#popperism

[conza]

Popper, Falsification, and rationalism

Popper would have us throw out any theory that is contradicted by any fact, which, if at all possible, would leave us virtually empty-handed, going nowhere. In recognizing the insoluble connection between theoretical knowledge (language) and actions, rationalism would instead deem such falsificationism, even if possible, as completely irrational.

There is no situation conceivable in which it would be reasonable to throw away any theory-conceived of as a cognitive instrument of action-that had been successfully applied in a past situation but proves unsuccessful in a new application-unless one already had a more successful theory at hand. And to thus immunize a theory from experience is perfectly rational from the point of view of an actor.

And it is just as rational for an actor to regard any two rivals, in their range of application overlapping theories t1 and t2 as incommensurable as long as there exists a single application in which t1 is more successful than t2 or vice versa. Only if t1 can be as successfully applied as t2 to every single instance to which t2 is applicable but still has more and different applications than t2 can it ever be rational to discard t2. To discard it any earlier, because of unsuccessful applications or because t1 could in some or even in most situations have been applied more successfully, would from the point of view of a knowing actor not be progress but retrogression.

And even if t2 is rationally discarded, progress is not achieved by falsifying it, as t2 would actually have had some successful applications that could never possibly be nullified by anything (in the future). Instead, t1 would outcompete t2 in such a way that any further clinging to t2, though of course possible, would be possible only at the price of not being able to successfully do everything that an adherent of t1 could do who could successfully do as much and more than any proponent of t2. — Hans-Hermann Hoppe, In Defense of Extreme Rationalism: Thoughts on Donald McClosky’s The Rhetoric of Economics

[conza]

It seems to be of great importance to first rid oneself of the notion that aprioristic knowledge has anything to do with ‘innate ideas’ or with ‘intuitive’ knowledge which would not have to be discovered somehow or learned. Innate or not, intuitive or not; these are questions that concern the psychology of knowledge.  In comparison, epistemology is concerned exclusively with the question of the validity of knowledge and of how to ascertain validity - and, to be sure, the problem of aprioristic knowledge is solely an epistemological one.

Hans-Hermann Hoppe, TSC, p. 108.