This paper introduces Google Votes, an experiment in liquid democracy built on Google's internal corporate Google+ social network. Liquid democracy decision-making systems can scale to cover large groups by enabling voters to delegate their votes to other voters. This approach is in contrast to direct democracy systems where voters vote directly on issues, and representative democracy systems where voters elect representatives to vote on issues for them. Liquid democracy systems can provide many of the benefits of both direct and representative democracy systems with few of the weaknesses. Thus far, high implementation complexity and infrastructure costs have prevented widespread adoption. Google Votes demonstrates how the use of social-networking technology can overcome these barriers and enable practical liquid democracy systems. The case-study of Google Votes usage at Google over a 3 year timeframe is included, as well as a framework for evaluating vote visibility called the "Golden Rule of Liquid Democracy".
Current implementation of democratic systems is result of the fact that process for voting had been expensive in pre-Internet era. One of the major thing Internet does is to make process of voting dirt cheap. One no longer has to setup physical voting booths, deploy thousands of election officials, physically tally votes and so on. This means we can give direct democracy a real chance. Why should we let senators or presidents make all of the decisions for us for years? Why not just vote for every issue directly? Why shouldn't anyone on Internet be able to propose a law and have it voted by people in the country directly? This can change everything...
...or so I thought. There are several problem with direct democracy: (1) Most people are not expert at things like foreign policy, economics and so on. (2) Many people can be heavily influenced to vote either way by creating powerful PR campaigns. (3) Most people have no time or capacity to digest tons of dense information to get the background. (4) Some information needed to make decision must remain classified.
This paper actually proposes a viable option here that works around many of the above issues. Instead of delegating all decisions for next 4 years to one person, we delegate case-by-cases and for arbitrary time length. This allows, for example, for a real economist to be elected to make a economy decision or nuclear scientist to be elected for Iran deal like decisions and so on. It might work. The bottom line is that we can get rid of arcane pre-Internet political system of senators, congressman and presidents.
