Wellington’s letters about the Argenton conspiracy
I apologize in advance for yet another monster post that probably will interest very few people, if any. But hey, for once I did not need to translate a thing as Arthur dearest was so kind to already write in English. This is quoted from Volume 4 of the Dispatches of Field Marshal Wellington, containing the letters from spring 1809, when Wellesley defeated Soult at Oporto and almost managed to cut him off and force him into a capitulation. A development made possible, among other things, by the unrest and conspiracies within Soult’s own army. While Argenton’s treason is only indirectly connected to the "roi Nicolas" story, Wellington’s correspondence does shed some light on what was going on within Soult’s army, at least from Argenton’s perspective.
Unfortunately, in the publication the names of the French officers are almost all left in blanks in Wellington’s letters to Castlereagh (weirdly enough, two names, that of Loison and Delaborde, are spelled out in his letter to Beresford). I have substituted Argenton’s name in those places where I was sure that it was he who was mentioned.
To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State. Lisbon, 27th April, 1809 Upon the arrival of General Beresford at Lisbon on the 25th instant, he informed me that he had had some communication with a French Officer, through the means of M., at Oporto, which announced a disposition in the officers of Soult's corps to revolt, and to seize Soult and other principal officers of the army. On the night before last, a French Officer, by the name of [Argenton], arrived here, accompanied by Major Douglas, who had been sent by General Beresford to the French advanced posts to confer with him; and I had yesterday an interview with this Officer. He informed me that great discontent and dissatisfaction with the measures of Buonaparte prevailed throughout the French army, and particularly in the corps of Marshal Soult, which had suffered, and was still suffering, extreme distress; that dissatisfaction had long prevailed on various accounts, particularly the conscription, but had been greatly increased by a sense of the injustice of the measures adopted in respect to Spain, and the seizure of the King; and that a large proportion of the officers of the army of Soult were determined to revolt, and to seize the general and other principal officers of the army, supposed to be particularly attached to the interests of Buonaparte, if that army should be pressed by the troops under my command, so as to oblige Soult to concentrate in situations chosen with a view to their defence rather than with a view to their subsistence. [Argenton] having met Major Douglas between the advanced posts of the two armies, and his communications having there appeared to the Major to be so important, that he thought it desirable that [Argenton] should see General Beresford, he proposed that [Argenton] should come to Lisbon. I draw your Lordship's attention to this fact, as it removes a suspicion which might otherwise attach to the whole subject. The objects of these communications appear to be: first, to prevail upon us to press upon Soult's corps; and, secondly, to give to [Argenton] and two other Captains of the French army passports to go to France. In respect to the first of these objects, your Lordship is aware that I had adopted a plan of operations which would have effected it; and I must add, that in the different conversations with Major Douglas, General Beresford, and me, [Argenton], in pressing that plan upon us, advised us to watch the movements of the enemy on the left of the Tagus, while we should be engaged in operations to the northward. He was, at the same time, entirely ignorant of the situation of Victor, and of all the other French corps in Spain, excepting that of Ney. In respect to the second object, I asked [Argenton] particularly the reason he had for wishing to go to France at all, and those he had for wishing to go before any blow should be struck. His answer was, that he wished to go in order to communicate to Generals ___, ___, ___, and others dissatisfied with the existing order of things, the measures which the Officers of Soult's army had in contemplation, and which would certainly be adopted if the army should be at all pressed by us; and that he wished to go at an early period, because it was certain that as soon as Buonaparte should receive intelligence of the event, he would seize all suspected of being adverse to him, and would put an end to the hopes which were entertained that the same measures would become general throughout the French army.
And oh how I would love to speculate who Generals ___, ___ and ___ could be!
In the existing situation of affairs in Portugal I have considered it proper to refuse to attend to these communications. I have therefore asked the Admiral to give to [Argenton] passports for himself and two other Captains of the French army to go to France by sea; in which [Argenton] says they will experience no difficulty, as Soult allows vessels of all nations to quit Oporto; and the Commanding Officers of the regiments to which they belong, being parties to the plan of revolt, are desirous and have the power to permit them to go. I have pledged myself no further; and I have particularly desired General Beresford, in delivering his passports to [Argenton] to request that he will inform his friends in the French army, that he asked from me, and only obtained, passports to go to France; that I wish them success in the accomplishment of their objects; but that the line which I shall take upon them must depend upon the circumstances in which the French army shall stand at the moment the Officers may seize their General. I acknowledge that I do not entertain any hopes that I shall be enabled to effect more to the northward than oblige Soult to retreat from Portugal. If circumstances should enable me to do more, the question whether the operations against the French army ought to be carried to extremities, or they should be allowed to seize their General and place themselves under our protection, becomes one of greater difficulty; upon which I am desirous, if possible, of having the opinion of His Majesty's Government. Your Lordship will observe, that I have not thought it proper to discourage the disposition which appears to prevail among the French Officers; at the same time that I have taken care not only not to pledge myself to any particular line of conduct, but that those concerned should understand that I do not consider myself pledged by anything that has passed. The successful revolt of a French army might be attended by the most extensive and important consequences; whereas their defeat, or what is a more improbable event, their surrender, would affect only local interests and objects, excepting that either of these events would add to the reputation of His Majesty's arms. In the consideration and decision of this question much must depend upon the minute circumstances attending the situation in which each of the armies shall be placed at the moment; but I consider it my duty to give the earliest intelligence to His Majesty's Ministers, in order, if possible, that I may have the advantage of their opinion, and His Majesty's commands, before I shall have to decide upon the line which I shall adopt. I have the honour to be etc. Arthur Wellesley
[Same date, an addition, possibly encoded:]
My dear Lord, I have but little to add to my public dispatches of this date. I fully believe in the intentions of the French Officers to revolt. The existence of this intention is confirmed by the recollection of what dropped from nearly every individual of the French army with whom I conversed when I was in this country last year, and it is highly probable on other grounds. I doubt, however, whether it will be quite so easy to carry their intentions successfully into execution as their emissary appears to imagine; and I also doubt whether it follows of course, as is generally imagined by those with whom I have conversed here upon this subject, that the successful revolt of this corps would be followed immediately by that of others; and I am convinced that the mode proposed by [Argenton?] which will be explained to you by Colonel Bayley, to accomplish that object, would not answer that purpose. It is, however, very certain, that the successful revolt of one French army would have a great effect, particularly in this part of the world; and would probably do more for Spain than Spain would ever do for itself. In case there should be an opportunity, I should not wait for a revolt, but shall try my own means of subduing Soult. If this army should revolt, or, indeed, at all events, I anxiously recommend to you to set all your emissaries to work in France. I have no doubt of the detestation of Buonaparte by the people of that country. There is a very clever fellow in communication with Mr. ___, who ought to be useful to you. [...]
So, this was Wellesley’s report of the first meeting with Argenton. It is to be noted that in this first interview, there’s only mention of unrest in the army because of Napoleon’s actions. Not because of Soult’s. Argenton and his co-conspirators want to seize Soult obviously because they think he is loyal to Napoleon and thus a threat to their plans.
However, this is about to change 😁. Here’s what Wellington reported to his subordinate Beresford after a second interview with Argenton, some days later.
Coimbra, 7th May, 1809. My dear Beresford, Our friend came to Aveiro yesterday; and I saw him last night at a fire on the road between Fornos and Martede. He says there are two parties now in the army: one, to seize at all events; the other, who wish to seize only in case the person persists in declaring himself King. He had two plans to propose: one that we should endeavor to draw S[oult] into a snare by persuading some of the people in this part of the country to address him to declare himself King, and even that I should write to recommend the same measure to him, as one most likely to pacify Portugal and Spain; the other, that we should make our dispositions, and attack forthwith, taking care to cut off their retreat by a strong corps upon the Douro and even at Villa Real. In respect to the measures proposed for my adoption, I declared that I could have nothing to do with them, as the inevitable result would be to deprive me of the confidence of the Portuguese. In respect to the attack, I told our friend that I would make it as soon as I could, but that the time must depend upon circumstances. He said that if S[oult] could be induced to declare himself King, the whole army of [De]Laborde and Loison would declare against him, and lead the army back into France.
I actually find Argenton’s idea kinda cute.
Argenton: How about you tell the Portuguese on your side that they should make Soult their king, and you tell Soult that you’re totally fine with that, so that he really does it and our army revolts against him?
Wellington: … How about no?
I could not exactly understand by what road the French were to march after having made good their retreat to Villa Real: he said, towards Benavente in Spain. However, it is not impossible that they might endeavor to pass the Douro and to go by Lamego, which place indeed our friend mentioned at one time, though he did not say where they were to go from Lamego. He showed me a paper very ably drawn up, as he said, by an Officer of rank, pointing out their different lines of retreat, which states a decided preference for that of Villa Real, but to what point from Villa Real is not stated; and I observe that there are several roads which lead through Villa Real, to Braganza, to Chaves, &c. Our friend particularly cautioned me against the employment of too small a corps to cut them off at Villa Real. […]
And so on; apparently Argenton detailed to the enemy every single thing he knew about Soult’s defensive measures and the position of his troops.
Wellington wrote another letter to Castlereagh about that second meeting, too:
Coimbra, 7th May, 1809. I met last night [Argenton] for the first time since I had seen him at Lisbon. He told me that the French army was at this time divided into two parties; one, which intended to seize Soult at all events, and to carry into execution the plan he had before communicated to me; the other, consisting of ___, ___, and even those connected with Buonaparte, who were determined to seize Soult if he should declare himself King of Portugal, of which he has manifested an intention. This latter party would then lead the army into France, where it is understood that Buonaparte wishes to have it. But [Argenton] thinks that if Soult was once seized, everything would go on as his friends wished. He then made two propositions to me: one, that I should make my arrangements to attack them immediately, taking care to cut off their retreat into Spain; the other, that, if I would not make my attack immediately, I should endeavor to prevail upon the inhabitants of some of the towns in Portugal with which I was in communication, to petition Soult to take upon himself the government of Portugal as King; and that I should even go so far as to advise him myself to take that step as the most likely to secure the peace of Portugal and Spain, and to lead to the overthrow of Buonaparte. In answer to these propositions, I told [Argenton], as to the first, that I should certainly operate upon Soult as soon as I should be ready. In regard to the second, I told him that I could not take any measures to induce the people of Portugal to act as he proposed, without incurring the risk of leading them to believe that I was unworthy of their confidence. He then gave me a good deal of information respecting the strength, the position, and the plans of the enemy, and of the detestation of Soult generally prevailing in the army; all of which was confirmed by Monsieur ___ who came with him; and I sent him back without his having seen any of our troops, or knowing that we had such numbers collected here. I firmly believe what he says respecting the prevailing discontent, and I think it not improbable that ___, and others attached to Buonaparte, aware of it, and apprehensive of its effects, would turn it so far to account of Buonaparte, as to induce the army to seize their General, for being guilty of an ambitious abuse of his authority and disobedience of the orders of the Emperor. And if they are really in a scrape, which I acknowledge I doubt, they would make use of this act, if possible, to induce us to allow them to go away. This is certainly the case if ___, ___, and others of that party knew of [Argenton]’s communications with us, which I cannot find out. Believe me, etc. Arthur Wellesley
So, what can be learned from all this? Mostly, imo, that the idea Soult wanted to make himself king came up some time later than Argenton's conspiracy; during his first interview with Welly, Argenton seems still unaware of it. But by the time he met with Welly again, a second party within Soult's army had become convinced that Soult was up to no good, and felt they had to do something against him.
I really wish we could fill in the suppressed names of the generals. It would be highly interesting to compare them to those that Soult himself suspected.