1939 05 11 Khalkin Gol - Clash of cavalry - Adam Hook
This scene depicts the attack of 35 BA-6 and BA-10 armoured cars on a Man chukuo cavalry unit, which crossed the Mongolian/Soviet recognized border about 10 miles east of the river. The armoured cars quickly outpaced the infantry battalion with which it had begun the attack and independently drove back the cavalry with heavy casualties, including to the cavalry regiment headquarters. However, the armoured cars attacked without mounting their auxiliary tracks and four BA-6s became stuck in the sandy soil that predominated on the eastern side of the river, being destroyed by enemy fire.
Asia Pacific 80 years ago today: Nomonhan Incident (31 Aug 1939) https://buff.ly/2zwalMk A second Soviet-Japanese dispute broke out on the Mongolian border in May 1939, culminating in the Soviet defeat of Japanese forces at Nomonhan in August. At the same time, the Soviets signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, a non-aggression treaty with Japan's erstwhile ally Germany. #asiapacific #history #welovehistory #welovemaps #map #1930s #20thcentury #modernhistory #1939 #august #august31 #chinesecivilwar #chinesehistory #sovietunion #japaneseempire #japanesehistory #ussr #manchuria #nomonhan #secondsinojapanesewar #maps #todayinhistory #historytoday #historyteacher #historybuff #historygeek #historynerd #worldhistory #cartography #geopolitics (at Mongolia) https://www.instagram.com/p/B10KkSaAUk4/?igshid=17l2k350k0wge
a barca. o trem. abaixo, a sabedoria do sr. Honda: . "você não deve obstruir o fluxo: deve subir quando tiver que subir e descer quando tiver que descer. quando o fluxo estiver para cima, basta encontrar a torre mais alta e subir até o topo. quando o fluxo estiver para baixo, basta encontrar o poço mais fundo e descer até as profundezas. quando não existir fluxo, basta ficar parado. se você obstruir o fluxo, tudo seca. se tudo secar, o mundo vira um lugar de trevas. . é extremamente difícil esperar o fluxo aparecer, mas, quando precisa esperar, precisa esperar. em momentos assim é melhor se fingir de morto." . Crônica do Pássaro de Corda - Haruki Murakami. . #harukimurakami #crônicadopássarodecorda #toruokada #nomonhan #fluxo #água 🐤 #leituradeférias #sempre #marca #a #vida. 🌌 #水 #鳥 #戦争 #女 #運命 #空 #月#星 #村上春樹 🌌 https://www.instagram.com/p/BujqGGDDha3/?utm_source=ig_tumblr_share&igshid=4hl3a63kth6n
/k/ Planes Episode 81: The Fiery Skies Over Khalkhin Gol
It’s time for another episode of /k/ Planes! This time, we’ll be looking into the air battles that occurred during the Russo-Japanese border clashes in 1939.
Across the latter half of the 1930s, the Soviets and Japanese found border clashes along the 3,000-mile Manchurian border were becoming increasingly frequent. Over 1,000 incidents of some kind would occur, ranging from things as benign as Soviet soldiers stealing fish off the lines of Manchurian fishermen to full-fledged battles over disputed areas. These disputes hit their climax in the summer of 1939 in a disputed region between the tiny village of Nomonhan and a river known to the Mongols as the Khalkhin Gol. The bull-headed Kwantung Army, sick of diplomatic interventions over the previous years, finally took matters into their own hands, expanding a minor dispute into the largest incident of the Russo-Japanese border clashes. Raging from May to September 1939, the incident that would become known as the Battle of Khalkhin Gol would see some of the most vicious air combat of the interwar period and in many ways underline the critical shortcomings of both belligerents that would be further revealed in the coming war.
The Belligerents: VVS
The Soviet Air Force of early 1939 was a far cry from the powerhouse it would become six years later. Two years into Stalin’s purges, the VVS officer corps had been hit hard, all while crew training remained horrifically poor - most pilots got at most 60 hours of flying per year. Save the experienced pilots drawn from foreign missions to Spain and China, the VVS found itself without capable airmen. The fact that crews often removed heavy equipment like radios and oxygen tanks only further exacerbated things - relying on hand signals between planes and giant cloth arrows pointed to the battlefield by ground control, formations often fell apart, even without the help of the poorly-trained, undisciplined pilots. The lack of oxygen equipment also proved a liability - crews were limited to lower altitudes, yielding higher altitudes to Japanese fighters.
For all their problems, however, the VVS was far from useless. Typical of Russia, they seemed to make up for their lack of quality with a seemingly endless supply of men and materiel. This in turn gave the VVS plenty of room to learn - something they did quickly. Over the course of the campaign, tactics evolved to better suit the environment, all while the Soviet industry sent its best and newest aircraft to the theater for operational evaluation. Some performed well, while others were disappointing. It seemed as though the border clash was as much a testing ground for new concepts as it was a decisive battlefield to the VVS.
The Belligerents: Mongolian People’s Republic Air Corps
As a client state of Russia, the relative backwater nation of Mongolia understandably had far from a first-rate air force. If the state of the VVS at the time seemed poor, the Mongolian Air Corps was even worse off. Lacking any fighters of their own, the Mongolian contingent supporting Soviet forces during the border clash consisted primarily of R-5 biplanes. At the start of the conflict, three squadrons of R-5 and R-5Sh light bombers were committed, actually outnumbering the reconnaissance aircraft committed by the Soviets. However, the types were hardly competitive, and, just as the VVS relegated their own R-5s to secondary duties, the MPR’s air forces would also be marginalized during the conflict.
The Belligerents: IJAAF
The Imperial Japanese Army Air Forces were practically the antithesis of the VVS in 1939. Years of fighting in China had produced countless expert airmen with thousands of hours of flight time under their belts. Excellent crews across the board were further aided by quality machines and equipment - particularly radios and oxygen tanks. However, for all they had in individual quality, they lacked in quantity. Japanese industrial capacity was so horrifically poor that the IJAAF was forced to operate foreign types on occasion (like the Fiat BR.20). Domestic industry could barely meet the demands of the China war (only about one Ki-27 was rolled out every day), and the incredibly intensity of this border clash in a tertiary theater only served to further strain IJA resources. Crew replacement programs were in an even worse state. Since their inception 30 years’ prior, Japan’s national flying schools had produced just 1,700 pilots. Of course, men could come from other places, but nevertheless it meant that there was a very real shortage of aircraft and crews.
The Aircraft: Nakajima Ki-27 Army Type 97 Fighter
The premier fighter of the IJAAF was the agile Ki-27 monoplane. The product of poor engine development and an archaic IJA focus on maneuverability, the Ki-27 was stereotypical of Japanese monoplane fighters - almost absurdly light and agile and unbeatable on the horizontal plane, but at the cost of poor dive performance, inadequate armament (just two rifle-caliber machineguns), and a complete lack of protection. As if the expert pilots flying the type weren’t enough, the Ki-27 was also an easy platform to fly and a far more stable gun platform than its closest Soviet competitor, the I-16, making things far easier on exhausted pilots who often had to fly as many as seven sorties a day. Further advantages were held in the type’s onboard equipment - all aircraft held radios (although only the group leader’s could transmit), and the decision to keep oxygen equipment aboard the aircraft meant that the IJAAF fighters more often than not came into engagements with a significant altitude advantage.
The Aircraft: Kawasaki Ki-10-II Army Type 95 Fighter
As the last biplane fighter of the IJAAF, the Ki-10 was hardly a competitive design. Far sleeker than the portly Soviet fighters it went up against, it nevertheless was obsolete by 1939. Armed with just two rifle-caliber machineguns and lacking the performance advantages the modern Ki-27 monoplanes held over Soviet fighters, the Ki-10 would be committed to the theater only as a last resort. Hoping to bolster fighter numbers to alleviate the exhaustion and attrition of the expert Ki-27 crews, the Ki-10 would make its belated debut over Khalkhin Gol well after the balance of power had tipped in favor of the Soviets. Their late debut over the border region coupled with the priority given to the more capable Ki-27 meant that operations were sporadic - in the end, only a single Ki-10 would be lost to enemy action, and although their crews would claim a fair number of Soviet aircraft, the Ki-10 in reality saw little combat.
The Aircraft: Mitsubishi Ki-21-Ia Army Type 97 Heavy Bomber
The most numerous “heavy” bomber of the IJAAF over Manchukuo in 1939 was the twin-engined Ki-21. Compared to its Soviet contemporary, the SB, the Ki-21 was a superior aircraft - it was faster, longer-ranged, and carried a heavier payload (1,000kg compared to 600kg). However, it suffered from many flaws endemic to Japanese bombers. It was poorly protected, lacking in both armor and defensive armament, but ideally fighter escort would make up for these shortcomings. It also carried sufficient equipment for night operations, although such operations would be far less regular than those of the Soviets. Really the biggest shortcomings of the design came on the strategic scale - production was slow, and the war in China took priority over the tertiary theater that was Manchukuo. Thus, any losses - no matter how light - were painful, and available numbers were always low. At the start of the conflict, just 12 Ki-21s were available.
The Aircraft: Fiat BR.20
Slow production of the Ki-21 caused the IJAAF to look abroad for a stopgap solution to boost bomber numbers. Japan chose the Italian BR.20 fast bomber, which had proven itself in the skies over Spain in the latter half of the 1930s. 85 were purchased, with deliveries beginning in 1938. They would make their combat debut over China in early 1939, and by the start of the conflict at Khalkhin Gol, 18 were available to commanders in Manchukuo. Unfortunately, when finally pressed into combat against the VVs, the BR.20’s shortcomings were revealed. Even by Japanese standards, armament and protection was poor, and compared to the Ki-21 the BR.20 proved unsatisfactory. As more Ki-21s became available and the balance in the air tipped in favor of the VVS, the BR.20 was withdrawn from the theater.
The Aircraft: Mitsubishi Ki-30 Army Type 97 Light Bomber
Mitsubishi’s Ki-30 would come to form half of the IJAAF’s light bomber force during the conflict. The Ki-30 was a light two-man bomber capable of carrying a payload of 450kg of bombs, capable of serving as a tactical bomber or reconnaissance aircraft. In spite of its archaic fixed landing gear, the Ki-30 was blisteringly fast, making it invulnerable to all but the I-16 in a straightaway dash. While the type featured shortcomings endemic to Japanese aircraft - poor armament (just two rifle-caliber machineguns) and minimal armor - the Ki-30 would also inherit the characteristic long legs of its country’s designs. This allowed the Ki-30 to operate from more distant airfields, keeping it safe from enemy bombers which would target IJAAF airfields with increasing intensity.
The Aircraft: Kawasaki Ki-32 Army Type 98 Light Bomber
Developed in parallel with Mitsubishi’s radial-engined Ki-30, the Ki-32 was notable for being the IJAAF’s last bomber to use a liquid-cooled engine. Apart from its distinct engine, the Ki-32 was very similar to the Ki-30 - it had fixed landing gear, a light machinegun armament, and an airframe strengthened for dive-bombing. Performance was slightly lower than the Ki-30, and operational numbers were also eclipsed by its Mitsubishi counterpart, but service against the VVS would show similar results - the Ki-32 was fast enough to evade most Soviet fighters on a straightaway, although it was very vulnerable to enemy fighters if it was caught. Also, poor payloads forced the IJAAF to fly the type in large numbers for bombing raids.
The Aircraft: Mitsubishi Ki-15-II Army Type 97 Command Reconnaissance Plane
The most potent reconnaissance platform at the IJAAF’s disposal in 1939 was the Ki-15. Like their light bombers, the Ki-15 was a sleek, two-man monoplane with fixed landing gear. However, it was intended purely for reconnaissance - apart from a single defensive machinegun, it was unarmed. Rather, it held advanced cameras, oxygen equipment, and radios to optimize its role as a scout. It outpaced even the Ki-30, proving to be the most difficult target for Soviet fighters. However, aggressive use of the Ki-15 meant that even with its high speed, it would not leave the theater unscathed - the IJAAF would admit to the loss of 7 aircraft.
Tachikawa Ki-36 Army Type 96 Cooperation Aircraft
The Ki-36 was hardly a remarkable aircraft. Almost identical in layout to the IJAAF’s other light bombers, the Ki-36 was designed as an army cooperation aircraft. It was built with simplicity and ease of operation in mind, so while rough-field performance was excellent, actual combat performance was lacking. Over China, this was not too much of an issue thanks to Japanese air supremacy, but things would be different over Mongolia. Ki-36s would undertake tactical reconnaissance flights (compared to the longer-range missions assigned to other single-engined bombers) and, as the situation deteriorated, they were pressed into service as bombers. However, they were ill-suited to the role. The Ki-36 was incredibly slow (its top speed was lower than the Ki-30’s cruise speed) and it was limited to 150kg of payload.
The Aircraft: Polikarpov I-15bis
The I-15bis, or I-152, was a refined version of Polikarpov’s iconic biplane fighter. The I-15bis carried over the characteristic portly fuselage and fixed landing gear of the I-15, but did away with the gull-wing in favor of a more conventional parasol upper wing to improve visibility. Additionally, the new M-25 radial (also used on the I-16) was mounted to improve performance. Despite these changes, the archaic design was still underperforming. Now surpassed by modern monoplanes, the type nevertheless would see considerable use over the Khalkhin Gol. Unsurprisingly, losses were high. The I-15bis was completely outclassed by the Ki-27, and only when working in concert with I-16s did the biplane fighter have any hopes of success. The ineffectiveness of the I-15bis would show in loss records - despite being considerably rarer on the front than the I-16 (and having numbers drawn down as the conflict dragged on), combat losses of I-15bis amounted to 60 aircraft - a mere 27 less than the vastly more numerous I-16s.
The Aircraft: Polikarpov I-16
The most capable and numerous fighter at the Soviets’ disposal was the portly I-16. The most modern fighter in the world when it first flew in 1934, the snub-nosed monoplane fighter had seen distinguished service over China and Spain in the preceding years. While incredibly agile by Western terms, it was outperformed in nearly every aspect by the Ki-27, meaning that the conditions that led to its agility - namely the poorly-placed center of gravity - merely made the type dangerous to fly. However, it did have its advantages. It was far sturdier than any IJAAF fighter, allowing it to survive more punishment and dive faster away from its foes. Although its instability somewhat counteracted this, its four rapid-firing ShKAS guns (or in the type-17s, two ShVAK cannon and two ShKAS) gave the I-16 far better firepower than anything they went up against. Combined with the effects of attrition on the IJAAF and the fact that the I-16 was almost always flying with numbers on its side, it could fight on about even terms with the Ki-27.
The Aircraft: Polikarpov I-153 Chaika
As a more advanced development of the archaic I-15, Polikarpov had created the I-153. The I-153 aimed to improve the performance of the I-15 and I-15bis with a number of aerodynamic refinements. The Chaika reverted to the I-15’s original gull-wing, but took the more efficient airfoil of the I-15bis to further reduce drag. Meanwhile, the M-25 radial gave way to the twin-supercharged M-62, and retractable landing gear was added, giving the I-153 a sleek, modern appearance. Armament was also revised, with the four PV-1 machineguns of the I-15bis giving way to the faster firing ShKAS. Making its debut midway through the conflict, the Chaika was originally kept secret and forbidden from crossing the border. However, combat quickly proved the Chaika to be underwhelming. The aerodynamic improvements were not enough to beat the Ki-27, and a poorly designed internal structure led to regular structural failures during heavy maneuvering. Such poor combat reports were enough to convince leaders to do away with the flight restrictions, but the I-153 would remain on the front, as it still represented an improvement over the I-15bis.
The Aircraft: Polikarpov R-5/R-5Sh/R-Z
The archaic R-5 biplane and its variants - a design that first flew in 1928 - was without a doubt hopelessly obsolete by 1939. Serving with reconnaissance units but also intended to undertake light bomber duties, the R-5 would fly in significant numbers with both Soviet and Mongolian forces. Understandably, combat performance was poor. They quickly proved incapable of operating in the presence of enemy fighters, and the type had to be withdrawn from frontline reconnaissance duties and replaced with I-16s or SB-2s. Offensive duties would go similarly poorly - experience in Spain had shown even the vastly improved R-Z was vulnerable to enemy fighters, and, as VVS commanders soon found themselves with more I-16s and SBs than they knew what to do with, the R-5s and R-Zs present in the theater were shifted to auxiliary roles.
The Aircraft: Tupolev SB-2
The famed duralumin fast bomber from the Spanish Civil War had passed its prime by the time the incident at Nomonhan broke out. While designed to rely on its speed for protection, technology had since progressed to the point where this was no longer feasible. Even the newest variants were surpassed by their Japanese counterparts both in terms of speed and payload. Meanwhile combat performance was hampered by the horrendous ergonomics and fields of fire for the defensive guns, making flying the SB a miserable and dangerous experience. Worst of all was the fact that the forces flying the SB in Mongolia were operating several different variants, each with a unique engine. Apart from complicating the logistics chain, the differing variants meant that keeping formations was exceedingly difficult, serving to make the bombers more vulnerable to enemy fighters. For all the SB-2’s failings, however, it would form the mainstay of the Soviet bomber forces in the campaign, making up for its failings with changing tactics and overwhelming numbers.
The Aircraft: Tupolev TB-3
The corrugated duralumin behemoth that was the TB-3 heavy bomber was an iconic symbol of interwar Soviet airpower. It boasted an impressive range - in theory it could make strikes on Japan - along with a capable payload of 3,000kg. However, even a VVS command hampered by the purges could recognize that the TB-3 was long past its prime. From 1933, the VVS in the Far East had 143 TB-3s at their disposal, which they put to good use over the Khalkhin Gol. Rather than risk the massive lumbering machine in conventional operations, they were instead committed to less conventional duties. Making use of their unparalleled range, they operated from bases well beyond the reach of Japanese bombers to fly night missions over Japanese positions. While such sorties did little damage, they kept constant pressure on enemy forces. For this, the TB-3 seemed perfectly suited - with no threat of enemy fighters, they could drop their impressive payloads unmolested, taking the load off of the SB-2s which were better used for daylight missions.
The Aircraft: Neman R-10
A product of the Ivanov program of the 1930s, the R-10 was the newest addition to the neglected VVS reconnaissance corps. While not originally deployed to the theater, the outbreak of hostilities gave the VVS a prime opportunity to test their new modern monoplane. A small number were dispatched by rail to the theater to be assembled on site, and by May of 1939, 45 R-10s were operational in the Far East. They would supplement reconnaissance operations, but their impact was minimal and their appearance in the conflict was more an operational evaluation than a true commitment of the type. While the R-10 was not the only aircraft to make its debut over Mongolia, production was slow, and a general neglect of the VVS reconnaissance corps (which would carry into WW2) meant that despite good performance, the R-10 would never completely take over reconnaissance operations. Rather, the bulk of reconnaissance duties fell on the abundant SBs and I-16s.
Background
Although sporadic incidents ranging from benign trespassing to full-blown battles had occurred along the 3,000 mile long border Japan found itself sharing with the Soviets since 1932, the coming of 1939 would see tensions reaching new heights. In the Spring of 1939, the newest disputes focused on a region of the Mongolian-Manchukuo border near a village called Nomonhan. According to the Japanese, the border followed the Halha River/Khalkhin Gol, which the Mongolian border followed elsewhere. However, the Soviets and Mongolians, relying on different maps and treaties with China, considered the border to be parallel to the river about ten miles to the east in the vicinity of Nomonhan. The land itself was hardly valuable - there was nothing but barren steppe for hundreds of miles, and even the village of Nomonhan that sat on the Soviet-claimed border was little more than a collection of huts with no strategic value.
Of course, the Kwantung Army - an alarmingly proud and belligerent entity that often operated beyond the control of the central government - would not let something as simple as strategic irrelevance stop them from escalating their disputes. By early 1939, minor clashes between Japanese and Mongolian forces near the disputed border became fairly regular. Firefights between patrols gradually escalated, and by the end of March the first combat sorties would be flown. On at least one occasion, lone Mongolian R-5s strafed and dispersed Manchukuo cavalrymen, and on March 31, the Kwantung Army would launch seven Ki-30s to support an attack on a border outpost. Although the attack failed, it marked a major escalation of the border clashes.
Kicking Things Off
The turning point of these skirmishes came on the night of May 10. A Mongolian patrol crossed into the disputed zone over the night, and the next day they were evicted by a Manchukuo cavalry force. The Mongolians responded in turn with a larger force, leading to a week of indecisive skirmishes. However, the Manchukuo reported the event to General Komatsubara, who viewed the incident as an opportunity to reclaim the glory lost at Changkufeng a year prior. On May 12, the Kwantung Army formed the Rinji-Hikotai, comprising of the 10th Sentai (six Ki-30s and six Ki-15s) and 24th Sentai (twenty Ki-27s). The next day, they were relocated to airfields 160km from Nomonhan, and on the 14th they sprang into action. Flying unopposed, the single-engined bombers dropped 52 bombs on the Mongolian border post, while the next day they turned their attention to another post indisputably within Mongolian territory. . Over the following days, the Japanese aircraft made continuing incursions to perform reconnaissance, strafe ground forces, and drop bombs.
By the end of the 15th, the Mongolians had been repulsed west of the Khalkhin Gol, and, although intrusions in the air continued, the Japanese generals withdrew forces and generally considered the action to be over. For the Soviets, that was hardly the case. The escalating tensions saw the Soviet 57th Corps committed to reclaim the disputed territory, supported by the modest VVS forces in the region. Making their appearance over the battlefield on May 17, the VVS got off to a rough start. The mixed force of I-15s, I-16s, and R-5s could muster only a fraction of the sorties flown by their opponents, and there was a massive disparity in quality of aircraft and crews. In these opening days, the IJAAF reigned supreme - R-5s were easy prey to the Ki-27s, even when escorted by friendly fighters. The fighters themselves fared little better - poorly trained, lacking radios, and outnumbered, they suffered heavy losses. By the 21st, between nine and seventeen (depending on the source) VVS aircraft had been shot down, causing leaders to briefly suspend all air operations as reinforcements were brought in.
While the combined Soviet-Mongolian forces on the ground secured a foothold, the VVS worked to bolster its forces. The 22nd IAP, totaling 35 I-15bis and 28 I-16 type 10s, was transferred on May 26, losing one I-15 during the ferry flight. Two days prior, the IJAAF had also bolstered their numbers, transferring twenty Ki-27s to support rapidly expanding air operations. On the ground and in the air, the situation remained tense - ground forces prepared for the next retaliatory assault while the newly arrived fighters battled it out in the skies. On the 25th, Soviet fighters flew 60 sorties - a major jump from the previous days. However, the Japanese continued to hold the advantage in the skies, claiming three I-15bis and an I-16. The following two days were even worse. Through superior coordination, the IJAAF fighters baited a squadron of I-16s across the border and annihilated them, destroying all but one of eight fighters that rose to face them.
The May 28th Offensive
The tension finally broke on May 28, when General Komatsubara launched a surprise offensive to dislodge the Soviet-MPR forces entrenched in the disputed territory. Supporting the opening of the assault at dawn was a strike package of forty aircraft. In response, the VVS ordered the 70th IAP to launch 20 fighters, only to rescind the order after three I-15s had sortied. Unable to recall them, the three biplanes flew off to their deaths at the hands of nine Ki-27s of the 10th Sentai. Elsewhere, the 22nd IAP hastily scrambled its forces piecemeal as Japanese aircraft appeared overhead. The I-16s would be first to sortie, but they lost their way and returned to base without seeing action. The ten I-15bis that launched 25 minutes late thus arrived over the battlefield without their customary monoplane fighter support. They were met by eighteen Ki-27s that dove down on them, blasting apart the biplanes. A single I-15bis managed to limp back to base, the sole survivor of an engagement which cost the VVS nine fighters for just a single Ki-27.
Fortunately for the Soviets, things would go far better on the ground. The initial Japanese offensive had pushed the Soviet-MPR forces several miles back, but a Japanese force intended to cut off their path across the Khalkhin Gol ended up being surrounded themselves. Meanwhile, VVS high command had recognized the horrific performance of their fighters (15 losses and 11 men killed for just a single enemy fighter over the past two days), and 22 of the most decorated pilots were drawn in to be sent to the theater. All of them veterans from Spain or China, these aces would work to improve the combat effectiveness of local fighter units. They set out on May 29th, taking four days to fly from Moscow to their remote airfields in Mongolia. By the end of that same day, the Soviets had claimed their first victory - the surrounded Japanese force had been annihilated, and the foothold east of the Khalkhin Gol remained.
Reorganization
In the aftermath of the major skirmish near Nomonhan at the end of May, the Soviet high command decided they needed a better commander in place. On June 1st, Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov was called to Moscow to meet with Kliment Voroshilov, who briefed him on the situation in Mongolia and sent him to visit and assess the situation and possibly take over if required. Zhukov arrived on June 5, reporting that a renewed Japanese offensive was increasingly likely. He soon took over command of Soviet forces in Mongolia and initiated a massive buildup of forces. As part of this buildup, the VVS poured men and aircraft into the theater. More aces from the Spanish Civil War made their way to Mongolia, and the newest ShVAK cannon-armed I-16 type 17s followed. Soon enough, the Soviets had mustered a force of 318 aircraft, including three IAPs (22nd, 70th, and 56th) totaling 151 fighters. Additionally, 116 SB-2s of the 150ths and 38th SBAP were transferred to provide local forces with offensive airpower for the first time. Meanwhile, R-5s that remained in the theater were relegated to secondary duties.
The Japanese, who had been flying regular reconnaissance missions over Mongolia, were quick to discover the buildup of aircraft. While the Ki-27s still held air superiority, the Kwantung Army was not going to risk losing that. Ki-21 and BR.20 “heavy” bombers made their way to the theater for the first time, giving the IJAAF a long enough reach to threaten the logistical hub of Bain-Tumen. More importantly, however, the forces were reorganized into three units - the 7th Hikodan (1st Sentai with 23 Ki-27s, 12th Sentai with 12 BR.20s, and 15th Sentai with 6 Ki-15s and 8 Ki-36s), 9th Hikodan (61st Sentai with 12 Ki-21s and 10th Sentai with 6 Ki-15s and 6 Ki-30s) and 12th Hikodan (11th and 24th Sentais with a total of 55 Ki-27s between them). In all, the IJAAF could muster 128 aircraft (78 fighters, 24 twin-engined bombers, and 26 reconnaissance aircraft/light bombers), dispersed at three airfields 600km, 160km, and 40km from the battlefield.
While ground forces sat waiting for the next offensive to start, the VVS was hard at work to address issues revealed earlier in the campaign. The Soviet Union’s most renowned ace, Major Ivan Lakeev, was put in charge of all fighter forces, and top aces were placed in most command positions to train the pilots under their command. While seemingly vital equipment like radios and oxygen tanks continued to be removed by crews, accelerated training courses hoped to improve coordination of aircraft and dogfight performance - both areas where Soviet pilots performed miserably. Fighter tactics continued to match the faster monoplanes with the lumbering biplanes, but improved discipline and coordination aimed to eliminate the all-too-common situation where I-15s were caught alone against Japanese fighters. New airfields were built closer to the frontlines to give fighters better reaction time, and an early-warning network was established.
Of course, the lull was not entirely quiet. The occasional Japanese reconnaissance plane - escorted by fighters - would often be challenged by Soviet fighters, leading to brief air battles from which the Japanese always emerged the victors. By mid-June, however, it would be the Soviets’ turn to take the initiative. June 17 marked the first truly offensive VVS sorties, in which cannon-armed I-16t type 17s were sent out on reconnaissance missions with freedom to strafe targets of opportunity. These strafing missions intensified over the following days, ultimately leading to a direct report to Kwantung Army HQ on June 19th about the attacks. This incident proved critical - while hardly undeserved, the Kwantung Army felt that such an attack could not go unpunished. Thus, planning began for a retaliatory offensive to not only reclaim the disputed territory, but completely destroy the offending Soviet-MPR forces. In just one day, the Kwantung Army HQ had learned of the attacks and decided to launch an offensive, making use of 15,000 men, 120 guns, 70 tanks, and 180 aircraft.
Shifting Balance in the Skies
Unusually, the decision to launch the offensive (scheduled for early July) actually led to the curtailing of cross-border sorties. Fearing that such reconnaissance missions would tip off the Soviets to their intentions and confident of their own superiority, reconnaissance sorties were drawn down over the coming days. Air combat did not cease entirely, however. June 22 would see the largest air battle thus far in the conflict. Reconnaissance sorties had began that morning with renewed intensity, causing bases along the front to be put on alert. Soon enough, 18 fighters of the 24th Sentai appeared over the disputed area, successfully drawing out twelve I-16s and ten I-15bis that rose to meet them. Unfortunately, the units arrived separate from eachother, meaning that the Ki-27s still had local numerical superiority. The I-16s, which met the intruders first, were quickly dispersed, so when the I-15s finally made it to the battle, they found themselves outnumbered and outgunned. Three I-15s made forced landings before a squadron of I-16s came to chase away the fighters.
This first skirmish was only a taste of things to come that day. About 60 Ki-27s appeared soon after the first battle dispersed, and the VVS mustered a massive force totaling 40 I-15bis and 44 I-16s to meet them. The battle got off to a rough start for the VVS, with a large formation of fighters being ambushed by Ki-27s, but through sheer numbers they pulled through, eventually finding themselves holding the initiative as the Ki-27s depleted their ammunition. Soon enough, however, the Soviet fighters began to run out of fuel, and one by one the fighters returned to base to refuel and rearm, only to return to the ongoing battle in the skies. For two and a half hours, the battle raged on as superior Japanese pilots were pitted against more numerous Soviet fighters. By the time the last fighters touched down, the results were hardly conclusive. The Soviets admitted to the loss of 13 I-15bis and an I-16 while claiming 30 enemy fighters, while Japanese claims went as high as 49 enemy aircraft for the loss of seven of their own.
While the numbers showed things to be slightly in favor of the Japanese, the circumstances of the engagement showed a significant change from the previous month. For the first time, Japanese fighters could not secure air superiority, and even more alarmingly, were forced to flee the battlefield on several occasions. The Japanese responded quickly, ferrying in 59 Ki-27s from Harbin the next day. While the 23rd would be considerably calmer, it was not entirely peaceful - five I-16s engaged five Ki-27s, ending with one loss on either side. The increased VVS activity saw the IJAAF send another reconnaissance flight over the border, which, much to their surprise, counted over 200 aircraft. A larger battle broke out the following day. Again, losses were in favor of the Japanese, but the Soviets had forced their foes to flee the skies again. Clearly, the days of Japanese air superiority were numbered.
The Japanese Strike
The discovery of the massive fighter forces stationed along the front caused considerable alarm among the Kwantung Army HQ. Recent air battles were showing that the VVS could put up enough aircraft to challenge their air superiority, and reconnaissance was showing that they would likely weather the attrition of air combat better than their own pilots. Hoping to level this disparity, the Kwantung Army HQ planned an extensive strike on forward airfields. As the air battles continued to sap the IJAAF’s strength, reconnaissance sorties intensified, extensively mapping Soviet airfields in preparation for the coming assault. Making use of the nigh-invulnerable Ki-15s, the Kwantung Army gathered accurate estimates of every Soviet airfield without suffering a single loss.
At 5:50 AM Tokyo time on June 27th, a lone reconnaissance aircraft overflew the forwardmost Soviet airbase, leaving a prominent contrail in its wake. Having been on alert for several days due to increasing reconnaissance activity, the 70th IAP scrambled to intercept the aircraft. However, unbeknownst to the Soviets, Japanese infiltration teams had successfully cut the telephone lines of the early warning stations. As the 70th IAP chased after the lone Ki-15, a massive strike package of nine Ki-21s, twelve BR.20s, and nine Ki-30s, escorted by seventy-four Ki-27s appeared over the main Soviet airbase of Tamsag-Bulak. Some fighters and bombers separated to block the 22nd IAP at a nearby airfield from sortieing, but the bulk of the force continued on towards the main Soviet airfields.
The Ki-21s led the attack, dropping their 50kg bombs from 3,000 meters, followed by the BR.20s, coming in several minutes later at 3,700 meters. The Fiat bombers circled the airfield as they waited for the smoke caused by the first wave to clear, but as they finally lined up for their attack run, they were met with a fierce barrage of antiaircraft fire that forced them to drop their payloads earlier than planned. Following the Fiats was the single-engined bombers, coming in to make low-level dive-bombing attacks. All the while, Soviet fighters were scrambling, taking off in ones and twos to oppose the massive strike. They were easy prey for the Ki-27s that lay in wait above, although 34 I-16s and 13 I-15bis did manage to take off. However, ground-based guns did the bulk of the damage, as the outnumbered fighters were preoccupied with fighting for their lives. As the outnumbered VVS fighters were engaged, some Ki-27s flying top cover at 5,000 meters dove down to strafe targets of opportunity.
The Japanese strike package returned to their bases between 7 and 8 AM. While reports pointed to a spectacular success, the VVS still was known to possess a huge number of aircraft, so another strike was ordered. This time, the strike would hit deeper, targeting Bain-Tumen, where the Japanese believed that the bulk of the Soviet bomber force was stationed. A force of Ki-21s, Ki-30s, and Ki-27s took off, arriving over the target in the early afternoon. While the Japanese forces expected to encounter heavy resistance and formed up accordingly, the skies over Bain-Tumen were alarmingly quiet. There was no sight of the bombers on the ground or in the air, and apart from a couple of I-15bis that rose to meet the Japanese aircraft, there was little resistance. Even the ground-based AAA did little to oppose the bombers. Operating at the edge of their endurance, the bombers hit the few targets they could find before returning home.
Just how successful the strike was depends on which records we believe. The Japanese claimed 99 dogfight victories and a further 49 aircraft destroyed on the ground for just six losses, while Soviet records only admit to the loss of eight fighters and 18 damaged aircraft. Aircraft losses were fairly low, but damage to airfields was significant, keeping sortie rates low in the following days. On the other side of the front, Japanese morale skyrocketed as reports claimed that nearly the entire Soviet fighter force was annihilated, although celebrations were cut short as high command rebuked the Kwantung Army for such a blatant violation of their orders to contain the conflict.
The July Offensive
The skies of Mongolia were fairly quiet in the last days of June thanks to the onset of fairly extreme weather. Sporadic reconnaissance flights continued from the Japanese side, but even then these sorties were few and far between to avoid tipping off the Soviets as to their intentions. Unfortunately, these overflights led to misleading intelligence reports. The presence of tanks was downplayed when reported to HQ, and Zhukov’s decision to only allow trucks leaving the theater to drive during the day gave the impression that the Soviets were evacuating. Through excellent planning, Zhukov had coordinated supply trucks so that they only came to the theater at night, away from the prying eyes of Japanese planes. While Zhukov’s men did an exceptional job at hiding their buildup, the VVS had been thrown into chaos by the June 27 air raid, meaning that the Soviets remained oblivious to the impending Japanese offensive.
The Japanese offensive began quietly in the early morning hours of July 1. With 15,000 men at his disposal (actually outnumbering the Soviets), Komatsubara sent a large force to Fui Heights, north of the Soviet bridgehead. The Japanese easily secured the lightly defended heights, and for the next two days they lay dormant while materials for fording the river were moved in. On the night of July 2, combat engineers moved to the river under the cover of darkness, establishing a pontoon bridge several miles north of the Soviet-built bridge. By the early morning the next day, the bridge was complete, and - still unmolested by the Soviets - the force holding Fui Heights spent all of July 3 crossing the Khalkhin Gol into indisputable Mongolian territory.
While the offensive itself had begun on July 1, air operations for both sides only began on the second day. Japanese single-engined bombers began flying CAS for the advancing troops on this second day, while the VVS responded with SB-2 sorties that hit frontline forces and their immediate rear. Taking advantage of poor coordination of Japanese fighters and weak air defenses, the SB-2s could bomb with relative impunity. The next day saw the escalation of fighting in both the skies and on the ground. July 3 opened with a predawn tank assault on the Soviet bridgehead, while daybreak saw an increased fighter presence on both sides. As roaming Ki-27s made SB-2 sorties increasingly dangerous, I-15bis and canon-armed I-16s took on attacker roles, strafing and bombing Japanese positions around the new pontoon bridge.
Rather than a massive single air battle like the ones that erupted earlier in the conflict, July 3 would see the practice of staggered sorties adopted by both sides. Smaller numbers of bombers and fighters would sortie at intervals, ensuring a constant presence over the battlefield. However, this would not prevent an air battle from erupting. Soon enough, the entirety of the 11th and 24th Sentais had appeared over the river, challenging Soviet fighters for air superiority as the bombers scrambled to contain the bridgehead. The presence of the enemy fighters again pushed away the vulnerable SB-2s, meaning that attacker sorties were handed off to the cannon-equipped I-16 type 17s. Unfortunately, these fared little better against the Ki-27s - the lighter I-16 type 10 already had its hands full with the Ki-27, so the fighters weighed down by their cannons could hardly hope to compete.
When Zhukov finally discovered the Japanese bridgehead across the Khalkhin Gol, he hastily ordered an all-out assault by the armored units on the west bank of the river. Unsupported by infantry, the armor would make a high-speed dash across open ground against Japanese infantry and artillery in hopes of dislodging them. As the attack began just before 11 AM, forty I-15bis carrying a small payload of bombs swooped in to support them. However, they would be intercepted by a large group of Ki-27s, and, although patrolling I-16s entered the fray to save the friendly biplanes, the attempt to provide close support was ruined. Fortunately, drawing the Ki-27s towards the ground gave a formation of 73 SB-2s room to operate freely 3 kilometer above the steppe. Continuing their operations from before, the concentrated their payloads on the Japanese bridgehead across the Khalkhin Gol and tactical reserves on the east bank. As the day came to an end, the Japanese bridgehead remained, but the hasty tank assault had halted their expansion efforts. But this tactical victory came at great cost - spearhead units suffered over 50% casualties.
Back on the disputed bank of the river, things were going poorly for the Japanese. On the ground, eight tanks and twenty armored cars were holding off the entire armored assault, destroying some forty Japanese tanks. Single-engined bombers of the IJAAF swooped down in hopes of changing the course of the battle, but they were intercepted by Soviet fighters. Another great air battle formed as the Ki-27 escorted joined the fray, and again the SB-2s would seize the opportunity to make medium-altitude runs unmolested. In just one day, SB-2s had dropped over 6,000 100kg and 250kg bombs. As the day came to an end, the outcome was clear - the Soviets had secured air superiority for the first time.
As the day gave way to night, the failure of the Japanese offensive and the precarious position of Komatubara’s bridgehead became apparent. That very night, the bridgehead across the Khalkhin gol began evacuating. By daybreak the next day, all but one regiment had made it across the river. The Soviets caught wind of the evacuation, however, and began a renewed assault. The Kwantung Army sortied their twin-engined “heavies” to stave off the advancing tanks, but soon enough they were met by enemy fighters. The I-15bis were first to engage, followed by covering I-16s, and, as the Japanese fighters became fully engaged, the SB-2s of the 150th SBAP appeared over the steppes, pounding the beleaguered Japanese soldiers. The Japanese bridgehead would hold until night, at which point they withdrew across the river and destroyed their bridge. In just five days, the abortive assault had cost Komatsubara 10% of his forces and 60% of his tanks.
The High Water Mark
The failure of the July Offensive would not mark the end of Japanese operations. July 6 saw a lull in the fighting on the ground, but the air remained a battlefield. SBs continued to hammer the Japanese ground forces, albeit with less intensity than the previous days. That same day, a unit of 23 TB-3s was established to begin night bombing. On July 8th (the same day that Komatsubara began a series of night attacks to push the Soviets from their bridgehead), TB-3s began their first night raids that followed the end of the day’s air battles between the opposing fighters. During the day, Japanese bombers worked to soften the Soviet foothold on the east bank of the Khalkhin Gol, and each night, small-scale infantry assaults worked to eliminate the bridgehead.
The high water mark of the Japanese efforts at Nomonhan came on the night of July 11-12. A massed infantry assault came within 500 yards of the river, but in the predawn hours of the morning, a desperate counterattack by Soviet tanks put an end to the Japanese offensive. As day broke, artillery and air support opened up on the enemy, and over the course of the day five successive Soviet counterattacks broke the Japanese force. The Kwantung Army had finally lost the initiative once and for all, and the battle hit another lull as both sides prepared for the next - and final - stage of the conflict. Thus far, the Soviets admitted to the loss of 89 aircraft to the Japanese admissions of 47 losses. The coming days would see a major reorganization of forces as Zhukov’s plans were set into motion.
Preparations
After nearly half a month of constant fighting in a remote corner of Mongolia, both sides were in dire need of rest. The Japanese withdrew to a new defensive position to consolidate their gains, and, lacking the reserves to exploit the Japanese withdrawal, Zhukov opted to dig in as well. Meanwhile, Soviet forces were reorganized as the 1st Army Group (headed by Zhukov), and new aircraft began streaming into the region. Among these were the first I-153s, newly arrived from the factory and slated for field testing. Along with the influx of aircraft came experienced pilots, this time drawn from the Baltic and Black Sea fleets. Major reorganizations of units occurred, and forces worked to retrain to address shortcomings revealed in battle. With a more strategic outlook on things, the VVS worked to create new airfields to spread out their forces, and several dummy airfields, complete with dummy aircraft, were created to hamper enemy reconnaissance efforts. The influx of new fighters meant that the obsolescent I-15bis could finally be withdrawn from fighter duties and relegated instead to CAS missions.
The Japanese underwent similar replenishments and reorganizations. The Fiat bombers were found to not live up to expectations, so they were relocated and replaced by Ki-30 single-engined bombers. Local air forces were restructured, losing striking power in favor of improved fighter strength. In effect, the Kwantung Army had accepted that they were no longer capable of supporting any offensive operations from the air. Having recognized the effectiveness of the Soviet artillery, the Kwantung Army scrounged up all the guns they could get their hands on. The rest of Manchuria was stripped of its artillery, bringing 86 heavy guns to bear at Nomonhan. Of course, this hardly gave them the advantage - all of their pieces were outranged and outnumbered by Soviet guns, and Japanese logistics could not keep up with the planned bombardment of 15,000 rounds per day.
The lull would not last long, unfortunately. As the buildup on the ground continued, the skies would grow restive once again. Japanese reconnaissance flights intensified, and the inevitable clashes between escorts and interceptors became more frequent. On July 20th, the first aerial ramming of the conflict occurred when an I-16 collided head-on with a Ki-27 (wing-to-undercarriage). The following day saw the air war escalate once again. A limited bomber assault was launched by the IJAAF against communications hubs. As part of this effort, the full force of the 1st and 24th Sentais swooped in on the airfields of the 22nd and 70th IAPs. Nevertheless, the 95 I-16s and 62 I-15bis would successfully sortie, resulting in a ferocious 90 minute air battle. The next day saw limited retaliatory strikes by SB-2s, although new tactics calling for higher altitudes meant that these raids had little effect.
One Last Push
On the morning of July 23, the Japanese guns broke the silence that had lasted some ten days. The bombardment was met with enthusiasm by friendly troops, but this morale-boost was short lived - the Soviet guns were quick to respond. A fierce artillery duel broke out while the skies above were filled with aircraft. SB-2s, Ki-30s, and Ki-21s made raids into enemy territory while Soviet fighters supported the counterbattery fire of the guns. The exhausted Japanese fighters were unable to secure air superiority, so the guns below were left without a spotter aircraft. Hoping to provide their guns with better direction, the Japanese gunners naively let up spotting balloons. Twice the balloons were downed by enemy fighters before the artillerymen finally gave up. Soviet fire ramped up in accuracy and intensity through the day, and by nightfall, the Soviets had fired 30,000 rounds to the Japanese 10,000.
The artillery duel continued with renewed ferocity the following day. Although Japanese commanders had hoped that the Soviets had expended their stores, the barrage continued uninterrupted. The battle in the skies also continued unabated, and increased sorties by the SBs complemented the artillery fire on the ground. Hoping the break the stalemate, the IJAAF increased activity on the third day of the artillery duel. However, these efforts would be in vain. The VVS countered the increased activity by sending the new I-153s into combat (although they were kept from crossing the border for secrecy’s sake), and the ever-intensifying Soviet artillery soon smothered the Japanese guns. By the end of the day, Japanese artillery commanders were asking for permission to cease fire.
As the last guns fell silent on July 25, the Kwantung Army’s belligerence had finally come to an end. The central authorities would soon intervene, creating a new command to separate the unruly officers from the events on the front. The Japanese now dug in to consolidate their holdings in hopes of a diplomatic solution. Such a solution would never come. Zhukov was preparing for his final assault to decisively defeat the Kwantung Army and retake the disputed ground, and the buildup that had occurred in the preceding months continued to expand. While the pilots of the IJAAF were reaching the end of their rope, the VVS was a different story - they had so many men and planes at their disposal they hardly knew what to do with all of them. This surplus of aircraft for the first time allowed a fundamental shift in tactics - cross-border raids were now to become the norm.
Lying in Wait
Now released from restrictions on cross-border activity, the VVS began to target the IJAAF directly. I-16s began to undertake deep penetration missions to strafe enemy airfields, and TB-3s switched their focus to night raids on the beleaguered Japanese airmen. Inclement weather slowed operations for several days, but whenever the skies cleared, the VVS returned in force to keep the pressure on the enemy. Early-morning raids by I-16s hit fighter airfields regularly, and such missions were often followed by SB-2 raids on supply depots that took advantage of the chaos at the fighter fields. On the 29th, the 1st and 11th Sentais sortied nearly 60 planes in hopes of decisively defeating the VVS fighters, but the Soviets mustered double their number to meet them. Although the expert pilots would fare surprisingly well against the Soviet fighters, they nevertheless failed to achieve their objective - they downed just three Soviet fighters for the loss of two of their own.
On the 30th, the IJAAF sortied their bombers in hopes of hitting command posts and forward airfields. The last two days of July saw less activity, although the battle for air superiority continued. Meanwhile, the surplus of aircraft meant that the VVS could finally undertake coordinated reconnaissance efforts. The neglected reconnaissance corps consisted primarily of obsolete R-5s and the newer (but still too slow) R-10, but the influx of new aircraft meant that some I-16s and SBs could be drawn away for reconnaissance duties. The ad-hoc scouts began their missions in the last days of July, and soon enough they had managed to achieve what the Japanese had failed - accurate reconnaissance reports. Reports sent to Zhukov claimed the Japanese had 252 fighters 144 single-engined bombers, and 54 twin-engined bombers.
By the first week of August, Soviet offensive air actions had eclipsed those of the Japanese. Strafing raids by I-16 type 17s were now a regular occurrence, and SB-2s were improving their accuracy as they flew against supply depots and enemy reserves. Japanese fighters would rise to meet the attackers when they could, but the battle was taking a toll on the pilots. They were outnumbered and outgunned, and to make up for the difference in numbers they were forced to fly multiple sorties per day. While Japanese claims remained high (absurdly so), admitted losses on both sides were starting to even out. While the Soviets could replenish these losses, the Japanese could not, and the occasional loss of veteran aces was slowly becoming all too frequent.
August 5 saw several significant changes. A flight of I-16s and Chaikas equipped with the experimental RS aerial rocket was ferried to a forward airfield, while the 61st Sentai, the sole remaining IJAAF unit flying twin-engined bombers, was rotated out of action. As Zhukov’s offensive loomed, the Japanese were counterintuitively planning an offensive of their own. What remained of their airpower was scrounged up and prepared for another major assault on enemy airfields, and ground forces began preparations for an offensive on August 24. Unfortunately, attrition had reduced their numbers to just 88 fighters, 24 light bombers, 21 reconnaissance aircraft, and 12 “heavy” bombers. Zhukov, on the other hand, held a clear advantage in every field. They had 244 I-16s, 62 I-15bis, 70 Chaikas, 181 SB-2s, 23 TB-3s, and 43 light bombers/reconnaissance aircraft (primarily R-5s). The Soviets outnumbered the enemy 1.5:1 in infantry, 2:1 in artillery, 4:1 in armor, and 3.6:1 in aircraft, and, critically, the impending assault had been hidden from Japanese intelligence.
Zhukov Strikes: The August Offensive
On August 20, under the cover of thick fog, the Soviet war machine went to work. Small groups of SBs flew out over the battlefield at medium altitudes, waiting for Japanese AAA to reveal themselves. Once the enemy guns opened up, the SBs dropped their bombs and flew off as I-16s rushed in at low-level to methodically exterminate the batteries. Meanwhile, a force of 150 SBs formed up west of the river at 4,000 meters. As they neared the river, Soviet artillery opened up with a ferocious barrage, signaling the fighters hitting enemy air defenses to withdraw. Coordinated use of flares signaled when it was safe for the fighters to swoop in and strafe and when to withdraw to let the artillery do its job. Close coordination between ground and air forces wreaked havoc on enemy defenses. Without suffering a single loss, the Soviet aircraft returned to base to refuel, rearm, and most critically, eat breakfast.
The VVS reappeared over the Khalkhin Gol at 8:45 with a force of 52 SBs and 167 fighters. Artillery fire continued for 15 more minutes, cutting short just seconds before 9:00. As the clock rolled to 9:00, Soviet and Mongolian forces rolled across the river. The Japanese were taken completely by surprise. The first Japanese aircraft were only just taking to the skies, and artillery did not respond to the onset of hostilities until 10:15. Air battles broke out between Ki-27s and VVS escort fighters, and at 9:30 a small force of Ki-30s broke through to bomb forward airfields. The VVS responded in turn, striking several Japanese forward airfields and destroying several critically scare fighters. The RS-equipped fighters would make their debut as well, claiming several Japanese fighters with the rockets.
As the sun set on August 20, the Japanese were in a critical position. While the center force had advanced less than 1,000 yards in some places, the ferocity of fighting prevented Komatsubara from moving his reserves to the flanks, which were in danger of being overrun. The VVS flew 1,094 sorties that day (350 bomber and 744 fighter), claiming sixteen enemy aircraft for five losses. The following two days saw the southern defense line start to crumble, and on the 23rd all but one section of the southern flank had been encircled and destroyed. Air combat raged above, but the Soviets now held air superiority. Ki-27s could rise to offer resistance, but the exhausted crews could no longer compete with the enemy. Improved models of I-16 had finally entered the fray, offering improved performance, better radios, and critically, enough armor to protect them from the Ki-27’s guns.
No Japanese forces were spared from the VVS onslaught. All throughout the day, I-16s strafed enemy forces on the front and forward airfields and SBs hit fortifications and rear elements. Even at night, the attacks continued, this time by TB-3s free to drop their massive payloads unmolested. August 21 marked the highest sortie rate of the campaign, with 1,138 Soviet sorties flown. Japanese sorties were significantly lower, and the deteriorating situation meant that operations were becoming increasingly desperate. Raids on airfields gave way to direct CAS missions targeting tanks and artillery, but the constant VVS fighter presence hindered the effectiveness of such attacks.
The securing of air supremacy meant that the R-5s of the Mongolian Air Force could finally make their presence known. In just two days, they flew 218 sorties and dropped 96 tonnes of bombs. On August 25, the north flank of the Japanese defenses at Fui Heights had fallen, and the Soviet pincers raced to close the encirclement at Nomonhan. By the end of the day, the Japanese center was entirely encircled. Many artillerymen found their positions overrun from the rear, and the battle was, for all intents and purposes, lost. However, the Kwantung Army fought on. In a belated attempt to replenish their losses, the Kwantung Army brought in the 33rd Sentai with its obsolete Ki-10 biplanes. However, this did little to alleviate the situation in the air.
August 27 saw things slow down. The Japanese line had crumbled into a series of pockets that were now being systematically destroyed by artillery, armor, and airpower, and the IJAAF could no longer sustain the sortie rate of previous days. Nevertheless, the fighters continued their futile struggle, resulting in the death of the highest-scoring Japanese ace (WO Shinohara with 58 victories). A relief force made an attack to break the encirclement on the 27th, but it lacked the numbers to do so. Thus, the bulk of the Japanese forces would be annihilated. General Komatsubara resigned to take his own life, but at the last minute received orders to make a breakout. He and 400 survivors would slip through a breach in the lines as the Soviets let some men rest, although those that went with the General had to physically restrain him from taking his own life.
Closing Battles
The annihilation of the Japanese forces in the disputed territory would not mark the last of the fighting. The Kwantung Army had suffered a catastrophic defeat and would be powerless to prevent Zhukov from sweeping into Manchuria, and yet they continued to fight in the air in hopes of redeeming themselves. August 31 saw another massive air battle totaling over 200 aircraft as the Japanese again sent in their bombers, but as the last resistance on the ground was mopped up, VVS orders were changed to confine them within their own borders once more. The early days of September saw the Ki-10 biplanes finally appear over the front, and, with offensive operations winding down, the TB-3s were withdrawn.
The drawdown of sorties due both to the end of the ground combat and inclement weather finally allowed the Kwantung Army to replenish its forces. By September 11, 158 fighters, 79 bombers, and 18 reconnaissance aircraft were available to the Kwantung Army compared to the VVS’s 362 fighters, 166 bombers, and 54 reconnaissance aircraft. Unfortunately for the Kwantung Army, these reinforcements came far too late. Peace talks began the next day, and, apart from the sporadic Japanese reconnaissance aircraft, the skies were clear. The 14th marked another bomber raid on forward airfields, resulting in no damage nor any losses on either side despite heavy fighting.
The final bombing raids of the conflict came around lunchtime on September 15. The first Ki-30s came around 11:00 at low level, but they were intercepted, causing a panicked dropping of their bombs on the target airfield before a hasty retreat. An hour later, a single Ki-32 led two squadrons of twin-engined bombers and 21 Ki-21s appeared over an airfield filled with I-153s. The Chaikas rose to meet the invaders, but those that managed to takeoff found themselves fighting for their lives. Only when three squadrons of I-16s appeared did the Chaikas get some relief. Angered by the incursions, four squadrons of I-16s were ordered to fly the last mission of the conflict. They encountered eighteen Ki-27s, with whom they battled it out for half an hour. By the time the ceasefire came into effect at 1:00 that afternoon, the Soviets had flown 212 fighter sorties against 180 enemy incursions. Six aircraft (five of which were I-153s) were admitted to have been lost. Thus ended the Battle of Khalkhin Gol.
Aftermath
When the ceasefire came into effect on September 15, the Imperial Japanese Army was faced with its first operational defeat since its inception. The 6th Army (which had been created to separate the belligerent Kwantung Army HQ from the battle) had been annihilated, suffering somewhere around 20,000 casualties. The IJAAF had lost 162 aircraft along with 152 crewmen (and 66 wounded), and, despite their claims that they had downed 1,260 Soviet aircraft, Soviet losses were far lower - 207 aircraft would never fly again. The VVS suffered 159 crew killed and a further 102 wounded, although they did an excellent job at repairing damaged aircraft - 436 damaged planes (385 of them fighters) were returned to action, while the IJAAF would only manage half of that. Of course, if we look at losses, the Japanese appear to come out on top - the Soviets lost more aircraft and suffered about 5,000 more casualties. However, the reality of the situation was that the Soviets occupied the entire disputed territory and that subsequent emergency negotiations settled on the Soviet - not the Japanese - claims for the border dispute.
Taking a broader view of things, the Battle of Khalkhin Gol was very much a signal of things to come for both sides. The Imperial Japanese Army lacked the logistical and industrial capacity to really compete with western powers, even in their own backyard. Japanese armor and artillery proved wholly inadequate, and, despite having a railhead several times closer to the battlefield than their foes, they lacked a significant fleet of vehicles to transport men and materiel to the combat zone. The famed fighting spirit of the Japanese soldier was no longer invincible. The VVS had shown a remarkable ability to absorb losses and quickly adapt, although their inventory was shown to be verging on obsolescence. Unfortunately, many of the lessons learned over Nomonhan seemed to be lost over the coming two years - the VVS grew complacent, and the air actions that would be seen in June of 1941 took the failings of May 1939 to a catastrophic scale.
Epilogue
After the ceasefire, both belligerents promptly aimed their sights elsewhere. Just two days after the ceasefire took effect, Stalin, now secure that he would not have to fight a two-front war, began the invasion of Poland. Japan continued their war in China, but they expanded negotiations with the Soviets for a nonaggression pact. These negotiations spanned two years, and in April of 1941 the treaty was finalized. The crushing defeat at Nomonhan and the nonaggression treaty meant that as Japan looked to expand its influence in Asia, they were forced to look elsewhere. Rather than expand north, they looked south to the French colonies of Indochina. The two-stage occupation of Indochina led to the deterioration of relations with the United States, and, thanks to the belligerence of the IJA command, culminated in a war that would ultimately be their undoing.
