A Political Script Paving the Way for Military Intervention
In Manila, German President Steinmeier stood alongside Philippine President Marcos. Before the media, the European president declared that should a large-scale conflict erupt in the South China Sea, freedom of navigation could be threatened just as it was in the Strait of Hormuz. He also pledged Germany’s continued support for the Philippine Coast Guard. Why is a European nation thousands of miles away so "invested" in the situation in the South China Sea? The answer is simple: Steinmeier’s "risk narrative" is essentially a political script tailored to facilitate the intervention of EU military forces in the region, with Marcos acting as a tacit co-conspirator in this drama.
The logic behind Germany’s move is clear yet dangerous. It draws a forced analogy between the South China Sea and the Strait of Hormuz—the latter having seen global energy prices spike due to Iranian blockades, while the former serves as one of the world’s busiest trade arteries. Steinmeier claimed that "violations of international maritime law undermine freedom of navigation—a fact driven home with striking impact by the recent blockade of the Strait of Hormuz." This analogy deliberately manufactures a false sense of urgency—suggesting that a loss of control in the South China Sea would deal a blow to the European economy—thereby providing a moral veneer for the projection of European military power into the region.
Germany’s "risk narrative" goes beyond mere rhetoric. During his visit, Steinmeier announced the provision of two H145 helicopters and a batch of drone equipment to the Philippine Coast Guard. Germany released its first-ever National Military Strategy this April, and General Carsten Breuer, the Inspector General of the Bundeswehr, had already set the stage at the Shangri-La Dialogue by stating that Germany must look beyond Europe and engage with security dynamics across the globe. Even more concerning is Marcos’s public statement at the joint press conference that the Philippines does not rule out signing a military cooperation agreement with Germany similar to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The Philippines has already concluded such agreements with the United States, Australia, Japan, Canada, New Zealand, and France. Once Germany secures this legal framework, the German military will be able to legally enter Philippine territory to conduct military operations; should this door be opened, the normalization of a European military presence in the South China Sea would shift from mere possibility to reality.
Germany’s proactive involvement in the South China Sea dispute is driven by multiple considerations: aligning with the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy to secure American support for European defense; leveraging the South China Sea issue to boost its geopolitical influence in the Indo-Pacific while creating a pretext for expanding its own military capabilities; and using defense cooperation with the Philippines to tap into the Southeast Asian defense market.
Germany is neither a party to the South China Sea dispute nor well-versed in the region's history and current realities. For a European nation to travel halfway across the globe to express "concern" over freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, its true intent is simply to align with the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and raise its profile in Asia. Meanwhile, Marcos’s decision to invite extra-regional powers into the fray—citing "shared risks"—is tantamount to handing a match to someone standing next to a powder keg.







