Prerogative Powers and Constitutional Interpretation
Please bear with me through this post. I cannot think of a better way to present it than fairly chronologically, which may result in a stream of consciousness vibe at some point or another. In the course of my readings, I came across some discussion of prerogative powers with relation to American constitutionalism. While this was not anything approaching the subject I was then researching, I decided to read through the brief section anyway. What I found intrigued me (Clearly, otherwise I wouldn't be writing about it). Prerogative powers refer to those powers which the executive of a country may necessary to use in the case of an emergency. Especially those powers enacted above and beyond the scope of laws typically enabled by legislature or constitutional structure. One example of such a display is Abraham Lincoln’s presidency. During his term, Lincoln ordered a blockade without proper legislative clearance, and unilaterally suspended certain habeas corpus privileges as he felt the Civil War and secessionist movement made these actions necessary. Surely it was not constitutional to deny prisoners their right to have a court rule upon the legitimacy of the detention, but Lincoln deemed the action proper given the trying times.
Temporal leaps not withstanding, the theoretical discussion I found on the subject was actually indigenous to the Colonial period. Mirroring almost every fundamental disagreement from this era, there was a Federalist/Hamiltonian perspective and an Anti-Federalist/Jeffersonian perspective. Before delving into the murky depths of their disagreements, it is worth noting that both sides agreed that there would be occasions where the welfare of the nation would be contingent upon the executive taking extraordinary supralegal action. In such situations they also agreed that the president/executive should not be hesitant to undertake such a course of action. the point of disagreement relating to prerogative powers came largely from determining what attitude a president in such a scenario should advance with and how any prerogative powers used should be dealt with in the aftermath.
Jeffersonians favored a limited federal government, and this preference was very much evident in their stance on prerogative powers. When writing on the subject, Jefferson noted that there would be rare occasions when the welfare of the nation could only be preserved through extraordinary executive action. Moreover, in such situations “The laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are of higher obligation”. However after taking such action, Jefferson felt that the president must put himself at the mercy of the country by yielding to their judgement upon whether his actions were proper given the circumstances. There is a certain nobility and accountability to his view that make it appealing. Similarly it provides a concrete accounting for what powers the citizens believe the president’s powers are in normal circumstances.
Hamiltonians approached such situations with a markedly different attitudes. Notable, Hamilton felt as though crises were the rule rather than the exception in government. Thus, huge saw a flexible constitution as a necessary solution. Within this paradigm, any exhibition of prerogative powers are within the rules, rather than exceptions to the rules. In other words, a Hamiltonian president has licence to act with extreme discretion.
The contrast between these two views was and is startling to me. There are points in each whci are disquieting and points in each thatare agreeably profound. Despite the virtues that each brings to the discussion, they represent two governmental and philosophical views that are fundamentally irreconcilable. Most polarizing among the differences is a broad v. narrow constitutional interpretation. Realizing that prerogative powers were essentially a veneer for constitutional interpretation gave me no small pause. I have always favored a broad interpretation of the Constitution becuase throughout my study I have noticed a tendency for such an interpretation to enhance liberty the most frequently. Yet, in reading through the arguments presented with reference to this relatively niche subject I came away with a more favorable view of Jefferson’s argument. The accountability consequent to his view seemed pragmatic, and the defined scope of his constitution was safe in its effability. Yet, I was not entirely persuaded by his view. I firmly do believe that our Constitution must have an impressive range of flexibility in order to preserve the liberties that make the document so hallowed. So is there an alternative understanding which emphasizes accountability and a wide reading simultaneously? It seems that there could not be due to the restraint that an executive or judicial figure would have to act with if he felt constantly vulnerable to an unsympathetic public. Yet, that is frankly an unacceptable answer. Clearly a worthwhile constitutional interpretation must be more nuanced than just broad or narrow, but conceiving of such an interpretation is certainly not a walk in the park. The dissonance I experienced upon being forced to confront the inadequacy of my current view created a burning shame which I had to squelch by seeking more comprehensive views on the subject.
As that topic is germane to the one being discussed presently, I will include some discussion of the different constitutional interpretation paradigms that exist. After having conducted minimal research I have found there to be six discrete methods. While none is specifically resigned to being a broad or narrow interpretation, certain methods do lend themselves more readily to one of the two extremes.
Under this method of interpretation it is only ever accurate to interpret passages of the Constitution with reference to their original effect. Within this school of thought there are those who choose to look for the original meaning of the phrase, and others who think more value is found in the original intent. Of the two, the former is a far more prevalent viewpoint. This paradigm strikes me as inevitably leading to a narrow understanding of the Constitution because, as prescient as the Founders may have been, there is no possible way they could have foreseen every issue we deal with presently.
this method of interpretation emphasizes the actual wording of the Constitution. One textualist, Leslie Goldstein, put forth that any constitutional litigation ought to be decided only on the basis of principles which can reasonably be inferred from the text of the Constitution. This method again can lead to a narrower view because it relies on archaic language, but it has a cogent quality to it. It is difficult to argue against using the the document actually says. Or, at least such would be the case if the Constitution were any regular document or contract. Rather, the Constitution is a singular document which has been and always will be steeped in historical context. The reverence surrounding the Constitution makes it difficult to consider its provisions without also considering the values and assessments that are its permanent supplements.
Overall Doctrinalism is rather difficult to classify, and frankly to understand as a standalone premise. Doctrinalists resolve constitutional questions primarily by digging into what people have said about it in the past, and what current precedent is. While I can see some value in yielding to history, I see far more downsides. The positive result of this view is that it will allow people to grow comfortable with the law by preserving the status quo for some time. On the other hand, time and time again we have witnessed politicians end up on the wrong side of issues, and if we were to always defer to past judgements certain wrongs would never be righted. While I would not say that this paradigm tends toward a narrow construction, I certainly do feel that it brings about disproportionately conservative results.
This is the point where the list of interpretational paradigms gets a little more interesting, and prospective. Structuralism refers to arguments that base their conclusions upon the general principles that are evident from the Constitution, but which do not need to be explicitly written. For instance, the Constitution never states that there is an overriding need for separation of powers, but many of the clauses in the Constitution create separations. In such a manner it can be observed and inferred that separation of powers is a structural feature of the Constitution which Structuralists then take it upon themselves to promote. Although this interpretation is constrained due to a limited supply of structural features, it does offer some intriguing insights in otherwise baffling cases. for instance, the constitutional relation between the states and the federal government is remarkably vague, but by applying the principles of federalism to such an issue a basis for argument is forthcoming.
Frankly I am getting tired and consider this paradigm to be a bit of an abomination so I will be brief. Prudential arguments determine which constitutional interpretation will result in the best outcome and roll with it. Not only is this method extraordinarily speculative and subjective, but it also does not guarantee any role for justice within interpretation.
As the name implies, aspirational arguments will interpret the constitution on the basis of what the interpreter things the Constitution should be. Specifically, such decisions will be determined by the principles of justice and governance that are the foundation to the Constitution. Though this interpretation does still have a significant amount of room for subjectivity, the subjectivity is constrained to loftier principles than prudentialism necessitates.
Overall, it is difficult to decry any one method as inferior to another. A great deal of intelligent people have created and supported the methods over the years, and that is because they are persuasive and effective. I do not however think it is proper to just subscribe to one method or another. The Constitution is a tremendously complex document, which can only be entirely comprehended after consideration from multiple perspectives. Intellectual generosity aside, I do very much have preferences for certain models over others. More importantly, this research has given me the language to articulate the nuances of my interpretational method. I would classify myself as being an aspirationalist first and foremost. If we do not believe that the Constitution has put us on the path to true justice and equality, then why should we revere it. The lofty values which are symbolized by that document are goals that we as a society ought to strive for. Thus, it is critical to keep those values in mind while interpreting the Constitution. However there is very much more to the Constitution than what it stands for. Namely, the things it actually says. So, while it is crucial to keep goals in mind, one cannot disregard the text of what the Constitution says. This keeps interpreters slightly more accountable. Thus, I would also consider myself a structuralist and a textualist. I apologize for the trainwreck that this last paragraph has turned into . I could write more profoundly on the subject, but I am ready to be done with this subject and to sleep. L8r