, and another of the Registrars, Zhang Bao. They told him, "If you offer no assistance to the loyalists, then if any difficulties should arise in our province, you will have no means to protect it."
But Chi Long still could not follow their advice, and in the end he was killed by his subordinates. Zhao You returned home, closed the doors of his house, and did not come out again.
Several years later (~311), when Wang Dun was serving as General of the Left, he recruited Zhao You as an Army Advisor. Zhao You was later promoted to be General of Broad Valor. He worked together with Gan Zhuo and Zhou Fang to campaign against Hua Yi, and they routed him. Zhao You also fought Du Tao in western Xiangzhou, and at the beginning of the Taixing reign era (~318), he and Gan Zhuo attacked Du Tao and vanquished him. Zhao You was appointed as Marquis of Ping'a county for his achievements, and he replaced Tao Kan as Administrator of Wuchang.
Around that time (~317), Du Zeng had welcomed Diwu Yi to Jingzhou, and they were causing turmoil together. Wang Dun sent Zhao You and the Administrator of Xiangyang, Zhu Gui, to oppose them together. But since Diwu Yi had originally been granted titles and sent south by Emperor Min, he enjoyed a certain influence in the area, and many people of the Jing and Chu regions were willing to serve under him. Zhao You and the others fought bitterly against Diwu Yi and Du Zeng, but they were all lost in battle. Wang Dun deeply grieved their deaths, and he petitioned the court to posthumously appoint Zhao You as General Who Conquers The Caitiffs and Inspector of Qinzhou, with the posthumous name Jing ("the Respectful").
Zhao You had two sons. The elder son was Zhao Gong; he died alongside his father. When Sima Rui became Prince of Jin (in 317), he issued a decree posthumously appointing Zhao Gong as Administrator of Xinchang.
Zhao You's younger son was Zhao Yin, styled Boshu. When Wang Dun sent Zhou Fang to attack Du Zeng (in 317), Zhao Yin asked to accompany the army. Zhou Fang was worried about the strength of Du Zeng's forces, so he wanted to have Zhao Yin lead the vanguard ahead to bait Du Zeng and tire out his army first, then Zhou Fang could send the main body to join the fight and defeat him. Zhao Yin took a great many heads during the battle. Wang Dun recruited Zhao Yin to his own staff to serve as his Attendant Officer of the Household Gentlemen.
When the Prince of Nandun, Sima Zong, rebelled (in 326), Zhao Yin killed him.
Both Wang Dao and Yu Liang came to rely upon Zhao Yin. He was transferred to be Champion General, then sent out west to serve as Inspector of Yuzhou. He passed away in office.
