Image is everything in today's politics. Issues of policy have become secondary to the principal aim of the campaigning politician: To craft an image commensurate with the perceived desires of the voters. Nowhere has this been made clearer than in America, where the first President with no previous military or political experience will take over, swept to office on the strength of his image as a macho television celebrity. There is perhaps no institution worse placed to deal with the rise of this new politics of perception than the technocratic, bureaucratic European Union.
The EU deals with some of the most complex legislative tasks ever conceived, such as the creation of the Digital Single Market. The innumerable intricacies and ponderous pace of legislative progress more often than not make this a hindrance in terms of public perception. “Ambitious” and “grand” give way to “cumbersome” and “incomprehensible” in the public discourse. Brexit poster-child Nigel Farage himself calls the EU “dull” in comparison with the rest of the world. The EU’s shadowy procedures are innumerable and arcane, deliberately so in the eyes of its detractors. Who is familiar with the Spitzenkandidaten process of electing European Commission presidents? Can any busy citizen be expected to take the time to understand the balance of power between the Commission, Parliament, Council, and Court? Complexity and technicality are anathema to a compelling public message. Yet these two characteristics are among the first recalled by mention of the European Union.
If there were a figurehead for the EU who could provide ideological clarity and a mental focal point for the EU’s citizens, much of the impression of complexity would fade into the background, eclipsed by a clear, consistent message from a strong personality adept at the new politics of personality. Despite having a nominal head of state in European Council president Donald Tusk, and head of government in European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker, the EU has no central figurehead. Indeed, some EU citizens might consider Angela Merkel to be the de facto leader of the EU, such is the perceived power vacuum at the top of the Union. A lack of an identifiable figurehead clouds the EU’s message, and heightens perceptions of complexity, as parts of the whole offer up their individual messages.
The EU’s branding and imagery do little to help. Its architecture is insipid: The Commission’s Berlaymont headquarters in Brussels, a vast yet unimposing block that for some reason the Commission is so proud of that it includes it in its logo, could just as well house a dreary accounting firm. Its logos are bland and corporate: Even the flag of the European Union is a PowerPoint-friendly yellow on blue. Its institutions are clumsily and technically named, such as the Court of Justice for the European Union. None summon any inspiring imagery or patriotic pride, such as the gunboat diplomacy of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in the UK, or the authoritative Department of State in the USA. Some, inexcusably, manage to exacerbate EU complexity: By name alone, surely anyone would struggle to distinguish the Council of the European Union from the European Council, though the latter is not an EU institution. The European structures seem by their very design to evoke grey technocracy rather than image or emotion.
Most pressing are the impressions of detached elitism. Fallacious as it may have been, much of the rhetoric of the Leave campaign rested on ideas of diminished sovereignty and unaccountable elites. The day after the referendum result, the Daily Mail ran the byline “It was the day the quiet people of Britain rose up against an arrogant, out-of-touch political class and a contemptuous Brussels elite.” This is a compelling image, perhaps central to the Brexit vote. Nobody with a respect for democracy enjoys the idea of faceless overseas bureaucrats enacting legislation affecting them. This image is grounded in some degree of fact. Unsurprisingly, as the political scientists Ellinas and Suleiman have demonstrated, EU bureaucrats as a whole feel far more positively about the prospect of further European integration than do the populations of EU member states. Right-wing demagogues will continue to mine rich seams of patriotic anger if images of unaccountable technocrats siphoning national sovereignty in pursuit of their own agendas are allowed to go unchecked.
Of course, there is very little the EU can do about many of its image problems, which often stem from its design. No bureaucracy of such magnitude can truly act swiftly, nor will dry directives ever stir popular passions. Its principle of collective action renders an actual centralised leadership impossible. The EU must maintain an image of permanence, so it cannot swiftly re-brand as might a firm. Moreover, its institutions cannot summon the symbolism and connotations that flasher domestic counterparts enjoy thanks to their storied pasts. The concrete elements must be left alone. It is in abstract notions of competence and sovereignty that the EU has the most room for improvement.
Potentially fatal crises beset the EU. The Eurozone debt crisis lingers; refugees continue to die in their hundreds in their attempts to reach the Schengen Area; Brexit looms large. Each presents a distinct set of challenges: monetary, moral, legislative, or all-encompassing. In each crisis, however, there is opportunity. The EU must appear competent in addressing them. The Brexit negotiations, when they begin later this year, must appear to be proceeding efficiently and effectively, and any delays must, for the EU’s sake, be attributed to British obstinacy. A unified, coherent response to the refugee crisis, in whatever form that might take, would enhance the EU’s image of co-operation and capability. Centralised action to boost youth employment and reduce sovereign debt loads in the countries hardest hit, namely Spain and Greece, would begin to reverse the narrative of a cruel and incompetent European monetary response to economic turmoil. And a centralised, popularly-informed response to the refugee crisis could demonstrate the EU’s responsiveness to its citizens’ wishes.
Most importantly of all, the EU must be seen to be acting with domestic interests at heart. Pew research indicates that on average 50% of EU citizens have a negative opinion of refugees in terms of economics and job security, and 59% have a negative opinion in terms of terrorism and crime. While the EU does not as such have an overarching, Union-wide refugee policy, leading member state Germany has dampened its open borders policy but has not eliminated it. The distinction between member state and Union-wide policies is thus clouded. The EU might, therefore better reflect the interests of a significant proportion of its citizens with a unified, less hospitable approach to refugees. Brexit also presents an intriguing challenge. The EU must take a firm stance against Britain, to disabuse eurosceptic citizens and politicians of the notion that leaving is an easy option. At the same time, it must not stray too far the other way to dogmatic obstructionism, for any partnership kept together simply by threat of punishment is abusive. Domestic leaders with eurosceptic polities will not respond well to threats. Ultimately, EU chief negotiator Michel Barnier and his team must judge the public mood, and act accordingly. The EU should also acknowledge sweeping anti-globalism. Going after multinational corporate giants such as Amazon and Google for tax evasion is a strong step in this direction.
It is worth noting that the EU does try to fight back. Prominent figures such as Martin Schulz and Guy Verhofstadt are outspoken on Twitter, frequently throwing barbed comments the way of Britain’s most bellicose Brexiteers. There is also the Euromyth website, run by the Commission, which maintains an alphabetised database of debunked and discredited news stories about the EU, frequently British in origin, such as pithy falsehoods about illegally curved bananas. These defences do not, however, reach far into the public sphere; more significant steps are needed.
None of this matters if EU leaders heed the lesson of Britain’s EU referendum and decline to offer popular say on membership, or indeed any other European issue. They surely will–one could hardly imagine, for example, any potential French or German leader to the left of the Front National or the AfD bringing EU membership into question. But the EU should not be complacent in assuming the permanence of this stance. If nationalism and euroscepticism continue to rise, as can be observed from France to Poland, the EU could become a critical issue in future domestic elections. Brexit is not an isolated outcry of nationalism, and nor will such sentiments dissipate without a concerted effort at addressing them. The EU could one day wake up to a slew of far more eurosceptic governments than currently exist. Fostering a strong, cohesive, and positive public image, centred around concepts such as unity, cooperation, and mutual benefit, will help the EU counter these trends. The EU must show a public face of confidence and competence in the face of crisis, foster sentiments of unity and common identity, such as with the new scheme to offer free Interrail tickets to 18-year-olds, and remind citizens of the direct benefits the EU has on their lives. If these steps are taken, the EU may weather the next two decades. If not, the disintegration of the world liberal order will come to the shores of western Europe.
