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Husserl, like [the Yogācāran exegete] Dignāga, grounds the conceptual truths of his system in unassailable non-conceptual reality. But, as with Dignāga, a closer look reveals the sleight of hand that allows Husserl to pull this particular rabbit out of the hat. The claim that the “unresting flow of never recurring phenomena” given to us in “pure consciousness” is “indubitably given in reflective experience,” is a cheat, for as soon as Husserl introduces the notion of “reflection” we step back from the Lebenswelt—we retreat from the immediacy of pure consciousness—into the realm of concepts and meanings, and accordingly we forfeit whatever certainty we may once have had.
Robert Sharf, “Conclusion”, Is Yogācāra Phenomenology?