#paul iv

[marythequeen]

as you probably have realized- i am currently reading mary tudor by judith m richards. i'm in the latest chapters and mary's (also reginald pole's) beef with the pope is discussed. i've known that paul iv was glad with their deaths and rest but there had been apparently something i missed!

i'm leaving the paragraph here.

Rumour has it that Paul IV rejoiced when he heard of the almost simultaneous deaths of the heretical cardinal and Mary, whom he called the ‘Hapsburg’ queen, in November 1558.

and to me, it's just so ironic that while people still calling mary a religious bigot, pope himself didn't like her because of her (and again, pole too) "liberal" opinions on religion.

it's really funny when you think about it.

[maximumphilosopheranchor]

In April 1559 Paul IV decided to excommunicate Elizabeth. Philip at once protested. He argued that it would aggravate a tense situation, provoke open persecution against the Catholics and prompt them to resort to arms. It was madness to unleash a conflict in England at a time when Philip was powerless to come to their aid. It is true that at the time of his response Philip did not know that Elizabeth had taken the title of Governor of the Church in England and imprisoned the Catholic bishops who rejected her elevation. But even when he was informed, he did not change his mind over the excommunication. He was obsessed with the desire to minimize instability and avert civil war. Of course he was now open to accusations of using his influence in the curia in order to block the succession of Mary Stuart simply because she was allied to France. If Elizabeth was excommunicated this would strengthen the Stuart claim and legitimise a French invasion. Little wonder that ‘French’ cardinals urged Paul to proceed with the formal declaration. No one could accuse Paul IV of undue deference to Philip. Their relations had improved greatly since those stormy days of war in 1556, but they were far from close. The pope’s decision to delay the declaration must surely respond to his awareness that if he proceeded, two things could happen: Elizabeth might impose reprisals against the Catholics and Henry might invade England. Since Philip would oppose this it would reopen the conflict which had so recently ended. Nevertheless when her excommunication was again debated in the curia in August 1559, Philip sensibly adopted a dual approach. He strongly opposed the measure for the same reasons he had given early, but despairing of a second success, he instructed cardinal Pacheco to secure for him the sole rights of carrying out the excommunication and undertaking the reconquest of England. Paul’s willingness to delay the inevitable excommunication of Elizabeth was made conditional on Philip taking some action to stem the advance of Protestantism in England, if necessary, by threatening reprisals. The only gesture of disapproval Philip allowed himself to make, however, was to replace the high-ranking count of Feria by Quadra as his ambassador in England. (..) In July of that year Philip responded to renewed pressure from the pope and other Catholic zealots by sending a special envoy, Juan de Ayala, to warn Elizabeth that her measures against the Catholics were likely to cause unrest and therefore she ought to desist from taking further action for her own good. Mild as these expressions were, Philip was anxious that they might be misunderstood, so he instructed Ayala (and subsequent envoys) to ensure that the message was delivered in such a way that it could not be construed as a threat. Aside from toning down his missive so that it became an amicable warning against increasing dissent, he sought to make it even more palatable by adding that he had decided to inform Elizabeth because her anti-Catholic measures would cause tension and trouble in his own lands.

Maria José Rodriguez-Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire: Charles V, Philip II and Habsburg Authority 1551-1559

[maximumphilosopheranchor]

The question that had to be faced in 1556 was as simple to formulate as it was difficult to answer: under what conditions could Philip take up arms against the pope? The problem was to ensure that the king took part in a “just war”, but necessity dictated a pre-emptive strike against the papal states. The theologians he consulted replied almost to a man in the strongest, clearest, most negative terms. By definition, no war against the papacy was just. Even if the pope was at fault, as they were willing to admit, Philip must not fight against him. If he did, he would be accused of being a bad Christian, if not indeed a heretic, which would cause him to lose reputation. Furthermore, if Philip took up arms against the pope it might deal a mortal blow against the papacy which had been so seriously weakened by the onslaughts of heresy and worse might follow. In the words of Domingo de Soto, if Philip attacked Paul, he could inadvertently end up ‘eliminating the faith’. (..) Ranged against Alba and the theologians were those who believed that defence was always a just cause, and pre-emptive strikes justified under pressing circumstances such as this. Philip would fail in his duty to his subjects if he remained inactive and allowed his enemies to gather their forces and attack his lands. Better keep the fighting away from his troubled and divided states, particularly in areas like Naples where pro-French sentiments endured. It would be cheaper and more effective to attack before the Franco-papal forces had time to coalesce. Such tactical and financial considerations won the day, but they were not the only reasons why Philip eventually attacked. As some of his counsellors pointed out, there was nothing in the military or financial situation of his empire to attract new allies, and little to persuade existing allies to remain within his camp. Philip’s sole international success to date had been to cement his friendship with Genoa by offering help to recover Corsica. The reputation he had established as a king willing to back his allies in their time of need was being undermined and would be lost if he failed to help Colonna and the other victims of Paul’s aggression. (..) Philip’s attitude towards the war had been ambivalent throughout. He found it abhorrent to take up arms against the papacy, having considerable respect for the institution if not for its incumbents. He was a very traditional man, and it disturbed him to see the world upside down, with the Catholic monarch on one side; the pope, Most Christian king and Ottoman sultan on the other. He was deeply upset by Paul’s accusations of rebellion, perhaps because he was terrified that it would deal the death blow to his much weakened authority in some of his troubled states. But he felt very strongly that the action was unjust and dishonourable. From a letter written to Juana during June-July 1557 it is also evident that he was astonished as well as upset to find himself in this predicament. He thought it inconceivable that the pope should attack him – the man who had so distinguished himself in the restoration of England to the fold.

Maria José Rodriguez-Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire: Charles V, Philip II and Habsburg Authority 1551-1559