A process of confrontation: An enquiry into the processes of environmental policy-making in India. Part Two
The second part of my dissertation.
1.34 The black box of policy making
The only way to answer questions such as the ones above is to reconstruct the negotiations. Given that I was in India for just 45 days -- too short a while to reconstruct all the negotiations which took place after the ERM report’s submission -- I focused on one phase of the public consultations. This is the one after the draft notification’s public release. Part of the reason for choosing this period is rank opportunism. During the fieldwork, I managed to get my hands on a set of internal MoEF documents that contained over a thousand representations from stakeholders that the ministry received as feedback during this period. This, while not the complete set of submissions (a lot of the suggestions were made during the negotiations themselves), offered sharp insights about the concerns of participants in this stage. Also, this being the latest round of consultations, it was felt that recollections among the people being interviewed would be the sharpest. (Needless to say, it is hoped that this section will leave the reader with a sense of what previous rounds of negotiations had been like.)
One of the most contentious debates centred on decentralisation. Within this were several small disputes -- on the pace of decentralisation, on whether projects should be cleared by the state bureaucracy or the state’s political executive, and whether the centre (or the states) should set up the state EC institutions.
The centre wanted to delegate only less polluting industries. The stated reason for not wanting to decentralise more was that all the states are not equally well equipped in terms of capacity for appraisal. And so, given that it was not practical to differentiate between states in terms of the extent of delegation, the centre wanted capacity-building in all states to precede decentralisation (26). This might have been a somewhat prejudiced point of view. It can be argued that the states are in closer touch with ground realities, which might enable them to gauge the potential impacts better than a mandarin sitting a thousand miles away in Delhi. Also, the MoEF is not all that great at managing the environment either.
Further, the centre wanted the delegated projects to be appraised by professional independent bodies (SEIAA and SEAC), not by the political executive. The fear was that, between corruption and a hurry to get the state economy growing, politicians might disregard environmental norms altogether. Further, the centre argued, appraisal and decision-making based on the appraisals require a good knowledge of a variety of subjects ranging from air quality/water quality modelling to biodiversity. Hence, the need for a multi-disciplinary panel for appraisal and decision-making. And so, the institutions would have to be staffed by professionals with defined skills, they would have to be independent so that they could arrive at independent decisions, and not be moved about at the state’s whim (27). It is pertinent here to mention the MoU between Orissa and Korean Steel major Posco, the state commits in writing that it will help the company get all clearances for its steel plant at Paradip – even the EC (28).
With those ends in mind, the draft notification had stipulated that the SEIAA would be constituted by the “Central government in consultation with the state government or union territory concerned.” It, however, was a great deal more ambiguous about the SEACs. Contradicting itself by first saying the SEACs will be formed by the state, and then saying a little later that they would be constituted by the centre in consultation with the concerned state or union territory (Draft EIA notification, 2005).
For their part, while all states favoured decentralisation, they split on the question of how the ECs should be granted. A few (West Bengal, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Gujarat) wanted them to be granted by a professional body. The rest wanted a process where the final approval came from the political executive. Then, they bristled at the suggestion that the centre should set up the state level bodies. And rejected the idea that capacity-building should precede delegation of projects. One, they said, the SPCBs and relevant academic institutions in states could appraise any project. Two, how could capacities be built without knowing which industries were going to be delegated? And three, why should they invest money in capacity-building even before the decentralisation had been finalised?
As for the other actors, the central ministeries with PSUs (coal, power, highways, water resources, petroleum, etc) opposed decentralisation. Under the current system, they can swiftly redress any regulatory roadblocks through inter-ministerial avenues (29). Incidentally, this is one of the primary explanations for the amendments to the 1994 notification. At the behest of any ministry facing problems getting its projects approved, the MoEF would amend its laws. The Ministry of Oil and Gas might, say, seek a relaxation so that oil and gas exploration could extend to areas currently barred by the notification (30). Such options would not be available once project clearance moved to the states -- it is easier to prevail upon one’s colleagues in the central ministeries than it is on the Chief Ministers -- especially if they belong to an opposition party.
Industry seemed unmoved. The representation from the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), one of the biggest industry associations in the country, called “Relatively higher decentralization to state environmental authorities” a positive step (31). Distrustful about the environmental pedigree of the state governments, NGOs opposed decentralisation bitterly (32). Within the government, the only actors asking for total decentralisation were the PMO and the Planning Commission (33).
In the end, the MoEF won two and lost one. It got everyone to agree that the state-level clearances should be based on expert judgement. As for who would set the committees up, it cited the EPA. Under its section 3(3), only the centre has the power to set up committees. And, so, it was able to insist on the kind of committee that would be set up. It also ensured that while the states will nominate candidates for the committees, the central government would retain the powers to approve them.
It fared less well on the question of capacity-building versus immediate delegation. Capacity-building-first meant the states would have to wait for another 1.5 years. And it was evident that they would react strongly to such a move. The Punjab CM’s strongly-worded letters to the Indian Prime Minister about projects not getting off the ground were being passed down to the MoEF.
Then, there were about three meetings of the state environment ministers. From each of those, the signals came back loud and clear: “Where was the decentralisation?” Delegation would go ahead. ASCI (Administrative Staff College of India) was asked to write manuals for technical guidance. Capacity building would have to take the form of ‘learning by doing’ (34). An insane idea given that environmental management is supposed to be predicated on the precautionary principle.
And then, there was Indian industry. It contested the thresholds which had been set for separating categories A and B, for determining inclusion in the EC process. Why this size for a project, industry would ask. Was the ministry aware that, given that threshold, it would have to clear an additional 5,000 new projects every year? Did it have the capacity to do that? Or would it just end up delaying development some more? (35) Note that last question. One big reason why the MoEF has been on the defensive is questions like that. Another contentious issue was the inclusion of industries. Why the auto sector? It does no manufacturing. All it does is assembly. Why urban railway projects? These reduce pollution. Surely they don’t need an EC? Why small mining? It creates jobs (36).
Of these, no one pushed the envelope as far as the real estate lobby. The draft notification had enveloped all real estate projects with an activity area of 20,000 sq metres or more under its purview. This idea came about shortly after the floods in Bombay when the local river, constricted over several years at its delta due to illegal construction and dumping of waste, burst its banks after uncommonly heavy rains and flooded several suburbs (37) Feeling that Indian cities were growing in an extremely unplanned fashion and that, for the most part, the states didn’t care, the MoEF stepped in.
For its part, CREDAI, the real estate lobby, wanted the sector to be exempted from the EC process altogether. With that intent, it had several meetings with the MoEF. And when it did not get a receptive ear, the association began talking to the PMO, the Ministry of Finance and the Planning Commission. And, much to the MoEF’s horror, all three agreed with CREDAI.
In response, the MoEF made a presentation to the PM on the environmental issues at stake. It argued that CREDAI’s suggestion that environmental requirements for the construction sector should be built into the municipal bylaws was impractical. All municipalities have their own bylaws, harmonising them to ensure a national approach would take time. And so, the best way to bring about a coherent national level plan was to work through the EPA. The engineers with the municipalities had little competence in dealing with the issues that needed to be considered for an EIA. Finally, the centre did not have any power to bring these changes about anyway – municipalities are run by states. And thus argued that real estate belonged in the EC process (38).
It worked to some extent. Real estate stayed under the purview of the EIA notification but got bumped down to category B. A clause that brought all real estate projects (covered in the notification) in cities with a population over 3 million under the purview of the central government got deleted. The lobby also got itself exempted from public hearings as long as the land use is in line with land use rules (Final EIA notification, 2006).
Then, the notion of scoping proved controversial. Industry wanted generic TORs for every industry. No one was happy with the A/B category. The states saw it as another move to perpetuate the power of the centre over them. Similarly, industry, weary of the bureaucracy, hated the idea. It did not want an additional stage in the process. And then, there were the public hearings. The NGOs wanted these to approve projects. Industry wanted minimal consultation. Then, draft notification had made it mandatory that the local MLA should be present at the public hearings. Which was opposed by everyone (39).
Action was taken on these right at the end. A few days before the notification was to be promulgated, a two-member delegation representing India’s three major industrial associations (CII, Ficci and Assocham) came to meet Ghosh. They demanded that the notification be scrapped. And that work on the new EIA notification begin all over again. A compromise was worked out. In return for meeting their primary demands -- crunch the timeframes further, drop the MLA – they would drop their demands (40). (I should add here that they came with three demands, not two. I could not confirm the third one. A former MoEF mandarin felt it had to do with restricting the public hearings only to the affected persons. (41))
1.35 Policy making by confrontation
As policy processes go, this one was suboptimal. With the exception of the timelines, the TORs and the screening of projects, hardly any other problem in the previous notification had been resolved. Instead, new problems had come in. The new notification delegates power to the states even before the SEACs and the SEIAAs were set up. When I visited India, nine months after September, 2006, just one state had set up the two institutions (42). No one else had. As a stopgap, the MoEF was clearing all the projects. Clearance delays, I heard, were higher than ever before (43).
In this section, I try and reach some conclusions on why such outcomes came about. One, to revisit the theoretical review, Foucault’s teachings reverberate better with this case than a lot of the policy process theory. Take cooptation. While the secretary undertook a lot of public consultation, I doubt these were held to protect the ministry. He had been sent to the ministry with a specific mandate – to overhaul the environmental clearance process. And that is what he did. The primary reason for holding the consultations, for Ghosh was to build support for the new notification. Or take policy network theory. It too is only partially applicable. While the states, industry and the MoEF did come together to shape the policy, within the network, the attitude of the actors wasn’t one of bargaining and stressing common interests as the policy network school says.
Far from it. This was policy-making by confrontation. The companies wanted to reduce the footprint of government in their operations. The states wanted to reduce their dependence on the centre. The MoEF, for whatever reason, be it the fear of losing a profitable franchise, unwillingness to let go of power, or a lack of confidence in the others’ ability to manage these issues, was resisting them.
Now, go back to the negotiations. The states won immediate delegation. Industry won some exemptions, got (with the help of others) AB dropped. It got the MoEF to drop the MLA (again, with the help of others) and to agree that data confidentiality would be protected. For its part, the MoEF ensured that state clearance would be given by institutions, not the political executive. It also retained its control over these institutions and beat back opposition on a range of fronts – to delete scoping, from the need to exempt expansion/modernisation from the EC process, to bring in generic TORs, to ensure that only environmental, not livelihood and social, concerns are discussed at the public hearings.
Think about it. For an actor widely believed to be low on political power, the MoEF made nowhere as many concessions as it could have been expected to. This raises a question about its sources of power in these post-Indira Gandhi, post-Rajiv Gandhi times. Partly, I guess, as the negotiation on who constitutes the state committees shows, from the legal framework. Partly, perhaps, from the fact that it was the only party negotiating with the other two (especially for industry, a lot would have been riding on the MoEF’s negotiations with the states). A third source could have been the DMK, the regional party whose MP was the minister at the ministry when the notification was developed. From all accounts, this MP was quite apathetic towards national environmental policy. But it is important that this point be made anyway. Whichever political party gets ministership at the MoEF gains power over other states and political parties (44). Seen like that, and given the realities of coalition politics where the PM cannot assert himself, the process of environmental policy formation then leaves the purview of the ministry and becomes a decision taken at a political party level.
Another source of power was the secretary. The centre tries to place a strong bureaucrat in every ministry where it has an MP from a coalition ally (45). In this instance, it is Pradipto Ghosh who shaped the notification, not his ministers. The impact that Ghosh, a Phd in environmental economics, had on the EC process can be seen by contrasting the Environment Protection Act with the National Environment Policy (2006). If the focus of the EPA was on protecting the environment, under Ghosh, the emphasis shifted to economic efficiency -- thresholds would now be set at a level that called for minimal consumption of the resources available with the ministry; industry would now be pushed to accommodate these mitigatory mechanisms only to the extent it was cost effective for it; development itself was placed on a pedestal; and the ministry gradually distanced itself from civil society (Lele and Menon, 2005).
Then, the process was exclusionary. At two levels. One, for a while now, as scientific posts in the MoEF fall vacant, they have been converted to non-scientific posts and taken over by the IAS and allied services (46). Similarly, expertise outside the ministry has been whittled down as well. Institutions like the Wildlife Institute of India or NEERI are funded by the project evaluations and other studies they do – this affects their ability to speak impartially on policy matters (47).
Now, after the second round of consultations, Ghosh blocked environmental NGOs from the consultations. It was partly the NGOs’ fault. During the consultations, they, as ideological as ever, accused the MoEF of being in cahoots with corporates, proceeded to tear up a copy of the NEP, and burnt an effigy of Ghosh. Who in turn decided that there would be no more face-to-face consultations with the NGOs. That they could, if they liked, send in their comments by letter.
Three points can be made here. One, obviously, the secretary was overstepping his limits. It was his role to facilitate discussions, and to get all points of view into his thinking. Regardless of whether he approved of the way they were being expressed or not (48). Two, the NGOs, for all their stridency, could not force their way back into the consultations. It shows how politically marginal, how bereft of clout, India’s environmental NGOs really are. It is ironical. India is filled with robust grassroot-level environmental movements. But the country’s NGOs have failed to convert that into political leverage. And three, the cost of these exclusionary tendencies has been high.
Here is why. The fact that the notification was promulgated anyway shows the lack of any checks and balances. Due to the Indian system of governance which works on the back of enabling legislation (acts laying down broad values and directions) which then empower the government to govern through notifications, any parliamentary scrutiny can be ruled out. Given that the central government is too busy chasing growth to worry about luxuries such as the environment, that left, within the government, the MoEF to look after the environment. And here, even notions like cooptation cannot dispel the impression that the ministry doesn’t care about environmental governance. Look at the decisions it has taken -- setting pollution thresholds at a level where its workload would be manageable, capitulating to the demand for instant delegation… It shows that the ministry is keener to protect itself than the environment.
Put this, the observations about policy-making through confrontation and the exclusionary pressures together, and you see that in the policy-making negotiations, no one was talking, at an institutional level, on behalf of the environment. This is why the cost of the NGOs’ exclusion was severe. A voice speaking for the environment went missing. With their exit, the power over decision-making moved entirely to the political economy.
The rest was always going to be predictable.
This paper has advanced a new hypothesis about the process that resulted in the EIA notification of 2006. It has argued that while the first drafts of the notification were promising, things began to unravel once the MoEF embarked upon a series of public consultations to build support for the proposed notification, that the policy became a contested space with the actors in the consultations – the state governments, industry, the MoEF itself – trying to reshape it into something that served their individual interests. Further, it has argued, that this process is exclusionary, that it relies only on inputs from three stakeholders – the industry, the ministry and the state governments – while creating the new policy. In the process, more sceptical voices on whether this tightrope on environment versus development can be walked have been excluded.
I will close by making two points. One, the interesting aspect here is that the process is confrontational. This represents an opportunity for excluded actors. Can they ally with (and helping to bolster the case/power of ) any of the actors taking a similar stance on an issue as them – helping the MoEF on this issue of decentralisation (since that is the NGO stance), helping the rightwing parties opposing Sethusamudram – even if that means burying ideological differences for the greater good of India’s increasingly beleaguered environment?
But even that is an imperfect solution. It still leaves the excluded actors (and desired outcomes) at the mercy of the political economy. And so, how does one reform something like this? The NGOs were insisting that the EIA notification was too important to be left in the hands of the bureaucrats. And that it must be passed by the Parliament (49). But that is to assume that the Parliament would give it the attention it deserves. Then, there is the legal option. But, between the fact that Indian court rulings tend to be subjective and that policies can be challenged only after they get promulgated (50). which leaves a lot of scope for harm to be done before they can be struck down (assuming they are struck down), this is not a foolproof option either.
It raises a bunch of questions. Like where should the authority for environmental governance rest? With the bureaucracy? Or, should it be driven, as in the US, wholly through the courts? Or, should it be a run by a panel of experts? What’s more, the sad fact is that even this is a decision that has to be taken by the centre. And, right now, it is hard to imagine any reason why it, or this political economy served so well by the current system, would wish to cede their power away.
We are surrounded by questions we know nothing about. Take the negotiations. It is possible to problematise each of the individual outcomes – on decentralisation, on the MLAs, etc – further. How did these outcomes come about? In this process of negotiation, what were the strategies of the actors? Which areas were they willing to compromise on? And which areas where they unwilling to compromise? And what are the factors that determine these choices every actor makes? These are questions that need to be understood. Because, again, it is not possible to change a policy without understanding how it comes about.
Either that. Or game, set and match to the political economy.
1. Personal communication from Professor Shekhar Singh
2. Off the record communication from a former senior employee of ERM.
3. Personal communication from Professor Shekhar Singh
4. Personal communication from Dr MV Ramana, CISED
5. Personal communication from Professor Shekhar Singh
6. Personal communication from Mangesh Dakhore, previously with ERM
7. Personal communication from R Chandramohan, ex-joint secretary, MoEF
8. “Dissent will be brushed aside if it impedes growth”, Hindu Businessline, 2006. www.blonnet.com/2006/09/11/stories/2006091102260300.htm)
9. Personal communication from Dunu Roy
10. Personal communication from KPS Chauhan, independent environmental consultant, ex-scientific advisor, MoEF
11. Personal communication from Ashish Kothari, founder, Kalpavriksh
12. Personal experience reporting on these issues; Personal communication from Ashish Kothari, founder, Kalpavriksh;
13. Personal communication from Dr Prodipto Ghosh, former secretary, MoEF
14. Personal communication from a senior ex-employee of ERM
15. Personal communication from Mangesh Dakhore, previously with ERM
16. Personal communication from Professor Shekhar Singh; Personal communication from Mangesh Dakhore, previously with ERM
17. Personal communication from Mangesh Dakhore, previously with ERM
18. Personal communication from a senior ex-employee of ERM; Personal communication from Mangesh Dakhore, previously with ERM
19. Personal communication from Mangesh Dakhore, previously with ERM; Personal communication from Dr Prodipto Ghosh, former secretary, MoEF
20. Personal communication from Mangesh Dakhore, previously with ERM
21. Personal communication from Manju Menon, Kalpvriksh
22. Personal communication from Dr Prodipto Ghosh, former secretary, MoEF; Personal communication from a senior ex-employee of ERM
23. Personal communication from R Chandramohan, ex-joint secretary, MoEF
24. Submission by the Himachal Pradesh government during public consultation process
25. The MoEF internal document containing submissions on how to improve the draft EIA notification.
26. Personal communication from Mangesh Dakhore, previously with ERM; Personal communication from Dr Prodipto Ghosh, former secretary, MoEF; Personal communication from Dr V Rajagopalan, former head, CPCB; Personal communication from R Chandramohan, ex-joint secretary, MoEF…
27. Personal communication from Dr Prodipto Ghosh, former secretary, MoEF; Personal communication from Dr V Rajagopalan, former head, CPCB;
28. Memorandum of understanding between the Government of Orissa and M/s Posco for establishment of an integrated steel plant at Paradip, 22 June, 2005
29. Personal communication from Dr Prodipto Ghosh, former secretary, MoEF
30. Personal communication from Dr Prodipto Ghosh, former secretary, MoEF; Personal communication from R Chandramohan, ex-joint secretary, MoEF
31. Submission by CII during the final public consultation process
32. Derived from submissions by NGOs during the final public consultation process
33. Personal communication from Dr Prodipto Ghosh, former secretary, MoEF
34. Personal communication from Dr Prodipto Ghosh, former secretary, MoEF
35. Personal communication from Mangesh Dakhore, previously with ERM
36. Based on submissions by industries and industry associations during the final public consultation process
37. Personal communication from Srikanta Panigrahi, previously with Planning Commission, India
38. Personal communication from Dr Prodipto Ghosh, former secretary, MoEF
39. Based on aggregate submissions received by the MoEF during the final public consultation process
40. Personal communication from Dr Prodipto Ghosh, former secretary, MoEF
41. Personal communication from R Chandramohan, ex-joint secretary, MoEF
42. Personal communication from Leo Saldanha, ESG
43. Personal communication from Mangesh Dakhore, previously with ERM
44. Personal communication from Professor Shekhar Singh
45. Personal communication from Nitin Sethi, The Times Of India
46. Personal communication from KPS Chauhan, independent environmental consultant, ex-scientific advisor, MoEF
47. Personal communication from Mahesh Rangarajan, environmental historian
48. Personal communication from Dr Usha Ramanathan, legal researcher
49. Personal communication from Leo Saldanha, ESG
50. Personal communication from Ashish Kothari, founder, Kalpvriksh
Fernandes, D and L. Saldanha. 2000 (1). Deep Politics, Liberalisation and Corruption: the Mangalore Power Company Controversy. Law, Justice & Global Development Journal
Keeley, J and I. Scoones. Understanding Environmental Policy Processes. June, 1999. IDS working paper 89
Lele, Sharachchandra and Menon, Ajit. 2005. Draft NEP 2004: a flawed vision. Seminar. 547.
Lu, M and M Cheranik. 2004. Evaluation of the environmental impact assessment for the proposed Sethusamudram ship canal project. Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide
Menon, M and K. Kohli. 2007. Environmental Decision-making: Whose Agenda? Economic and Political Weekly. June 30-July 6. Volume 42 (26). 2490-2494.
Mosse, D. September, 2004. Is Good Policy Unimplementable? Reflections on the Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice. Development and Change. Volume 35 (4). 639-671
Stuligross, D. 1999. The political economy of environmental regulation in India. Pacific Affairs. Volume 72 (3) 392-406
S. Divan and A. Rosencranz. 2001. Environmental Law and Policy in India. Oxford University Press
Saldanha, L., A. Naik, A. Joshi and S. Sastry. 2007. Green Tapism: a review of the environmental impact assessment notification 2006. AID Publications.
Selznick, P. 1953. TVA and the grassroots: a study in the sociology of formal organization. University of California Press
Shore, C and S Wright. 2004. The anthropology of policy: critical perspectives on governance and power, Routledge
Smith, Martin J. 1993. Pressure, power and policy: state autonomy and policy networks in Britain and the United States. Harvester Wheatsheaf
Wilson, James Q. 1989. Bureaucracy: what government agencies do and why they do it. Basic Books
Amendments to the 1994 notification (SO 356, SO 318, SO 73, SO 1119, SO 737, SO 1148, SO 632, SO 248, SO 506, SO 891, SO 1087, SO 801, SO 942)
Govindrajan Committee Report, GoI, November, 2002
ERM, MoEF EIA Component A – Task Three report
Reforms in grant of environmental clearance. MoEF note.
Draft EIA notification, 2005
Final EIA notification, 2006
Kohli, K and M. Menon. 2005. How effective has it been: eleven years of the environmental impact assessment notification. Kalpvriksh Enviornmental Action Group
Lockhart, William, “The environmental impact assessment process in India: perspective, details and prospects”, September, 2004
Report by the independent fact finding team on issues related to the proposed Posco project in Jagatsinghpur (Orissa), 19th to 22nd April, 2007
The first amendment, SO 356, that of 4th May 1994, announced, among other things, that it was no longer mandatory for the Impact Assessment Authority (IAA), the institution tasked with studying proposals, to interact with affected populations and environmental groups or conduct site visits; it also freed the IAA from having to necessarily consult the Group of Experts while evaluating proposals; site clearance, previously required for prospecting and exploration of all minerals, was restricted only to major minerals in areas over 500ha; it exempted ports, harbours, airports, some tourism projects and highway projects costing less than Rs 0.5 billion, from the environmental clearance process.
The notification which followed it, SO 318, made public hearings an integral part of the decision making process. from now on, the IAA’s recommendations would have to also be based on the views and concerns of the affected community. It also put all thermal power plants, except those within 25km of a ecologically senstitive area or within 50 km of a interstate boundary, under the purview of the state governments.
The third amendment, SO 73, brought any expansion or modernisation of industrial projects, if resulting in an increase of the pollution load, into the purview of the EIA notification, and exempted small scale industrial units, widening and strengthening of highways, mining projects (major minerals) with lease area up to twenty-five hectares and modernisation of existing irrigation projects, from the public hearing. The fourth amendment, SO 1119, excluded defence-related road construction in border areas from the purview of the EIA notification.
The fifth amendment, SO 737, exempted, in addition to the highways, mining and irrigation projects, small scale industrial undertakings located in industrial areas, and units located in Export Processing Zones, Special Economic Zones et al from the public hearing as well. The next amendment, SO 1148, exempted bulk drugs and pharmaceuticals from the purview of the EIA notification, and announced that all public hearings would be completed within 60 days of the IAA receiving all relevant documents.
The seventh amendment, SO 632, made it mandatory for the Environment Impact Assessment report to be made locally available at least 30 days before the public hearing. Before this change, only an executive summary of the EIA was to be made available. It also exempted pipeline projects from the EIA process while, puzzlingly, insisting that these projects (and highways) hold public hearings in every district through which their pipeline or highway passes. Further, it exempted 16 sets of projects where the investment is less than Rs 1 billion for new projects and less than Rs 0.5 billion for expansion or modernisation (including nuclear power projects, river valley projects, ports, harbours, airports, petroleum refineries, storage batteries, thermal power plants, pulp, paper and newsprint) from the environmental clearance process. And clarified the previous amendment on bulk drugs to assert that the exemption only extended to genetically modified organisms.
In 1999, the MoEF had imposed “prohibitions on carrying certain processes and operations in the specified areas of Aravalli range as specified in the said notification, except with prior permission of the Central Government.” In the eighth amendment, SO 248, this exemption was removed. The ninth amendment, SO 506, exempted improvement work on river valley projects, except that in ecologically sensitive areas, from an environmental clearance.
SO 891, the next amendment, diluted the provisions in the second amendment. From now on, only those projects (including thermal power plants) located in a critically polluted area, within a radius of 15 kilometres of ecologically sensitive areas, other states, would have to obtain environmental clearance from the Central Government. Earlier, all thermal plants located within 25 kms of a ecologically sensitive area, or within 50 kms of a state, had to get their clearance from the central government.
SO 1087 made site clearance mandatory for green field airport, petrochemical complexes and refineries. And exempted offshore exploration activities, beyond 10 km from the nearest habitation and ecologically sensitive areas like mangroves, corals, national parks, marine parks, sanctuaries, reserve forests and breeding and spawning grounds of fish and other marine life, from the public hearing. The next notification, SO 801, made environmental clearance mandatory for construction projects and industrial estate.
The final amendment, SO 942, out in July 2005, announced that the MoEF would grant temporary working permission on receipt of application for a period not exceeding two years, during which the proponent shall obtain the requisite environmental clearance as per the procedure laid down in the notification.
