The CNE’s decision to impose January 26 as the date to collect the signatures required to activate the recall referendum against Nicolás Maduro violated four sub-legal standards approved by the CNE in 2007 to regulate these processes:
• Standards regulating the promotion and request for recall elections of popularly elected officials approved under Resolution No. 070906-2770, dated September 6,…
Suspension of Venezuela’s Recall Process Generates Reactions
Hugo Pérez Hernáiz and David Smilde
On Thursday, October 20 Venezuela’s electoral ruling body, the Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) indefinitely postponed the signature gathering drive of 20% of registered voters in support of a recall referendum against president Maduro due to have taken place this coming week. After weeks of rumors about a possible Supreme Justice Tribunal (TSJ) ruling blocking the recall referendum, the process has been effectively stopped, not by the TSJ, but by the decisions of five regional penal courts.
In almost simultaneous events during the afternoon hours of October 20, the penal courts of the States of Aragua, Bolivar, Carabobo, Monagas, and Apure, said they were “nullifying” the first stage of the recall referendum petition process, the collecting of 1% of registered voter’s signatures supporting the petition, because of electoral fraud allegations. Later, on October 21 and 22, courts at the States of Zulia and Trujillo also issued similar rulings.
Following the decisions by the regional penal courts the CNE said in a press release issued in the afternoon of October 20 that “as a consequence of these (the court’s) decisions, and until there is a new judicial order, the process of collecting the signatures of 20% scheduled for October 26, 27, and 28, and for which the CNE had been working, will be halted.”
Rumors of the cancelation of the recall referendum process had been rife at least since Jesús Torrealba, Executive Secretary of the opposition coalition Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (MUD) declared on October 8 that he had information that the TSJ would probably issue a decision “assassinating” the recall referendum. The MUD published a press release on October 10 announcing a demonstration “ten times the size of the Toma de Caracas” of September 1 in the case rumors about the impending decision by the TSJ were confirmed. This time, said Torrealba, the opposition march would head to the “centers of power.”
The source of Torrealba’s suppositions, and of the ensuing debate within the opposition about the TSJ suspending the recall referendum process, seemed to have been the petitions made to the tribunal by government officials on June 13 demanding a suspension of the process on the basis that the opposition had incurred in a widespread fraud during the collection of the signatures of 1% of voters to kick start the process.
However, parallel to that petition, Chavista State governors had been asking regional penal courts to nullify the 1% signatures events “and their consequences” in their States. It was these regional courts and not the TSJ as the opposition first feared, who eventually ruled against the referendum.
According to constitutional expert José Ignacio Hernández, the allegations by the government that the opposition had staged a “mega fraud” during the 1% signature gathering drive lacks legal basis. The government’s claim seems to rest on the fact that the CNE rejected 605,727 of the more than 1,859,000 signatures presented by the opposition. Most of those the rejections had to do with technical irregularities which do not imply fraudulent intentions by the opposition.
In any case, argues Hernández, the Venezuelan electoral norms only speak of fraud if the irregularities had affected the final result of the process, and this was not the case in the 1% drive. Eugenio G Martinez, a leading electoral journalist, also explained via twitter (@puzkas) that 97% of the cases of signatures of deceased persons, a main allegation of fraud by the government, were due to transcription errors by the CNE.
Government officials however insisted on claiming that the process was being suspended because of a fraud during the 1% signature collection drive, and in order to prevent a new fraud in the upcoming 20% drive. PSUV leader, and Maduro’s appointed overseer for the referendum process, Jorge Rodríguez, said that the whole process was being cancelled because it had been “tainted by fraud.” He insisted that the fraud had been revealed by the existence of “10,995 signatures of deceased, 3,000 signatures of underage citizens, and 1,333 citizens politically disqualified for crimes related to drug trafficking, murder, and fraud.” He also said that a future TSJ decision against the referendum was still possible.
Socialist Party (PSUV) Vice-president Diosdado Cabello said that the “electoral fraud” during the 1% collection drive could have grave consequences for opposition leaders. “We are sure that here in Venezuela there will be justice and those who have committed fraud will have to respond to justice,” he said. As if coordinated with Cabello’s declarations and the courts decisions, another penal court of Carabobo issued, also on October 20, a prohibition for Jesús Torrealba, Herique Carpriles Radonski, and six more opposition leaders to leave the country.
Upon leaving the country on a surprise international trip, president Maduro did not directly refer to the recall referendum, but warned that the opposition was “making calls for violence,” and also warned that those involved in “insurrection” would end up in prison.
On October 22 Cabello gave another press conference surrounded by other PSUV leaders announcing that the government had evidence of a coup d’état plot plan named, according to Cabello, “Rock and Roll,” part of a wider conspiracy plot named “Operation Condor.” The plan would include the taking over of military facilities by opposition supporters in order to “force the Bolivarian Armed Forces” to either accept the 20% signature collection drive or to force Maduro’s resignation. “We will not allow them to topple the government,” said Cabello.
The coalition of opposition parties Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (MUD) said it would react shortly and jointly to the decision by the CNE to abide by the regional court’s rulings. Jesús Torrealba said in a press conference that the opposition would be calling to street demonstrations shortly, but he warned followers against giving in to violence: “It has become very clear for us that the government needs a scenario of violence and submission. This is a government that lives from chaos, it feeds from chaos, and it needs a violent response.”
On October 22 the most prominent opposition leaders, including Henrique Capriles Radonski and Henry Ramos Allup, announced the agenda for the opposition for this next week. Capriles claimed that a “coup d’état” by the government has taken place with the suspension of the recall referendum process, and announced that the opposition will stage nation-wide protests on Wednesday, October 26, the day the signature collection drive was supposed to have started. Wednesday’s protests will be called the “Takeover of Venezuela” (Toma de Venezuela.) There have so far been limited peaceful protests in some areas of Caracas.
Reactions were also swift from the critical chavismo. Nicmer Evans, leader of Marea Socialista, a party that proclaims itself chavista but critical of the Maduro government, declared that with the decision to block the referendum the government “has closed the last democratic window left, “ and said that the government had stepped from a competitive authoritarianism into an absolute authoritarianism.”
Religious authorities also reacted to the events. “Today a new political regime has dawned, one in which neither the popular will not he petitions of the people are respected, one in which popular expressions are blocked,” also argued the Jesuit rector of the Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, José Virtuoso. “I think we are all in shock in the country, and I agree with the opinion of Marea Socialista: we have passed from competitive form of authoritarianism to a complete authoritarianism,” he added. The president of the Venezuelan Episcopal Conference, Diego Padrón, said that “the suspension of the 20% (signature collection drive) is disrespectful of the will of the people.”
Constitutional expert José Ignacio Hernández believes that the October 20 events amount to a “constitutional fraud.” As part of this fraud Hernández points to the improbable coincidence of five different regional courts deciding on the same issue the very same day, almost to the hour.
PROVEA, the local leading human rights NGO, has stated that the suspension of the recall referendum “closes peaceful channels and encourages violence.” PROVEA also sees a coordinated response by different government bodies as part of a plan: “The rulings, announced almost simultaneously by different penal courts –which do not have the legal attribution to suspend electoral processes,- and their almost immediate compliance by the maximum electoral arbiter of the country, reveals the existence of a coordinated plan by the Executive Power to block citizens from evaluating the performance of the President through the recall referendum mechanism.”
The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) has issued a press release urging Venezuela’s electoral authorities to “reverse its suspension of the signature collection process.” WOLA says that the CNE decision is a dangerous set back which counters legal norms, further raises tensions in the country.
There has also been a strong international reaction. The Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS) Luis Almagro, wrote on twitter (@OEA_oficial): “Only dictatorships strip their citizens of their rights, do not acknowledge the legislative, and have political prisoners.” He also wrote “Today we are more convinced than ever that a rupture of democracy has occurred in Venezuela. Time has come for concrete actions.”
United States State Department spokesperson, John Kirby, said the US government is “deeply worried” about the CNE blocking the recall referendum process. The governments of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, United States, Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay signed a joint document made public by Argentina’s foreign ministry, in which they lament the “blocking of the (referendum) process,” but they also call on all parties within the country to strengthen national dialogue, “directly or through facilitators.”
WOLA Statement: Venezuela’s Suspension of Signature Collection is a Dangerous Setback
In light of yesterday’s announcement from Venezuelan electoral authorities, WOLA (the Washington Office on Latin America) has responded by releasing the statement below, describing the decision as “ a grave setback for democracy in Venezuela.”
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Venezuela’s Suspension of Signature Collection is a Dangerous Setback
CNE Decision Counters Legal Norms and Further Raises Tensions
Washington, D.C.—On October 20, Venezuela’s National Electoral Council (CNE) suspended the next step in the recall referendum process against President Nicolas Maduro, indefinitely placing a hold on a signature drive that had been set for October 26-28.
The CNE announcement represents a grave setback for democracy in Venezuela. The decision was based on the judicial process in lower jurisdiction courts in four different districts around the country which ruled simultaneously against the signature drive moving forward. However, the courts have no legal authority over the CNE, and the electoral authority is under no constitutional obligation to abide by these decisions.
As WOLA (the Washington Office on Latin America) has noted, the people’s right to choose leaders and exercise control over them is a fundamental human right, and the CNE has a duty to ensure that Venezuelans have the opportunity to participate in a timely, well-organized recall referendum process in accordance with the Venezuelan constitution. Suspending the signature drive represents an alarming deviation from this duty.
The CNE’s announcement also contains a call for “national dialogue” as a mechanism to preserve peace and stability, a reference to the internationally-facilitated dialogue between the Venezuelan government and the opposition. This appears to present dialogue as an alternative to a recall referendum and thereby serves to delegitimize such talks. Dialogue is absolutely necessary in order for Venezuela to overcome a deepening political and economic crisis, but this process should be considered independent of the recall referendum process.
WOLA urges the CNE to reverse its suspension of the signature collection process in Venezuela.
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Contact:
Kristel Muciño
Director of Communications, WOLA
+1 (202) 797-2171
[email protected]
WOLA Statement: Venezuela’s Electoral Authorities Should Facilitate a Timely Recall Referendum
In a new statement today, WOLA urges the Venezuelan National Electoral Council (CNE) to exercise its full technical capacity to carry out a well-organized recall referendum in a timely fashion. As the statement notes: provided that the necessary conditions are met, the CNE can still organize a recall referendum to be held in the first half of December 2016. See the full statement below.
Venezuela’s Electoral Authorities Should Facilitate a Timely Recall Referendum
Washington, D.C.—On September 21, Venezuela’s National Electoral Council (CNE) announced a number of requirements for the process of gathering signatures in support of a recall referendum regarding the Presidency of Nicolás Maduro.
WOLA (the Washington Office on Latin America) respects the significant advances that the CNE has made in expanding the right to vote among formerly excluded populations, and in facilitating the automation of the voting process over the last fifteen years. However these conditions, combined with the many hurdles that authorities have placed on the process so far, appear unjustly designed to ensure that such a referendum does not occur this year.
As such, WOLA urges the CNE to respect constitutional norms and use its full technical capacity to move the referendum process forward in a timely manner. We urge the following:
That, in accordance with the Venezuelan constitution, the CNE clarify that the 20 percent threshold of signatures from the electorate should be measured at the national level, and not at the level of individual states.
That the CNE increase the number of voting machines and voting centers available for this process. While electoral authorities have over 14,000 voting centers at their disposal, they have said that they will use 1,356 of them, equipped with just 5,392 machines to gather the more than 3.9 million signatures necessary to trigger the referendum. Electoral norms dictate that all Venezuelans who appear in the voting registry have the right to access voting centers.
That the CNE modify its timeline for verifying the results of this signature drive, and devote all of its available resources in order to do so in a timely fashion. Officials have said that the results of the signature collection will be determined in late November, yet this long delay is unnecessary. The CNE has already demonstrated a technical capacity to quickly determine the results in more complicated and extensive electoral events than this, and should apply this capacity to the referendum process.
Finally, if all of the above conditions are met we firmly believe that—provided that signatures are gathered from 20 percent of the electorate, nationwide—the CNE can organize a recall referendum to be held in the first half of December.
As a leading research and advocacy organization advancing human rights in the Americas, WOLA does not seek to take a position in partisan politics, which should be reserved for Venezuelans. Rather we are concerned with a curtailment of a fundamental human right, the right of the people to choose their leaders and exercise control over them. The instrument of the recall referendum represents an admirable expansion of political rights stemming from the 1999 Constitution and should be respected. We urge the CNE to ensure that the recall referendum process is carried out in accordance with the law and in a way that prioritizes the expression of the will of the people.
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Contact:
Kristel Muciño
Director of Communications, WOLA
+1 (202) 797-2171
[email protected]
Venezuela’s Electoral Authority Makes Recall Referendum All but Impossible for 2016
David Smilde and Hugo Pérez Hernáiz
The Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) has issued a press release setting out a series of requirements for the signature drive to call a recall referendum against President Nicolás Maduro that make it all but impossible to hold this year. The announcement puts in place three enormous obstacles.
Dates
The CNE set the three days from October 26-28 as the dates during which the opposition needs to collected the required signatures. In the case that this requirement was fulfilled, which will be determined by late-November, the CNE date would be announced in early December the date for the actual referendum. They stated that given the 90 days they have by law to hold the event, it would take place “during the middle of the first quarter of 2017.”
If President Maduro were to lose a referendum after January 10, no new elections would be triggered, but the Vice-president would fill in as president until 2019.
Threshold
Perhaps the biggest obstacle is the decision by the CNE that the percentage of voter’s signatures needed to petition for the referendum will be 20% in each state, not nationwide. During the previous phase in which the MUD had to gather 1% voter’s signatures, the opposition coalition struggled to meet this requirement in states such as Nueva Sparta, Carabobo, and Anzoátegui.
Capacity
Yet another problem is the number of finger print scanning machines that the CNE has said it will use to validate the signatures collected in the event of a 20% gathering drive. The MUD had argued that at least 19,500 machines should be distributed around the country for there to be any possibility of reaching the target of 3,913,403 signatures in three days.
But the CNE said it will deploy only 5,392 such machines in 1,355 voting centers. The CNE has at its disposal over 14 thousand voting centers.
Elections journalist Electoral expert Eugenio Martinez says that for the 1% signature validation drive each machine scanned an average of 260 voters per day. In a perfect scenario the opposition could top 1,401,920 per day. It has to gather at least 3,913,403 signatures in three days.
However, the CNE centers will be open three days for just seven hours a day—from 8 am to 4 pm with a lunch break from 12 pm to 1 pm.
Reactions
The only pro-opposition rector of the CNE, Luís Emilio Rondón, dissented from the majority opinion on the decisions announced. He also made public the CNE’s decisions shortly before the publication of the official press release. He summed up his disagreement with the CNE’s actions saying “I thought it was necessary to establish conditions that facilitate the exercise of these [i.e. electoral] rights.”
The MUD Executive Secretary, Jesús Torrealba, reacted by asking opposition leaders to wait “in silence” until the coalition has made a formal statement on the issue, which he announced for “the next few hours.” But unsurprisingly several opposition leaders immediately commented via Twitter.
Henrique Capriles criticized the CNE for simply issuing a press release and not giving a press conference to explain its decisions: (@hcapriles) “Are they not going to come out to face the country and explain what they have approved? Have they no shame, no respect for the People?” He also however appealed for time for a common opposition reaction: “When we have all the information, and in unity the country is asking for, we will make our pronouncement.”
But radical opposition leader Maria Corina Machado called for civil disobedience: (@MariaCorinaYa) “Let’s focus on what its central: not only are the conditions for collecting the signatures unacceptable; they announced that the referendum will be in 2017. It is time for civil disobedience.”
Several analysts hit especially hard the requirement that 20% had to be collected in each state. Constitutional expert José Ignacio Hernández argues that the decision by the CNE to ask for 20% signatures for each State is “unconstitutional, illegal, and arbitrary.”
Well known political consultant Edgar Gutierrez tweeted “The 20% per state norm is as ridiculous as if the CNE had not proclaimed Maduro [president] in 2013 because he did not win every state.”
Eugenio Martínez summed up tweeting: “The CNE has approved the worst possible conditions for the 20%. The political bias of the decision is undeniable.”
The president of Venezuela’s National Electoral Council (CNE), Tibisay Lucena, finally announced yesterday the result of the audit of the signatures submitted by the opposition as the first step to petition for a recall referendum (RR) against president Maduro. Lucena said that the opposition coalition Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (MUD) had in fact gathered the signatures of 1% of registered voters in each state required to back the organization as the petitioner of a referendum.
The results of the CNE’s audit, carried out in the presence of opposition and PSUV witnesses, was already available on July 19, showing that almost 400,000 signatures had been successfully collected, audited, validated, and then audited again. It was thought that the CNE would make its announcement on July 26. Instead they waited to consider the report on August 1.
Hours before the CNE’s announcement and after meeting with the CNE rectors, Socialist Party (PSUV) mayor of Caracas Jorge Rodriguez said that the RR was legally dead because it is based on “the largest electoral fraud in the history of Venezuela.” He suggested that the Constitutional Chamber of the TSJ is processing a protective measure against the signature process. PSUV leader and National Assembly deputy, Diosdado Cabello, said that “we will do everything possible within the law and the Constitution to block this referendum from happening, how? By denouncing the fraud [it is based on].” Since June, state media has been insisting that “the right committed fraud with the signatures.”
Lucena did mention that the CNE would ask prosecutors to conduct an investigation into what she called “irregularities in relation to identity theft” in the 1% signatures submitted by the opposition. According to Lucena, under investigation are “1,326 signatures and fingerprints that do not match, plus 243 duplicated signatures.” She also said that 5,969 persons had made used of the five days period granted by the CNE to withdraw signatures, but that petitions were still being submitted and that the CNE would consider if they should be granted extempore.
International pressure was mounting before the CNE announcement. OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro suggested that Venezuela would reach the “terminal phase of de-legitimation.” He argued that the only source of legitimacy the government still had was the fact that Nicolas Maduro had been democratically elected. But if they it they continue to try to block the referendum “they are not only denying the powers of the state, but are also denying the rights of the people.” Also yesterday, US Secretary of State John Kerry called on the Venezuelan authorities not to drag out the recall process and favor democracy and the constitution over partisanship.
Because of complex rules set by the CNE, calculations regarding how long it could take for the actual referendum to take place vary. Elections journalist Eugenio Martínez says that if the CNE takes the maximum amount of the time that each step allows it, the collection of signatures could take place from September 10-12 and the referendum on January 6. That would be only three days before the limit of January 10. After that date a successful recall would not lead to new presidential elections but to the vice president completing the presidential term.
A different count by Alessandro di Stasio for the news portal Efecto Cocuyo, establishes the last week of November or the first week of December as possible dates. In contrast a count published yesterday in government backed news channel Telesur instead warned that the process “could be delayed if the Head of States, or any voter, were to introduce a legal appeal for any irregularity.” In any case, said Telesur, even “if the set periods are completed, the referendum would be held in 2017.”
The next phase of the process calls for the MUD to collect at least 20% of signatures of registered voters petitioning for the recall referendum. The date for this second signature collection was not set by Lucena in her announcement. One issue that will surely generate contention is the number and location of the signature collection centers the CNE authorizes.
In contrast to the validation of the 1% signatures in June in which the CNE’s fingerprint machines were used but not connected for instant authentication, meaning they required posterior verification against the CNE’s fingerprint data base, for the 20% drive they will be. This should simplify the process. However the 20% signatures will also be subject to a process of verification.
No Recall Referendum in 2016, Says Venezuelan Government
Hugo Pérez Hernáiz
After a long delay, in June 10 the president of the national electoral ruling body (CNE), Tibisay Lucena, finally gave the official go ahead to the process by which signers of the recall referendum against president Maduro will have to go to the regional offices of the CNE to authenticate or “validate” their signatures. Petitioners will have June 20 to 24 to do this, but the whole process of authentication will take up to thirty-two working days, said Lucena, Which means that the final result of the process probably will not be finished until July 26.
Lucena also said that a total of 605,727 signatures presented by the opposition had been excluded for irregularities (the several categories of irregularities are detailed here by electoral journalist Eugenio Martínez.) However these exclusions should not affect the outcome of the process since, according to Lucena, the opposition will still authenticate 1,352,052 signatures, far more than the 1% needed in each state. Lucena added during her press conference that “any alteration of public order would entail the immediate suspension of the process until order and respect have been stablished.”
After Lucena’s press conference PSUV leader Jorge Rodríguez, ex-rector of the CNE and commission by Maduro to overlook the process, said that on Monday, June 13, the PSUV would introduce in the Supreme Tribunal (TSJ) a appeal for interpretation (recurso de interpretación) about what he said had been a “gigantic fraud” by the opposition in the signature gathering process.
The opposition’s victory was even more short-lived, as a series of new obstacles started to become apparent. As soon as Lucena’s announcement had ended, followers started searching for their names in the web page provided by the CNE to check whether and where they would have to authenticate their signatures. Many expressed frustration via Twitter at finding that they had been excluded from the process.
Surprisingly, several prominent opposition leaders, including Henrique Capriles Radonski, also found their signatures had either been excluded or showed up as not even having been presented at all to the CNE by the opposition coalition Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (MUD) for consideration. Others reported finding their signatures deleted on a first search, only to find them included 24 hours later.
MUD representatives immediately protested questioning the CNE’s criteria for excluding many signatures. For example, the CNE excluded around 100,000 signatures because the voters did not sign the recall referendum petition in the same locality in which they are registered to vote, a requisite the MUD argues had not been previously established. Others were deleted for spelling errors, or for using “too much or too little ink” for the fingerprints.
The opposition also questioned the fact that the CNE had provided in its web portal a special form for people who wanted to have their signature excluded to do so from June 13 to 17. But the CNE provides no mechanism by which those who have signed and been excluded could re-include their signatures in the recall petition. The exclusion form is seen by the opposition as a way for the government to pressure public workers who might have signed.
Further issues could complicate matters for the opposition at this stage of the process. The CNE asks for the signatures of 1% of the voters in each state. In the scarcely populated states of Delta Amacuro and Amazonas, for example, that 1% is 1,171 and 1,016 voters respectively. The CNE has called for the authentication of 3,919 signatures in Delta Amacuro, and 3,877 in Amazonas. That is over three times that those needed to reach the threshold of 1%, which provides some margin of error. But it still will represent a significant mobilization challenge for the MUD in those two, far-flung, rural states.
The limitation by the CNE to one validation center per state will also put serious pressure on the MUD’s mobilization capacity, since thousands of voters will have to attend these places in only four days. In many instances supporters will have to travel to the capital cities of the states, where the CNE offices are located.
Government officials have been insisting that, even if the opposition were able to fulfil all the requisites, the referendum will not be held before 2017 because, they argue, the opposition should have started the process in January this year. If the referendum is held next year and Maduro loses, no new elections would be called, but the vice-president would complete the presidential period until 2019.
Addressing government supporters at a gathering of the Congreso de la Patria on June 11, President Maduro said “if they fulfil all the requisites, the recall referendum will be next year, period. We must respect the CNE.” He went on to encourage those who think their signature may have been wrongfully used to go to the CNE and withdraw their names. Finally, he said that the more than 600,000 bad signatures (firmas chimbas) entailed legal responsibilities for the opposition leaders.
After Maduro, Jorge Rodríguez spoke and said that perhaps the referendum could be held from March 2017 on, but not before that date. In any case he repeated that on Monday 13 he would ask the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Justice Tribunal to annul the whole process of signatures gathering by the opposition based on what he said was evidence of a fraud.
According to legal expert José Ignacio Hernández the CNE has incurred in several irregularities. Not only the time lapses have been grossly inflated, but the decision to include an additional step by which persons can delete their signatures, the limitation of the places for authentication to one per region, and the publication of the signing petitioners, are all unconstitutional.
A group of NGO’s and research institutions, including the Center for Political Studies of the Universidad Católica Andrés Bello and Transparencia Venezuela, have published a press release also criticizing the CNE and the government for putting unconstitutional obstacles in the way of a democratic process that, they argue, should be much easier and expeditous. They say that the CNE has issued post-factum norms for excluding signatures and should open many more offices for authenticating the signatures.
This is only the first stage of the process for activating a recall referendum. If the requisite 1% signatures are finally authenticated, the MUD will then have to ask for the signatures of 20% of registered voters. Opposition analysts argue that there is still time for a recall referendum this year, but this is looking increasingly unlikely.
The MUD has announced protests on June 16 in support of the “excluded 600,000.”
[Yesterday I did an interview with a foreign journalist who sent me some questions beforehand. Below I elaborate the notes I wrote for our Skype conversation.]
I just read your piece “The End of Chavismo?” What are your latest thoughts?
As I said there it seems that Nicolas Maduro has found the one possible way to undermine Chavismo as a significant political-electoral movement: leave the model as is and drive it off a cliff. If he had altered the model and fallen into trouble, people would have simply blamed him and proposed going back to true Chavismo. But it is quite evident for everyone that what Maduro has done is simply take the model of state-led economic growth and an overvalued currency to its reductio ad absurdum. There are some on the far left who suggest that there is not a problem with the model, that it is really just a matter of corruption and execution. But I don’t think they are convincing many people.
Having said all this, Chavismo has always been not just about Chavismo but about an opposition that has been in-grown and out-of-touch. This opposition could indeed rescue Chavismo by misplaying their hand as they have so many times in the past.
Right now the opposition is discussing their strategy for trying to force Nicolás Maduro from office and can’t seem to come to an agreement. The 1999 Constitution has a mechanism explicitly created for this situation called a “recall referendum” which has high legitimacy with the population. But instead they are considering a constitutional amendment that would reduce Maduro’s term from six to four years and require new elections by the end of the year. Many in the opposition see this as the line of least resistance since it would not require a petition drive, nor a vote with the requirements of the recall referendum—in which you need to get more than 50% of the tally, and more votes than the president was elected with. And a constitutional amendment would lead to a full presidential term, rather than a completion of the existing term.
The background of this is that many in the opposition have always thought they were the majority, think that “Venezuela” supports them—i.e that there is a consensus in their favor--that Chavismo is illegitimate, and that therefore anything they do to try to obtain power will be seen as legitimate. But Chavismo still has support from about a third of the population—indeed in the legislative elections they got 42% of the vote despite horrendous economic conditions. And a good portion of the opposition’s support in the December election was light, coming from independent voters or disaffected Chavistas, and cannot simply be counted on come what may.
If the opposition pushes for a constitutional amendment instead of using the established mechanism of the recall referendum, the majority of Venezuelans who are not committed opposition supporters could well see it as a power play of dubious legitimacy, and withhold their support. Opposition leaders will likely say that the National Electoral Council is controlled by the government and biased against them. But three months after that same CNE presided over an election in which the opposition swept the legislative elections, it is not clear how convincing that argument will be. It could generate the image that they don’t want to play by the rules and are once again seeking a shortcut to power instead of mobilizing the population through footwork and communication.
Why is the currency considered overvalued and who wins and loses?
Already during the Chávez period, Venezuela’s national currency--the “Bolivar”--was overvalued. This reduced the prices of foreign imports and generated an economic bonanza. So one set of winners were average Venezuelans, especially the middle class, who were able to consume imported goods at reasonable prices. Along with them importers, transportation and distribution companies, construction firms and retail outlets all boomed.
However, letting your currency remain overvalued also creates “Dutch disease,” which refers to the process whereby a country with one very valuable export, ends up not being able to export anything else, and suffers a decline in national industry. Thus one big loser traditionally has been national industry, especially those manufacturers who aspired to export their goods. Exporting anything but oil became impossible because even efficiently produced goods would be too expensive in international markets because of the artificially high exchange rate. And competing with imported goods in national markets was also difficult.
What is the relationship between an overvalued currency and scarcities and what impact do these latter have?
The combination of an overvalued currency and price controls for basic goods created scarcities even when it had an expanding number of dollars coming in. These scarcities were extremely unpopular among the middle classes insofar as it meant they had to go shopping several times a week rather than, say, once every two weeks. But it was popular among the poor because it meant that they could actually obtain goods that in the past were difficult for them to purchase. Put differently, the middle class has more money than time, while the poor have more time than money. The system favored the latter over the former.
Indeed from 2008-2012 at the same time that Venezuela experienced a rate of scarcities of around 20% (meaning that in any given store one out of five basic goods was unattainable) it also saw soaring consumption in terms of calorie and protein intake.
But progressively over the past three years, and especially in the last year, the situation has become much worse and now affects the poor more than the middle classes. Scarcities have gotten so bad that it is next to impossible to obtain all the price-controlled goods you need even if you are willing to wait in line. This is because each person can only shop for basic goods on two days a week depending on their ID number. It can take 4 or 5 hours to wait in line at a store, so the maximum one person can do is visit 3 stores on their day. And there is no guarantee of what is going to be available. You might wait 4 hours in line and only get, say, rice and laundry soap. Another day you might get pasta, toilet paper and milk. Thus an average person can easily spend twenty hours a week waiting in lines. Whatever is available you buy even if you don’t need it because then you can use it to trade with with friends, family and neighbors—one kilo of pasta for one package of diapers, etc.
Or people sell whatever extra they are able to buy, to a middle man who then sells it to an informal street seller, who sells it to the public at double, five times or even thirty times its original price, depending on the product. As you might imagine, many people have dedicated themselves to this. They might have several ID cards, or have a circuit of stores where they know cashiers or pay them small kickbacks. They spend all of their time in lines, buying products, and then reselling them. In Venezuelan slang they are called bachaqueros, after leaf-cutting ants that carry enormous loads. This has created an enormous parallel distribution and retailing system which has actually functioned as an important economic escape valve because it has given economic opportunity to many unemployed or marginally employed people.
Thus in the current situation poor people are waiting in lines either because they don’t have the money to buy the goods in the informal market, or because they don’t have a better source of income than buying and reselling. The middle class can usually obtain goods at a fairly reasonable price on the informal market. However, who exactly is “middle class” these days is not clear. Professionals with a fixed income in local currency are hard pressed.
The situation with prescription medicines is really much worse. Many of them are simply unavailable. Drugs for chemotherapy, high blood pressure or other chronic conditions are difficult to obtain and these scarcities can have fatal consequences.
Any anecdotes of your own regarding scarcities in Venezuela?
Right now I have a car with some sort of problem in the drive train. It has taken three or four weeks just to find an auto repair shop that will accept it because they are all full of cars that are waiting for parts. Last year our car was in the shop 5 months after a fender bender that could have been fixed in two weeks in any other context. The year before that it was in the shop 4 months because of an air conditioner. In that case it only got fixed because I bought an air conditioner on Ebay and brought it with me in my suitcase from the US. In the parking lot of our apartment building in Caracas, about one third of the cars are not running because it is impossible or prohibitively expensive to get them fixed.
Beyond that we haven’t suffered scarcities like others because I travel abroad frequently. All of the dish soap, laundry soap, shampoo, cooking oil, milk, toilet paper, deodorant, shaving cream, razors, and pain relievers we consume I bring from abroad. I have even brought pasta, beans and rice in my suitcase. My luggage always, always gets searched by TSA agents when I travel and they are often bemused by the items they find.
Why is devaluation politically incorrect for Maduro?
Devaluing the currency can relieve pressure on Venezuela’s scarce dollars. But it essentially does so by reducing consumption through inflation, which is never popular. And to actually address the problem of scarcities would require raising or eliminating price controls which would be disruptive and unpopular in the short term.
First, any devaluation will have significant negative effects on Venezuela’s poor, which is the base of Chavismo. While floating the currency and lifting price controls would mean that the store shelves would quickly be filled. It would also mean that all of these people who depend on price controlled goods will be unable to afford them, and those who had bachaqueo as their primary economic activity will suddenly be unemployed. Of course devaluing can also reverse the aforementioned Dutch disease and restart national production. But that process takes months and years while deprivations are experienced in terms of days and weeks.
Second, any clear and substantial devaluation smells neoliberal and Chavismo was born as an anti-neoliberal movement, as a reaction to the neoliberal measures of the 1990s. Indeed, Chávez claimed that the decision to make a push for power among he and other military officers came as a reaction to the rioting, looting and massacres that occurred in February 1989 after the Carlos Andres Pérez government devalued the currency and raised gasoline prices.
Finally, in and around the government there are stakeholders that profit from these distortions, using them to export capital or contraband. It is likely that they are impeding significant change.
How significant was the gas price hike? The mild currency devaluation?
The measures taken in February helped the government’s bottom line somewhat but were really too little too late. For example, they had no impact in lowering the parallel rate for dollars which remained above 1000 per $1. The price of gasoline increased significantly, but with inflation in triple digits this year and the government continuing to print inorganic money, it will not matter for long. With the official exchange rate now at Bs. 10 per $1 the currency is still 100 times cheaper than on the parallel market, meaning there are huge incentives for siphoning off dollars for capital flight or for the parallel market, instead of using them to import goods.
It is important to realize that Venezuela is now in a very different context. All of these problems of scarcities and inflation existed in 2013 and 2014 with oil at $100 a barrel. At that time, getting ahold of the exchange rate distortions could have turned things around. But now, even if they did everything right, they would have a serious crunch because with oil below $30 a barrel they simply do not have enough dollars to both meet their foreign debt obligations and provide dollars to importers.
Economically, how horrific is the math as far as availability of dollars to buy imports?
This year Venezuela has approximately $14 billion in debt service to meet—which at current oil prices would leave approximately $10 billion to pay for imports. That would be approximately a third of what Venezuela imported in 2015, which was already a drop from the previous year and provided a context of severe scarcities and hardship. Venezuela has already met its first couple of payments this year. But it is not at all clear how the government can meet its obligations this fall even if it continues to burn its reserves, sell off assets, and restrict consumption. It could monetize more of the debt its Petrocaribe partners owe. It could also continue to try to get more loans from the Chinese. But even if it does everything in its power and intends to pay the debt, it is not clear that it can.
How can you explain Chavistas for a foreign audience? What was Chavez’s appeal for his supporters?
Chavez was a charismatic leader who put forward an inspiring nationalistic narrative that said that Venezuela could gain control of its resources and use them to improve the lives of its people. And he fulfilled his promises, at least during his presidency. He was able to reduce poverty and inequality and make people believe in Venezuela again, after the drab technocratic suffering of the 1990s. There was nothing messianic about his leadership and nothing irrational about those who supported him. He really did improve their lives. It was clear to many of us that his economic model was not sustainable long term. But the data are quite clear that many people’s lives improved during his presidency, and these people won’t forget that anytime soon. Indeed, given how terrible the current economic conditions are, it is amazing that Chavismo still has 20 to 30 percent support and this is why. Many still think that Chávez was the only politician who cared about average people.
