ABOUT THE BLOG: Venezuelan Politics and Human Rights, a blog hosted by the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), is a unique resource for journalists, policymakers, scholars, activists and others interested in understanding Venezuelan politics and human rights.
The contributors call it as they see it, providing insights on Venezuela’s politics that go beyond the polarized pro-Chávez/anti-Chávez debate. The views expressed in the posts are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect WOLA’s institutional positions.
THE BLOGGERS: David Smilde, curator of the blog, is a WOLA Senior Fellow and the Charles A. and Leo M. Favrot Professor of Human Relations at Tulane University. He has lived in or worked on Venezuela since 1992. He is co-editor of Venezuela's Bolivarian Democracy: Participation, Politics and Culture under Chávez (Duke 2011).
Hugo Pérez Hernáiz is Associate Professor of Sociology at the Universidad Central de Venezuela.
Rebecca Hanson is a graduate student in sociology at the University of Georgia doing doctoral research on police reform and citizen participation in Venezuela.
Timothy Gill is a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Center for Inter-American Policy and Research at Tulane University. His research focuses on US foreign policy towards Venezuela and foreign funding for non-governmental organizations.
ABOUT WOLA: WOLA is a leading research and advocacy organization advancing human rights in the Americas.
CONTACT: For comments related to this blog, email us at [email protected].
For press inquiries only, please email us at [email protected].
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WOLA Launches Redesigned Venezuelan Politics and Human Rights Blog
On July 27, 2017 WOLA launched a redesigned version of the Venezuelan Politics and Human Rights blog, which will provide better readability, while maintaining the same, high-quality content. The new blog can be found at www.venezuelablog.org.
With the launch of the new platform, all Tumblr followers will need to subscribe to the redesigned blog. All readers who have already subscribed to the blog via email will continue to receive notifications regarding new posts.
If you want to subscribe to the new blog click here.
Unhappy Birthday: “Venezuelan Politics and Human Rights” is Five Years Old
David Smilde
This month marks the fifth anniversary of Venezuelan Politics and Human Rights. This would normally be a cause for popping corks and cutting cakes. But, writing this on the eve of the vote to select representatives for a Constituent Assembly that is not only unconstitutional but could disempower the Venezuelan people for years to come, it’s hard to be festive.
This anniversary message, then, will not be a celebration but rather a reiteration of our commitment to the Venezuelan people. Whatever happens in the coming weeks and months, we will be here, fighting for the rights of Venezuelans, and against the powers that seek to restrict them—whomever those powers may be.
Over the past year we’ve frequently heard—as both praise and criticism—that the blog has changed, that we now have a much more critical line on the Venezuelan government. This latter is true, but it does not represent a change, because our perspective has never been oriented by partisan political options. Indeed, the very first post on this blog back in July 2012, stated the following:
“Reality-based,” of course, does not mean that our facts or our analyses are always right. Rather it means that our posts seek to engage facts and be influenced by them rather than trying to select facts to support pre-established perspectives. And of course, “independent” does not mean apolitical. The contributions to this blog will be consistent with WOLA’s values of human rights, democracy, and social justice, and this is in itself a political position. But it is a non-partisan position insofar as it does not ally itself with particular political projects, parties, or personalities. Rather, we seek to call it as we see it, identifying the good, the bad and the ugly on all sides of the political spectrum.
On our first anniversary, in 2013, I further clarified.
“Reality-based” does not mean that this blog provides inerrant truth. We simply try to get it right using the best available information, rather than spinning difficult facts in favor of one of Venezuela’s current political options. Nor does it mean that our analysis will necessarily be “balanced.” If at any given moment one side deserves it, they are going to get more criticism than the other.
And this is what we have done. In 2014, when radical sectors of the opposition launched the #lasalida movement, we were quite critical of them, while defending their right to protest. That movement came approximately two months after Maduro’s coalition received strong support at the polls in the nationwide municipal elections in December 2013. In that sense it seemed to us like an undemocratic rejection of popular sovereignty as expressed at the ballot box.
In the past year and a half the same situation has occurred but with the actors reversed. In December 2015 National Assembly elections, Venezuelan citizens sent a clear message that they wanted change. Since then the Maduro government has consistently ignored that message, undemocratically rejecting popular sovereignty as expressed at the ballot box. They have used the Supreme Court to neutralize the National Assembly and the National Electoral Council to postpone further elections. Now they are calling a Constituent Assembly to change the rules before they get voted out of power.
None of this means we have “turned the corner” or have become allied with opposition politics. In terms of partisan politics, we should be considered fickle, untrustworthy and unreliable because that is not where our loyalties lie. Rather, our loyalties lie with the Venezuelan people and their struggle to defend their rights against power, whether that power is leftwing or rightwing, national or international, public or private. An individual or institution we praise today, we’ll throw under the bus tomorrow if they disempower, abuse or otherwise betray the people.
This blog is a thoroughly collective undertaking and I would like point to a few people who are especially important.
Hugo Pérez Hernáiz, Timothy Gill and Rebecca Hanson were my original collaborators on the blog. All three of them have finished their Ph.Ds. in the past year and are moving on. Hugo is in the process of moving to Barcelona, Spain to teach there. After one year as a postdoc at Tulane, Tim will be starting as an assistant professor of sociology at the University of North Carolina, Wilmington. In the midst of a flurry of important projects, Becca will be starting as an assistant professor of sociology and Latin American studies at the University of Florida. I am thrilled by their success and hope they will continue to contribute to the blog.
Geoff Ramsey will now be my main collaborator, bringing his crack research and communication skills. He has already coauthored or authored some of our most successful pieces this year. Elsewhere at WOLA, John Walsh and Geoff Thale provide substantive commentary and feedback when needed, as do Gimena Sánchez and Adam Isacson. Kristel Muciño originally conceived the blog and leads a crack communications team including Loren Riesenfeld, that is always innovating and pushing us forward. Former Executive Directory Joy Olson was unfailing in her support. New ED Matthew Clausen has enthusiastically embraced the blog’s mission.
Venezuela’s foreign correspondents have become my closest interlocutors. Nick Casey, Stephan Gibbs, Josh Goodman, Girish Gupta, Anatoly Kurmanaev, Gideon Long, Nick Miroff, John Otis, Alexandra Ulmer, and Jim Wyss, always push me along with their questions. Andy Cawthorne, Josh Goodman, Andy Rosati and Kejal Vyas have become friends as well as colleagues. Hannah Dreier has moved on to ProPublica and we all wish her well there. I also appreciate the sustained interest in Venezuela shown by Jerome McDonnell of WBEZ Worldview and Ian Masters of Background Briefing.
My scholarly and activist colleagues provide pointed yet generous feedback. Carolina Acosta-Alzúru, Benigno Alarcón, Andrés Antillano, Marino Alvarado, Mario Arraigada, Felipe Cala, Javier Corrales, Mariano De Alba, Steve Ellner, María Pilar García Guadilla, Gabriel Hetland, David Holiday, Luis Lander, Luis Vicente Leon, Abraham Lowenthal, Margarita López Maya, Miguel Martínez Meucci, Michael McCarthy, Jennifer McCoy, Manoela Miklos, Francisco Monaldi, Boris Muñoz, Pedro Nikken, Dimitris Pantoulas, Francisco Rodríguez, Antulio Rosales, Luz Mely Reyes, Iñaki Sagarzazu, Ana María Sanjuan, Michael Shifter, Harold Trinkunas, Rafael Uzcategui, Alejandro Velasco, José Virtuoso S.J., Angélica Zamora, and Verónica Zubillaga. At Tulane Ludovico Feoli and Tom Reese provide consistent support for my work. Eduardo Silva provides extended pushback on our extended bike rides along the Mississippi.
We would also like to express our appreciation for our readers. We are flattered by your interest and humbled by your trust. The weeks and months to come are sure to be unpleasant. But we aim to rise to the occasion, contribute to the understanding of complex situations, and hopefully to the development of just and democratic solutions.
Please stay tuned, as very soon we will launch a shiny new version of the blog.
Artículo de Opinión sobre Venezuela en NYT Español
Hoy el New York Times Español publicó mi artículo de opinión sobre Venezuela y lo que debe y no debe hacer la comunidad internacional.
Cómo evitar la guerra civil en Venezuela
David Smilde
El 16 de julio, más de siete millones de venezolanos votaron en un plebiscito que rechazó de manera tajante los planes del presidente Nicolás Maduro de convocar una Asamblea Constituyente para redactar de nuevo la Constitución. Fue una notable demostración a través de un evento electoral organizado autónomamente y encarnó un sólido revés, aunque no exento de tensiones, en los distritos de la clase trabajadora que alguna vez fueron bastiones de Hugo Chávez, el predecesor de Maduro.
Desde el plebiscito, la oposición venezolana ha dado pasos hacia el establecimiento de un gobierno paralelo. Esto podría mantenerse como una iniciativa simbólica, pero si la oposición sigue avanzando en ese camino, pronto podría estar buscando el reconocimiento internacional y solicitando financiamiento, y, al menos implícitamente, estaría afirmando el derecho a hacer un uso legítimo de la fuerza como gobierno paralelo. Posteriormente, perseguiría lo que cualquier gobierno quiere: armas para defenderse. Si tiene éxito, Venezuela podría caer en una guerra civil que haría ver el conflicto actual como una pelea entre chicos de secundaria.
Today the New York Times published my op ed on what the international community should and should not do with respect to the Venezuela crisis.
How to Avoid Civil War in Venezuela
On July 16, more than seven million Venezuelans voted in a plebiscite that emphatically rejected President Nicolás Maduro’s plans to convene a Constituent Assembly to rewrite the Constitution. It was a remarkable showing for a D.I.Y. electoral event and included robust, if nervous, turnout in the working-class districts that were once strongholds for Mr. Maduro’s predecessor, Hugo Chávez.
Since the plebiscite, Venezuela’s opposition has taken steps toward establishing a parallel government. This might remain a symbolic initiative. But if the opposition continues down this road, itwill soon be looking for international recognition and funding, and will at least implicitly be asserting the parallel government’s claim to the legitimate monopoly on the use of force. After that itwill seek what every government wants: weapons to defend itself. If it succeeds, Venezuela could plunge into a civil war that will make the current conflict seem like high school fisticuffs.
The other day I received an email from Venezuela from a person I have known for over twenty years, whom I will refer to as “Fran.” While he has worked in the government for the last ten years, he has never been strongly ideological. He has continued to work in the government because he has a strong belief in public service and needs a stable income to support his wife and two sons. The story he tells is consistent with other denunciations and this video circulating on social media.
Dear David,
The story I am going to tell you has to do with my government job. Yesterday, first thing in the morning, the 5 directors of [unnamed government institution] were called in for an emergency meeting to tell us that it was an order that we vote on the 30th of July. To be perfectly sincere, I had already imagined this would happen. Nevertheless, I never thought the order would include my entire work team.
The instructions that came from above were that “employee who does not vote, is out.” The cell phones of each director were taken by our technology directors, to install in our presence an application with which to scan our “Fatherland Cards,” and which can then be used to monitor when we vote, and when people under our charge vote.
Today I was told—I still haven’t confirmed this—that null votes will not be possible in this election. Now I understand why my boss told me: ‘Vote for whoever you want Fran. Who you vote for doesn’t matter.’
Sincerely, Fran.
Human rights group Provea has denounced this situation, and has provided an email address for public employees to denounce threats.
NGOs have also launched a campaign explaining how people can cast a null vote.
From Congratulations to Sanctions: International Community Responds to Venezuela’s ‘Consulta Popular.’
Geoff Ramsey and David Smilde
Last Sunday’s symbolic vote organized by the Venezuelan opposition to reject the government’s proposed Constituent Assembly, was met with an outpouring of support from regional and European countries, who called on the administration of President Nicolas Maduro to reconsider its bid to rewrite the country’s basic document.
Among governments in the Americas, the most vocal have been members of the same group of 20 nations that have spoken out in recent weeks against the Constituent Assembly in forums like the Organization of American States (OAS). The governments of Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Brazil, Argentina, Panama, Costa Rica, and Canada all issued statements of support for the July 16 vote as evidence that Venezuela’s people oppose the Constituent Assembly.
Most of these statements also included varying endorsements of, as Mexico’s government put it, “the search for a negotiated solution that will allow for the restoration of democratic order.”
OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro, for his part, called the vote a “historic step in the exercise of democracy” in Venezuela, and described it as a reference point for the international community.
These statements were echoed by European countries. Along with statements by the governments of Germany, France, and Spain, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, spoke to press about the vote and the situation in Venezuela more broadly.
Hinting at the possibility of the EU leveling sanctions against Venezuela, Mogherini told reporters that “[o]bviously all the options are always on the table for political consideration.” In subsequent reporting, it has become clear that there is support for at least considering such sanctions in the body, with the government of Portugal being the only clear dissenting voice against them.
The day after the vote, United States’ President Donald Trump issued a statement lamenting that the “strong and courageous actions continue to be ignored by a bad leader who dreams of becoming a dictator,” referring to Maduro. Going further, the U.S. leader promised "swift economic actions" if the Constituent Assembly proposal moves forward on July 30, a message that was echoed by State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert.
On July 18, administration figures told members of the press that the government was preparing a new round of targeted sanctions against Venezuelan officials, which could be announced in the coming days. According to reports, those on the sanctions list would include Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López, as well as United Socialist Party (PSUV) Vice President Diosdado Cabello.
The White House is apparently prepared to take this strategy even further, with the Wall Street Journal reporting that the administration is weighing banning Venezuelan crude-oil exports to the U.S. Reuters is reporting that the US could ban dollar payments for oil shipments.
US Senator Marco Rubio, who has for the past several years argued for the virtues of targeted sanctions on government officials on the basis of their not hurting the Venezuelan people, now says broad economic sanctions would not hurt them either. He explains: “I don’t believe the Venezuelan people are enjoying the benefits of a declining oil industry…It’s going entirely to enrich those who are tied to it, and to pay for debt obligations.”
He is receiving support in this position from Secretary General Luis Almagro, who in his testimony to a US Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Venezuela suggested. “We need more economic pressure on a government that is investing the money it earns through natural resources that belong to the people to fight and kill that very same people.”
But there is widespread skepticism of economic sanctions in Venezuela and elsewhere. Venezuelan opposition lawmaker Angel Alvarado—a member of the National Assembly’s economic commission—suggested “the consequences for Venezuela would be catastrophic…it would be a collapse without precedent.”
Moises Naim—former Venezuelan Minister of Trade and Industry and a Distinguished Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace—remarked to the WSJ that a U.S. oil embargo would be like "political manna from heaven for Caracas," noting that it could aid Maduro’s attempts to paint his government as under siege from U.S. aggression.
Columnist Andres Oppenheimer echoed this argument, but suggested the US could condition oil purchases on the consent of the National Assembly.
WOLA analysts have likewise rejected the specter of unilateral economic sanctions. Geoff Thale argued that unilateral sanctions—targeted or broad—could raise exit costs on officials in the government, making them “feel they have no option but to resist.”
Speaking to the AFP, David Smilde noted that blanket sanctions against the oil sector could have a devastating impact on the economy, and in turn on everyday Venezuelans. “There is no way to apply economic sanctions now in Venezuela without making the humanitarian situation much worse. People will starve to death," argued Smilde (listen also to podcast discussion of sanctions).
In new podcast David Smilde discusses “Why is Maduro Turning Venezuela Into a Cuban-Style Pseudo-Democracy?”
In a July 20th podcast on Background Briefing with Ian Masters, Smilde discusses the ongoing political crisis in Venezuela and the Maduro regime’s spiral toward a “Cuban-Style Pseudo-Democracy”. Click here to listen to the podcast.
Q&A: What Does López’s Release Mean for Venezuela?
The Inter-American Dialogue’s daily Latin America Advisor has published a Q&A on the significance of the recent release of Leopoldo Lopez to house arrest, with a roundup of opinions from a number of Venezuela analysts.
WOLA Senior Fellow David Smilde’s contribution is below. See other contributions by Luis Vicente León, Jennifer McCoy, Alejandro Velasco, and Eva Golinger here.
Q: Venezuela’s government on July 8 released opposition leader Leopoldo López from prison and transferred him to house arrest. The government said he was released due to health reasons, and the Supreme Court said his release was also due to “serious signs of irregularities” in the handling of his case. Was the decision to release López indeed motivated by concern for his well-being, or did the government have other motives for doing so? How will López’s release affect the opposition’s strategy in confronting the administration of President Nicolás Maduro, if at all? To what extent will López now have more direct infl uence over the anti-government movement in the country?
A (from David Smilde, WOLA senior fellow and professor of sociology at Tulane University):
“Sending Leopoldo López to home detention does not appear to have been part of any type of negotiation, other than José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero’s request for a goodwill gesture. As such, it allowed the government to relieve some international pressure by apparently making such a gesture. The way the government framed the move—as a ruling by the Supreme Justice Tribunal (TSJ) for humanitarian reasons and due to irregularities in the case—also helped the government in its battle against Attorney General Luisa Ortega. Her break with the government has made her a hero among the opposition. This move allowed the government to highlight the uncomfortable fact that it was Ortega’s office that prosecuted López. It also allowed government officials to portray themselves as obedient to the orders of an independent TSJ that does not always rule their way. That would give them some grounding to suggest to the opposition that it should not complain if and when the TSJ dismisses Ortega. Early suggestions by some of us that the López move would cause divisions within the opposition have not been borne out. López is at home but is under a gag order that limits what he can say and therefore what influence he can have. In fact, the López release provided a rare victory for the opposition and as such, an important boost a week before its effort to call a plebiscite. The plebiscite itself was much more important than the López release. Getting seven million people to turn out for a do-it-yourself election was an impressive feat and gave the opposition some momentum and international attention in its struggle against Nicolás Maduro’s authoritarian project.”
Statement from the International Study and Research Mission
David Smilde
Sunday’s Consulta Popular benefitted from the work of a research team that came to accompany the effort and provide their assessment. They were invited by the Comission of Guarantors of the Referendum. Below is a translation of their press release. Overall it praises the effort but does point out two ways in which it did not qualify as an actual electoral process: it did not have an electoral registry and therefore would not be able to detect any kind of multiple voting. As well, in many instances the vote was not secret.
Their complete Spanish-language report can be found here.
Statement from the International Mission of Study and Investigation of the Referendum in Venezuela
By invitation of the Commission of Guarantors of the Referendum called by the Venezuelan National Assembly, an international study and research mission was created for the the July 16th, 2017 electral process. The group consisted of politicians and academics, as well as representatives of institutions that carry out electoral observation in Latin America.
There were two political aspects of this electoral day that stood out. First, the participation of those in charge of electoral tables and concurring to vote was massive. This is an indication of the organizational capacity of civil society—those who took on the cost of some of the activities and materials--and the democratic conviction of the citizens that understand elections to be a privileged of democracy. It is important that the organizers offer detailed, break-downs of participation, and valid and invalid votes for each of the three questions.
Second, the participation of citizens occurred in a calm, even enthusiastic environment. The strong presence of women at the electoral tables merits special mention. The murder of a female citizen in Catia must be sanctioned. It was an isolated event that contrasted with the general setting of serenity, despite that lack of public security measures.
These political facts regarding the initiative called by the National Assembly, overshadow the technical details of the popular consultation. Regarding these elements, it is essential to highlight the organizational capacity necessary to set up more than 14,000 tables in more than 2,000 voting facilities and train those deemed capable of supervising, during a very short period of time. The voting process was manual. The seriousness with which the different individuals involved in the Referendum assumed their roles was notable.
Despite these achievements, it should be stated that while the preliminary data does corroborate the qualitative impression of a large mobilization, the absence of an electoral registry reduced the technical precision of the popular consultation in establishing the level of participation. In addition, there was no guarantee of the secrecy of the vote. It was common for the citizens to vote in front of those in charge of the table. While this did not appear to cause discomfort--and reflected that the event was fundamentally an occurrence of citizens aligned with the opposition--it distanced the Referendum from one of the fundamental characteristics of an electoral event.
The Referendum amounted to a relevant, political event. It was celebrated in a setting in which challenges for the political actors remain; particularly, the necessity to establish permanent, fluid channels of communication between political forces that should perceive each another as antagonists, but not enemies. Those spaces are fundamental for debating and finding solutions for what is a multi-dimensional crisis. This extremely essential task requires a political environment respectful of the rule of law, and respectful of the competencies of each branch of the stae, which today does not exist; framed by constitutional rules, the implementation of an electoral calendar, and the protection of human rights.
The dust has not yet settled from yesterday’s plebiscite and the interpretive terrain is still moving. Here are some of my takeaways.
The Good
*The event was a good strategic move for the opposition, which needed to move beyond the continuous street protests of the past three and half months, to and activity that could aggregate discontent in a different way.
*The government deserves some credit for moving beyond suggestions that this plebiscite was unconstitutional and illegal, to implicit recognition that it was legal, if non-binding and partisan. Nicolás Maduro even called for both events to be held in peace.
*For a self-made plebiscite not using state resources, this was a herculean task that was largely successful (although see below).
*Kudos to the people. This was no normal electoral event. It was clear that those participating were there to vote against the ANC meaning to be seen going to vote is to be seen as a government opponent. That is a not ureasonable cause for fear, especially in many popular barrios where colectivos are present. However, many citizens confronted this fear and went anyway (See here and here).
The Bad
*The opposition mismanaged expectations and did not fully aggregate existing discontent. Some officials said they expected 14 million people to turnout, at the same time that they only printed up 8 million ballots and only marshalled roughly a fifth of the electoral tables normally used in a national election. Add to this highly tendentious questions that were designed to mobilize their base but not reach out to disaffected Chavistas, and the result was not as big as it could have been. As Luis Vicente Leon suggested, what should be a great victory is now being cast as a disappointment by some.
*One can add to mismanaged expectations National Assembly president Julio Borges incorrect statement that they had achieved more votes than Nicolas Maduro had in 2013. This both misled the public, unnecessarily harms MUD credibility, and suggested that this was the goal they were aiming for. Knowing they came up short, he should have focused on the imagery of massive turnout.
*The opposition came up just short of three important thresholds: the number of people who voted for Maduro in the April 2013 Presidential election (which would have been the number needed to revoke Maduro had the recall referendum not been postponed), the number of people who voted for Capriles in the 2013 election, and the number who voted for opposition candidates in the December 2015 legislative elections. Were they really only able to put together 2000 electoral centers, or did they want to make sure that the images coming out would show lines and traffic jams? If the later, they robbed Peter to pay Paul and Paul was more important. With 3000 electoral centers, 15 million ballots just in case, and non-tendentious questions, they probably could have increased this result by 30-40% even if they lost a few radicals along the way (because of the non-tendentious questions.)
*The government organized a trial run of the ANC vote on the same day. There were reports of “stationary lines” meaning people had to wait in line for hours because of delay tactics meant to show high participation. This move wasted people’s time and caused unnecessary tension in some places where the CNE electoral center was next to a “punto soberano.”
*The collective(s) in Catia who fired into the crowd of people exercising their democratic rights earn the award for the most disgusting act of the day. Images of middle-aged women from the same popular sectors these collectives hail from, laying on the ground in puddles of blood will hopefully give pause to many who support or admire these collectives. The fatal victim was a much loved local nurse who went out of her way to attend to “malandros,” young men involved in crime and violence.
*Award for the worst soundbite of the day goes to Rector of the Universidad Central de Venezuela. To a logical question of what they, the “guarantors” of the event made of reports that one person had voted seventeen times, she said that that it would be impossible for someone who participated in this event to do such a thing. This response can only be taken as a sign that there were not controls against double voting or other abuses. If there were, she would have mentioned them clearly to dispel reasonable doubts.
The Potentially Worse
*The entire event has had an implicit bait-and-switch running through it which could lead the MUD to significant misteps. People who turned out to vote against the ANC, found themselves asked to vote for the Armed Forces to support the National Assembly (Question 2), and the third question starts with a logical call for the Constitutional validation of authorities but then adds the ambiguous figure of a “National Unity government” to “restore the Constitution. If the opposition tries to put forward a parallel government and seek international recognition, it could considerably complicate matters. Recognizing such a parallel government would be no small step for governments in the region and would likely take longer than the two week window they have before the ANC is installed. So far it looks like the opposition is not going this route. But you can assume it is still on the agenda of opposition radicals.
*It looks as though the government will focus on trying to dismiss and discredit the results of the plebiscite, with videos of people voting multiple times and spurious comparisons to other electoral processes—criticisms the opposition admittedly set itself up for. It would be much better if they listened to the population and changed course.
The opposition coalition is going to get a good result today. So far turnout is impressive and people are enthusiastic. The one thing that could have supressed turnout is fear of violence. However, the TSJ did not declare the plebiscite illegal, and President Nicolás Maduro made a clear call for both events to be held in peace. This has clearly generated a sense among voters that it is safe to go and wait in line in publc space.
The only limit to the result would seem to be logistical, in other words, the number, placement, and functioning of the “puntos soberanos” (sovereign points). There are less than a third of the number of electoral tables as in a normal election. Insiders suggest that the maximum capacity of the structure the opposition has mobilized is 8 million or so.
That would be an extraordinary result since it would be more voters than those who voted for opposition candidates in the National Assembly elections in December 2015. It would also surpass the number of voters that would have been needed to recall Nicolás Maduro had the recall referendum not been indefinitely postponed.
Whatever the actual numbers say, the optics of a large turnout, especially in longtime Chavista areas in the Western part of Caracas will perhaps be more important.
People who think about these things, have been predicting a result of between 3-5 milllion, which would be positive. Given the dynamics of the past 24 hours, I would not be at all surprised by a result of over 5 million.
One week link of the entire effort is the inability to control multiple voting. Each voter has to show her or his ID and sign a sheet. This in theory could be cross checked to control multiple voting. But they won’t because these voter lists will be burned lest they become a new “Tascón List”--the list from 2003-04 of those who signed in favor of a recall referndum that has since been used to exclude people from government jobs and other benefits.
This will allow government figures to suggest that the turnout was due to multiple voting. I would not be surprised of government media would send a team out to film one of their members voting ten times during the day at different voting centers. They can add to this some videos of the opposition buring the voter lists as evidence of guilt.
One thing to watch will be if there is a significant difference between how many people vote “yes” on the three questions. The first one is, of course, the most important. The second two go further and further towards radical opposition strategy. The second asks people to affirm that they want the Armed Forces to support the National Assembly.
The final one asks people whether they agree with an unspecified “unity government” that would relegitimize the public powers. This last one especially amounts to the MUD to throwing a bone to opposition radicals. It will surely benefit them since many people will vote “yes” on all three without thinking too carefully about it. But it will be interesting to see if there are significant differences in support between these questions. Some dissident Chavistas have made calls to vote yes on the first question and no on the second two.
On July 30, the Venezuelan government intends to hold a public vote to select delegates to a National Constituent Assembly, which would begin rewriting the country’s Constitution. As local human rights organizations, Venezuelan judicial experts, opposition figures and Chavista dissidents have pointed out, this effort is clearly unconstitutional and threatens to disempower Venezuelan citizens for years to come.
Why is the government of President Nicolas Maduro pushing to rewrite the 1999 Constitution, which was supported by his predecessor, the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez?
The current Constitution came out one of Chavez’s first promises upon taking office: to create a new magna carta that reflected the needs of a long-ignored majority in the country. Chávez took the proposal to the people by referendum and it was approved by over 80 percent of voters in April 1999. Members of the Constituent Assembly were selected in July and the Constitutional Assembly was seated in August. The resulting document was ratified by roughly 72 percent of voters in December of that same year. Although abstention rates in these votes were high (between roughly 50 and 60 percent of the electorate failed to vote), the 1999 Constitution was embraced by Chávez and his governing United Socialist Party (PSUV) as the founding document for the creation of a new national project.
By contrast, Maduro’s May 1 convocation of a National Constituent Assembly contained none of the democratic legitimacy of his predecessor’s effort. It is not the initiative of a newly elected leader riding a fresh societal consensus. Rather it is the initiative of an unpopular leader avoiding fair elections at all cost. In 2016 the Maduro government used its control over the National Electoral Council to indefinitely suspend a presidential recall referendum and postpone elections for governors. The Constituent Assembly is clearly and effort to change the rules to avoid being voted out.
Even though the National Electoral Council has announced that state elections will be held in December 2017, the fact that the government is moving forward with an effort to create a new Constitution that could potentially override all other powers renders assurances of a post-July 30 electoral calendar essentially meaningless.
How exactly does the Maduro government’s convocation of a National Constituent Assembly violate the current Venezuelan Constitution?
The initiative is fundamentally unconstitutional and undemocratic from its inception, which has been highlighted by Venezuelan legal scholars like José Ignacio Hernández as well as international human rights organizations like WOLA. Put simply, it conflates two separate steps: initiating the call for such an assembly and actually convoking it. According to Article 348 of the 1999 Constitution, the President has the right to initiate a call for a Constituent Assembly. However, Article 347 says it is the people who exclusively have the right to convoke a Constituent Assembly.
During the 1999 debate, the current head of the presidential commission on the Constituent Assembly, Elias Jaua, explicitly recognized the distinction between the initiation of a call for a new constitution and the importance of holding a referendum on this proposal. In a 2008 speech, Chavez appeared to make reference to this difference as well.
Essentially, Venezuelan voters are not being empowered to say whether or not they want to rewrite the Constitution, only who they want to do it. While Maduro has suggested that this Constitution would be submitted to voter for approval, the fact that the entire initiative has not been put before voters in the first place raises doubts about the ability of the electorate to reject a new national charter once configured.
How have the criteria for the selection of members to the Constituent Assembly “stacked the deck” in favor of the government?
On July 30, the National Electoral Council (CNE) has announced that Venezuelans will be electing 545 members of the Constituent Assembly. Of these, 181 positions will be “sectoral,” which the government has portrayed as representatives of all walks of Venezuelan life, and 364 positions will be reserved for “territorial” representatives of each of Venezuela’s municipalities.
The 181 sectoral members of this body will come from eight broad sectors: indigenous constituents (with 8 representatives), students (24), peasants and fishermen (8), entrepreneurs (5), people with disabilities (5), pensioners (28), community councils (24) and workers (79). However, the fact that many of these will come from government-affiliated organizations that make up the PSUV base gives Chavismo a clear advantage.
The division of territorial representatives to the Constituent Assembly provides a similar advantage to Chavismo. Instead of apportioning representatives according to population size, each municipality will receive at least one representative, while the 23 municipalities that are state capitals—as well as the Capital District of Caracas—will each get two. This gives outsized weight to rural municipalities with low populations, and minimizes the say of voters in populated urban areas.
Eugenio Martínez, a leading Venezuelan electoral analyst, writes that if municipalities voted the way they did in the legislative election that resulted in an opposition landslide in December 2015, Chavismo would win a majority (54 percent) of representatives to the Constituent Assembly on July 30. But economist Francisco Rodriguez has argued that while that is true, if the opposition over performed their 2015 result by a couple of percentage points, they would win the majority of the delegates. And if they were to get two thirds of the vote, they would win over 70% of the Constituent Assembly.
In any case, all of this is moot now because the opposition has declined to participate in the Constituent Assembly. That means Chavismo, which is now the minority political block in Venezuela, will have free reign to rewrite the Constitution.
What kind of Constitution would the government propose in the likely event that its supporters obtain a majority of the National Constituent Assembly on July 30?
Assuming the Maduro government is successful in rewriting the constitution, the exact nature of the new document remains an open question. However, there is substantial evidence to suggest that a new constitution could see Venezuela adopt a system radically different from the federal system and representative democracy it has known heretofore.
Maduro has often claimed that one of the last instructions given to him by Chávez on his deathbed was to advance the “communal project,” a reference to a process that began in 2006 and involved the creation and integration of “communal councils” into the state apparatus. The number of these councils, which began as an experiment in participatory democracy and facilitating community organizing to meet local needs, is claimed to be over 45,000. Their administration falls under the Ministry of the Communes and Social Movements, a fact that opponents have pointed to as evidence of an effort to create a parallel state. The plan to create a “communal state” would involve a pyramid-like structure that begins with communal councils, which are aggregated into communes, then communal cities and every larger structures with the executive branch at the top.
Voting would likely take places through consensual procedures in assemblies, rather than direct, universal and secret voting.
(See here for Maduro’s repeated references to “re-founding Venezuela” and his vows that the Constituent Assembly would be “profoundly communal.” See here for past assertions that “new democracy is communal democracy.”)
What is the opposition planning in response? What are dissident Chavistas saying?
Ever since Maduro first announced a plan to convene a National Assembly, the opposition Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD) coalition has loudly rejected the proposal, and vowed to refrain from participating in it. Instead, the MUD has continued organizing rallies, marches, and demonstrations against the Maduro government, and has insisted that the Constituent Assembly be abandoned.
As the scheduled vote approaches, the MUD is stepping up its attempts to highlight the Constituent Assembly’s lack of democratic legitimacy. On Sunday, July 16, the MUD will hold a nationwide referendum on the issue that, while not endorsed by electoral authorities, the opposition will hold as evidence that Venezuelans reject Maduro’s initiative.
If such pressure fails and the July 30 vote goes ahead as planned, the opposition’s next move is unclear. A number of opposition lawmakers have supported the idea of mass mobilizations on July 30, and National Assembly President Julio Borges has said the MUD has a “well-prepared plan for national protests to prevent it.”
The MUD has not been alone in rejecting the initiative. Independent Attorney General Luisa Ortega has been a vocal challenger of the Constituent Assembly, and she has been joined by other voices within the growing faction of “dissident” Chavistas, like former Interior Minister Miguel Rodriguez Torres, former Ombudswoman Gabriela Ramírez Pérez, and two high court justices.
Venezuelan Intellectuals, Civil Society Call for a ‘National Agreement’ to Resolve the Country’s Crisis
On July 10, former President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights Pedro Nikken presented a joint statement on the situation in Venezuela alongside more than 60 other leading members of civil society, intellectuals, and media figures. In it, the statement’s signers call on the leadership of the government and opposition to come together and seek a common position in order to address the country’s political, economic, and social crisis. The statement also encourages the Vatican to mediate such a process, with a group of four mutually agreed upon countries to serve as guarantors.
A full translation of the statement is available below. In a separate El Universal interview, Nikken discusses the importance of international mediation of this process in greater detail, with particular emphasis on the Vatican.
Call for a National Agreement
The unprecedented political, economic, and social crisis from which Venezuela suffers will only get worse if the exercise of intelligence and patriotism of the country’s leadership does not serve to halt rising confrontation.
The below-signed do not intend to assert or renounce their points of view about the Venezuelan political process. But we do call attention to the fact that the current conflict is occurring during the greatest social and economic crisis in the last 100 years of our republican history, and that the same conflict finds us buried in a relentless struggle that has already cost us dozens of lives. The attack by armed groups on the Legislative Palace and on lawmakers, guests, and journalists that were gathered to celebrate Independence Day exemplifies how political violence grows day by day, in a spiral that bears dangerously upon the peace of the country. Fear and hate threaten to take root as sentiments that indefinitely infect our social fabric.
In order to attack the root of the rising political conflict in Venezuela, it is necessary to ensure that the behavior of all those involved is oriented toward ensuring the complete functioning of democratic institutions and of the rule of law. The basic rules of democracy involve the guarantee that the people can express themselves freely and that their will is respected, in order to ensure the stability of any government and the actions of those who find themselves in the opposition, which requires a reliable system to resolve disputes.
All this occurs in the midst of the great economic difficulties that the country is going through, which affect the entire population, and are expressed in the high cost of essential goods and the shortage and deterioration of public services. This situation results in scarcity and social unrest, for which a primary need exists to immediately address social, financial, and economic problems, particularly those related to food and medicine and the decline of the currency’s purchasing value.
The crisis that we are living in must be stopped before its outcome destroys essential components of human dignity, condemning us to either generalized political and social violence or to an oppressive government, if not both.
In the certainty of raising our voice to express a sentiment felt by the majority of the country, we call on all sectors that can contribute to address the current state of affairs to assume their responsibility. It is not a question of lowering flags or of giving up the struggle, but of addressing without delay the search for minimum understandings on disputed matters according to a mutually agreed upon agenda.
We know that this is not an easy task, but this country’s leaders must not be daunted by any skepticism upon confronting irrationality. It is their task, precisely, to create hope and to contribute to its fulfillment, counting on the ability of the people to defeat adversity and work peacefully towards their future. This does not mean naivety. The experience of failed negotiations must not be ignored. Instead it must be taken advantage of to rectify errors and adopt more efficient procedures.
It is necessary, above all, to remove obstacles that affect the credibility of the purpose of an agreement and the viability of what is agreed upon. Among those obstacles, the most notorious would be the creation of a National Constituent Assembly that would not be linked to agreements between the government and the opposition, and could assume the right to ignore and contradict them. To this end, in order for the call we make today to have useful collective results, President Nicolás Maduro has in his hands the initiative to suspend the electoral act scheduled for July 30th and thus open up an opportunity for a wider agreement among Venezuelans.
In that context, we propose that the Holy See continue its generous mediation in this process. We ask that once again it help us build trust, to bridge differences and promote agreements. At the same time, we require the utmost seriousness and good faith from critical stakeholders. We also suggest that four friendly countries, invited by mutual agreement, accompany and support this mediation. We request that, with complete respect for Venezuelan sovereignty, they act as guarantors, and help us verify that what is agreed upon is carried out and that they accompany the process until the end of this crisis. To ensure the efficacy and the success of that mediation and avoid repeating prior errors, we suggest that its functioning be clearly defined by formal rules, which protect the proposals discussed, and that the sole spokesperson of the process be reserved for a representative of the Holy See.
Thus, we urge the political leadership of the government, the political leadership of the opposition, the distinct elements that make up each of them, as well as every collective group that does not identify with either group, to immediately undertake a search for an agreement. Venezuela—not only the country of its people but rather that of its republican history as well—needs and demands with far greater urgency an agreement and peace than an outcome imposed upon it through violence.
Political Impact of López House Arrest Still Unclear
Geoff Ramsey and David Smilde
Venezuelan opposition figure Leopoldo López’s July 8 transfer to house arrest—following more than three years in military prison—was accompanied by a flurry of speculation among Venezuela analysts over the motivations and meaning of the move. While interpretations varied, one thing remains clear: transferring Lopez to house arrest was not, as the government has insisted, merely a procedural matter that illustrates the health of checks and balances in Venezuela.
For Venezuelan pollster and political analyst Luis Vicente Leon, the move is an effort by the Maduro government to “lower the pressure” it has felt from the international community, the opposition, and from Chavistas themselves in the wake of the widely condemned July 4 attack on the National Assembly. As evidence of this, he also points to the Supreme Court’s delay in deciding whether to move forward a trial against Attorney General Luisa Ortega, as well as the court’s silence on a pending appeal of Henrique Capriles’ ban on holding public office. These, suggests Leon, could be part of the government’s attempt at jump-starting renewed talks with the opposition Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD), although he is skeptical that this will result in the kind of meaningful negotiations the opposition is seeking.
Another interpretation, from David Smilde, is that the Lopez move may actually make it easier for the government to remove Luisa Ortega from office. Since Ortega was responsible for Lopez’s prosecution for allegedly inciting violence in the 2014 wave of protests, her ouster would allow Maduro to distance itself from Lopez’s jailing, while simultaneously ridding itself of a meddlesome critic in the Attorney General’s Office. In turn, this would also allow the Maduro government to respond to criticism of Ortega’s sacking by pointing to its adherence to the Supreme Court’s Lopez decision out of respect for the “autonomy” for the court.
Other analysts have focused on the involvement of former Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, as well as the other two ex-presidents involved in UNASUR-supported talks that began last year. Opposition blogger Francisco Toro was one of the early observers to point to Zapatero’s role in the Lopez transfer, and questioned whether this heralded the emergence of further government concessions like the suspension of the Constituent Assembly initiative in exchange for a break in the more than 100 days of recent protests.
The government did release National Assembly Deputy William Azuaje for home arrest yesterday. Nevertheless, the government, meanwhile, appears to be moving full speed ahead with the July 30 election of representatives to the Constituent Assembly. Electoral officials have published a list of candidates, and announced plans to hold a practice run of the vote on the same day that the MUD is holding an unofficial referendum on Maduro’s plan to alter the 1999 Constitution.
For its part, on July 10, the opposition organized a ten hour “shutdown,” blocking major roads in Caracas and various points in major cities around the country for several hours, showing no willingness to discourage protests.
A separate, more cynical explanation for Lopez’s transfer has also been put forward in recent days. Because Capriles and Lopez have long been rivals in the opposition, some have speculated that the move is an attempt to foment disarray and disorganization inside the MUD. One Venezuela journalist even called López’s release “poisoned candy.” While Lopez has been barred from office and is not allowed to speak to journalists while under house arrest, his political ambitions have not faded: his family says he has met with members of his Voluntad Popular party since his release.
Others in the MUD, including Capriles and MUD spokesman Jesús "Chúo" Torrealba, have congratulated Lopez and supported his released, but it remains unclear how his release will affect opposition dynamics. In a potential nudge at Lopez’s past support for a more confrontational approach to the government, Torrealba told BBC Mundo he believed Lopez was more “statesmanlike” since his release and that this is what the opposition needed, rather than what he called a “messiah.”
The MUD spokesman also acknowledged Lopez’s broad popular support while encouraging a shift from past rhetoric, saying: “Probably what this country is hoping for from Leopoldo Lopez […] is not calls for a march. It is hoping for a leader that can use action and discourse to unlock the Venezuelan political crisis and allow us not to witness an ending, but to build a transition.”
So far it is not clear how active López will be given limits put on speech during home arrest—he apparently cannot tweet or do one-on-one interviews with journalists. With others such as Antonio Ledezma, this has effectively withdrawn them from Venezuela’s public sphere. López has not tweeted in over a month and has only made statements through his wife Lilian Tintori. But he has been able to talk to a number of politicians who also transmit his message.
On July 2, in an event called “The Great National Agreement,” president of the National Assembly, Julio Borges convoked a plebescite for Sunday, July 16. He based his call on articles 5, 71, 333 and 350 of the 1999 Constitution.
Borges presented a document titled “Let the people decide” (Que sea el pueblo quién decida) which contained the main points of the initiative and argued that it is “based on our Carta Magna, we want it to be the people who reject the Constituent Assembly.”
On July 5, the Plebescite was voted upon by the National Assembly. The AN agreed upon the following questions.
Do you reject or refuse to recognize the realization of a constituent assembly proposed by Nicolás Maduro without the prior approval of the people of Venezuela?
Do you demand that the Armed Forces and all public officials obey and defend the 1999 Constitution and back the decisions of the National Assembly?
Do you agree with the need to procede with the renewal of public powers in accordance with the Constitution and the realization of free and transparent elections, as well as the formation of a National Unity government to restore the Constitutional order?
The following day a number of civil society groups announced the creation of the Liberator Movement, and initiative aiming to promote the realization of the plebiscite. The movement brings together student government groups from Venezuela’s private and autonomous public universities, as well as the Engineers Association, the Lawyers Association, and NGO Foro Penal Venezolano and Broad Social Front.
Government calls plebiscite unconstitutional
Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro said any popular consultation organized outside of Venezuela’s Electoral Power is unconstitutional. He suggested that to call any kind of binding referendum or consultation it is necessary to fulfill a specific set of requirements and mechanisms.
Progovernment constitutional legal scholar Hermán Escarrá says that the plebiscite convoked by the MUD “is not contemplated in the 1999 Constitution.” Rather there is such a thing as a “consultative referendum, which is provided for by the Constitution and the procedure would be to go to the National Electoral Council (CNE) to solicit its convocation.”
Socorro Hernández, a rector of the CNE suggested that the plebiscite convoked by the opposition for July 16, will not be valid. “The ability to convoke elections, consultations, and referenda belongs to the Electoral Power. There is no other institution or facto that has this among its competencies. As such, for any consultation to be valid, it must be carried-out by the Electoral Power.”
Critical Chavismo Considers Plebiscite Legitimate
The former ombudswoman Gabriela Ramírez, along with other dissenting Chavistas, called on the people to reject Maduro’s initiative. “We are against the National Constituent Assembly and the derogation of a Constitution that we have all approved.”
Chavista National Assembly deputy Germán Ferrer, husband of the Attorney General Luisa Ortega argues that the National Assembly’s actions are entirely legitimate.
Nicmer Evans, a critical Chavista who recently withdrew from the party Marea Socialista in order to be able to try to bridge dissident Chavismo and the opposition agreed with the initiative “as long as it takes place in a transparent way,” because it is “legitimate, legal and constitutional.”
However, he is critical of the three questions which he says are not oriented towards mobililzing the participation of Chavistas. He suggested that “the three questions should be reduced to one very clear question: Do you agree with the Constitutional Assembly?”
Opposition support
Unsurprisingly, activists and opinion makers allied with the opposition have voiced vigorous support.
Alfredo Romero, Director of Foro Penal Venezolano argued that the plebiscite is a way for the people to participate directly in political decisions. “The plebiscite is a peaceful response to the Constitutional Assembly…Popular sovereignty resides with the people and the President can’t assume that soveriengty and make decisions behind the backs of the people.”
Román Duque Corredor, former justice of Venezuela’s Supreme Court (since renamed the Supreme Justice Tribunal) says the plebiscite is valid for the restitution of democratic legitimacy in the country. “As citizens we are all enabled to exercise our political rights, among those is the popular consultation, as well as a consultative referendum.”
Lawyer and former TSJ justice Jorge Rosell, who also coordinates the Front for the Defense of the Constitution and Democracy argues that the figure of a popular consultation and it does not depend on the intervention of the CNE since the latter is governed by a law inferior to the Constitution. As a result it cannot impede it. “Any citizen can organize in their community a consultation about an idea. The plebiscite is simply the act of asking people what they want.
Complications
July 16th is guaranteed to be eventful. Beyond the logistic difficulty the opposition faces in carrying out a nationwide plebiscite, the government is going to do what it can to complicate it. The CNE has already announced that it is going to use July 16 to carryout a trial run of the ANC election nationwide.
Socialist National Assembly member Pedro Carreño has also called on the TSJ to suspend the plebiscite.
Statement from Venezuelan Scholars and Activists: We All Fit Here!!
David Smilde
This week Aquí Cabemos Todos a group of scholars and activists released a diagnosis of the Venezuelan conflict and urged the construction of a space of negiotiation that includes all of Venezuela’s social and political actors. See the original Spanish version published on EfectoCocuyo.com.
WE ALL FIT HERE!!
IN DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC:
NATIONAL UNITY, NEGOTIATION, AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
Confrontation, socio-political violence, and the crisis of governability are all accelerating in Venezuela. At the same time that the precariousness of food and medicines increases, so does the systematic violation of human rights by organisms in charge of guaranteeing them, as well as by the anarchic actions of individuals, gangs and paramilitary groups, which cause pain and social indignation in the entire country, with attacks, looting and death.
Numerous international organizations and diverse sectors of national life--unions, human rights organizations, academia, education, sanitary, communitarian, religious, communicational, syndicates, etc.--have warned about the risks that this increase in violence presents. The situation has been aggravated by the government’s decision to impose, through illegal procedures and the support of the National Electoral Council, a corporatist Constituent Assembly as a resource to turn into a majority what is clearly a minority of the country, and in this way strengthening their forces with the evident political and military purposes of consolidating absolute control of state and society.
The expansion of repressive actions, exercised with pseudo-legal appearances—for example the unconstitutional and illegal aggressions and failure to respect the Attorney General and the National Assembly—worsen the divisions within Venezuelan society and contribute to the failed state we are suffering. They incentivize the emergence of a parallel state on the part of those forces that are opposed to this totalitarian project. This context could favor massive episodes of violence in the struggle for resources and territory, episodes that are difficult to control and which could overwhelm institutional measures and lead to another of the intra-state conflicts and fratricidal wars that are occuring around the world.
To this confrontation between State institutions (the Executive Branch, the Judiciary, the Comptroller's Office and the Ombudsman's Office on the one hand, and the Legislative Branch and the Attorney General’s Office on the other), we can add the multiple and diverse sectors that resist with tenacity and commitment, the militarist and authoritarian push, in the streets and in other social spaces, ranging from opposition groups and parties organized or not around the opposition coalition MUD, to dissident groups and dissident legislators and critics of Chavismo.
In this diverse and plural setting with different ideological perspectives, but also coexisting in a confrontational context that is increasingly harsh and violent, we must construct a space of negotiation, of national unity, that guarantees a pacific and democratic transition, a space that leads to conversations, understandings, and possible negotiations among all of the actors in dispute without exception, with adequate technical and international support. This effort will strengthen the Republic and lead to a necessary transition government.
Here, in this effort to construct an inclusive, democratically sustainable peace, we all fit. Together and united, those citizens who defend the principles of justice, peace, and human rights contemplated in the 1999 Constitution—which today serves as our social pact and guide for national reconstruction—are being called upon.
Arnaldo Esté, Alberto Lovera, Ignacio Avalos, José María Cadenas, Francisco Alfaro, José Virtuoso, S.J, Luis Lander, Luzmely Reyes, Margarita López Maya, María Teresa Urreiztieta, Mireya Lozada, Rafael Uzcategui, Verónica Zubillaga.
Caracas, July 6 2017
Personal and institutional adherence can be sent to: [email protected]
WOLA Denounces Further Breakdown of Rule of Law and Democratic Institutions in Venezuela
WOLA released the following statement on the latest events in Venezuela on July 7. The Spanish version is available here.
Washington, DC—On July 5, a group of armed supporters of the Venezuelan government attacked opposition lawmakers and members of the media at the National Assembly, with video evidence suggesting that the group entered with the consent of members of the Venezuelan National Guard. The attack followed an event organized in the Legislative Palace by the Maduro administration without the prior consent of the National Assembly. It is never acceptable for government officials or security forces to encourage citizen violence. Allowing such violence to be wielded against a branch of government is a violation of the separation of powers, and of the democratic sovereignty of the people. WOLA (the Washington Office on Latin America) strongly condemns the attack.
This latest violent incident comes just as the government wages a parallel assault on one of Venezuela’s last remaining independent institutions: the Attorney General’s Office. On July 4, Venezuela’s highest court heard a petition to remove Attorney General Luisa Ortega from office based on charges that she committed “grave errors” in her role as the country’s top prosecutor by denouncing the unconstitutional nature of the Maduro government’s proposed Constituent Assembly, and the illegal naming of 17 judges in December 2015. These allegations of misconduct by Ortega are baseless, and the petition and the court’s treatment of it as a criminal rather than administrative case are politically motivated. This is a clear effort to remove the Attorney General from office in response to her public criticisms of the government of President Nicolas Maduro, and the actions she has taken against its authoritarian measures.
Venezuela’s Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, TSJ) has said it will take several days to review the merits of the case against Ortega, but her ouster appears imminent. On July 3, the court annulled the National Assembly’s designation of a deputy attorney general, appointing instead a government loyalist, Katherine Harrington, who is poised to replace Ortega in the event of her removal from office.
WOLA condemns the Maduro government’s move to dislodge Ortega as a blatant effort to remove an independent official. We share the concerns of attorney generals from 10 Latin American nations (as well as Spain and Portugal) that have expressed alarm over the recent assault on Ortega, and reject any efforts to limit the autonomy and independence of her office. Under Venezuela’s 1999 Constitution, the autonomy of the Attorney General’s Office is designed precisely to serve as a check on the rest of the government.
These moves come in the context of the Maduro government’s anti-democratic and unconstitutional push for a Constituent Assembly. As we have noted before, this effort is unconstitutional insofar as it usurps the people’s exclusive right to call a Constituent Assembly through a referendum or another mechanism. Furthermore, the Constituent Assembly’s “powers of origin” will allow it to override all other branches of government. Government officials have already suggested the Constituent Assembly will disband the opposition National Assembly. It is clear that the Maduro government is using the Constituent Assembly to change the rules of the game because it knows it cannot win a fair election.
WOLA urges the Maduro government to rectify its undemocratic course and ensure the rule of law. We also urge countries in the region to communicate and work together to facilitate this rectification.
