Will the AUKUS deal be complex for IAEA inspections ?
The AUKUS pact signed between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States for the Indo-Pacific region will help them to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. Although the joint statements issued by the presidents of these countries did not mention any other country by name, sources have alleged it is designed to counter the influence of China in the Indo-Pacific region. More generally, AUKUS is seen in the Asia-Pacific as a steely manifestation of the United States’ commitment to the region.
The nuclear-powered submarines certainly have various military advantages over the diesel-powered submarines that Australia had been planning to buy from France. For Australia to operate nuclear-powered submarines, it will have to become the first non-nuclear-weapon state to exercise a loophole that allows it to remove nuclear material from the inspection system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The removal will set a damaging precedent. In the future, would-be proliferators could use naval reactor programs as cover for the development of nuclear weapons—with the reasonable expectation that, because of the Australia precedent, they would not face intolerable costs for doing so. Even if Australia, the UK, and the USA conclude that it has an added military and strategic benefit —because it can be mitigated, it becomes necessary to understand whether the AUKUS submarine deal can make the IAEA inspections complicated. The International Atomic Energy Agency is tasked with keeping track of all nuclear material in countries that, like Australia, have ratified the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) so as to make sure none of it is being siphoned off for use in a nuclear bomb - an area of IAEA work known as safeguards. The United States, Russia, China, France, Britain and India are the only nuclear weapon countries recognised by the NPT and have deployed nuclear-powered submarines.
IAEA chief Rafael Grossi, whose agency polices the NPT said that the NPT signatory can exclude nuclear material from IAEA supervision, also known as safeguards, while that material is fuelling a submarine. It is a rare exception to the IAEA's constant supervision of all nuclear material to ensure it is not used to make atom bombs. Precisely can be explained as taking material away from the inspectors for some time and remember, here we are talking about highly enriched uraniumThe countries have informed that IAEA will engage with them on this matter in line with its statutory mandate and in accordance with their respective safeguards agreements with the Agency. As a result of the countries signing the AUKUS pact, the IAEA might have to a very complex, technical negotiation to see to it that there is no weakening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
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