#ncpo

[southeastasianists]

Sandwiches, 1984 and wristwatches: four years of the NCPO, four years of creative resistance—part one - New Mandala

สี่ปีคสช.: สัญลักษณ์และประดิษฐกรรมแห่งการท้าทายอำนาจรัฐทหาร Activists never intended to use sandwiches during protests—it was the authorities themselves who seized upon sandwiches in 2014, making an unintended contribution to anti-authoritarian emblems.

For the past four years, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) has sought to control political resistance. Measures have included confining protest leaders and key political figures in detention for ‘attitude adjustment’ and coercive memorandums on political activity. Soldiers, police and other security officers continue to pay visits to the homes of activists. Laws to curb political assembly, enacted via executive powers, include but are certainly not limited to NCPO Order No. 7/2557 and NCPO Order No. 3/2558 (bans on political gatherings of five or more people), and NCPO Order 49/2557 (a ban on providing support for political assembly).

At a glance, the NCPO’s efforts may appear to have had some measure of success. Key political movements such as the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) has ceased organising rallies at the scales seen before the 2014 coup. Yet the UDD’s quietness does not at all mean that civilians who disagree with military rule have surrendered to the finality of the NCPO. In a context where peaceful assembly is outlawed, activists are managing the risk of open conflict with authorities by creatively transforming everyday activities into symbolic expressions of frustration.

These strategies are as much about toeing the lines set by law, as they are about imparting a message that political expression is a normal thing that all people can do, rather than a dangerous and scary thing as suggested by the NCPO’s discourse. To mark the fourth anniversary of the NCPO’s coup, I have compiled a tapestry of activist inventiveness that military rule has not been able to stamp out.

Anti-coup sandwiches  

Activists never intended to use sandwiches during protests—rather, it was the authorities themselves who seized upon sandwiches in 2014, making their own, unintended contribution to anti-authoritarian emblems.

Kate, an activist leader*, recalls that after the junta announced its ban on political gatherings of five people or more, she and her friends (who at the time were still students) decided they should organise some kind of resistance activity. Not wanting to draw the ire of officials, they decided to revolve the event around an everyday activity: watching a movie and eating snacks together. So Kate and fellow activists created an open Facebook event for 6 June 2014: “Picnic Under The Shade: Poetry, Movie Screening, Coup”.

At first, Kate and the activists had no ulterior motives in serving sandwiches at the event to attendees—they had brought them because they are easy to cut and hand out. But before the event began, authorities gathered at the event location and forcibly cancelled the event. The students requested to merely eat the sandwiches and then go home, seeing as they had prepared them already. The authorities refused—leading to a now notorious image of a security officer snatching sandwiches from a small-bodied student. In that second, sandwiches were transformed into a resonant anti-authoritarian symbol.

“The best spokesmen for the activists isn’t Rome or Ja New, but the NCPO itself,” Kate laughs.

Kate and eight other friends decided to make the best out of a bad situation, and organised an event to eat sandwiches—‘Nothing Much, We Just Want To Eat Sandwiches’—outside the Siam Paragon mall on 22 June 2014. The students were promptly arrested and detained in a camp for ‘attitude adjustment’. Several other sandwich-eating events have been since been staged, leading to international headlines such as “4 Absurdly Harmless Acts Now Criminalised By Thailand’s Military Rulers” and “Man Eats Sandwich, Gets Arrested”.

*At the time of this article’s publication, Kate is being detained in a police station for leading a protest demanding elections at Thammasat University.

Subversive reading groups

‘Peach’ (pseudonym), the activist behind past stunts where civilians gathered to do nothing more and nothing less than read books together, recalls following the news of activists being harrassed in the aftermath of the coup. She felt that the NCPO was succeeding in building a climate of fear through open collisions between protesters and authorities. She and her friends began divising resistance tactics that avoided overt political expression—to give authorities no cause to interfere—but which could still impart forcefully an anti-authoritarian sentiment. When a friend told Peach about a stunt in Turkey in 2013 where civilians gathered to read books at a park to protest plans to turn the public space into a mall, Peach borrowed the idea and applied it to the recent coup.

Peach felt that the activity of reading was not overly confrontational, but that the choice of books—George Orwell’s 1984 and other political books—would still impart that the gathering was aligned against the coup. In total, she organised four gatherings to read books: at the National Stadium skywalk, the Chong Nonsi BTS skywalk and near Wat Pathum Wanaram. The fourth reading session was mobile—readers rode on trains.

Peach recounts that the reading sessions were closed events, in that attendees were invited by word of mouth, out of fears for their safety. Only the fourth session was advertised through a Facebook event. At each gathering, Peach brought a cheap phone that she could quickly discard if necessary, rather than her usual smartphone. Though the reading sessions were organised secretly, Peach contacted trusted media contacts to cover the events and disperse images of civilians reading political texts together. She did not experience any direct harassment from authorities, which she puts down to their covert organisation.

Peach and her friends also poked holes in the junta’s laws, by reading in groups of four—not enough to violate the ban on gatherings on five people or more. Though Peach felt some fear while reading, she feels now certain they brought new tactics to Thailand’s resistance space that left authorities scratching their heads over law enforcement manuals—Peach recalls with humour that after the third reading session at the Chong Nonsi BTS skywalk, a stage for aerobics was conspicuously erected covering the space where the event had been held.

The three-finger salute

Protests against the NCPO took place as early as 23 May 2014 (the day after the coup). But in the coup’s immediate aftermath, protesters in their urgency did not think to seek a unifying symbol of resistance—individuals constructed their respective signs, converged at agreed meeting points, and shouted their grievances. Gatherings that took place on 1 June 2014 were probably the first time that protesters performed a shared symbolic gesture across a number of disparate meeting points (the National Stadium skywalk, outside the Bangkok Art and Culture Centre, outside the Terminal 21 Mall, Thammasat University’s Tha Prachan campus).

This gesture was a raising of three fingers, a salute borrowed from The Hunger Games. In the book and film series, the three-finger salute “means thanks, it means admiration, it means goodbye to someone you love”. But for protesters on the ground, the raising of three fingers is laden with further meaning borrowed from other “revolutionary trios” such as the 1789 French Revolution’s liberty, equality and fraternity.

On 19 November 2014, while General Prayuth was visiting the province of Khon Kaen, five students from the local activist group Dao Din stood in a line and raised the salute, while wearing shirts reading, “No To The Coup”. The students were arrested quickly—the day the first part of The Hunger Games: Mocking Jay was scheduled to come out in Thai theatres. The following day, another student from Bangkok University stood in front of an advertisement for the film, raised the three finger salute and placed her other hand over her mouth. Unsurprisingly, she was “invited” by police officers to Pathum Wan Police Station.

The salute has been repeatedly performed at resistance events in Thailand, capturing considerable public attention. But its meaning has also shifted with political context. The formation in early 2018 of the People Who Want Elections (คนอยากเลือกตั้ง), an activist network mobilising against the entrenchment of military rule, has vested the three-finger salute with the following messages: “1. elections in 2018 2. down with dictatorship 3. long live democracy”.

This article was submitted by iLaw as an amended version of its annual post-coup report.

[grotesken-cirkus-kamui-gackt]

I made the 3rd place in a side event of NCPO. I couldn't take it down. Oh well, next time. ニューカレドニアポーカオープンNCPOサイドイベントで惜しくも3位。優勝出来なかった。でも仲間のブッダが別のイベントで見事優勝！嬉しいね。@GACKT #gacktstagram #NCPO #優勝できず #Gackt

[grotesken-cirkus-kamui-gackt]

Mr.Shiga got victory in the main event!!!!!!!! TeamGACKT is really strong!!! Congrats bro!!! とうとうチームGACKTの志賀ちゃんが優勝!!!!!!!! めちゃ嬉しい！チームGACKT最高 @GACKT #チームGACKT #TeamGACKT #優勝おめでと #NCPO #Gackt

[theaseanpost]

Thailand’s music wars

The NCPO’s rap riposte has come up short, drawing more attention to RAD’s anti-junta song instead.

Will a flopped rap response affect Prayut?

[chiangraitimes-blog]

Future Forward Party Leaders Seek to Amend Junta's 2017 Constitution-https://www.chiangraitimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/80703ea2-2821-11e8-b567-adb1113855b0_1320x770_172142.jpg -https://www.chiangraitimes.com/future-forward-party-leaders-seek-to-amend-juntas-2017-constitution.html

New Post has been published on https://www.chiangraitimes.com/future-forward-party-leaders-seek-to-amend-juntas-2017-constitution.html

Future Forward Party Leaders Seek to Amend Junta's 2017 Constitution

BANGKOK – Future Forward Party leader Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit and Co-founder Piyabutr Saengkanokkul have said their party will kick off its campaign to amend the 2017 constitution on Feb 25, the day after the planned general election.

The party, one of the eight new entrants endorsed so far by the Election Commission, started recruiting members on Saturday at the Thai Summit Tower on New Phetchaburi Road in Bangkok.

It also began sales of souvenirs, ranging from T-shirts, shopping bags and caps to mobile accessories, all bearing the party’s logo, to raise funds as allowed under the Political Parties law.

Among the well-known people applying to be members was Charnvit Kasetsiri, a former Thammasat University dean, and a number of ex-politicians.

Party leader Thanathorn Juangroongrungakij said he was glad to see so many people showing up to support his party.

“Today we are accepting the applications for party members. We will open applications for MP candidates on Oct 18,” he said.

The former auto-parts tycoon reiterated that Future Forward would field candidates in all 350 constituencies. “We aim to be a national party. Without enough MP candidates, we won’t be able to achieve our goals.”

The party, he added, would focus on both party-list and constituency votes. “Some believe we will win only party-list MPs but our own estimates show our candidates have potential in several constituencies.”

As a new player, Future Forward is viewed by some as benefiting from the new mixed-member apportionment system to be used in the coming election, as it counts all votes for all parties regardless of who wins in a constituency.

Mr Thanathorn declined to say how many MPs his party hopes for.

“It’s too soon to tell. We’ve gone to the provinces to disseminate our ideology and campaign for votes. We’ve done everything by the book.

“We pledge to comply with the rules whatever they are. We’d like a clean win in the NCPO’s game to avoid any problems in the future,” he said, referring to the National Council for Peace and Order.

Future Forward has set up branches in six provinces: Chiang Mai for the North, Khon Kaen for the Northeast, Rayong for the East, Ayutthaya for the central region, Nakhon Si Thammarat for the South and Narathiwat for the three southernmost provinces, he said.

The law requires a party to have branches in at least four regions.

In mid-October, party leaders will go to the six provinces to recruit members and raise funds. One of its goals is for the party to be self-sustaining, without the need to rely on funds from wealthy patrons. This alone would set it apart from many parties.

“Our vision of Thailand2x — equality and modernity — is our compass and all our policies will be based on these two core concepts,” said Mr Thanathorn.

“I’ve never said anything about joining the government. I’d like to stress here that setting the political agenda and winning votes are not the same thing. We don’t want only power. Our three goals are to stop the power succession by the NCPO, to rewrite the constitution and to eliminate the legacy of coup makers.

“In order to do so, I must be the prime minister. But we don’t dream of having power for power’s sake. We need power so we can use it to change society. Being prime minister is not a goal. It’s a means.”

Starting on Feb 25 next year, a day after the general election if the current timetable isn’t changed, Future Forward will start a campaign to change the constitution, which requires a third of the 250 appointed senators to approve.

After the cabinet is sworn in, the NCPO will be dissolved. “If millions of people rise, the pressure can force the senators to side with people and vote for the amendment,” the Future Forward leader said.

“Votes are not enough for change. Instilling ideology must be done hand-in-hand with campaigning for votes,” he added.

Some of the souvenirs sold at Saturday’s event to raise funds.

“Given the 86 years of democracy in the country, I know my work won’t be finished anytime soon. Future Forward is here for the long haul. We may fail this time but we’ll continue our work. Those who don’t work in Parliament will work continually outside to propagate the ideology and democratic values.”

Aware that action is louder than words, Future Forward will disclose its accounts for public scrutiny every quarter and the first disclosure, for the fourth quarter of this year, will be made in the latter half of January.

Asked about the four ministers who joined the pro-regime Palang Pracharath Party without resigning from the cabinet, Mr Thanthorn said the Prayut Chan-o-cha government used lack of governance and unrest as a pretext to stage its 2014 coup, but now it had become clear that there is no good governance in this government.

“When a government that preaches about these values every day does not set an example, I won’t interfere. But politicians must set an example for society. They must set standards for Thai society,” he said.

Somkiat Santakorn, 58, a vendor who travelled from Chumphon with his family to register as members of the party, said he liked its policy ideas and had faith in the democratic stance of the party.

“What I want Future Forward to do quickly is [work on] the economy. People haven’t had more money in their pockets over the past few years. Next, I want to see changes in the laws and constitution for equality of rights.”

Passakorn Suttadham, 36, a company employee, said he signed up because the party’s ideology matched his. “Its stance is clear. It doesn’t try to play both ways. I wholeheartedly agree with the three goals or coups will keep happening.”

He would like to see changes in the constitution because it aimed to block certain groups and take advantage politically, citing appointed senators.

He also likes the idea of increasing opportunities and equality. “For example, beer can only be produced in large quantities, which limits the possibility only to a handful of wealthy groups. I also like to see hyperloop in Thailand. It should bode well for transport.”

Member registration can also be done online for people residing in Thailand at the party’s website starting on Sunday. The fees are 100 baht for one year and 2,000 baht for life.

By Aekarach Sattaburuth The Bangkok Post

[southeastasianists]

Four years of the NCPO, four years of creative resistance—part two - New Mandala

Part two of Anon Chawalawan's compilation of the activist inventiveness that has survived the NCPO's four-year rule.

For the past four years, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) has sought to control political resistance. Measures have included confining protest leaders and key political figures in detention for ‘attitude adjustment’ and coercive memorandums on political activity. Soldiers, police and other security officers continue to pay visits to the homes of activists. Laws to curb political assembly, enacted via executive powers, include but are certainly not limited to NCPO Order No. 7/2557 and NCPO Order No. 3/2558 (bans on political gatherings of five or more people), and NCPO Order 49/2557 (a ban on providing support for political assembly).

At a glance, the NCPO’s efforts may appear to have had some measure of success. Key political movements such as the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) has ceased organising rallies at the scales seen before the 2014 coup. Yet the UDD’s quietness does not at all mean that civilians who disagree with military rule have surrendered to the finality of the NCPO. In a context where peaceful assembly is outlawed, activists are managing the risk of open conflict with authorities by creatively transforming everyday activities into expressions of frustration.

These strategies are as much about toeing the lines set by law, as they are about imparting a message that political expression is a normal thing that all people can do, rather than a dangerous and scary thing as suggested by the NCPO’s discourse. To mark the fourth anniversary of the NCPO’s coup, I have compiled a tapestry of activist inventiveness that military rule has not been able to stamp out.

Part one can be found here.

Time stops for no junta

While activists have long drawn upon the motif of clocks to symbolise lost time under the junta, they have in an unexpected twist come to represent the corruption of high-ranking officials in the NCPO.

Kate is now a leader of the We Want Elections group, whose leaders were recently detained for protesting the fourth anniversary of the most recent coup. On the first anniversary of coup , Kate  led an event that invited the general public to gather at 6pm outside the Bangkok Art and Cultural Centre and quietly look at their watches. While the theme of “watches” intended to symbolise all that the people had lost under the junta, Kate also felt that the activity was accessible to all since most people have access to a time-telling device, at least on their mobile phones. Four years later, a case against Kate and 8 other student activists for participating in the stunt is still making its way through military court.

Fast forward to the fourth year of the NCPO’s rule and Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Prawit Wongsuwan birthed a whole new terrain of satire revolving around watches. On 4 December 2017, netizens collated a collage of the Defence Minister’s outfits on various occasions, calculating that Prawit possesses at least 25 different luxury watches—none of which had been included in his assets declaration to the National Anti-Corruption Commission upon entering office in 2014.

Widespread criticism and ridicule ensued online. Ekkachai Hongkangwan, a prominent activist, has, for example, taken to tailing Prawit in a shirt adorned with cut-out pictures of luxury watches—wearing it to submit a request to the Anti-Corruption Commission to investigate Prawit’s assets on 5 March 2018. Ekkachai has vowed to wait outside the state cabinet meeting every Monday to bestow another watch onto the deputy PM.

On 30 January 2018, the artist Headache Stencil unveiled a large graffiti mural of a fake Rolex watch featuring Prawit’s face on the clock-face, accompanied by the caption: “You have many watches, but your time is up. All parties have to come to an end”. On 2 February 2018, the prominent activist, Toto, distributed photos of a security officer covering the mural. Two days later, Headache Stencil reported that plain-clothes officers had stationed themselves near his residence on an almost 24-hour basis.

Prayuth Pinocchio

We Want Elections first unveiled “Prayuth Pinocchio” on 24 February 2018: a cartoon of the junta leader General Prayuth with a long nose like Pinocchio’s.

In November 2014, Prayuth announced to media that elections would be held within one year, as per the junta’s “road map” to democracy. But in February 2015, he announced that there would not be elections that year after all, as the National Reform Council had not yet approved the draft constitution. In October 2017, the Organic Law on Elections finally came into effect and Prayuth told reporters that an election date would be announced in June 2018. From there, elections would supposedly take place in November 2018.

In January 2018, however, it became apparent that elections were likely to be delayed once again. That month, the special committee from the junta-appointed National Legislative Assembly tasked with vetting the Organic Law on Elections voted to amend Section 2 of the law. The reform means that the Organic Law on Elections will come into effect 90 days after its publishing in the Royal Gazette, rather than immediately as specified in the original draft of the law. Elections may now be pushed back to February 2019.

This prospect mobilised the formation of the We Want Elections group, which on 24 February 2018 distributed “Prayuth Pinocchio” masks in a stunt to demand elections this year. Kate recalls that the masks were sketched in a humorous design, to lessen the stressfulness of engaging in politics. But distributing masks also served to allowed attendees at the event to participate and take photos while mitigating the risk of identification by plain clothes officers.

From there, the group decided to print and distribute various paraphernalia featuring Prayuth Pinocchio, such as fans and waterproof phone cases. Kate and other activists intend to make Prayuth Pinocchio ‘go mainstream’—rather than just an image seen at protests—by making the cartoon of the junta leader with a long nose as ubiquitous as ‘those stickers with the names of temples that are always on the back of pick-trucks’.

During this year’s Songkran festival, We Want Elections distributed waterproof phone cases featuring Prayuth Pinocchio at the annual water fights along Khao San Road, hoping to impart that elections too should be a regular feature of the Thai calendar. Kate admits that at first, she was nervous to distribute the phone cases at Khao San, knowing she would encounter people of different political leanings. In the end, the response was largely enthusiastic: people were curious about Prayuth Pinocchio, some asked for photos with the We Want Elections members, and nobody tried to start a quarrel. Others however, upon seeing that the phone cases featured a pro-election message, hesitated to accept them.

The symbolic acts featured in this series are just a fragment of the creative elements of resistance that have survived under four years of the NCPO. These stories and images provide good cause to believe that as long as the military government is in power, civilians will continue to adapt novel tactics and inventive strategies to communicate their opposition to the status quo.

This article was submitted by iLaw as an amended version of its annual post-coup report.

[southeastasianists]

Purging the Thai Sangha - New Mandala

The persecution of one of the junta's most outspoken supporters, Buddha Issara, demands explanation

The early morning of 24 May 2018 was the morning of long knives for the Thai Sangha. Commandos stormed Or-Noi Temple to arrest the abbot, Buddha Issara, a staunch supporter of the NCPO. In an unrelated case, five other senior monks were arrested from three famous temples in Bangkok. Two remain on the run. This is the purge of a lifetime. Never have there been such high-profile arrests and so many prominent monks falling from grace.

The Thai Sangha has long suffered from falling public trust. Can these two incidents help restore its faded aura? Or do they reveal a deeper crisis in not only the Sangha, but also the leadership of the National Council of Peace and Order (NCPO). The persecution of one of the junta’s most outspoken supporters demands explanation.

Buddha Issara is no stranger to press. He led a militia-style mob during the 2014 Bangkok Shutdown campaign, occupying the road in front of a government complex and the Army Headquarters north of Bangkok. His heavily armed guards fought with riot police, detained intelligence officers and assailed bystanders, inflicting terror, injuries and even death. He raided a TV station and a hotel to extort money. Later, Buddha Issara staged mass protests demanding that the US Ambassador be recalled for criticising the junta.

The abbot’s impunity despite outrageous crimes has convinced the public that he enjoys the NCPO’s support, as confirmed by photos of military generals paying homage to him on several occasions. This time, though, he was on the receiving end of the NCPO’s wrath. He has been charged with assault, extortion and unauthorised use of the royal seal for amulets. For this last act, he was fortunate enough not to be charged with lese majeste.

The other five senior monks have been involved in more sophisticated, but more typical, crime. These monks held key positions in the Sangha administration and served as dhamma instructors to younger monks. Phra Phrom Dilok was an abbot of Sam Phraya Temple. Phra Atthakit Sophon was his secretary. Three deputies of Wat Sa Ket, known for its landmark Golden Mountain, were caught while the abbot, Phra Phrom Sitthi, fled. Another fugitive is the Deputy Abbot, Phra Phrom Methee, of Wat Samphanthawong. These are prestigious temples under royal patronage.

For years, these temples had embezzled hundreds of millions of baht from the Temple Education Fund. Investigations revealed that money was transferred into a fake bank account, some of which was used to pay for sexual services. While Thais are familiar with the financial and sexual scandals of monks, the scale and magnitude of the case stunned the public. The court denied bail to all six monks. In accordance with Sangha law, they were defrocked before being sent into jail. This archaic rule is to protect the integrity of the saffron robe, making sure that it never touches a jail.

A shake-up is needed if the Sangha is to restore its credibility. A purge would not be unheard of. According to Buddhist belief, everything degenerates over time. From time to time, Buddhist kings exercise their power to purify the Sangha, halting the degeneration process. Purification can involve revisions in the Buddha’s teaching, the book of Tipitaka. Rama I, the founder of Bangkok and the Chakri dynasty, ordered the recension of Tipitaka and promulgated ten rules on the conduct of monks (Kod Mai Pra Song).

But on other occasions, force is invoked. King Asoka of Maurya India set an example when he tried and executed monks who failed to satisfy his standard of Buddhist knowledge and behaviour. King Taksin, of the Thonburi dynasty, did the same.

Actions to purify the Sangha are more common in a regime whose power is yet to be consolidated (Taksin fresh after the fall of Ayutthaya, and Rama I after founding the new dynasty of Chakri). The duty is shouldered by modern governments too. Their upkeep of Buddhism earns them the Sangha’s moral endorsement of the regime in return.

But purification often masks a political motive. In early 2017, after the death of the beloved King Bhumibol, the NCPO applied a final solution to the struggle over the Sangha Raja vacancy (the previous Sangha Raja, Somdej Phra Yanasangvorn, had died a few years earlier). The NCPO blocked the Sangha Council’s nomination of Somdej Phra Maha Rajjamangalacharn (Somdej Chuang), due to Chuang’s affiliation with the controversial Dhammakaya Temple.

Dhammakaya, a consumerist heretic sect, was not only one of the largest contemporary Buddhist movements, it also allegedly supported Thaksin Shinawatra. The Sangha law was amended and a new Sangha Raja with no Dhammakaya connection, Somdej Phra Maha Muniwong, was appointed. Soldiers then broke into Dhammakaya Temple and Thammachaiyo, the abbot, fled a fraud charge, ending the two-year feud.

But Dhammakaya has not been totally stamped out. Dhammakaya still has sympathisers within the Sangha Council, which was evidenced in the Sangha Council’s initial endorsement of Somdej Chuang’s candidacy. The Sangha Raja has yet to appoint a new abbot to govern the Dhammakaya Temple. The 24 May purge is seen as the latest attempt to uproot Dhammakaya since the five senior monks are accused of having connections to Dhammakaya.

The motives behind the case of Buddha Issara are more puzzling. Since he sided with the NCPO, he is naturally an enemy of both Dhammakaya and Thaksin. He was very active in inciting hatred and the use of deadly force against the temple. But he is different from other famous monks, who are usually seen as possessing magical charisma. Buddha Issara is admired for his political views, not celestial power—he is a mercenary, a hired gun, with no spiritual backup. This less austere status makes him more vulnerable.

As Buddha Issara became more outspoken and controversial, the cost of aligning with him might have exceeded the benefits for the NCPO. As a liability, he was dealt with the same way Sondhi Limthongkul was silenced by a failed assassination after the 2006 coup. Perhaps, spectators observe, Buddha Issara has been strategically sacrificed to divert media attention from the more embarrassing embezzlement case. This arrest would make the government appear impartial too.

Still, so much remains unexplained. A few hours after the arrest, video footageof the operation was released online. This footage was definitely intended to humiliate Buddha Issara. Furious followers, almost all of them also supporters of NCPO, slammed the government for inappropriate treatment of their revered master. The baffled NCPO quickly apologized.

For the junta, the operations against the monks might not be helpful after all. Thailand is so polarised that purification attempts may muddle the situation further. Dhammakaya is a highly politicised topic and it has become a symbolic battle between the NCPO and Thaksin’s supporters. Resentment still lingers so the arrest of the five monks only adds insult to injury.

Most importantly, intervening in Sangha politics depends on more than law. It requires an extra-legal qualification known as barami (charisma). Barami means the possession of desirable virtues such as piety, tolerance, integrity and generosity. Not every ruler can detain a monk without consequences. The limits are set by public opinion. If a leader is unwise, violent or selfish, purification easily turns into harassment.

Prayuth is certainly not a man of great barami. His government is corrupt, cruel and incompetent. Disciples of the accused senior monks point out that the Director of the National Office of Buddhism, who spearheaded the embezzlement investigation, has himself misused state temple funds money to fund a trip with his wife abroad. Incidents of this kind badly delegitimise the NCPO’s investigations into the Sangha.

Despite the arrested monks’ serious crimes and breaches of the monastic code, the Sangha Council itself never acted seriously against them. Only after the arrests were made did the Sangha Raja dismiss the detained monks from the council and recall honorific titles. The Sangha Council has neither praised nor condemned the raids. The current Sangha Raja is well-liked for his exemplary behaviour and knowledge in Dhamma. But his quietness sends an ambiguous signal. It may imply the Sangha Council’s approval of the government’s intervention, which allows the Sangha Council to appear neutral while the government does the unpleasant job of cleaning up the Sangha.

But acquiescence may suggest a lack of leadership, a skill much needed if the Sangha wishes to restore public faith in the body. Many monks assert that the temporal government cannot sanction members of the spiritual realm. Yet there have been growing calls from within the Sangha for greater state support to halt the deterioration of social morality. As a rule, support always comes with control. How can the Sangha expect a close, deeper and more intimate relationship with the NCPO without forsaking autonomy?

Thai Buddhism needs more than just two high-profile arrests to successfully reform itself. The Sangha is still divided over temporal politics. Evidently, the Sangha’s leaders lack the courage to weed out rogue monks by themselves. They have placed the issue in the hands of the junta, whose legitimacy is in tatters and commitment to reforming Buddhism questionable.