Helfert, Joachim Murat, Chapter 2, part 2
However, the British Congress Legation also used language very unfavourable to the King of Naples. When in the last days of September the Duke of Campochiaro appeared before Castlereagh to explain to him that "his monarch was prepared to let his troops clear all land beyond the borders of his kingdom, even the Marches promised to him by Austria, but that he would defend Naples itself to the last drop of blood, that he had at his command an armed force of 80,000 men, not counting the militia", the Lord replied evasively: "if King Joachim had intervened in earnest during the last war, his cause would have been different; but his dithering and vacillation had put all claims in suspense, and left open a question now to be decided solely from the standpoint of high policy; besides, he could only advise the King to keep as quiet as possible in the meantime, especially not to take any action against Sicily; any hostility on that side would be regarded by England as a case of war, and she would use all her strength against it" [Footnote 1]. The Duke of Wellington, then accredited to the court of Louis XVIII, and entirely drawn into its interests, most eagerly calculated where the troops could be obtained for a crusade against Naples: 10,000 Sicilians 10,000 Spaniards 12,000 Portuguese 15 to 20,000 from the British garrisons in the Mediterranean, "with such a force the enterprise might be ventured" [Footnote 2]. A pamphlet that appeared in London at this time defending Murat's claims seems to have made little impression in congressional circles.
One of the most ardent advocates in favour of the plan to expel the King of Naples was the representative of Great Britain in Palermo, who also received secret instructions from Castlereagh in the autumn of 1814, no doubt in accordance with Wellington's designs, to make enquiries about Murat's forces and about the mood prevailing in Naples on behalf of the Bourbons. A'Court's despatches spoke only of the "usurper" who should no longer be left on the throne, even though the envoy could not conceal the fact that "it would not be easy to give the matter a turn such that the dignity and faithfulness of the British Cabinet would not suffer shipwreck". Incidentally, it was thought in Palermo that nothing could be risked by an enterprise against Murat; every day, Ferdinand's ministers claimed, they received reports from the mainland saying that the impatience to see the ancestral king in possession of the country again could hardly be restrained. A'Court was furious when he heard that the British Consul Fagan, sent to Naples by Lord Bentinck, had assumed the position of Consul-General there, had gained admittance to the court, exchanged notes with the Minister Gallo, expressing a lively desire to strengthen the good understanding between the government of England and His Majesty's Majesty in Naples, and so on. He denounced him to Lord Castlereagh and at the same time recalled him to his former post in Palermo.
Already in the summer Castlereagh must already have uttered observations like the one mentioned earlier against King Joachim's representatives, which prompted the latter to draw up a memorandum on his attitude in the last campaign and to send it to the British First Secretary of State. This did little to improve his case. For Castlereagh obtained Nugent's and Bentinck's comments on the document, and each of them expressed himself more unfavourably about Murat than the other. "Once the allies had entered into certain obligations," the imperial general said, "they were obliged to fulfil them; but they were also relieved of all further considerations against Murat if he, for his part, had not observed them". Nugent now went through the Neapolitan account of the campaign of last spring point by point and everywhere came to the conclusion that King Joachim, by his strategic intervention, had not benefited but only harmed the allies in Upper Italy: "If the Neapolitan army had not moved, two Austrian battalions and a few squadrons would have sufficed to sweep the country clean, and if Murat, as he is pleased to claim, has conquered the country as far as the Po with his troops, this has been done at our expense, not that of our enemy".
Lord William considered the political rather than the military side, but came to similar conclusions as did the Austrian count. "Murat's policy," was Bentinck's brief opinion, "was calculated to save his crown, and so he always followed whoever seemed to emerge victorious from the struggle. At his court, as in his army, there were two parties at feud with each other and fighting for influence with him, a French and a Neapolitan one; he himself always remained a Frenchman at heart; he was of no use to the allies as a friend and, if fortune had turned his back on us, would have hastened our downfall as an enemy. Between the French and Neapolitan armies throughout the campaign there was obvious understanding; no hostile act was undertaken by either side against the other. A large part of the Neapolitan officers were burning with desire to compete with the French, but the King carefully avoided this. In the affair at Parma, March 6 to 8, the corps of General Nugent was, so to speak, sacrificed by Murat, and it has been said that a number of Neapolitan generals, because of the stain which this has placed on their militaristic character, have signed a letter to Murat" [Footnote 3].
To tell the truth, Murat's more than lax conduct of war in the last campaign was by no means the reason why people were speaking out against him more and more decidedly: it only offered a welcome excuse to be now able to turn away from him with decency, after he had been approached so often in the past. Even if, following the advice of his wise wife, he had been zealous in the interests of the Allies, he would not have been able to maintain the position he actually occupied. It must also be admitted that the "victrix causa", the cause which, after a quarter of a century of humiliations, defeats and losses of all kinds, was finally helped to victory, could have resulted in nothing else than Murat's removal from the throne, which he, too, owed only to the defeats and losses of his opponents at the time. Louis XVIII had hit the nail on the head when he exclaimed: "How can one tolerate a small usurpation after having put an end to a great one?
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Footnote 1) Castlereagh to A’Court, Vienna October 2, 1814 X (III 2) p. 145 f.
Footnote 2) Wellington to Castlereagh September 12 and to Liverpool, December 25 1814, ibit, p.114 f., 226 — 228. „I concur very much in opinion with the King“, he writes to the First Lord of the Treasury, „that the chances of disturbance, particularly in this country, are very much increased by leaving Murat on the throne of Naples. If he were gone, Bonaparte in Elba would not be an object of great dread“. However, he asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs to not reveal anything about the entire plan for the time being: "The King is anxious that nothing should be said upon the subject at Vienna, until I shall receive an answer from England". In fact, the reply did not actually take the form the bellicose Duke had hoped for. Lord Liverpool agreed with Wellington completely on the main point; only, he said (Bath, 1 January 1815), it was necessary to wait for the time: "The only point which I wish to impress upon you is the absolute impossibility, in the present state of the circumstances and feelings in this country, of our engaging in military operations for the purpose of expelling Murat". Incidentally, in the unfavourable sentiment against Joachim, as in any question of British policy, there were also very material motives at play: "Si cette péninsule retombe dans les mains de la famille Buonaparte, le commerce anglais va à être gêné de nouveau dans cette péninsule, et certainement elle y tombera si de mesures rigoureuses et l'expulsion de Murat de l'Italie ne préviennent ce malheur"; Le Chevalier T. (Tinseau?) to Castlereagh 29 Nov. 1814; ibit p. 211, 243 f.
Footnote 3) Schöll, Recueil VI S. 364—394: Mémoire historique sur la conduite politique et militaire de S. M. le Roi de Naples etc.; S. 395—419 : Observations par le général comte Nugent etc.; S. 435—450: Dépêche de Lord William Bentinck au vicomte Castlereagh en date de Florence le 7 janvier 1815. The first two pieces are undated, but fall into the year 1814, and the memorandum into midsummer, since Castlereagh sent it to Count Bathurst on 6 September.
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Just to add to this: Colonel Maceroni in his memoirs, as we have seen, had accused Eugène of having informed Austrian commander Bellegarde about the secret negotiations with Murat. This was obviously unnecessary, as Mier’s letters prove the Austrians to be very aware of what was going on anyway. But talked about it he surely had, as even in Paris the British had already taken note:
Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst. Paris, May 3, 1814.
My Lord, I have delayed transmitting the enclosed correspondence for a few days, in the hope that I might be enabled to ascertain whether the Viceroy's assertions of Murat's treachery were supported by any documents on which the Allies could justify a change of policy towards him ; but none have as yet been received : I shall, however, take steps to ascertain the fact. The Austrian Government have no other reluctance on this point than what good faith imposes. As soon as I can learn anything further on this subject, your lordship shall hear from me.
I have, &c.,
CASTLEREAGH.
PS. Since this despatch was closed, I have received despatches from Sir R. Wilson, which throw further light upon Murat's conduct.
(taken from: »Memoirs and Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh«, Volume X)
During that time, Eugène was still on his way to Munich; so he must have opened up quite a bit to Bellegarde before, when handing over Upper Italy to him. One can assume both commanders agreed heartily in their dislike for poor Murat.
(On a side note: As for the opinion of General Nugent cited above, I’ve recently come across an account of the battle of Raab which this gentleman apparently managed to loose singlehandedly. Not sure I’d put too much faith in his view of military matters.)
