#moroccancrises

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Moroccan Crises: German v. French Imperialism

The Moroccan Crises were two international incidents, the first in 1905-6 and the second in 1911, when Imperial Germany, eager to expand its empire, threatened France's presence in Morocco. France's position was supported by Britain and Russia, meaning Germany was obliged to back down twice. Although not a direct contributor to war, the Moroccan Crises certainly caused a strengthening of alliances and worsened the atmosphere of international distrust then prevalent in Europe, a distrust which was itself one of the primary causes of WWI as Europe shifted into two mutually opposed alliance groups.

The Kaiser's Weltpolitik

Kaiser Wilhelm II (1859-1941) came to power as emperor of Germany in 1888 (reigning until 1918), and he pushed for more territorial and military expansion in order to secure the natural resources Germany's booming economy demanded. This new policy was called 'World Policy' or Weltpolitik. Wilhelm II's chancellor, Bernhard von Bülow (1849-1929), and the naval minister, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz (1849-1930), were both in wholehearted agreement with this policy, which had the added advantage of distracting the population from domestic problems such as the weakening of the power of the Junker Prussian landowners in the ongoing process of industrialisation and democratisation. Popular support for the policy was whipped up by a jingoistic press. The policy of Weltpolitik only worsened the pervading instability in international relations. As the historian F. McDonough states: "The policy created a great deal of tension, accomplished very little, and soured international relations" (9). As the historian D. Khan adds: "From the 1890s imperial Germany was a fundamentally dissatisfied power, eager to disrupt the status quo and to achieve its expansive goals, by bullying if possible, by war if necessary" (209). In short, Germany was now widely seen as enemy number one when it came to world peace. Countries began to form alliances to counter Germany's rising power.

In 1904, Britain and France signed the Entente Cordiale, which removed conflicts of interest in Africa and Asia but did not cover mutual assistance in the case of a war in Europe. The same year, France agreed with Spain to divide Morocco between themselves. Britain agreed not to interfere in exchange for a free hand to control Egypt. The problem was now for France to defend its gains in North Africa. Long in decline, by the early years of the 20th century, France was "a second-class naval power" (Bruce, 139). Germany's navy, thanks to an unrelenting arms race with Britain, was moving in the opposite direction.

Germany was anxious over the development of the Entente Cordiale since France's diplomatic ties (established in 1894) with Russia would effectively mean that three powerful states might align themselves against Germany. Indeed, the kaiser was convinced, despite a lack of evidence, that the Entente Cordiale contained a secret clause that promised mutual military aid in Europe. The kaiser was determined to test the strength of the Entente Cordiale, and the ideal place to do it seemed to be North Africa.

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⇒ Moroccan Crises: German v. French Imperialism

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1911 saw another diplomatic crisis between Germany and France over Morocco. Although the German position was legally sound, the French had violated previous international agreements concerning North Africa by attempting to establish a protectorate, any advantage was squandered by the clumsy, sabor rattling of foreign minister Alfred Von Kiderlen-Wachter. The ultimate result was to leave Germany isolated and further cement the entente between France and Great Britain, expressed very forcefully by Chancellor of the Exchequer David Lloyd George in his famous Mansion House speech. Before the crisis was finally resolved both sides openly talked of war, hoping to leverage the threat to exact concessions, and with public opinion enraged, Europe had come closer to the edge of that terrible precipice than many at the time realized or cared to admit. The developments in Morocco, however, had even more far reaching consequences, ones that would eventually bring about the dreaded general conflagration so narrowly avoided in 1911. The Kingdom of Italy had long had interests, both economic and political, in the part of the Ottoman Empire now known as Libya, the twin provinces of Cyrenaica and Tripoli. Italy was a minor power, poor with a weak military and instable, largely corrupt government, she counted for nothing in the European balance. There were, of course, many Italian statesmen keen to change all of that, particularly foreign minister Antonio di San Guiliano. He had extracted agreements from the other powers protecting Italian interests in Ottoman Libya but with the settlement over North Africa obviously about to change, San Guiliano found that the moment was right to seize the provinces outright. Pursuing dreams of a great Italian Empire in the Mediterranean to rival that of even France or Britain, Italy invaded in September of 1911. The Ottoman army, untrained and underfunded, quickly surrendered. The Italo-Turkish War did not alarm the other nations of Europe. Italian preponderance in Libya was well established and after two war scares with Germany over Morocco the Entente Powers of Britain, France and Russia were gratified to see a more friendly country gain influence in the Mediterranean while Austria-Hungary was pleased to have attention diverted away from her own Italian speaking territories of the Trentino and Trieste. However, the immediate calm after the annexations was deceptive. The Ottoman Empire, having survived for the previous 500 years and once even reaching the temples of India in the East and the gates of Vienna in the West, was crumbling. By 1911 the Turks had only a shallow foothold left in Europe, around the southern tip of the Balkan peninsula. The new nations of Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, Rumania and Bulgaria had emerged from the Empire’s former territories in the region. What was to become of southeastern Europe once liberated from Ottoman rule, known as the “Eastern Question”, dominated European diplomacy in the last half of the 19th and first part of the 20th century. All of the Great Powers took an enthusiastic interest in the Balkans during this period but none more so than Austria-Hungary and Russia. The poisonous rivalry between these two eastern empires had already menaced the peace of Europe, most recently in 1908 when Austria annexed the formerly Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Now, with the Turks already weakened from their unsuccessful war with Italy, the new Balkan states scented blood. The Rumanian Prime Minister sensed the coming trouble when he said “Two will start the dance, but many are in at the end.” Looking to take control over events as the Ottoman Empire retreated out of Europe, wanting to be in charge of any future settlement, and hopefully take possession of the strategically crucial Straits between the Mediterranean and Black Seas, Russia encouraged the formation of a ‘Balkan League’ consisting of Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria. The next year, in the autumn of 1912, the League duly declared war on Turkey. Within a matter of months the Turks were defeated, the Balkan states victorious. This greatly alarmed Austria-Hungary, a multinational empire containing a large minority of Serbs, Rumanians and Bulgars. Many of these minorities, particularly the Slavs including Serbs, demanded union with their brethren outside the Empire. Militant Serbian nationalists openly agitated against Austria and it was widely believed that the Serbian government itself sponsored acts of terrorism on Austrian soil. Any expansion of Serbia was unacceptable and the chief of the Austro-Hungarian general staff Conrad Von Hötzendorf was to urge war on the Serbs no less than 20 times during the crisis, from 1912 to 1913. Ultimately the threat of mobilization proved sufficient and the Balkan League had since disintegrated with its former members were busy fighting amongst themselves over the spoils of the First Balkan War in what became known as the Second Balkan War. The nation of Albania was created at Austrian insistence to block Serbia from gaining a strategically important port on the Adriatic Sea and both sides were able to save face. However, a year later, in the summer of 1914 after the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne by a Bosnian-Serb neither the Austrians or the Russians were willing to back down. The events of the previous several years had convinced the powers of Europe that threatening war was an effective, perhaps even normal, diplomatic technique regardless of the potential consequences. This in turn conditioned the public in the various belligerent countries to accept, perhaps even expect war if and when it came. The Italo-Turkish and subsequent two Balkan Wars were dress rehearsals for the Great War that was to break out a year later, narrowing the focus of Great Power politics and reinforcing the rival alliance blocs, while paving the way for a local conflict in the Balkans to become a world war.